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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines intragenerational equity for developing coastal states in transboundary 
tuna management. Intragenerational equity issues feature prominently in negotiations among 
members of intergovernmental organisations responsible for managing regional tuna stocks. 
Recent scholarship examining the performance of these organisations⎯referred to as the five 
tuna regional fisheries management organisations (TRFMOs)⎯demonstrates that disparities 
in economic development among members negatively impacts their effectiveness. This thesis 
builds on a developing thread in the TRFMO scholarship that views policy outcomes through 
the lens of distributive conflicts between developing coastal states and industrialised distant 
water fishing states.  
In order to analyse intragenerational equity for developing coastal states, this thesis examines 
legal differentiation in treaty regimes that govern TRFMOs. Legal provisions in TRFMO 
treaty regimes commonly differentiate obligations between states on the basis of their levels 
of economic development. The purpose of these differentiated legal obligations is to address 
intragenerational equity for coastal states in developing regions where the majority of 
worldwide tuna stocks are located, and in doing so support equitable and effective 
transboundary tuna management. Despite the significance and pervasiveness of these 
differentiated legal provisions, there is currently little research into how they are designed 
and applied by the TRFMOs.  
Through case studies of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC) 
and Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), this thesis examines how TRFMOs address 
intragenerational equity (conceptualised as procedural and distributive equity) through the 
application of differentiation advantaging developing coastal state members to their law and 
practice. The thesis compares and evaluates six Policy Examples of differentiation to assess 
the equitability of policy outcomes observed in each TRFMO. Across Policy Examples, the 
thesis finds that both TRFMOs fail to adequately address intragenerational equity issues for 
developing coastal state members.  
This thesis demonstrates that TRFMOs confront significant challenges to addressing 
intragenerational equity issues in their work. Differentiation in TRFMO treaty regimes does 
xii 
not capture the full scope of procedural and distributive equity issues for developing coastal 
states and is repurposed to achieve compromises in negotiations rather than equitable 
management decisions. Distributional struggles, rather than legal commitments among states, 
tend to shape (liberate or constrain) the equitability of TRFMO management decisions. To 
address these issues, the thesis proposes that it is necessary to improve current formulations 
of differentiation within TRFMO treaty regimes and to introduce new elements to the 
TRFMO management model, such as a ‘Coastal State Development Quota’, thereby ensuring 
the delivery of concrete socio-economic benefits to developing coastal states. 
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I THE GLOBAL TUNA INDUSTRY AND EQUITY FOR DEVELOPING COASTAL STATES 
Tuna fisheries contribute over 40 billion USD to the global economy each year.1 
Concentrated in the equatorial band of tropical regions, most significant tuna fisheries are 
located offshore from developing states.2 In the 1970s and 1980s, developing states gained 
resource rights to tuna fisheries after the introduction of Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) 
under the modern law of the sea regime. During this time, fisheries experts believed the new 
regime would transfer control over up to 90% of global fish stocks, including tuna, to coastal 
states—the majority of which were developing.3 EEZ and other resource rights granted under 
the new regime were expected to represent the greatest redistribution of wealth to developing 
states in the history of international law.4  
In the decade since 2010, states have seen the largest escalation of tuna catches to date. The 
largest tuna catch on record was taken in 2014.5 For seven years, the third largest catch of 
fish species has been a tuna species.6 As a result of this escalation, the United Nations Food 
and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) reports that nearly half of tuna fisheries are 
unsustainable.7 Despite the transformations heralded by the modern law of the sea regime, 
developing states have received variable economic returns from tuna resources, and in many 
cases engagement with the tuna industry has not noticeably improved their national 
development outcomes.  
Since declaring rights to tuna resources in their EEZs, many developing coastal states (DCSs) 
have pursued tuna-led economic development. However, their efforts are complicated by the 
 
1 Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management, Graeme Macfadyen, Study of the Global Estimate of the Value of 
Tuna Fisheries—Phase 3 Report (1059-GBR/R/03/D, 29 February 2016). 
2 FAO, ‘Geographical Distribution’, Biological Characteristics of Tuna (Web Page, August 2020) 
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/16082/en#Distribution>. Significant fisheries for albacore and bluefin tuna 
species are further distributed in subtropical and temperate regions: ibid.  
3 R. P. Anand, ‘The Politics of a New Legal Order for Fisheries’ (1982) 11(3/4) Ocean Development and 
International Law Journal 265, 283 (‘A New Legal Order for Fisheries’).  
4 R. P. Anand, Origin and Development of the Law of the Sea (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1983) 198−200 
(‘Origin and Development of LOS’). 
5 FAO, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture: Meeting the Sustainable Development Goals (SOFIA No 
I9540, 2018) 4 (‘SOFIA 2018’).  
6 Ibid.  
7 Ibid 6.  
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unique political economy of tuna fisheries. Under the law of the sea regime, DCSs share 
rights and obligations to tuna stocks with industrialised distant water fishing states (DWFSs)8 
that are historically responsible for the development of the tuna industry.9 Together, these 
states regulate the tuna industry through tuna regional fisheries management organisations 
(TRFMOs). This is a complex mandate, as the tuna industry is governed by multinational 
firms that oversee geographically sprawling production networks for harvesting, processing, 
trading, and retailing tuna products. Against the background of these competitive dynamics, 
DCSs have struggled to get their fair share from the tuna resources within and adjacent to 
their EEZs.  
This thesis argues that international fisheries law (IFL) enshrines the principle of equity for 
DCSs to anticipate and remedy these distributional issues in tuna fisheries. It points to 
evidence of this principle in international fisheries instruments that differentiate legal 
obligations for states on the basis of their levels of economic development. These instruments 
include the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), its implementing 
agreement, the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) and the treaty law of 
TRFMOs that conserve and manage tuna stocks.10 
This thesis examines how TRFMOs apply legal differentiation advantaging DCSs to tuna 
management decisions. In international law, legal differentiation advantages one state or 
group of states through the creation of different obligations within a treaty regime. In IFL, 
differentiated obligations advantaging DCSs address the broader objective of achieving 
effective and equitable transboundary tuna management. For example, TRFMO members are 
obliged under IFL to take into account the special requirements of DCSs in discharging their 
duty to cooperate in the conservation, management, and sustainable use of transboundary 
tuna stocks.11 TRFMOs may address this obligation through different catch and/or effort 
 
8 This thesis uses the terms ‘developing’ and ‘industrialised’ states. The reason the term ‘developed’ states is not 
used is because one major DWFS—China—is still self-designated within the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
as a developing country.  
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 397 
(entered into force 16 November 1994) arts 64, 118 (‘UNCLOS’). 
10 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995, 2167 UNTS 3 (entered into force 11 December 
2001) (‘UNFSA’). 
11 See UNCLOS (n 9) art 119(1)(a); ibid art 24.  
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allocations to DCSs for particular tuna stocks, as well as the provision of financial and 
technical assistance for capacity building activities in fisheries management. 
This thesis will demonstrate that despite being codified in law, differentiation provisions 
continue to be the source of vigorous annual debate among TRFMO members. This thesis 
studies this contestation and the conditions under which it takes place, both in terms of how 
the law is written and designed, and the broader political economic context under which 
TRFMOs apply differentiation to their management decisions.  
II BACKGROUND 
A Differentiation in International Fisheries Law 
Differentiated obligations for developing states depart from the assumption that the 
international legal system is based predominantly on reciprocal legal arrangements between 
equal sovereigns.12 Despite being an exception to typical state practice, differentiation is 
becoming more prominent, particularly in international environmental law (IEL). In 
contemporary IEL, differentiation has been used to advantage developing states in treaty 
regimes which require cooperation between industrialised and developing states.13 Given 
powerful asymmetries in perceived political power and levels of economic development, 
scholars describe differentiation as incentivising and facilitating the participation of 
developing states in solving contemporary international environmental problems.14 
Meanwhile, scholars have observed differentiation declining in other areas like international 
trade law, where industrialised states have resisted forms of differentiation that provide for 
broader commitments to economic justice for developing states.15 
 
12 Philippe Cullet, Differential Treatment in International Environmental Law (Ashgate Publishing, 2003) 15−7 
(‘Differential Treatment’).  
13 See Lavanya Rajamani, ‘The Changing Fortunes of Differential Treatment in the Evolution of International 
Environmental Law’ (2012) 88(3) International Affairs 605 (‘Differential Treatment in the Evolution of 
International Environmental Law’).  
14 Anita Halvorssen, Equity Among Unequals in International Environmental Law: Differential Treatment for 
Developing Countries (Westview Press, 1999).  
15 See Cullet, Differential Treatment (n 12) 66-7; Lavanya Rajamani, Differential Treatment in International 
Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2006) 24-31 (‘Differential Treatment in IEL’). 
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This thesis shows that differentiation advantaging DCSs is a longstanding feature of law and 
practice in transboundary tuna management.16 This thesis’ analysis of key instruments 
identifies three objectives for differentiation in IFL. These objectives are derived from treaty 
law provisions that differentiate obligations so as to directly or indirectly advantage or 
benefit DCSs.  
The first objective functions similarly to the use of differentiation in IEL. This is the 
objective of facilitating the participation of DCSs in transboundary fisheries management.17 
As in IEL, this objective is motivated by the goal of enhancing the overall effectiveness of 
transboundary fisheries management through increased cooperation between industrialised 
and developing states. It relates to multiple elements of transboundary fisheries management 
explored in this thesis, especially the need to consider the special needs, interests, and 
requirements of DCSs’, including their effective participation in management processes and 
decisions.  
The second objective for differentiation in IFL is to protect vulnerable and fisheries 
dependent populations in DCSs.18 The thesis presents evidence of IFL providing protections 
for particular populations, including small-scale, artisanal, and indigenous fishers and 
fishworkers in DCSs, as well as considerations for relevant economic and social 
factors⎯such as their dependence on tuna resources for food security⎯within these states. 
This objective also relates to a critical function of transboundary fisheries management: 
determining the distribution of the burdens and benefits of conservation actions.  
The third, and perhaps most contested, objective for differentiation in IFL is to promote 
DCSs’ access to high seas fisheries.19 The thesis provides evidence for this objective in 
recent IFL and describes related principles, such as transfer of marine technology to DCSs. 
Using these three objectives as an analytical framework, this thesis analyses how treaty 
regimes that carry out transboundary tuna management apply these objectives. 
 
16 Unless otherwise noted in this thesis, the term ‘differentiation’ refers to legal provisions advantaging DCSs. 
17 See UNCLOS (n 9) art 244(2); UNFSA (n 10) arts 24(1), 25 paras (1)(c), (2), (3), 26. 
18 See UNCLOS (n 9) arts 61(3), 62(3), 119(1)(a); UNFSA (n 10) arts 5(i), 24(2).  
19 See UNCLOS (n 9) arts 266, 268, 269; UNFSA (n 10) art 25(1) sub-paras (a), (b). 
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B Tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
The governance architecture for global tuna management is comprised of five TRFMOs. 
Each TRFMO is an intergovernmental organisation that derives its management authority 
from treaty law adopted by its members. The majority of the five TRFMOs operate in tropical 
developing regions, where the greatest concentration of commercial tuna stocks is located. 
Clustered along the equatorial band of the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans, TRFMO 
memberships primarily comprise coastal states from within these regions and fishing states 
from distant waters.20 Three TRFMOs have large memberships containing DCS majorities in 
combination with the six principal DWFS powers (China, the European Union, Japan, South 
Korea, Taiwan, and the United States). Each of the TRFMOs was established independently 
of one another by states to manage the development of industrial tuna fisheries in the 20th and 
21st centuries. Consequently, the TRFMOs emerged at different points in the historical 
development of IFL and represent a range of legal frameworks and memberships.  
Figure 1: Areas of Application of the Five TRFMOs21 
 
 
20 The five TRFMOs are the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC), the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas (ICCAT), the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), and the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC).  
21 World Ocean Review, Tim Schröder, The Future of Fish—The Fisheries of the Future (WOR No 2013) 67. 
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Despite their diversity, TRFMOs share some fundamental similarities. Each TRFMO was 
established by the entry into force of a binding legal instrument negotiated by states. The 
TRFMOs are governed by treaty regimes, which include this founding legal instrument, as 
well as treaty law comprising a rules of procedure, financial regulations, and (binding and 
non-binding) conservation and management measures. In addition, TRFMOs share a similar 
institutional structure. A primary governing body typically sits on top of a number of 
subcommittees devoted to particular areas of TRFMO work, such as science, compliance, and 
finances and administration. While TRFMOs represent a substantial degree of diversity, they 
also exhibit key structural similarities in their legal and economic characteristics. 
C Legal Differentiation within TRFMOs 
1 Overview 
Differentiation is a common feature of TRFMO treaty regimes. Reflecting the economic 
organisation of the tuna industry, TRFMO memberships typically present a diverse 
combination of states with different interests (coastal and fishing) and levels of economic 
development (developing and industrialised). In TRFMOs, differentiation has emerged to 
address these differences in their memberships and to guide areas of TRFMO work that are 
relevant to equitable fisheries management. Evidence from recent annual sessions of multiple 
TRFMOs indicates that DCSs have drawn attention to the need for these treaty organisations 
to address both procedural and substantive aspects of equitable fisheries management. These 
issues have been raised in the context of highly contested discussions on the role of 
differentiation in TRFMO law and policy. 
This thesis argues that structural similarities have resulted in the rise of differentiation within 
TRFMO treaty regimes. DCSs in these regions are numerous and diverse. Collectively, they 
often represent relatively new postcolonial governments facing a number of governance 
challenges alongside marginalisation in the global economic system. Among these states, 
many have been identified and characterised by the United Nations system as economically 
vulnerable; the majority are small vulnerable economies (SVEs), least developed countries 
(LDCs), and/or small island developing states (SIDS). By contrast, the principal DWFSs 
represent the world’s foremost industrialised economies. Most industrial-scale tuna fishing 
20 
 
vessels are built, owned, and operated by nationals from these states. Consequently, DWFSs 
have formed close historical ties with key actors in the tuna industry.  
The interplay between broader economic relations among TRFMO members and the 
collective management decisions they produce has been acknowledged, but not directly 
analysed, in the scholarly literature on TRFMOs.22 This thesis advances the premise that, as 
has been shown in other areas of international law, differentiation within TRFMOs speaks to 
underlying economic relations among TRFMO members. The thesis posits that contestation 
surrounding this class of legal provisions within TRFMOs provides insight into a 
combination of legal and economic drivers that inform state-led tuna management. 
2 Challenges 
TRFMO memberships face a number of challenges in applying differentiation to specific 
management decisions. To discuss these challenges, it is necessary to elucidate the mode of 
decision-making within most TRFMOs. The TRFMO management cycle often begins with 
scientific committees, which use the best available science to provide advice to members. 
TRFMO members then develop and propose regulatory measures on the basis of this 
scientific advice. The governing body of the TRFMO deliberates on proposed measures and 
traditionally adopts measures by consensus.  
Three key aspects of this decision-making model pose issues for TRFMO members 
attempting to apply differentiation to management decisions. The first is that TRFMO 
decision-making is currently organised around ad-hoc deliberations on short-term regulatory 
measures. The scholarship on TRFMOs has identified this decision-making modality as a 
barrier to effective transboundary tuna management.23 In response to advice from the 
scientific community, many TRFMOs have taken steps to retool their regulatory approaches 
and adopt recommended best practices. This has typically required instituting a Management 
Strategy Evaluation (MSE) process.24 Despite ongoing changes in this direction, many 
 
22 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Anthony Cox, Leonie Renwrantz, and 
Ingrid Kelling, Strengthening Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (OECD Publication, 2009).  
23 Paul de Bruyn, Hilario Murua, and Martín Aranda, ‘The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management: 
How This is Taken into Account by Tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs)’ (2013) 38 
Marine Policy 397.  
24 To describe an MSE process, it is necessary to define some fisheries management terms. A harvest strategy 
(also called a management procedure) is based on pre-agreed management objectives, which set out goals for the 
fish stock and associated fishery, and indicators for achieving these goals. Harvest strategies typically involve 
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TRFMOs continue to adopt regulatory measures based on ad-hoc scientific advice for periods 
of one to three years.  
While it is less discussed in the literature, this lack of a long-term, systematic approach to 
decision-making also obstructs equitable transboundary tuna management. In the absence of a 
more structured approach to the adoption of regulatory measures, most TRFMOs base their 
management decisions on negotiations during annual sessions of their governing body. This 
means that decisions on how to apply differentiation are often negotiated⎯and typically 
agreed as a concession⎯in deliberations on proposed regulatory measures. This process 
results in the patchwork application of differentiation to TRFMO regulatory measures. 
The second issue with this model is that TRFMO decision-making typically requires 
consensus among TRFMO members. While many TRFMO treaty regimes provide for voting 
procedures, TRFMOs generally seek to operate by consensus. A consensus-based approach to 
management decisions requires TRFMO members to remain flexible in their negotiating 
positions and produce policy outcomes that all members perceive as legitimate.25 In the 
context of more sensitive areas of TRFMO work, which at times produce differing 
interpretations of treaty law among members, consensus-based decision-making may either 
produce a lowest common-denominator policy outcome or⎯worse⎯hamstring agreement 
altogether.26 As will be shown, differentiation is often formulated within TRFMO treaty 
regimes in language with a substantial degree of ambiguity. Combined with differences 
 
setting reference points and a harvest control rule. Two types of reference points⎯a limit reference point (LRP) 
and target reference point (TRP)⎯are critical. An LRP is a biological indicator for the stock, whereas a TRP is 
(generally) an economic indicator for the fishery⎯both are based on levels of fishing mortality and stock 
biomass. An LRP defines the (undesirable) point at which a stock requires immediate management 
action⎯generally fisheries managers avoid approaching LRP. A TRP sets the (desirable) point at which a stock 
can support long-term, sustainable exploitation and provide optimum catch levels. A harvest control rule (HCR) 
provides fisheries managers a pre-agreed rule for determining how much of a stock will be harvested based on 
its status. Finally, a management strategy evaluation (MSE) process enables fisheries managers to simulate and 
compare multiple potential harvest strategies according to their management objectives. For an explanation of 
MSEs in tuna fisheries, see PEW, Management Strategy Evaluation (Fact Sheet, 18 November 2016) 
<https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2019/07/harvest-strategies/hs_mse_update.pdf>. See also Shuya 
Nakatsuka, ‘Management Strategy Evaluation in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations—How to 
Promote Robust Fisheries Management in International Settings’ (2017) 18 Fisheries Research 127, 127−8. 
25 This thesis refers to TRFMO ‘policy outcomes’ rather than ‘management outcomes’. This distinction 
highlights the difference between TRFMO policy outcomes, produced through management decisions, and tuna 
management outcomes, which are the material effects of management decisions on tuna stocks and fisheries.  
26 Robin Allen, ‘International Management of Tuna Fisheries: Arrangements, Challenges and a Way Forward’ 
(FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper No 536, 2010) 8. 
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among members as to the perceived legality of differentiation provisions, this ambiguity 
leads to extensive negotiations on how TRFMOs apply differentiation to regulatory measures.  
The third issue is that TRFMO decision-making is almost wholly informed by biological 
data. While many TRFMO treaty regimes have provisions that point to the need to consider 
relevant social and economic conditions related to the management of tuna stocks, many 
TRFMOs have yet to collect this information. Therefore, there is currently limited provision 
of socio-economic data within TRFMOs to inform the application of differentiation to 
management decisions. This contributes to the status quo: most TRFMOs apply 
differentiation in the heat of negotiations, without an informed and systematic approach to 
integrating socio-economic considerations into their management decisions. 
3 Emerging Trends  
Emerging trends across the five TRFMOs indicate that differentiation will play a central role 
in future transboundary tuna management. The first of these trends has already been 
mentioned: most TRFMOs are currently undergoing a shift towards longer-term modes of 
decision-making. This shift has induced TRFMO members to adopt MSE processes and to 
initiate negotiations on the development of long-term allocation systems. While critical, 
many of these processes are ongoing.  
Two core aspects of this shift are currently the subject of difficult negotiations within 
TRFMOs. These are identifying and defining: (i) management objectives and (ii) allocation 
criteria. While framed by IFL principles, these two aspects of long-term TRFMO decision-
making continue to be subject to heated negotiations. DCSs have argued that these decisions 
must incorporate their special interests in regional tuna stocks through the application of 
differentiation. This thesis predicts that the systematic application of differentiation within 
the context of longer-term modes of decision-making is likely to become a core issue for 
TRFMOs in the future.  
Another trend implicating differentiation within TRFMOs is the potential role for tuna stocks 
in coastal food security and livelihoods under future climate change scenarios. Recent 
research suggests that tuna stocks may play an essential role in the future food security of 
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coastal populations in Pacific Island countries (PICs).27 This research is associated with 
studies that project management scenarios under which climate change impacts have 
substantially reduced tuna stocks and shifted their migrations.28 As tuna resources diminish, 
TRFMOs will play a critical role in how the fallout from climate change impacts are 
managed. Under these management conditions, DCSs (and SIDS in particular) will require 
TRFMOs to consider differentiation in light of their particular vulnerabilities to climate 
change impacts and the need to secure coastal food security and livelihoods.  
Finally, recent developments in international law concerning the high seas may impact future 
TRFMO management processes. Since 2017, the UN has convened negotiations under 
UNCLOS for an international, legally binding instrument to protect biological diversity in 
areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ).29 At the outset of negotiations, states agreed that 
the new instrument would not undermine existing institutional arrangements, including 
sectoral bodies such as the TRFMOs.30 Crespo et al argue that ‘This has generally been 
assumed to mean that the new instrument should complement and strengthen the existing 
framework and prevent the adoption of weaker or dissonant management measures’.31 
However, a minority of states continue to argue for the exclusion of commercial fisheries 
from the BBNJ instrument, voicing concerns that it will undermine the existing governance 
architecture of fisheries management bodies.32  
It remains to be seen whether the adoption of a BBNJ instrument will enhance TRFMO 
obligations under UNFSA to monitor and manage the impacts of high seas fishing activities 
on associated, dependent, and ecosystem-related species. Scholars have noted that legal and 
 
27 Johann Bell et al, ‘Diversifying the Use of Tuna to Improve Food Security and Public Health in Pacific Island 
Countries and Territories’ (2015) 51 Marine Policy 584. 
28 Inna Senina et al, Impact of Climate Change on Tropical Tuna Species and Tuna Fisheries in Pacific Island 
Waters and High Seas Areas (SPC-Conservation International Report for FAO Common Oceans ABNJ 
Program, No CI-3, 7 September 2018).  
29 See International Legally Binding Instrument Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on 
the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biological Diversity of Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction, 
GA Res 72/249, UN Doc A/RES/72/249 (19 January 2018).  
30 Ibid para 7. See also Zoe Scanlon, ‘The Art of “Not Undermining”: Possibilities with Existing Architecture to 
Improve Environmental Protections in Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2018) 75(1) ICES Journal of 
Marine Science 405.  
31 Guillermo Crespo et al, ‘High-Seas Fish Biodiversity is Slipping through the Governance Net’ (2019) 3 
Nature Ecology and Evolution 1273, 1273.  
32 Ibid. The legal and institutional implications of a possible BBNJ instrument and existing RFMOs has also 
been explored by scholars. See, eg, Dire Tladi, ‘The Proposed Implementing Agreement: Options for Coherence 
and Consistency in the Establishment of Protected Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2015) 30 The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 654.  
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institutional changes ushered in by a possible BBNJ instrument could result in the adoption of 
more robust and precautionary management measures by TRFMOs.33 These measures could 
in turn alter the extent and distribution of high seas tuna resources accessed by states. 
Notably, negotiations for a BBNJ instrument have taken place under broader shifts in 
discourse on the importance of equity for developing states.34 Developing states have made 
clear that their capacity and development concerns must be addressed in order to adopt a 
BBNJ instrument.35 Consequently, differentiation may have a future role to play in mediating 
the effects of a BBNJ instrument on the ways TRFMOs address the special interests and 
needs of developing members within the context of a shifting landscape for ocean 
governance.  
III RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis is based on two premises: that IFL supports the broad objective of equitable 
transboundary fisheries management; and that, in the case of tuna, this objective is to be 
achieved through TRFMOs applying policies that use differentiation to advantage DCSs. 
Both of these premises are evidenced in IFL and current state practice within TRFMOs. Over 
the past decade, differentiation has developed into a critical feature of TRFMO treaty 
regimes. Emerging trends suggest that the role for differentiation within TRFMOs will only 
become more significant in the future.  
As scholars have observed in other areas of international law, the application of 
differentiation is often highly contested among states in TRFMOs. In the context of 
transboundary tuna fisheries, differentiation touches upon sensitive issues for all TRFMO 
members, including procedural issues, such as the ability of DCSs to finance their 
participation in TRFMO management processes, and substantive issues, such as the 
allocation of tuna fishing rights among members.  
 
33 Crespo et al (n 31) 1276. 
34 Biliana Cicin-Sain et al, Capacity Development as a Key Aspect of a New International Agreement on Marine 
Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (Policy Brief, August 2018).  
35 Earth Negotiations Bulletin, Tallash Kantai et al, ‘Summary of the Third Session of the Intergovernmental 
Conference (IGC) on the Conservation and Sustainable Use of Marine Biodiversity of Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction: 19−30 August 2019’ (ENB Summary Report No 218, 2 September 2019).  
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To provide a fuller account of how TRFMOs design and apply differentiation, and the forces 
which underwrite this process, the thesis employs an interdisciplinary approach which 
integrates perspectives from the fields of international law and political economy. Ultimately, 
these perspectives enable the thesis to address multiple understandings of legal decision-
making among states. Within the TRFMO context, this means describing differentiation in 
light of its function as mediating the legal and economic relations between DCSs and 
DWFSs.  
The primary aim of this thesis is to describe how TRFMOs design and apply differentiation. 
Its secondary aim is to explain how the application of differentiation is underwritten by 
political-economic relations between DCSs and DWFSs in TRFMO memberships. The third 
aim is to determine whether the application of differentiation advantaging DCSs has 
manifested in equitable TRFMO policy outcomes.  
IV RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
To develop practitioner and scholarly understandings of how TRFMOs might improve their 
approach to equity issues associated with transboundary tuna management, this research 
examines how TRFMOs design and apply legal differentiation through the following research 
questions: 
1 Primary Research Questions 
(i) How do TRFMOs use legal differentiation to respond to equity issues for 
DCSs? 
(ii) How is differentiation articulated in IFL and TRFMO treaty law?  
2 Secondary Research Questions 
(iii) What other factors might be responsible for shaping the equitability of 
TRFMO policy outcomes? 
(iv) How might the economic interests of DCSs and DWFSs in tuna fisheries 
shape how TRFMOs apply differentiation to management decisions? 
3 Tertiary Research Questions 
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(v) Does the use of differentiation produce equitable TRFMO policy outcomes for 
DCSs? 
(vi) Does the application of differentiation respond to procedural and distributive 
equity issues for DCSs within TRFMOs? 
(vii) How might TRFMOs improve their approach to equity issues for DCSs? 
V RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis examines how TRFMOs approach equity issues for DCSs through the design and 
application of differentiation to TRFMO policy. Positioned in relation to a sparse yet robust 
literature on equity issues in transboundary tuna management, this thesis addresses both 
descriptive and evaluative objectives. On the one hand, it sets out to conceptualise equity 
issues in TRFMOs by describing differentiation in IFL and TRFMO treaty law. On the other, 
it evaluates the extent to which the application of differentiation to TRFMO policy produces 
equitable outcomes for DCSs. These objectives are housed in an empirically grounded 
research design, largely as a result of the lack of both theoretical conceptualisation and 
empirical studies on equity issues in TRFMOs.36 The reality is that, in contrast to numerous 
studies describing their effectiveness, little scholarly research has been published on the 
equitability of TRFMO policies.  
A Conceptualising Intragenerational Equity within TRFMOs 
This thesis focuses on intragenerational equity within TRFMOs to examine distributive 
conflicts at the forefront of negotiating conditions for TRFMO members. Intragenerational 
equity in international law refers to economic and environmental justice for developing 
states. It emanates from early IEL instruments and is core to the concept of sustainable 
development.37 It is distinguished from other notions of equity, such as intergenerational 
 
36 Methodologically, this thesis adopts a constructivist perspective that views states (TRFMO members) and the 
structures in which they operate (TRFMOs and the global tuna industry) as mutually constitutive: Alexander E 
Wendt, ‘The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory’ (1987) 41(3) International 
Organization 335; Audie Klotz and Cecelia Lynch, Strategies for Research in Constructivist International 
Relations (ME Sharpe, 2007). However, it addresses contradictions often observed in constructivist research 
epistemology and methods through empirically grounded methods (participant-observation and document 
analysis) that analyse TRFMO members’ legal obligations (commitments to differentiation in treaty law) and 
management decisions (application of differentiation to regulatory measures). See Vogler’s description of 
‘institutional-constructivism’: John Vogler, ‘Taking Institutions Seriously: How Regime Analysis Can be 
Relevant to Multilevel Environmental Governance’ (2003) 3(2) Global Environmental Politics 25, 27, 33−5. 
37 See, e.g., Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, UN Doc 
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 (16 June 1972), Principles 11−12 (‘Stockholm Declaration’); Rio Declaration on 
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equity, in that it represents justice for present generations.38 Intragenerational equity 
identifies the need for states to equitably distribute the burdens and benefits of environmental 
protection and resource management.39 In the TRFMO context, intragenerational equity 
describes justice for DCSs with respect to how shared tuna resources are managed and how 
the economic benefits from these resources are distributed.40  
This thesis conceptualises intragenerational equity within TRFMOs from both legal and 
normative perspectives. First, the thesis conceptualises intragenerational equity according to 
what states have committed to under treaty law. This legal conceptualisation refers to 
provisions in IFL and TRFMO treaty law that differentiate obligations to advantage DCSs. 
Developed by scholars of international environmental treaty regimes, analyses of 
differentiation draw attention to the particular ways in which legal provisions that advantage 
developing states provide for intragenerational equity within treaty regimes.41 Furthermore, 
this legal framing of intragenerational equity articulates a set of standards which TRFMO 
members are legally obliged to address.  
Second, the thesis’ normative conceptualisation of intragenerational equity encompasses 
procedural and distributive equity for DCSs. Inspired by research into the function of 
‘fairness’ in treaty regimes, this thesis views normative understandings of intragenerational 
equity through the lens of TRFMO members’ perceptions and expectations.42 Therefore, 
procedural equity is defined as members’ perceptions of ‘right process’ and distributive 
equity as members’ expectations of a just distribution of burdens and benefits.43 Procedural 
 
Environment and Development, UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1(Vol.I), annex I (14 June 1992), Principles 3−4, 
6−7 (‘Rio Declaration’). See also ‘Introduction’ in Alan Boyle and David Freestone (eds), International Law 
and Sustainable Development: Past Achievements and Future Challenges (Oxford University Press, 1999) 1, 
15. 
38 See Dinah Shelton, ‘Equity’ in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The Oxford Handbook 
of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, 2008) 640, 641−3. 
39 Duncan A. French, ‘International Environmental Law and the Achievement of Intragenerational Equity’ 
(2001) 31(5) Environmental Law Reporter News & Analysis 10469, 10479. 
40 Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘The Challenge of Sustainable High Seas Fisheries’ in Nico Schrijver and Friedl Weiss 
(eds), International Law and Sustainable Development: Principles and Practice (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2004) 467, 482−3. 
41 Cullet and Rajamani both associate differentiation with the realisation of substantive equality (that is, 
intragenerational equity) for developing states. See Cullet, Differential Treatment (n 12) 15, 29; Rajamani, 
Differential Treatment in IEL (n 15) 7.  
42 Thomas Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford University Press, 1995) 7−9. See also 
Oran R. Young, ‘Does Fairness Matter in International Environmental Governance? Creating an Effective and 
Equitable Climate Regime’ in Todd L. Cherry, Jon Hovi and David M. McEvoy (eds), Toward a New Climate 
Agreement: Conflict, Resolution and Governance (Routledge, 2014) 16.  
43 Franck (n 42) 7.   
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equity for DCSs refers to their effective participation in tuna management activities 
(scientific research and MCS) and deliberative processes (attendance to and negotiating 
capacity within TRFMO meetings). Distributive equity for DCSs refers to their increased 
access to and preferential allocations of tuna resources. These understandings of procedural 
and distributive equity for DCSs reflect their differential capacities, needs, and interests with 
respect to participation in tuna management processes and deriving concrete economic 
benefits from tuna resources.  
B Selection of Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission Case Studies 
The Western Pacific and Indian Oceans are home to the two largest and most valuable fishing 
grounds in the world. This thesis is designed as a comparative case study of two TRFMOs 
with mandates in these fisheries: the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC)44 and Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)45. This thesis assumes that 
TRFMOs frequently encounter equity issues in their work because their memberships 
comprise majorities of DCSs and minorities of DWFSs. Furthermore, a comparative analysis 
of developing regions was elected to provide a combination of descriptive depth in each case 
study and evaluative insights across the two TRFMOs.  
The WCPFC and IOTC were selected for their similarities and differences, as well as the 
pragmatic decision to select TRFMOs of which Australia is a member. Both TRFMOs have 
mandates in developing regions and possess large memberships, the majority of which are 
 
44 WCPFC member states are: Australia, China, Canada, Cook Islands, the EU, Federated States of Micronesia 
(FSM), Fiji, France, Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, South Korea, Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI), Nauru, New 
Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea (PNG), Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Taiwan, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
the US, and Vanuatu. Participating Territories are: American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands, French 
Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Tokelau, and Wallis and Futuna. Cooperating Non-Members are Curacao, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Liberia, Thailand, and Vietnam: WCPFC, About WCPFC (Web 
Page, 2020) <https://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc> (‘WCPFC Website’). 
45 IOTC members are: Australia, Bangladesh, China, Comoros, Eritrea, the EU, France (Overseas Territories), 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kenya, South Korea, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, 
Thailand, UK (British Indian Ocean Overseas Territories), and Yemen. Cooperating Non-Members are Liberia 
and Senegal. Taiwan is considered an ‘invited expert’ by the IOTC: IOTC, Structure of the Commission (Web 
Page, 2020) <https://www.iotc.org/about-iotc/structure-commission> (‘IOTC Website’). 
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DCSs. Both were established under the modern law of the sea regime, after the entry into 
force of UNCLOS in 1994. 
The WCPFC and IOTC also differ in subtle, though important, ways. One difference is the 
legal frameworks under which they operate, which reflect the distinct historical and 
institutional contexts in which they were adopted.46 The WCPFC is younger than the IOTC 
by nearly a decade. The IOTC Agreement was negotiated under the auspices of the FAO in 
1993. Negotiated contemporaneously with the adoption of UNFSA, the IOTC Agreement was 
based on general principles in UNCLOS, rather than modern principles for transboundary 
fisheries management introduced by UNFSA.47 Conversely, the WCPF Convention, adopted 
in 2000, was the first TRFMO to model itself on provisions in UNFSA.48 The WCPFC is also 
an intergovernmental organisation independent of the UN system. 
The historical development of tuna fisheries management in both regions also differs. 
Whereas the WCPFC was established after nearly three decades of access relations between 
PICs and DWFSs (including a critical period of regional and subregional institutional 
development within the region), tuna management arrangements in the IO were relatively 
absent prior to the establishment of the IOTC.49 As a result of these differences, the WCPFC 
possesses a more modern and developed legal framework than the IOTC. The IOTC has 
 
46 The WCPFC convened its first meeting in 2004 after states adopted the WCPF Convention in 2000: 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean, opened for signature 5 September  2000, 2275 UNTS 43 (entered into force 19 June 2004) 
(‘WCPF Convention’). By comparison, the IOTC began operations in 1996 after the IOTC Agreement was 
adopted in 1993: Agreement for the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, opened for signature 
25 November 1993, 1927 UNTS 329 (entered into force 27 March 1996) (‘IOTC Agreement’). 
47 Negotiations for UNFSA occurred between 1993 and 1995—in the period after the IOTC Agreement was 
adopted. The timing of negotiations for the two instruments produced a situation whereby the IOTC Agreement 
lacked references to the reforms heralded by UNFSA. See JJ Kambona and SH Marashi, Process for the 
Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (FAO Fisheries Circular No 913, 1996). Allen describes 
the novel principles for transboundary tuna management codified in UNFSA, which among others, include the 
application of the precautionary approach, ecosystem-based management, and the elimination of overfishing and 
excess fishing capacity. Most importantly, UNFSA identifies (T)RFMOs as the primary mode of cooperation 
among states in transboundary fisheries like tuna: Allen (n 26) 3−4.  
48 See Sandra Tarte, ‘The Convention for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 
the WCPO: Implementation Challenges from a Historical Perspective’ in Quentin Hanich and Martin Tsamenyi 
(eds), Navigating Pacific Fisheries: Legal and Policy Trends in the Implementation of International Fisheries 
Instruments in the Western and Central Pacific Region (Ocean Publications, Australian National Centre for 
Ocean Resources and Security, 2009) 204. 
49 See Chapter 4, Section III, C2. 
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identified this issue and, for over a decade, members have discussed potential revisions to its 
legal framework.50  
Finally, the WCPO and IO tuna fisheries present a potentially significant juxtaposition of 
political geographies. The WCPO tuna fishery almost entirely supplies industrial fishing 
operations, while the IO tuna fishery sources a combination of artisanal, semi-industrial, and 
industrial fishing fleets. The majority of the WCPO tuna fishery—up to 80% of tuna 
resources—falls under the jurisdiction of PICs.51 By contrast, while less fine-grained data is 
published about the distribution of the IO tuna fishery, it is widely agreed that regional tuna 
resources are roughly divided between areas under the jurisdiction of Indian Ocean countries 
(IOCs) and high seas.52 Culturally, both regions differ in the level of shared regional identity 
among DCSs. Whereas PICs in the WCPO have built collective political organisations that 
refer to a shared ‘Oceania’ identity, IOCs come from a diverse representation of cultures 
(from East Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia) and exhibit limited political cohesion.   
The similarities and differences between the two TRFMOs and tuna fisheries thus offer a rich 
opportunity to explore multiple strands of analysis. The case studies were selected on the 
basis of expository research showing similarly fraught relations between DCSs and DWFSs. 
In line with this preliminary observation, it was expected that these conflicted relations would 
manifest in equity issues for transboundary tuna management. Beyond this fundamental 
similarity, the thesis compares both TRFMOs to investigate how differences in legal 
frameworks, tuna fisheries, and political geographies may reveal factors that influence how 
TRFMOs approach equity issues and the extent to which their policy outcomes are equitable. 
C Sources and Data Collection 
The sources used in this thesis include both primary and secondary texts. Primary sources 
comprise international legal instruments and publicly available documents associated with 
their negotiating histories; reports and meeting summaries published on the public webpages 
 
50 See IOTC, Terje Lobach, Analysis of the IOTC Agreement, IOTC-2015-PRIOTC02-04, 2nd sess IOTC 
Performance Review Panel, 30 January 2015.   
51 WCPFC, Peter Williams and Chris Reid, Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the WCPO Including Economic 
Conditions−2017, WCPFC-TCC14-2018-IP05, 14th reg sess, 5 August 2018 (‘Overview of WCPO Tuna 
Fisheries 2017’). 
52 IOTC, Review of the Statistical Data and Fishery Trends for Tropical Tunas, IOTC-2018-WPTT20-08, 20th 
reg sess of WPTT, 16 October 2018 (‘IOTC Review of Data and Trends for Tropical Tunas’). 
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of the WCPFC and IOTC; and publicly available catch and effort data for the WCPO and IO. 
Catch and effort data are derived from reporting available on the public facing websites of 
both TRFMOs, as well as other regional development organisations.  
Secondary sources include white and grey literature on equity in international law, legal 
differentiation, and TRFMOs. Political economic data on the global tuna industries, as well as 
the WCPO and IO regional tuna industries, have also been used extensively. This thesis does 
not provide original political-economic analysis but calls on existing analyses to inform its 
examination of equity issues in TRFMOs and their relationship to members’ economic 
interests in tuna fisheries. 
D Event Ethnographies of the WCPFC and IOTC: Fieldwork and Interviews 
Fieldwork and interviews at the annual meeting of each TRFMO were conducted as part of 
the research for this thesis. Two ‘event ethnographies’ helped explore live equity issues for 
DCS members within the WCPFC and IOTC.53 These issues informed the selection of 
comparative Policy Examples (described in Chapters 6 and 7), which were used to examine 
how each TRFMO applied differentiation. Access to interview participants and immersion 
within the TRFMO decision-making context were key to this work. Participant-observation 
on a government delegation and anonymity for interview participants were therefore critical 
elements of fieldwork. Furthermore, establishing and maintaining rapport with interview 
participants led to choices not to include direct quotations in this thesis and to provide and 
modify written transcripts of interviews in correspondence with interview participants.  
Ethnographic methods are relatively new to the fields of international law and relations.54 
Scholars have explored ethnographic methods as part of broader methodological arguments 
advancing a constructivist perspective of organisations like the TRFMOs and the treaty law 
 
53 For an overview of event ethnography (also called ‘collaborative event ethnography’ in reference to research 
teams), see Lisa M. Campbell et al, ‘Studying Global Environmental Meetings to Understand Global 
Environmental Governance: Collaborative Event Ethnography at the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity’ (2014) 14(3) Global Environmental Politics 1. See also generally Clifford 
Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’ in The Interpretation of Cultures (Basic 
Books, 1973) 3. 
54 See Wanda Vrasti, ‘The Strange Case of Ethnography and International Relations’ (2008) 37(2) Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 279.  
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they produce.55 Constructivists view states and the structures in which they operate as 
mutually constitutive.56 Constructivism also views policymaking outcomes through the lens 
of inter-subjective understandings established among policymakers.57 An even newer 
methodological development has been the introduction of ‘event ethnography’, which enables 
teams of researchers to conduct ethnographies at intergovernmental meetings to produce 
deeper understandings (‘thick descriptions’ in ethnographic terms) of how delegates frame, 
discuss, debate, and contest problems to produce negotiating outcomes.58 The use of event 
ethnography draws from work that acknowledges the significance of the social context 
operating within intergovernmental meetings.59 It also pushes back against the use of 
ethnographies to address more critical analyses of IR and instead focuses on the way 
government delegations address problems and produce outcomes at individual meetings.60 
Thus, event ethnography enables researchers to generate thick descriptions of interstate 
negotiations and provides explanatory value for understanding how negotiation outcomes are 
reached.  
Fieldwork was undertaken in 2017 at WCPFC and IOTC annual sessions. Approval for 
fieldwork and semi-structured interviews was received from the University of Tasmania 
Social Science Human Research Ethics Committee.61 Participant observation was carried out 
at the 21st Annual Session of the IOTC in Yogyakarta, Indonesia in May 2017 and the 14th 
Regular Session of the WCPFC from November to December 2017. The researcher attended 
both meetings as a non-governmental observer on the Australian delegation. This included 
attendance to pre-meetings arranged by DCSs caucusing prior to the annual sessions, as well 
as meetings of working groups, subsidiary bodies, and technical committees convened prior 
to, and alongside annual sessions. The researcher’s fieldwork produced over 100 pages of 
fieldnotes and daily audio journal recordings. 
 
55 See Vincent Pouliot, ‘“Sobjectivism”: Toward a Constructivist Methodology’ (2007) 51 International Studies 
Quarterly 359. 
56 See above (n 36).  
57 Ibid.  
58 J. Peter Brosius and Lisa M. Campbell, ‘Collaborative Event Ethnography: Conservation and Development 
Trade-offs at the Fourth World Conservation Congress’ (2010) 8(4) Conservation and Society 245.  
59 Ibid 247.  
60 Joseph MacKay and Jamie Levin, ‘Hanging Out in International Politics: Two Kinds of Explanatory Political 
Ethnography for IR’ (2015) 17 International Studies Review 163, 165−78.  
61 Human Research Ethics Committee (Tasmania) Network, Between Paper and Practice: The Role of Legal 




Semi-structured interviews were conducted with 22 participants. This encompassed 14 
participants at the IOTC annual session and eight participants at the WCPFC annual session. 
The researcher leveraged the presence of meeting participants in the margins of both annual 
sessions to gain access to interviewees.62 All interviewees (excluding one) chose to remain 
anonymous. Interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed, and approved in online 
correspondence with participants. In two cases, remote interviews were carried out by phone 
with fisheries management professionals.63 Interviews were semi-structured and therefore 
covered a range of topics relevant to the thesis. Interviews were loosely organised around 
questions that were both comparable across the two TRFMOs and particular to the WCPFC 
and IOTC. The flexibility of the interview format allowed the researcher to locate and obtain 
the most information from interview participants based on their expertise and experience.  
E Thesis Limitations 
This thesis is limited in several important ways by its analytical scope. First, due to time and 
resource constraints, it does not include an analysis of all TRFMOs; it excludes a comparable 
TRFMO, ICCAT. This omission may provide an avenue for future research in this vein, 
discussed in the Conclusion.64 
In addition, the fieldwork and interviews that informed this thesis were carried out in the 
context of one annual session for each TRFMO. While Policy Examples generally spanned 
multiple years of negotiations, the researcher was only able to observe negotiations in 2017. 
Although interviews, TRFMO meeting reports, and news publications were used to 
triangulate the researcher’s impression of negotiations in other years, this posed a possible 
limitation.  
The study is also premised on the current state of knowledge derived from recently published 
political-economic analyses and data on tuna fisheries. However, the quantity and quality of 
 
62 Practical considerations, as well as the objective of gaining access to interview participants, informed the 
researcher’s choice to engage in participant observation in the annual sessions as an observer on a government 
delegation. See Kenneth Goldstein, ‘Getting in the Door: Sampling and Completing Elite Interviews’ (2002) 
35(4) Political Science and Politics 669; Asif Efrat, ‘Cross-National Interviewing at International Conferences: 
How to Make the Most of a Unique Research Opportunity’ (2015) 16 International Studies Perspectives 302.  
63 These interviews provided points of clarification for TRFMO policy issues relevant to the thesis and were 
therefore not transcribed.  
64 See Conclusion Section IV B.  
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publications available for the WCPO and IO regions are not evenly distributed. There is a 
greater number of robust studies on the political economy of the WCPO tuna fishery, most 
likely as a result of the greater availability of fisheries and economic data on the region. 
While the WCPO tuna fishery is better studied, this thesis attempts to provide parity where 
possible by examining equivalent themes with respect to the political economy of both tuna 
fisheries. This presents a potential limitation for the thesis, which, again, does not contain any 
original political-economic analyses or data.  
Finally, the scope of the thesis remains fixed on the behaviour of states in TRFMO 
negotiations concerning differentiation. State behaviour is considered in light of political-
economic factors, which invariably concern non-state actors. While non-state actors, 
including firms, industry associations, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) engage 
in TRFMO negotiations and are likely to inform the negotiating positions of TRFMO 
members, their behaviour falls outside the analytical scope of this thesis.   
F Thesis Contribution 
Despite the growing significance of differentiation in the field, there is limited understanding 
in the scholarly literature on transboundary tuna management about differentiation and 
relevant state practice within TRFMOs. Most importantly, there is currently no systematic 
study of how TRFMOs design and apply differentiation to tuna management; what conditions 
and/or factors shape this application; and whether the rise of differentiation has produced 
equitable outcomes within TRFMOs. This thesis addresses this knowledge gap. More than 
filling a gap regarding the application of a narrow class of legal provisions, this thesis 
examines the additional economic and institutional dimensions associated with 
differentiation.  
The central contribution of the study is a detailed, empirically grounded analysis of how 
TRFMOs respond to equity issues for DCSs in their work. The study extends a growing body 
of literature on equity issues in transboundary tuna management and addresses the dearth of 
empirical data on current practices within TRFMOs.  
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Second, this thesis provides the first analysis of differentiation in IFL. While general surveys 
of differentiation have included IFL instruments,65 this is the first attempt to systematically 
articulate differentiation advantaging DCSs in key binding IFL instruments, as well as the 
treaty law of two TRFMOs.  
Finally, this thesis offers a constructivist methodology that synthesises research themes in 
multiple disciplines, including international law and political economy. The study reveals that 
inquiry concerning equity issues among states in resource sharing regimes such as the 
TRFMOs provides a rare opportunity to weave together questions concerning the role of legal 
obligations in interstate negotiations and the economic forces that inform state behaviour.  
VI THESIS ROADMAP 
This thesis employs a comparative, interdisciplinary approach to its examination of 
intragenerational equity within TRFMOs. This approach entails legal analyses of 
differentiation in treaty law, as well as political economy accounts of the economic interests 
that motivate member states within TRFMO negotiations. The thesis ultimately draws these 
strands together to formulate an in-depth description of how the WCPFC and IOTC currently 
address intragenerational equity for DCS members.  
To accomplish this, the thesis is divided into three Parts, which correspond with the primary, 
secondary, and tertiary research questions asked in Section IV. Part I backgrounds the thesis’ 
inquiry into equity for DCSs in transboundary fisheries. This requires setting out a legal 
policy analysis of differentiation in IFL and the treaty regimes of the WCPFC and IOTC. Part 
II examines the ways states operate as economic actors within tuna production and how this 
informs negotiating dynamics within the WCPFC and IOTC. Part III analyses Policy 
Examples to determine how the WCPFC and IOTC apply differentiation to management 
decisions. Drawing from this analysis, it assesses the equitability of the negotiating outcomes 
in these Policy Examples and points to possible improvements to how the WCPFC and IOTC 
approach equity issues for DCS members.  
 
65 See, e.g., Rajamani, Differential Treatment in IEL (n 15) 109. 
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Part I is comprised of Chapters 1 and 2 and responds to the thesis’ primary research 
questions. Chapter 1 provides a literature review of fisheries management studies on TRFMO 
performance and backgrounds key concepts in the thesis, such as equity among states, legal 
differentiation, and global production networks. Chapter 2 describes the origins and 
development of differentiation in both broader international law and IFL. It shows that over 
time, differentiation in IFL has shifted away from being associated with redistributive justice 
for developing states and towards focused assistance that enables DCSs to participate in 
transboundary fisheries and their management. It then sets out a legal policy analysis of 
differentiation in IFL and the treaty law of the WCPFC and IOTC. This legal policy analysis 
establishes evidence for the three main objectives for differentiation in IFL. It demonstrates 
that these objectives address both procedural and distributive equity for DCSs. It also sets out 
‘differentiation frameworks’ within WCPFC and IOTC treaty law.  
Part II concerns Chapters 3, 4, and 5, all of which relate to the thesis’ secondary research 
questions. These questions explore political economic factors that shape how TRFMOs apply 
differentiation to management decisions. Chapter 3 outlines the political economy of the 
global tuna industry. It shows how firms, states, and TRFMOs are imbricated in distributional 
struggles for value capture within tuna production chains. Chapters 4 and 5 provide 
overviews of how WCPFC and IOTC members are engaged in regional tuna production. The 
chapters introduce interference and cooperative strategies that have been employed by 
DWFSs and DCSs respectively to advantage their interests through the WCPFC and IOTC.  
Part II demonstrates that TRFMOs are part of environmental conditions that impact on the 
economic interests of actors within tuna production. This consequently implicates TRFMOs 
in distributional struggles between DCSs and DWFSs. Chapter 3 identifies two common 
distributional struggles within TRFMOs that affect distributive and procedural equity for 
DCSs. These are: (i) region-wide allocations and (ii) funding for the effective participation of 
DCS members, respectively. These chapters conclude that distributional struggles between 
DCSs and DWFSs are likely to influence how the WCPFC and IOTC address equity issues 
for DCS members and apply differentiation to their management decisions.  
Chapters 6, 7, and the Conclusion constitute Part III, which responds to the thesis’ tertiary 
research questions. Chapter 6 examines how the WCPFC and IOTC apply differentiation to 
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their management decisions through six Policy Examples. Chapter 7 performs a comparative 
analysis of these Policy Examples and assesses the equitability of their outcomes for DCS 
members. Ultimately Part III finds that neither TRFMO responds fully to procedural and 
distributive equity issues for their DCS members. Part III describes how distributional 
struggles between DCSs and DWFSs appear to have a greater role in shaping policy 
outcomes than legal differentiation. Pointing to this finding, the thesis suggests that the 
WCPFC and IOTC incorporate explicit quotas for fisheries-based economic development in 
DCSs into their future long-term allocation systems. This material recommendation may 
provide a pathway for the WCPFC and IOTC to concretely address intragenerational equity 
for DCS members.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRAGENERATIONAL EQUITY IN TRFMOS AND KEY 
CONCEPTS IN LAW AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
This chapter outlines the literatures and concepts that inform this thesis’ examination of 
intragenerational equity within TRFMOs. Section I introduces the scholarly literature on 
TRFMOs, arguing that a fisheries management-specific neoliberal bias informs 
recommendations for TRFMOs to adopt rights-based management. It also introduces research 
by scholars who emphasise the need to study how TRFMO management decisions distribute 
the burdens and benefits of conservation action onto members. Section II begins with a 
discussion of previous studies of equity in IFL. It then reviews the scholarly literature on 
differentiation to discuss what it might offer to this thesis’ analysis of the design of 
differentiation provisions advantaging DCSs in IFL and TRFMO treaty law. Section III 
introduces political economy research on the global tuna industry. It describes the concept of 
a tuna ‘global production network’ (GPN) and discusses how TRFMOs may be implicated in 
distributional struggles for value capture among firms and states. Political economy research 
provides insights into this thesis’ examination of the external factors that shape how TRFMO 
members apply differentiation to their management decisions. Finally, Section IV concludes 
by introducing a preliminary comparison of the WCPFC and IOTC.   
I EQUITY ISSUES IN TRFMOS MATTER 
A Reviews of TRFMO Performance 
Multiple studies have assessed the management performance of the five TRFMOs in view of 
evolving international standards.66 The FAO carried out one early study in 2010 after it 
undertook a work programme expressly focused on management of global tuna fisheries.67 
 
66 See A Willock and M Lack, Learning from Experience and Best Practice in Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations (WWF TRAFFIC Report, 2006); Michael Lodge et al, Recommended Best Practices for Regional 
Fisheries Management Organizations: Report of an Independent Panel to Develop a Model for Improved 
Governance by Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (Chatham House Report, 2007); Cox et al (n 
22); Allen (n 26); Sarika Cullis-Suzuki and Daniel Pauly, ‘Failing the High Seas: A Global Evaluation of 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (2010) 34 Marine Policy 1036; De Bruyn, Murua, and Aranda 
(n 23); Kristina Gjerde et al, ‘Ocean in Peril: Reforming the Management of Global Ocean Living Resources in 
Areas Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2013) 74 Marine Pollution Bulletin 540; Maite Pons, Michael C 
Melnychuk, and Ray Hilborn, ‘Management Effectiveness of Large Pelagic Fisheries in the High Seas’ (2018) 
19(2) Fish and Fisheries 260; Maria José Juan-Jordá et al, ‘Report Card on Ecosystem-Based Fisheries 
Management in Tuna Regional Fisheries Management Organizations’ (2018) 19(2) Fish and Fisheries 321. 
67 Allen (n 26) iii. 
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The study concluded that states were unable to cooperate to effectively conserve, manage, 
and promote the sustainable use of tuna stocks through TRFMOs.68 It showed that TRFMO 
members were often slow to respond to scientific advice and adopt appropriate regulatory 
measures for tuna stocks in need of management action.69 Closer analysis of TRFMO 
management actions revealed that other factors, outside the adoption of regulatory measures, 
were often responsible for necessary reductions in fishing effort and tuna catches.70  
The findings from the FAO study are situated within a broader literature on the performance 
of (T)RFMO71-directed transboundary fisheries management. This literature identifies a 
number of structural issues that undermine effective transboundary fisheries management, 
including: overcapacity;72 the problematic use of maximum sustainable yield (MSY) as a 
measure of stock health;73 and the slow uptake of best practices74 (among others). This 
literature has instigated performance reviews of the five TRFMOs,75 as well as initiatives by 
inter- and non- governmental organisations to improve TRFMO performance.76 
Some studies from this literature, like the FAO study and another study by Chatham House, 
pivot from discussions of TRFMO effectiveness to their obligations with respect to DCS 
members.77 These studies suggest that TRFMOs and their members are obliged to promote 
the aspirations of developing states to participate in tuna fisheries. They argue this obligation 
would require TRFMOs to reallocate tuna fishing rights from developed to developing 
 
68 Ibid 2.  
69 Ibid 29.  
70 Ibid 20. 
71 This refers to RFMOs in general, not just the five TRFMOs. 
72 Allen (n 26) 29−30; Martín Aranda, Hilario Murua, and Paul de Bruyn, ‘Managing Fishing Capacity in Tuna 
Regional Fisheries Management Organisations: Development and State of the Art’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy 
985. 
73 Allen (n 26) 5−6, 30. See, e.g., Maggie Skirtun et al, ‘Trade-Offs for the Southern Longline Fishery in 
Achieving a Candidate South Pacific Albacore Target Reference Point’ (2019) 100 Marine Policy 66, 66−7.  
74 Allen (n 26) 30; De Bruyn, Murua, and Aranda (n 23); Juan-Jordá et al (n 66); Nakatsuka (n 24) 127−8. The 
Kobe Process⎯a policy initiative to share best practices among TRFMO Secretariats⎯convened three meetings 
in 2007, 2009, and 2011. Despite the establishment of two working groups, few meetings have been held in 
recent years. 
75 For the most recent reports of performance reviews of CCSBT (2014), IATTC (2016), ICCAT (2016), IOTC 
(2016), and WCPFC (2012), see Network of Tuna Agencies and Programs, Tuna-org (Web Page, 2020) 
<http://www.tuna-org.org/index.htm>. 
76 See, e.g., the Common Oceans ABNJ Program, a joint project between the FAO and Global Environment 
Facility: FAO-GEF, Common Oceans ABNJ Tuna Project: A Partnership for Sustainability (Brochure No 
I5163E/1/05.16, 2016).  
77 Allen (n 26) 30; Lodge et al (n 66) 90−102.  
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members.78 To date, none of the five TRFMOs has undertaken such a redistribution of tuna 
fishing rights among its members.  
Instead, the TRFMOs have included exemptions for DCSs in particular regulatory measures. 
The FAO study refers to this practice as an example of ‘unsustainable development’.79 DCSs 
which do not possess the level of fishing technology to undertake industrial-scale tuna fishing 
often enter into chartering or licensing arrangements with actors from DWFSs.80 In this 
fashion, actors who were originally the target of regulatory measures are able to evade 
TRFMO fishing effort and catch restrictions. Therefore, these studies argue, the practice of 
exempting DCSs not only fails to address development aspirations, but often undermines 
TRFMO management actions.  
Moreover DCSs are incentivised to use their exemptions to undermine regulatory measures 
because TRFMOs currently base their allocations of tuna fishing rights on historical 
catches.81 This mode of allocation perversely encourages DCSs to generate a catch history for 
tuna stocks, many of which are at, or approaching, levels of full exploitation.82 A number of 
studies contend that TRFMOs could address this problem by instituting rights-based 
management.83 Raising issues with the idea of rights-based management as a panacea, 
scholars like Palma have argued that it may not provide a complete solution while TRFMOs 
and their members continue to address their obligations with respect to DCSs inadequately.84  
 
78 Allen asserts that: ‘Sharing of resources that are at or near full exploitation can only be done by reallocation 
of fishing opportunities from developed to developing countries’: Allen (n 26) 30; Lodge et al (n 66) x-xi. See 
Andrew Serdy, The New Entrants Problem in International Fisheries Law (Cambridge University Press, 2016).  
79 Allen (n 26) 30. 
80 See Emily Crigler, ‘Sub-Contracting on the Sea: Vessel Chartering and its Implications for Tuna 
Conservation Efforts in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’ (Master’s Thesis, University of Washington, 
2018). See also Chapter 3 Section II A-B.  
81 Maria Cecilia Engler Palma, ‘Allocation of Fishing Opportunities in Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations: A Legal Analysis in the Light of Equity’ (LLM Thesis, Dalhousie University, 2010).  
82 SOFIA 2018 (n 5).   
83 Allen (n 26); Robin Allen, James Joseph, and Dale Squires (eds) Conservation and Management of 
Transnational Tuna Fisheries (Blackwell, 2010). 
84 Palma (n 81) 282−7; Maria Cecilia Engler Palma, ‘Allocation of Fishing Opportunities in Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations: From Power to Law?’ in Dawn A. Russell and David L. VanderZwagg (eds) 
Recasting Transboundary Fisheries Management Arrangements in Light of Sustainability Principles: Canadian 
and International Perspectives (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010) 473. See also Evelyn Pinkerton and Danielle 
N Edwards, ‘The Elephant in the Room: The Hidden Costs of Leasing Individual Transferable Fishing Quotas’ 
(2009) 33 Marine Policy 707. 
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One recent evaluation of TRFMO performance by Pons, Melnychuk, and Hilborn assesses 
and compares the five TRFMOs in the following four areas: research, management, 
enforcement, and socio-economics.85 Combining scores for each TRFMO across these areas, 
the authors find that, overall, CCSBT scores the highest and IOTC the lowest, in terms of 
performance. Similar to the FAO’s findings, Pons, Melnychuk, and Hilborn also demonstrate 
that the status of tuna stocks is strongly correlated to biological and economic factors external 
to TRFMO management actions.86  
The results of Pons, Melnychuk, and Hilborn’s study point to several factors that correlate 
with poor TRFMO performance. These factors include ‘younger’ tuna fisheries (more 
recently developed); a higher number of both overall vessels and smaller vessels; and 
members with lower average per capita GDP and high economic dependence on tuna 
fisheries.87 The authors consequently argue that economic dependence on tuna fisheries is the 
single most important factor for explaining differences in performance among the five 
TRFMOs.88  
The study by Pons, Melnychuk, and Hilborn clarifies that TRFMO management outcomes are 
shaped by external factors which point to the dependence of DCSs on tuna stocks, and the 
difficulty this presents for reducing fishing pressure. Perhaps most significantly, their study 
situates the relationship between DCSs and tuna fisheries at the centre of effective 
transboundary tuna management. These findings indicate that how TRFMOs address the 
special aspirations, interests, and needs of DCSs which are dependent on tuna stocks has 
significant implications for the efficacy of TRFMO regulatory measures. 
B Equity Issues in TRFMO Decision-Making 
Headed by the Australian Centre for Ocean Resources and Security at the University of 
Wollongong, Fisheries Equity Research Network (‘FERN’) researchers argue that the 
 
85 Pons, Melnychuk, and Hilborn (n 66).  
86 Pons, Melnychuk, and Hilborn observe that ‘[T]he most important factors determining stock status and trends 
were related to biological and economic variables external to the management system. Not surprisingly, 
economic variables were important drivers of fishing mortality and life-history attributes were important drivers 
of biomass’: ibid 268.  
87 Ibid 263.  
88 The researchers determine economic dependency on tuna fisheries by calculating the average ratio of the 
landed value of 10 tuna species and the per capita GDP of each member state: ibid 262. 
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literature on (T)RFMO-directed transboundary fisheries management does not address 
distributional conflicts at the centre of decision-making by members.89 Studies by FERN 
researchers assert that TRFMO members are fundamentally in the position of negotiating 
how the burden and benefits of tuna conservation are to be distributed.90 Similar to Pons, 
Melnychuk, and Hilborn, FERN researchers conclude that how TRFMOs fulfil their 
obligations with respect to DCSs is integral to effective TRFMO regulatory measures. Hanich 
and Ota assert that: 
the primary cause of this impending [fisheries] crisis is the failure of States to transparently 
and equitably distribute the conservation burden and benefit, and thereby enable the adoption 
of sufficiently strong measures to reduce overfishing to sustainable levels and remove 
overcapacity.91  
Similarly, Campbell and Hanich contend that while TRFMO members often agree to 
equitable principles in the abstract, they fail to apply these principles to management 
decisions in negotiations.92 Campbell and Hanich suggest that TRFMOs use a procedural 
approach, or ‘equity process’, whereby members can systematically and transparently address 
the distribution of burdens and benefits contained within proposed regulatory measures.93  
Similarly, Hanich and Ota propose a ‘conservation burden methodology’ for TRFMOs, 
which would allow members to incorporate equity considerations into their management 
decisions. The authors derive their methodology from IFL, arguing that it provides a 
framework⎯with four main factors⎯for states to consider in the process of distributing the 
burdens and benefits of transboundary fisheries management: (i) the location of fishing 
activity; (ii) the form and content of cooperation; (iii) the special requirements of developing 
states; and (iv) principles for fisheries conservation and management.94 Hanich and Ota 
 
89 Quentin Hanich et al, ‘Research into Fisheries Equity and Fairness⎯Addressing Conservation and Burden 
Concerns in Transboundary Fisheries’ (2015) 51 Marine Policy 302. 
90 Quentin Hanich and Yoshitaka Ota, ‘Moving Beyond Rights-Based Management: A Transparent Approach to 
Distributing the Conservation Burden and Benefit in Tuna Fisheries’ (2013) 28 International Journal of Marine 
and Coastal Law 135; Brooke Campbell and Quentin Hanich, ‘Principles and Practice for the Equitable 
Governance of Transboundary Natural Resources: Cross-Cutting Lessons for Marine Fisheries Management’ 
(2015) 14(8) Maritime Studies 1; Kamal Azmi et al, ‘Defining a Disproportionate Burden in Transboundary 
Fisheries: Lessons from International Law’ (2016) 70 Marine Policy 164. Bailey also touches upon the 
distributional and equity-related effects of TRFMO decision-making: Megan Bailey, ‘Improving the 
Management of Global and Regional Tuna Fisheries’ (PhD Thesis, University of British Columbia, 2012) 15. 
91 Hanich and Ota (n 90) 136. 
92 Campbell and Hanich (n 90) 5. 
93 Campbell and Hanich organise their proposal for an ‘equity process’ around the elements of responsibility, 
rights, and distributive justice: ibid 6. 
94 Ibid 139−47. 
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reflect that these factors provide little guidance for TRFMO members. Indeed, they identify a 
number of critical, equity-related issues for which IFL leaves open to state practice.95 
Pragmatically, Hanich and Ota argue that TRFMOs require a transparent and equitable 
methodology to balance core interests in transboundary fisheries. In this respect, they identify 
four core interests that are supported by IFL principles: coastal states; flag states/DWFSs; 
markets/consumers; and developing states.96  
Hanich and Ota’s conservation burden methodology would enter the management cycle after 
TRFMO members have been advised of the need for a conservation response and presented 
with a range of management options.97 According to their methodology, TRFMO members 
would then examine the nature and extent of each of the four recognised interests in the 
fishery, assign a value to each interest, and use these values to guide a comparison of 
management options. This would allow TRFMO members to determine which option would 
least alter the weighted values already assigned to each interest.98 
C Rights-Based Management, Neoliberal Approaches to Fisheries Management, and Equity 
Issues for DCSs within TRFMOs 
Most reviews of TRFMO performance conclude that the central problem for managers is the 
‘open access’ nature of tuna resources.99 To remedy this problem, scholars and fisheries 
managers recommend the development of rights-based management within tuna fisheries. 
Mansfield argues that academics and fisheries managers who recommend rights-based 
management fail to recognise how power relations among resource users and the institutions 
they create shape the use and allocation of fisheries resources.100  
 
95 Ibid 139−47, 150.  
96 Ibid 151. Note that the authors separate the interests of ‘coastal states’ from that of ‘developing 
states’⎯DCSs represent a combination of these interests.  
97 Ibid 152.  
98 Ibid. 
99 See, e.g., Allen, Joseph, and Squires (n 83). 
100 See Becky Mansfield, ‘Neoliberalism in the Oceans: “Rationalization,” Property Rights, and the Commons 
Question’ (2004) 35 Geoforum 313 (‘Neoliberalism in the Oceans’). See also Rebecca Clausen and Brett Clark, 
‘The Metabolic Rift and Marine Ecology: An Analysis of the Ocean Crisis within Capitalist Production’ (2005) 
18(4) Organization and Environment 422; Chukwumerije Okereke, Global Justice and Neoliberal Governance: 
Ethics, Sustainable Development and International Co-Operation (Routledge, 2007).  
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Within the rights-based management model, fisheries require the application of some form of 
property right. Property rights limit access to the fishery, concretise incentives to conserve 
fisheries resources, and establish a market through which more efficient resource users can 
purchase rights from less efficient resource users (through transferable quotas), thereby 
rationalising overcapitalised fisheries—i.e. fisheries with unsustainable levels of fishing 
effort.101 Two critical assumptions underpin this model: that economic rationality drives the 
behaviour of fisheries resource users; and that the solution to tuna’s ‘open access problem’ is 
the privatisation of the fishery and marketisation of fishing rights.102 Unsurprisingly, the 
implementation of rights-based management has been shown to favour well-capitalised and 
historically-established fisheries resource users, often concentrating property rights in the 
hands of a wealthy few.103 
Mansfield chronicles how the dominant model for fisheries management developed over the 
second half of the 20th century following the introduction of economic analysis into fisheries 
policy.104 She argues that the coupling of privatisation and marketisation within rights-based 
management represents a unique form of neoliberalism in oceans governance that is specific 
to fisheries policy.105 Mansfield argues that a neoliberal approach to fisheries regulations 
forges the link between property rights and ‘market rationality’, but that this connection is 
neither inevitable nor empirically established.106  
By contrast, Mansfield identifies examples of property rights systems that have been 
designed in a fisheries context to protect economically disadvantaged groups.107 These 
property rights systems are not organised around the profit motives of fisheries resource users 
for the objective of economic efficiency, but rather to deliver economic and social benefits to 
communities.108 According to Mansfield, what is specifically neoliberal about rights-based 
 
101 Ibid. 
102 Ibid 314.  
103 Pinkerton and Edwards (n 84).  
104 Mansfield, Neoliberalism in the Oceans (n 100).  
105 Ibid 314.  
106 Ibid. 
107 Mansfield provides the example of a ‘Community Development Quota’ (CDQ) for communities of Native 
Alaskans in the Bering Sea Region of the North Pacific: ibid 314.  
108 In her example of the Bering Sea CDQ system, Mansfield explains that ‘This program guarantees these 




management approaches is their emphasis on markets to provide an economically rational 
basis for resource users to conserve fish stocks.  
As Mansfield shows, it is possible to organise property rights systems around objectives other 
than economic efficiency. In the context of tuna fisheries, Barclay and Parris have proposed a 
similar rationale for the establishment of pole and line tuna fisheries, in which an 
economically inefficient fishery may be preferred on the basis that it provides broader social 
and environmental benefits to local fishers and fishworkers.109  
Recent work by Finkbeiner et al and Lobo and Jacques furnishes additional evidence that 
neoliberal approaches continue to pervade fisheries regulation. These scholars show that, 
when framed by neoliberal assumptions, current approaches to fisheries management often 
neglect equity issues among fisheries resource users.110 This is clearly evidenced in the 
approach of rights-based management to equity issues, which strips the participation of less 
efficient fisheries resource users to a side payment in exchange for transferring quota to more 
efficient users. Under rights-based management, inefficient fisheries resource users with less 
capital are encouraged to sell their fishing rights and exit the fishery.  
While much has been written on the practical implementation of rights-based management at 
the TRFMO-level, little has been written on its equity implications.111 Hanich and Ota argue 
that their proposal for a conservation burden methodology provides an equitable alternative to 
this focus on rights-based management.112 They argue that the time-intensive and 
burdensome nature of negotiating initial allocations for such a system can often obstruct, 
rather than build on, momentum within management negotiations.113 Alternatively, the 
authors suggest that their approach can depoliticise scientific advice provided to TRFMOs 
and enable members to transparently engage in deliberations on the equitable distribution of 
 
109 Kate Barclay and Hannah Parris, Transforming Tuna Fisheries in Pacific Island Countries: An Alternative 
Model of Development (Greenpeace Report, July 2013).  
110 Elena M Finkbeiner et al, ‘Reconstructing Overfishing: Moving Beyond Malthus for Effective and Equitable 
Solutions’ (2017) 18(6) Fish and Fisheries 1180; Rafaella Lobo and Peter J Jacques, ‘SOFIA’s Choices: 
Discourses, Values, and Norms of the World Ocean Regime’ (2017) 78 Marine Policy 26. 
111 Cf Palma (n 81). Some fisheries economists discuss ‘distributional’ issues related to rights-based 
management systems, though they assume, if correctly designed, rights-based management will address these 
conflicts. See, e.g., Olivier Guyader and Olivier Thébaud, ‘Distributional Issues in the Operation of Rights 
Based Fisheries Management Systems’ (2001) 25 Marine Policy 103. 
112 Hanich and Ota (n 90) 148−9. 
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conservation burden and benefit. While their methodology provides a pragmatic alternative to 
rights-based management and reflects IFL principles, it also merely relocates distributional 
conflicts among states, from the assignation of allocations, to the assignation of interest-
values with the tuna fishery. In fact, this is what transpired when such a proposal was piloted 
at the WCPFC.114  
This thesis argues that, while Hanich and Ota’s conservation burden methodology represents 
an earnest attempt to respond to TRFMO equity issues and is distinct from rights-based 
management, it ultimately relies on the same logic⎯it seeks to respond to distributional 
conflicts among TRFMO members (the ‘political’ aspect of tuna management) through an 
economic (bureaucratic) framework.115 This thesis asserts that, to fully examine equity issues 
in TRFMOs, it is necessary to look more closely at the distributional conflicts that present 
difficulties among TRFMO members in negotiations for management decisions.  
Equity issues are closely coupled with distributional conflicts between DCSs and DWFSs 
within TRFMOs. FERN researchers have argued that these distributional conflicts impede the 
effectiveness of transboundary fisheries management.116 Finkbeiner et al arrive at a similar 
conclusion, but across fisheries management contexts.117 They argue that, to produce 
equitable and effective fisheries management, it is necessary to understand the ‘mediating 
drivers’ that currently motivate overfishing.118 The authors identify four main drivers: 
technology and innovation; resource demand and distribution; marginalisation and equity; 
and governance and management.119 They discuss how power relations play a key role in 
each driver, and argue that ‘power and politics’ shape how fisheries policy is designed and 
implemented.120 Similarly, this thesis seeks to investigate the underlying drivers for TRFMO 
policy outcomes and thereby elucidate the role of power and politics in TRFMO decision-
making. To achieve this, the thesis examines differentiation in light of distributional conflicts 
among TRFMO members.   
 
114 See Chapter 3 Section III A 2(a). 
115 See Palma (n 81) 3−4. 
116 Campbell and Hanich (n 90) 2; Hanich et al (n 89).  
117 Finkbeiner et al (n 110). 
118 Ibid 1.  
119 Ibid 3.  
120 Ibid.  
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II KEY LEGAL CONCEPTS: EQUITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, FAIRNESS AMONG STATES, AND 
DIFFERENTIATION IN IEL 
This thesis addresses the relative silence concerning equity issues for DCSs within the 
literature reviewing TRFMO performance. In view of distributional conflicts between DCSs 
and DWFSs, this thesis focuses on particular legal and normative conceptualisations of 
intragenerational equity, described in the Introduction.121 Though other formulations of 
equity exist in both hard and soft legal instruments in IFL, intragenerational equity—
conceptualised as procedural and distributive justice for DCSs and operationalised as 
differentiation advantaging DCSs—serves as the principal focus of this thesis. 
A Equity in International Law 
Equity contains multiple meanings in international law.122 It is generally defined against the 
concept of sovereign equality among states, which implies identical treatment of states 
regardless of wealth, size, or other factors.123 By contrast, equity generally refers to the need 
for unequal treatment of states in cases where equal treatment would produce an unjust 
result.124 Ultimately, equity represents a basic departure from the uniform application of rules 
within the international legal system.125  
Legal scholars have provided overviews of equity in international law, demonstrating that it 
encompasses judicial, legislative, and generational forms of justice.126 In international 
jurisprudence, judges are empowered to apply equity infra legem (within the law), praeter 
legem (outside of the law), and contra legem (against the law).127 Different forms of equity 
 
121 See Introduction Section V A.  
122 The many meanings of equity have led legal scholars to comment on the ambiguity that plagues this concept 
in international law. See Shelton (n 38) 640; M.W. Janis, ‘The Ambiguity of Equity in International Law’ 
(1983) 9(1) Brooklyn Journal of International Law 7, 33; Oxford Public International Law, Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law (online at October 2020) ‘Equity in International Law’ [4]. See also 
Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Role of Equity in International Law’ (1992) 12 Australian Year Book of International Law 
54. 
123 Cullet (n 12) 22−3. 
124 ‘As traditionally conceived, equity seeks to influence results brought about by the application of a given rule 
of law which are deemed undesirable according to broader justice, moral or social concerns’: ibid 29. Cullet 
describes the relationship between sovereign and substantive equality, equity, and differentiation in international 
law: at 21−32.  
125 ‘What is critical is the attachment of equity to the conception of justice and its detachment from the rules of 
any particular legal system’ Lowe (n 122) 54.  
126 See Shelton (n 38); Janis (n 122).  
127 For a concise explanation of the types of equity in international jurisprudence, see French (n 39) 10470−1.  
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govern each of these applications, whereby judges may appeal to: equitable principles (such 
as in the equitable allocation and utilisation of natural resources) infra legem; their discretion 
to adapt the law to specific circumstances praeter legem; and broader equity norms that fall 
outside the law contra legem.128  
In modern international law, equity has developed into an important element of legal relations 
between developing and industrialised states. International development law introduced legal 
understandings of equity as redistributive justice for developing states during the postcolonial 
period following World War II.129 More recently in the field of IEL, equity has expanded to 
refer to justice for present and future generations under the broader concept of sustainable 
development.130 Ultimately, while this thesis acknowledges the chimerical nature of equity in 
international law, it grounds its analysis in the concept of intragenerational equity.  
B Equity in IFL 
Two scholars⎯Palma and Burgt⎯have conducted reviews of equity in IFL, including 
(T)RFMO treaty regimes. Palma reviews equity in view of the allocation of fishing rights 
within (T)RFMOs, whereas Burgt reviews equity in the context of how (T)RFMO’s address 
the concept of human development (which includes not only equity but also poverty 
eradication and participation).131 Palma and Burgt observe that equity is not a word that 
appears frequently in IFL instruments.132 Palma cites the intentional deletion of ‘equity’ by 
states during negotiations of earlier drafts of UNFSA.133 In their analyses, both scholars 
similarly argue that, while equity for developing states featured strongly in negotiations for 
the modern law of the sea regime, references to equity are practically non-existent in recently 
adopted IFL instruments. 
 
128 Ibid. Legal scholars like French describe equity contra legem as the only invocation of equity in international 
jurisprudence that goes beyond the application of the law: see, e.g., ibid. This use of equity is typically discussed 
in the context of the ICJ’s discretion to decide a case ex aequo et bono (‘according to the right and good’): 
Statute of the International Court of Justice art 38(2). French demonstrates that the ICJ has generally avoided 
this use of equity: at 10473.  
129 Shelton (n 38) 649−52.  
130 Ibid.  
131 Palma (n 81); Nienke van der Burgt, The Contribution of International Fisheries Law to Human 
Development (Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) 9−10. 
132 Palma (n 81) 184−6; Burgt (n 131) 167−8. 
133 Palma (n 81) 184−6. 
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Palma and Burgt provide different arguments for the specific forms of equity articulated 
(though perhaps not named) in IFL. Palma concludes that the form of equity most supported 
by IFL instruments is ‘autonomous’ equity;134 Burgt claims that soft and hard law 
instruments articulate forms equity that combine inter- and intra- generational equity.135 
Palma and Burgt agree that (T)RFMO treaty regimes include explicit articulations of 
equitable concepts⎯what Burgt refers to as ‘indirect forms of equity’.136 Palma argues that 
(T)RFMOs are responsible for developing ‘equitable principles’ and assigning normative 
content to equity in IFL through state practice.137 
 Burgt’s analysis is more inclusive: she finds that intragenerational equity is generally 
supported within broader IFL and multiple (T)RFMO treaty regimes. Burgt finds (T)RFMO 
treaty regimes are primarily concerned with two requirements concerning intragenerational 
equity: (i) to take into account the interests and needs of developing states; and (ii) to provide 
assistance to developing states. In addition, Burgt finds evidence for related concepts, such as 
the need to have due consideration for local fishing communities in developing states, and the 
optimum utilisation of marine living resources (which she finds relates to equity insofar as it 
concerns broader food security objectives).138 
Palma and Burgt suggest that multiple (T)RFMO treaty regimes are governed by the wider 
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR).139 As will be discussed, this 
thesis departs from both scholars on this point and turns instead to the broader idea of 
differentiation advantaging DCSs.140 This is because, as it is articulated in most treaty 
regimes, CBDR concerns states’ responsibility with respect to the environment and therefore 
almost exclusively relates to conservation objectives in light of equity for developing states.  
C Fairness Among States 
This thesis turns to intragenerational equity as a lens for studying distributional conflicts 
between DCSs and DWFSs within TRFMOs. This focus contrasts with an examination of 
 
134 Ibid 227−8. 
135 Burgt (n 131) 69−82. Cf Palma (n 81) 136−8.  
136 Burgt (n 131) 172. 
137 Palma (n 81) 245−53.  
138 Burgt (n 131) 190. 
139 Palma (n 81) 218−226; Burgt (n 131) 72−3, 175, 340−1. 
140 See Chapter 1 Section II D2.  
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intergenerational equity within TRFMOs, which would view their management decisions 
through the lens of impacts on the availability and integrity of tuna resources for future 
generations.141 While research from this perspective would be relevant to the numerous 
studies on TRFMO effectiveness, this thesis is motivated by the observation that novel 
research is needed on how TRFMOs respond to intragenerational equity issues for DCSs. 
This perspective, which emphasises equity between states with differing levels of economic 
development, is informed by the work of scholars who view equity as an integral feature—for 
practical and moral purposes—of modern international law and relations. One such scholar is 
Franck, who considers equity within the context of a broader discussion of fairness in 
international law.142 Franck argues that the international legal discipline has evolved beyond 
ontological questions of whether international law matters.143 He contends that the discipline 
ought to direct its attention to evaluative questions of whether international law is fair.144  
Franck states that perceptions of fairness encourage voluntary compliance and provide a 
pathway for legal systems to evolve.145 For Franck, fairness provides a ‘rubric’ for evaluating 
‘certain consequential values by which institutions and processes are judged: do they provide 
the consequences which people expect, by means of an appropriate discursive and 
distributive process?’.146 From Franck’s perspective, notions of fairness respond to the need 
for two basic elements within a legal system: (i) legitimacy or perceptions of right process 
and (ii) distributive justice or moral expectations of a just distribution of burdens and 
benefits.147 In this fashion, fairness provides the flexibility for a legal system to develop on a 
path continuously in tension between the need for stability (legitimacy) and change 
(distributive justice).148 
Albin is another scholar who studies the operation of notions of justice and fairness among 
states, but in international negotiations. Like Franck, Albin argues that fairness plays a 
 
141 For discussions of intergenerational equity in IFL, see Rayfuse (n 40) 478−482; Palma (n 81) 136−8. 
142 Franck (n 42).  
143 Ibid 6.  
144 Ibid 9. 
145 Ibid 8.  
146 Ibid 7  
147 Ibid 7−8. Please note that these two elements correspond with this thesis’ description of procedural and 
distributive equity: see Introduction Section VA.  
148 Ibid 7.  
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functional role in international negotiations. She observes that while notions of fairness are 
often a locus of conflict in negotiations, they also enable negotiators to reach agreement 
where their interests conflict.149 Albin finds that in negotiating contexts like the TRFMOs, 
conflict occurs where broad principles are applied to specific decisions because states are 
considering how this application impacts on their interests.150 According to Albin, these 
conflicts arise with respect to both procedural and substantive principles.151 Negotiations in 
the context of these conflicts provide flexibility for negotiators to strike a balance in 
negotiating outcomes. She contends: ‘Collectively, international negotiators employ such 
principles as a tool to reach an agreement. They are used to overcome conflicting interests 
and claims, and to build consensus on the nature of an acceptable outcome’.152 In the heat of 
negotiations, Albin observes that these outcomes go beyond mere reflections of power 
inequalities or pursuit of self-interest.153 She argues that under these conditions, justice or 
fairness is best defined procedurally, as a ‘balanced settlement of conflicting claims’.154 This 
thesis consequently views intragenerational equity from Franck and Albin’s premise, that 
perceptions of fairness, justice, and equity among states enact a discursive process whereby 
states both affirm and challenge international law to arrive at negotiating outcomes. 
D Differentiation in IEL 
A basic definition of differentiation is the application of different standards to a state or 
grouping of states.155 A particular manifestation of the many legal understandings of equity in 
international law, differentiation represents a basic departure from legal reciprocity in treaty 
relations between states.156  In the context of intragenerational equity, differentiation 
 
149 Cecilia Albin, Justice and Fairness in International Negotiations (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 1 
(‘Fairness in International Negotiations’).  
150 Cecilia Albin, ‘Negotiating International Cooperation: Global Public Goods and Fairness’ (2003) 29(3) 
Review of International Studies 365, 368 (‘Global Public Goods and Fairness’).  
151 Ibid 370. According to Albin, substantive principles are often specific to treaty regimes (and would appear to 
refer to differentiation within TRFMOs) while procedural principles are not: at ibid. Albin categorises principles 
into those that are external, internal, and impartial to the negotiating context: at 371−3.  
152 Albin, Fairness in International Negotiations (n 149) 15.  
153 Albin, Global Public Goods and Fairness (n 150) 375.  
154 Ibid 374−5; Albin, Fairness in International Negotiations (n 149) 16.  
155 Rajamani, Differential Treatment in IEL (n 15) 1.  
156 Cullet Differential Treatment (n 12) 35.  
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functions as a legal tool enabling developing and industrialised states to acknowledge and 
respond to their differing capacities to address international environmental issues.157  
Rajamani and Cullet observe that differentiation provides developing and industrialised states 
opportunities to diverge from legal reciprocity to broker conflicting interests. Rajamani 
argues that developing states have deployed differentiation as ‘levers of influence’ in 
environmental negotiations with industrialised states.158  She surmises that ‘dissonance in 
international environmental dialogue is translated into differentiation in international 
environmental treaties’.159  Similarly, Cullet argues that ‘differentiation is the product of the 
convergence of different interests in international negotiations that offer a basis for diverging 
from the usual reciprocity of obligations’.160  Precisely as a consequence of this role, 
differentiation provisions in fields like international trade and climate change law have often 
served as the source of conflict and resistance for industrialised states in their treaty relations 
with developing states.  
In its examination of differentiation, this thesis engages closely with scholars who study 
differentiation.161 These scholars observe a rising trend in the use of differentiation in IEL, 
though none provide more than a passing reference to differentiation in (T)RFMO treaty 
regimes.162 These scholars agree on the basic form and function of differentiation as a 
departure from legal reciprocity and a method for brokering divergent interests, typically 
between developing and industrialised states. Despite basic agreement on the role for 
differentiation in treaty relations, these scholars differ in how they define differentiation and 
characterise its normative content. This section discusses how different scholars view 
differentiation; interrogates the relationship between differentiation and the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR); and introduces this thesis’ understanding 
 
157 Ibid 15.  
158 Rajamani, Differential Treatment in IEL (n 15) 88.  
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160 Philippe Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in Environmental Law: Addressing Critiques and Conceptualizing 
the Next Steps’ (2016) Transnational Environmental Law 5(2) 305, 308 (‘Addressing Critiques and Next 
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161 Daniel Barstow Magraw, ‘Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual, and Absolute 
Norms’ (1990) 1(69) Columbia Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 69; Cullet, Differential 
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of differentiation, including a working definition, common categories for differentiation 
provisions, and its application to institutional and treaty law.   
1 Different Normative Understandings of Differentiation in IEL Scholarship 
Despite its ubiquity in IEL, differentiation has not yet achieved customary status in 
international law.163 Though scholars argue that differentiation reflects a compact between 
developing and industrialised states to address differences in economic development and 
environmental vulnerability, they also show inherent ambiguities and tensions embodied in 
most forms of differentiation in IEL.164 Perhaps as a reflection of this finding, scholars 
themselves exhibit differing views as to its normative meaning. These views fall on a 
continuum of understandings that motivate states to include differentiation (in varying forms) 
in environmental treaty regimes.  
For example, Cullet argues that differentiation is based on broad notions of partnership and 
solidarity between developing and industrialised states which go beyond mere cooperation.165 
By comparison, Rajamani argues that differentiation (in IEL) is premised on a general 
recognition of industrialised states’ historical responsibility for causing environmental issues 
and developing states’ present lack of capacity to address them.166 In contrast to both 
scholars, Halvorssen argues that differentiation shapes incentive structures within 
environmental treaty regimes to enable self-interested states to cooperate under conditions of 
interdependence.167  
For most scholars, the normative understandings which determine differentiation depend 
largely on the measure of responsibility industrialised states take for their role in causing 
modern environmental crises. Rajamani argues that this determination can result in one of 
two premises for differentiation. The first is a culpability/entitlement premise, whereby 
themes of obligation and liability guide differentiation.168 Under this premise, industrialised 
states are culpable for their part in creating environmental problems and developing states are 
 
163 Philippe Cullet, ‘Differential Treatment in International Law: Towards a New Paradigm of Inter-State 
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entitled to forms of financial and technological assistance and greater flexibility in their 
commitments.169 The second is a consideration/capacity premise, whereby themes of 
morality, humanity, and goodwill predominate.170 From this perspective, industrialised states 
consider the significant economic disadvantages faced by developing states and acknowledge 
that capacity to carry out environmental obligations differs among states.171 This implies that 
industrialised states have a moral responsibility to address the special position of developing 
states.172 Rajamani contends that industrialised states prefer the consideration/capacity 
premise because it opts for an a historical and discretionary rationale (as opposed to ‘a legal 
or obligatory one’) for assisting developing states.173 She establishes a link between this 
premise and the articulation of differentiation provisions which set out soft legal 
commitments that cast industrialised countries in a benevolent light.174  
The normative content of differentiation remains unsettled in international law. Multiple 
surveys of differentiation in IEL conclude that differentiation comes in many forms and with 
various rationales within environmental treaty regimes. For example, in comparison to 
Rajamani’s dichotomy of premises for differentiation, Cullet identifies four potential 
rationales for differentiation.175 Rather than understate this diversity, this thesis assumes that 
contrasting and even opposing normative understandings of differentiation coexist among 
states in international law. 
2 Differentiation and Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in IEL  
The normative confusion described above extends to differences scholars have concerning 
the relationship between differentiation and the established principle of CBDR in IEL. CBDR 
refers to the common but different responsibilities developing and industrialised states have 
with respect to the protection of the environment.176 This understanding governs how 
differentiation is used to advantage developing states so as to create fair burden-sharing 
 
169 Ibid.  
170 Ibid 79, 86. 
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172 Ibid 81.  
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174 Ibid.  
175 Cullet’s rationales for differentiation are: principles of justice, inequalities in economic development, 
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arrangements within environmental treaty regimes. However, the relationship between 
differentiation and CBDR raises a question as to the normative content of differentiation 
within IEL. This question is whether differentiation relates merely to developing state 
participation in the protection of the environment, or whether it extends to developing states’ 
economic development concerns with respect to the use of natural resources. That is, does 
differentiation advantage developing states with respect to both the burdens and benefits of 
environmental protection and resource management? 
At first glance, Rajamani and Cullet appear to differ on this point. Rajamani argues that 
CBDR serves as the doctrinal basis for differentiation.177 By contrast, Cullet argues that 
differentiation is broader than CBDR.178 According to Cullet, CBDR narrowly focuses on 
states’ responsibilities with respect to the environment, whereas differentiation applies widely 
to states’ rights and responsibilities.179 In particular, Cullet argues that differentiation may 
extend beyond environmental protection themes and procedural justice norms to economic 
development themes and distributive justice norms. However, it is possible this point of 
difference between Rajamani and Cullet is semantic because Rajamani defines CBDR 
broadly, to include distributive justice themes for developing states.180 However, this 
difference highlights the normative tensions that abide within states’ use of differentiation in 
IEL.  
TRFMO treaty regimes concern not only states’ responsibility to conserve transboundary 
tuna stocks, but also states’ rights with respect to the exploitation of those tuna stocks. 
Therefore, this thesis proceeds on the assumption that an expanded concept of differentiation, 
which includes both rights and responsibilities, is required to analyse intragenerational equity 
within TRFMOs.  
3 The Use of Differentiation in this Thesis: Definition, Categories, and Institutional Law 
(a) Four Elements of Differentiation Provisions  
 
177 Rajamani, Differential Treatment in IEL (n 15) 133−50. 
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This thesis defines differentiation simply as legal provisions that create different obligations 
in response to inequalities among states.181 However, most full definitions of differentiation 
address four elements; that is, whether differentiation provisions: (i) solely favour or 
advantage developing states, (ii) are explicit or implicit, (iii) are direct or contextual, and (iv) 
are formulated as hard or soft law.  
The first element is whether differentiation is to be considered in the normative sense of 
‘favouring’ developing states. Cullet and Rajamani differ on this element of differentiation. 
Cullet argues that differentiation only refers to ‘non-reciprocal arrangements which seek to 
foster substantive equality in the international community’.182 In comparison, Rajamani takes 
pains to describe examples where differentiation favours industrialised states, such as United 
Nations Security Council membership.183 This thesis only examines differentiation provisions 
that favour or advantage developing states. However, it is important to note that this thesis 
focuses primarily on DCSs to reflect the regional contexts in which TRFMOs operate, where 
the majority of coastal states are developing states.184  
The second and third elements of differentiation are related. This includes whether 
differentiation provisions explicitly name (and therefore directly apply to) developing states, 
or implicitly refer to factors that correspond with levels of economic development (and 
indirectly apply to developing states). The corollary to this distinction is whether 
differentiation provisions serve as legal obligations in their own right, or merely serve to 
contextualise other obligations. Magraw describes this as the distinction between 
‘differential’ and ‘contextual’ treatment, respectively.185 Explicit, differential treatment often 
provides a stronger legal basis for differentiation advantaging developing states than implicit, 
contextual treatment. This analysis considers both explicit and implicit, and direct and 
contextual instances of differentiation in IFL and TRFMO law.  
 
181 This definition borrows heavily from Cullet’s: ‘[Differentiation] refers to instances where, because of 
pervasive differences or inequalities among states, the principle of sovereign equality is sidelined to 
accommodate extraneous factors, such as divergences in levels of economic development or unequal capacities 
to tackle a given problem’: Cullet, Differential Treatment (n 12) 15.  
182 Ibid.  
183 Rajamani, Differential Treatment in IEL (n 15) 34−7. 
184 Palma notes this distinction in IFL, and points out that legal scholars differ on whether Part VII UNFSA 
applies to developing states only ‘insofar as they are coastal states’: Palma (n 81) 100.  
185 Magraw (n 161) 73−5. Some scholars find this distinction more operable than others. See Halvorssen on the 
brighter line she draws between ‘differential’ (or ‘asymmetrical’) and ‘uniform’ norms: Halvorssen (n 14) 70.  
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Lastly the fourth element of differentiation is whether provisions are articulated as hard or 
soft law. This element governs whether differentiation is to be analysed solely in the context 
of binding treaty obligations, or whether it can also be considered within nonbinding 
instruments.186 Most importantly, this element draws attention to the need to analyse the 
extent to which differentiation provisions are justiciable or enforceable.187 This analysis 
focuses primarily on binding IFL instruments, though it examines some nonbinding 
instruments in TRFMO law to provide a deeper understanding of the WCPFC and IOTC’s 
approaches to differentiation.   
(b) Three Categories of Differentiation Provisions  
Scholars have also observed distinct categories of legal provisions to which states apply 
differentiation. Rajamani neatly divides these categories into provisions differentiating: (i) 
central obligations; (ii) implementation; and (iii) assistance.188 Rajamani defines central 
obligations as those ‘that are central to the purpose of the treaty’, and argues this form of 
differentiation is the rarest and most contested across treaty regimes.189 In contrast to central 
obligations, provisions that differentiate implementation obligations for developing states are 
more common. Rajamani divides these differentiated implementation provisions into five 
additional categories, which: (i) provide context to implementation; (ii) ease time-frames for 
implementation or delay compliance schedules; (iii) permit the adoption of later base years; 
(iv) allow delayed reporting schedules; and (iv) create softer approaches to non-
compliance.190  
Rajamani distinguishes differentiated implementation provisions from provisions that grant 
assistance to developing states⎯differentiated assistance provisions.191 In reality, these 
categories overlap, as assistance is often provided to developing states for the purpose of 
assisting with their implementation of treaty obligations. In any case, Rajamani divides 
differentiated assistance provisions into those related to: (i) financial assistance; (ii) 
technology transfer; and (iii) capacity building.192 Under ‘other forms of assistance’, 
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Rajamani identifies other differentiation provisions that provide funding to developing states 
to attend intergovernmental negotiations.193 This thesis uses the categories identified by 
Rajamani as a starting point for thinking about how IFL and TRFMO treaty law design 
differentiation.  
(c) Differentiation Provisions in Institutional Law   
Differentiation scholars agree on one key area relevant to TRFMOs: the distinction between 
differentiation in treaty law and institutional law. Cullet and Rajamani provide brief 
explorations into how the rules and practices of international organisations differentiate 
between members, at times benefitting developing and industrialised states.194  
Their typologies of differentiation in institutional law differ slightly. Each author claims that 
differentiation can be found in: costs of membership (‘differential contributions’); voting 
arrangements (‘differential decision-making’); and the eligibility of states to participate 
(‘differential membership’). Rajamani includes a further category of ‘differential 
enforcement’ to describe how some international organisations modify monitoring and 
enforcement procedures for developing states.195  
Cullet also describes special funds that support the participation of developing states in the 
meetings of some international organisations.196 In contrast, Halvorssen does not consider 
financial support for meeting attendance as differentiation, but rather as an incentive for 
developing states to participate in negotiations.197 This thesis views TRFMO treaty law as 
inclusive of institutional law and therefore includes this form of differentiation into its 
analysis⎯particularly of differentiation provisions concerning TRFMO ‘internal processes’ 
which encompass both administrative and institutional activities.  
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III KEY POLITICAL ECONOMY CONCEPTS: TUNA GPNS, COMPETITIVE INDUSTRY DYNAMICS, 
AND DISTRIBUTIONAL STRUGGLES BETWEEN DCSS AND DWFSS 
This thesis situates equity issues in TRFMOs within the broader political economy of the tuna 
industry. In doing so, it seeks to deepen understandings of the external drivers that motivate 
policy outcomes in TRFMOs. To address these drivers, the thesis borrows from a robust 
literature on the relationship between TRFMO decision-making and the tuna industry.  
A Applying GPN Theory to Analyses of the Tuna Industry 
Recent political economy studies describe how firms, states, and other actors interact through 
the production and consumption of global tuna products. These studies use GPN theory, first 
summarised by Coe and Yeung, to analyse the tuna industry.198 According to Coe and Yeung, 
a GPN is ‘an organizational arrangement, comprising interconnected economic and non-
economic actors, coordinated by a global lead firm, and producing goods or services across 
multiple geographical locations for worldwide markets’.199 Along with colleagues, Coe and 
Yeung developed the concept of a GPN to respond to theory-building around global 
commodity and value chain research.200 They argue that ‘organizationally fragmented and 
spatially dispersed production networks constitute a new form of economic structure that 
increasingly drives the complex global economy and its uneven development outcomes.201  
In separate studies, Havice and Campling and Miller use GPN theory to discuss how firm and 
non-firm actors govern the global production and consumption of tuna.202 To describe the 
‘tuna GPN’, these scholars present the production chains for canned and sashimi tuna. They 
show that tuna production chains are spatially diffuse, incorporate a diversity of actors and 
industries, and are heavily shaped by lead firms. As part of their research on how production 
networks shape tuna governance, these scholars situate TRFMOs and their management 
 
198 Neil Coe and Henry Yeung, Global Production Networks: Theorizing Economic Development in an 
Interconnected World (Oxford University Press, 2015). 
199 Ibid 1−2. 
200 Jeffrey Henderson et al, ‘Global Production Networks and the Analysis of Economic Development’ (2002) 
9(3) Review of International Political Economy 436. 
201 Coe and Yeung (n 198) 1. 
202 Elizabeth Havice and Liam Campling, ‘Where Chain Governance and Environmental Governance Meet: 
Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna Global Value Chain’ (2017) 93(3) Economic Geography 292, 295 
(‘Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC’); Alice Miller, ‘Governance Innovation Networks for 
Sustainable Tuna’ (PhD Thesis, Wageningen University, 2014). 
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decisions in relation to tuna GPNs. In pursuing distinct research questions, they reveal 
different aspects of how TRFMOs are positioned with respect to tuna GPNs.  
B Havice and Campling: Competitive Dynamics in the Tuna Industry, TRFMOs, and 
Distributional Struggle 
Havice and Campling draw upon a research program on the political economy of the tuna 
industry that spans over a decade. This research focuses primarily on tuna governance in the 
WCPO and IO. In multiple studies, Havice and Campling describe the ‘environmental 
conditions of production’ for the tuna industry.203 This concept refers to ‘the ever-shifting 
combination of regulatory, commercial, and ecological conditions that shape and are shaped 
by dynamic resource extraction practices’.204 In Havice and Campling’s work, TRFMOs 
contribute to these conditions through their regulatory measures and the ripple effects these 
measures have on the behaviour of both firms and states. In addition, they show that the 
environmental conditions of production are mutually constitutive of TRFMO regulatory 
measures, as firms and states alike attempt to intercede to alter these conditions in their 
favour at the level of TRFMO negotiations. 
In their study using GPN theory, Havice and Campling elucidate the connection between 
‘chain and environmental governance’ by analysing interfirm strategies in the canned tuna 
GPN.205 They provide a careful analysis of some specific strategies firms employ in TRFMOs 
to alter the environmental conditions of production to favour their interests. From this 
analysis, Havice and Campling conclude that TRFMOs are not solely engaged in regulating 
tuna fishing activity, but are also involved in managing interfirm relations⎯specifically, 
 
203 Elsewhere, Havice and Campling explain that, ‘The particular characteristics of any natural 
resource⎯referred to here as the environmental conditions of production⎯are constituted through 
biological/geographical specificities in concert with the social priorities of any mode of production and 
commodity sector’: Elizabeth Havice and Liam Campling, ‘Articulating Upgrading: Island Developing States 
and Canned Tuna Production’ (2013) 45 Environment and Planning A 2610, 2618 (emphasis in 
original)(‘Articulating Upgrading’). See also Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna 
GVC (n 202) 294; Liam Campling and Elizabeth Havice, ‘The Problem of Property in Industrial Fisheries’ 
(2014) 41(5) Journal of Peasant Studies 724 (‘Problem of Property’); Liam Campling, ‘The EU-Centred 
Commodity Chain in Canned Tuna and Upgrading in Seychelles’ (PhD Thesis, University of London, 2012) 
43−5 (‘Upgrading in Seychelles’).  
204 Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 294. 
205 ‘Interfirm strategies’ is a concept introduced by Havice and Campling to refer to four firm strategies from 
GPN theory (intrafirm coordination, interfirm control, interfirm partnership, and extrafirm bargaining): ibid 296. 
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interfirm relations where lead firms located in certain nodes of tuna production chains exert 
competitive pressure on firms in other nodes.  
Havice and Campling assert that this ‘competitive dynamic’ impacts on TRFMOs to the 
extent that they are, ‘becoming more deeply politicized as downstream firms argue that the 
[T]RFMOs are the principal site for contending with deteriorating environmental conditions, 
even as those firms continue their own high-volume business models’.206 Havice and 
Campling connect this finding to the ‘well-documented failures of [TRFMOs]’,207 arguing 
that the literature on (T)RFMO performance fails to acknowledge that they ‘are indirectly 
engaging in the management of interests across tuna value chains’.208 Havice and Campling 
conclude that in this de facto role, TRFMOs ‘are not structurally designed to engage with or 
regulate the competitive dynamics of capital’.209  
In addition to their work on tuna GPNs, the thesis draws from a number of Havice and 
Campling’s other studies of ‘distributional struggles’ between DCSs and DWFSs within and 
outside of the context of TRFMOs decision-making.210 This thesis engages with Havice and 
Campling’s contention that TRFMOs are implicated in distributional struggles within tuna 
GPNs and seeks to build on their work by examining legal differentiation within TRFMOs as 
a particular locus for these distributional struggles. 
C Miller: TRFMOs and Configurations of Power in Tuna GPNs 
Miller’s study uses GPN theory to explore ‘governance innovation networks’ within tuna 
GPNs.211 As a longer form piece of research, Miller has scope to explore, from a network 
perspective, the multiplicity of actors and instruments that are involved in shaping production 
and consumption practices within tuna GPNs. In her study, Miller describes how 
 
206 Ibid 309.  
207 Ibid 302.  
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210 Havice and Campling refer repeatedly to ‘distributional struggles’ among economic actors in tuna production 
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Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 294. Havice and Campling use the concept of 
distributional struggle to describe the contested dynamics that shape value capture among states and firms 
engaged in tuna GPNs.  
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constellations of firm, state, and civil society actors have produced governance innovations 
within tuna GPNs, thereby generating new ‘choreographies of [tuna] governance’.212  
Miller shows how TRFMOs are implicated in this process through case studies in the WCPO. 
In two case studies, she shows distinct strategies pursued by different state actors to advance 
their interests in tuna GPNs. The first is a cartel of DCSs with control over the majority of 
WCPO tuna resources, collectively organised as Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA); and 
the second is the largest market actor in the region, the EU.213  
Miller discusses how strategies pursued by these actors simultaneously challenge and 
reinforce power asymmetries within tuna GPNs (and consequently within TRFMOs). In the 
first case study, Miller explains how the PNA has leveraged subregionalism through its 
collective control over tuna resources to form a symbiotic relationship between their tuna 
fishing regulations and that of the relevant TRFMO, the WCPFC.214 Miller claims the PNA’s 
efforts show ‘that for contested marine resources such as fisheries, international sub-regions 
can go beyond functional units to also present wider opportunities to shift power relations in 
the favour of small island states’.215 Miller’s work subsequently underscores the importance 
of considering tuna governance in view of distributional struggles among actors within tuna 
GPNs and how these dynamics reconfigure power in particular ways. Moreover, for the 
purposes of this thesis, Miller demonstrates that dynamics among states within the broader 
setting of tuna GPNs can play a powerful role in shaping TRFMO management decisions. 
D Connecting Distributional Struggle within Tuna GPNs to Differentiation within TRFMOs  
This thesis backgrounds its investigation of equity issues within TRFMOs with the findings 
of this small⎯but robust⎯literature on tuna GPNs. The studies on tuna GPNs clarify some 
of the ‘mediating drivers’ that shape TRFMO management decisions and how TRFMOs are 
implicated in broader distributional struggles between firms and states.216 However, the 
 
212 Ibid 138.  
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analytical focus of this thesis remains distinct from this literature, in that it focuses on state-
led transboundary tuna management. In contrast, the literature on tuna GPNs seeks to expand 
this analytical scope in studies of multiple types of actors and interactions through concepts 
like interfirm strategies and governance innovation networks.  
This thesis agrees with the central assumption of the GPN literature—namely, that a wide 
variety of actors, institutions, and instruments are involved in tuna governance. While studies 
examining non-state actors are vital to TRFMO research, this thesis’ methodological 
perspective remains focused on the relevance of power asymmetries between DCSs and 
DWFSs to differentiation within TRFMO treaty regimes.217 While non-state actors and their 
dynamics influence TRFMO negotiations, they are not directly analysed within this thesis. 
Rather, the current state of political economic knowledge on these dynamics are summarised 
to provide context and background for this thesis’s analysis of inter-state negotiations within 
TRFMOs concerning differentiation. Crucially however, this thesis remains premised on a 
basic insight of the tuna GPN literature: that TRFMOs are subject to competitive dynamics 
that occur within the broader scope of the tuna industry. 
IV OVERVIEWS OF WCPFC AND IOTC 
This section introduces the WCPFC and IOTC with an overview of each TRFMO’s mandate, 
organisational structure, mode of decision-making, and regulatory system. A few 
observations emerge from an initial comparison of the two TRFMOs. Both have a mandate 
covering large oceanic regions that abut with other TRFMOs and both are tasked with 
managing stocks of migratory species beyond the four major commercial tuna species—
albacore, bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin. The objectives set out in their founding instruments 
differ slightly however, in that the WCPFC is to ensure proper conservation, management 
and sustainable use of stocks under its mandate, whereas the IOTC is merely to promote 
cooperation among members for this purpose.  
The IOTC exhibits a more complicated organisational structure than the WCPFC, though 
both TRFMOs have a governing body that strives to adopt management decisions by 
consensus. While both TRFMOs have treaty law that provides for voting procedures, only the 
 
217 Vogler underscores the necessity of state-focused research, particularly in studying the environmental 
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IOTC has applied them to an actual management decision. In terms of regulatory systems, the 
WCPFC is more developed, having adopted measures for all WCPO tuna stocks. In addition, 
both TRFMOs have initiated policy processes to systematise their regulatory approaches. Yet 
to be concluded in either TRFMO, these processes envision the implementation of MSEs and 
allocation systems to provide long-term frameworks for science-based decision-making and 
allocations of total allowable catch (TAC) and/or effort (TAE) among members.  
A WCPFC Mandate, Organisational Structure, Decision-Making, and Regulatory System 
1 WCPFC Mandate and Convention Area 
The WCPFC has operated for 16 years. At annual sessions of its governing body, the 
WCPFC adopts binding ‘Conservation and Management Measures’ (CMMs) and non-
binding ‘Resolutions’. The Commission has 26 member states, seven Participating Territories 
and eight Cooperating Non-Members—collectively referred to as ‘CCMs’.218 The WCPF 
Convention sets out the Commission’s objective as follows: ‘[T]o ensure, through effective 
management, the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks 
in the western and central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the 1982 Convention [UNCLOS] 
and the Agreement [UNFSA]’.219  
  
 
218 See above (n 44). 
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The WCPFC’s area of application covers almost 20% of Earth’s surface, as illustrated in the 
map below. 
Figure 2: Map of WCPFC Area of Application220 
 
All ‘highly migratory fish species’ in the WCPO fall under the WCPFC’s mandate.221 Over 
time, the Commission has expanded its regulatory framework beyond commercially 
significant tuna species in the region (albacore, bigeye, Pacific Bluefin, skipjack, and 
yellowfin) to include measures on species of marlin, swordfish, sharks, and sea turtles.  
2 WCPFC Organisational Structure and Decision-Making 
The WCPFC organisational structure comprises a Commission plenary, four subsidiary 
bodies, the WCPFC Secretariat, and the WCPFC Science Provider⎯the Oceanic Fisheries 
Programme of the Pacific Community (SPC-OFP). The WCPFC’s subsidiary bodies are the 
 
220 WCPFC, Convention Area Map (Web Page, 2020) <https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/convention-area-map>. Ibid 
art 3. The eastern boundary overlaps with that of the IATTC. 
221 Ibid art 1(f). 
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Scientific Committee (SC), the Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC), the Northern 
Committee (NC) and the Finance and Administration Committee (FAC).222  
At annual sessions of the Commission plenary, members adopt CMMs to build on the 
Commission’s body of treaty law. CMMs are often the product of a program of work carried 
out by WCPFC subsidiary bodies, as well as various intersessional working groups and 
workshops convened on particular issues. Over the course of the year, these various groups 
forward recommendations to the Commission for consideration. 
The Commission strives to make all decisions by consensus.223 However, the only decisions 
where the WCPFC is legally obliged to adopt measures by consensus are those related to the 
allocation of TAC or TAE.224 To date, the WCPFC has not instituted voting procedures 
contained in the WCPF Convention225 and WCPFC Rules of Procedure (ROP)226. Where the 
WCPFC cannot reach consensus, voting procedures require a three-fourths majority of 
present and voting members. This majority is determined through a process that divides 
WCPFC members into two chambers according to whether they are members of the Pacific 
Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).227 
The WCPFC Secretariat is based in the capital island of Pohnpei in FSM. The Secretariat 
provides administrative support to all aspects of the Commission’s work.228 The Secretariat’s 
compliance division plays a pivotal role in acquiring, processing, and reporting compliance 
information to WCPFC members. Key elements of the WCPFC’s compliance framework are 
maintained and housed by the Secretariat in cooperation with other regional organisations, 
such as the FFA and SPC. These include the WCPFC Regional Observer Program, Record of 
Fishing Vessels, Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), and IUU Vessel List.229 To a lesser 
extent, the Secretariat also assists in compiling and disseminating scientific information to 
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226 WCPFC, Rules of Procedure, 1st reg sess, updated 14 December 2018, r 22(2) (‘WCPFC ROP’). 
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228 Ibid art 15(4). 
229 See WCPFC, WCPFC Monitoring, Control and Surveillance (MCS) and Compliance Monitoring (Web Page, 
8 August 2019) <https://www.wcpfc.int/wcpfc-monitoring-control-and-surveillance-mcs-scheme>. 
67 
 
members. The Secretariat also publishes a quarterly newsletter reporting on recent activities 
of the Commission and maintains its website.  
3 WCPFC Regulatory System 
The WCPFC currently makes management decisions on an iterative, ad-hoc basis at its 
annual sessions. The Commission has yet to institute a pre-agreed system for deriving catch 
and effort limits or distributing allocations of these limits to its membership.230 This means 
that, in relation to catch and effort limits, the Commission generally adopts short-term 
measures on the basis of the most recent advice from its SC.  
The most powerful regulatory measure the WCPFC has adopted to date is its ‘tropical tunas 
measure’, which covers approximately 75% of tuna catches in the WCPO region.231 This 
measure was first adopted in 2006 and has since been regularly revised by the Commission. 
Its current iteration, CMM 2018-01, outlines a complex regulatory system for the tropical 
purse seine and longline tuna fisheries in the WCPO.232 This includes a combination of catch 
and effort limits for multiple gears, species, and geographic areas.233 Crucially, CMM 2018-
01 incorporates EEZ catch and effort limits that PICs have adopted sub-regionally.234 While 
the jurisdictional purview of the Commission over EEZ tuna resources remains a source of 
debate, the WCPFC’s current practice is to incorporate these existing limits into the tropical 
tunas measure. The high seas catch and effort limits in CMM 2018-01 are largely based on 
WCPFC members’ historical fishing activities. This is common practice across TRFMOs and 
reflects the absence of systematic approaches to deriving and distributing long-term limits 
among members. 
As the Introduction discussed, most TRFMOs, including the WCPFC, have made efforts to 
develop allocation systems and harvest strategies.235 In this regard, CMM 2018-01 commits 
the Commission to adopting a formal allocation system in the near term.236 Since 2014, the 
 
230 Cf above (n 24). 
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and Central Pacific Ocean, CMM 2018-01, 15th reg sess, 10−14 December 2018 (‘CMM 2018-01’).  
233 Ibid att 1.  
234 Ibid.  
235 See above (n 24).  
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Commission has embarked on a process to develop harvest strategies for all major 
commercial tuna stocks in the WCPO.237 CMM 2014-06 identifies specific elements of the 
Commission’s harvest strategy approach.238 While the Commission has made substantial 
progress on parts of the harvest strategy work program in recent years, two core elements 
where progress has stalled are the adoption of target reference points (TRPs) and 
management objectives.239 While the WCPFC has approved limit reference points (LRPs) for 
the WCPO’s four major commercial tuna stocks, members have only managed to agree to 
interim TRPs for skipjack and South Pacific albacore (SPA). The WCPFC has also not yet 
established important management objectives as part of the harvest strategies for these stocks, 
despite convening four Management Objectives workshops for this purpose between 2012 
and 2014.240 
B IOTC Mandate, Organisational Structure, Decision-Making, and Regulatory System 
1 IOTC Mandate and Area of Competence 
The IOTC has been the primary tuna management body in the IO for 24 years and is the only 
TRFMO established under the FAO legal framework. Like the WCPFC, the IOTC’s 
governing body meets annually to adopt binding ‘Resolutions’ and non-binding 
‘Recommendations’. The IOTC was established through the IOTC Agreement, which sets out 
its mandate to ‘promote cooperation among [its] Members with a view to ensuring, through 
appropriate management, the conservation and optimum utilization … and sustainable 
development of fisheries’ for 16 tuna and tuna-like species in the IO.241  
  
 
237 See WCPFC, WCPFC Harvest Strategy (Web Page, 2 December 2019) <https://www.wcpfc.int/harvest-
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The IOTC’s area of application is divided by the Commission into the Western IO and 
Eastern IO, illustrated in the map below. 
Figure 3: IOTC Area of Competence242 
 
The IOTC has 31 members and two Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties—referred to as 
‘CPCs’.243 The IOTC has struggled to incorporate a major DWFS—Taiwan—into its 
membership as a result of its association with FAO, which does not recognise Taiwan’s 
statehood as separate from mainland China.244 With delegates attending IOTC meetings as 
‘invited experts’, Taiwan is not officially subject to IOTC regulations, though it harvests the 
largest longline catch in the region.  
2 IOTC Organisational Structure and Decision-Making 
 
242 IOTC, IOTC Area of Competence (Web Page, 2020) <https://www.iotc.org/about-iotc/competence>. Ibid art. 
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The IOTC exhibits a more complicated organisational structure than the WCPFC. It is 
comprised of a Commission plenary, three subsidiary bodies, two technical committees, eight 
working parties, and the IOTC Secretariat. The IOTC subsidiary bodies are the Scientific 
Committee (SC), Compliance Committee (CoC), and Committee on Administration and 
Finance (SCAF). The technical committees are the Technical Committee on Management 
Procedures (TCMP), and the Technical Committee on Allocation Criteria (TCAC). In 
addition, the IOTC has established eight standing working parties, which it divides into 
scientific and non-scientific subjects. Seven scientific working parties are administered by the 
SC, which oversees an extensive work program on the following topics: tropical tunas 
(WPTT); temperate tunas (WPTmT); neritic tunas (WPNT); billfish (WPB); methods 
(WPM); data collection and statistics (WPDCS); and ecosystems and bycatch (WPEB).245 
While SC meetings provide a forum to adopt recommendations for the Commission, its 
working parties are where most work is accomplished. An eighth, non-scientific working 
party was established in 2017 to promote implementation and compliance with IOTC 
measures (WPICMM).246  
Similar to the WCPFC, annual sessions of the IOTC plenary adopt measures to elaborate 
IOTC treaty law. While the IOTC strives to adopt measures by consensus like other 
TRFMOs, it is the only TRFMO to have ever adopted a measure through voting 
procedures.247According to the IOTC Agreement, binding Resolutions must be adopted by a 
two-thirds majority of members present and voting.248 Non-binding Recommendations on the 
other hand only require a simple majority.249 Unlike other TRFMOs, the IOTC allows 
members to submit a formal objection, whereby they may choose not to be bound by a 
particular measure.250  
The IOTC Secretariat began operations in 1998 and is located in Victoria, the capital of 
Seychelles, on the island of Mahé. It is involved in acquiring, processing, and disseminating 
scientific and compliance information that inform IOTC decisions as well as supporting their 
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implementation. The function of the Secretariat comprises six major areas: support to 
scientific activities; support to compliance activities; communications and public 
information; support to meetings; information technology; and administration.251  
3 IOTC Regulatory System 
Like the WCPFC, the IOTC does not systematise its management decisions, but adopts 
Resolutions on an ad-hoc basis at its annual sessions. Unlike the WCPFC, however, the IOTC 
does not have measures in place for most of the tuna and tuna-like species under its mandate. 
To date, the IOTC has adopted three active Resolutions that restrict catches of yellowfin, 
skipjack, and four species of billfish.  
These Resolutions display varied management approaches. The yellowfin Resolution, which 
is part of an interim rebuilding plan, caps significant catches of yellowfin at different levels 
for various gears using 2014 and 2015 as reference years.252 The skipjack Resolution sets a 
harvest control rule, along with a LRP and TRP, to generate a total catch allocation to be 
distributed among IOTC members.253 The Resolution on species of billfish sets direct, annual 
limits for overall catches of striped, black, and blue marlin, and Indo Pacific Sailfish.254  
To address this ad-hoc and sparse collection of Resolutions, two processes are underway at 
the IOTC to develop a more systematic approach to: (i) scientifically informed decision-
making for setting TAC; and (ii) a transparent and equitable distribution of TAC among 
members. The technical committees mentioned above were established to address these two 
objectives. The IOTC established the TCMP in 2016 after a series of ‘Science and 
Management Dialogue Workshops’.255 It is tasked with systematising the IOTC’s 
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reg sess, 23−27 May 2016 (‘Resolution 16/02’). Due to an objection, Australia is not subject to this measure.   
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management approach through tools like MSEs. The TCAC was established in 2011 to guide 
negotiations on an IOTC quota allocation system.256  
Finally, the IOTC has endeavoured to limit the number of fishing vessels, or ‘fleet capacity’ 
in the IOTC Area of Competence through four Resolutions. More recently, these negotiations 
have suffered a setback, partly due to stalled negotiations for allocation criteria. The currently 
active Resolution caps the number of vessels at 2003 levels.257 In 2009, the IOTC required 
members with aspirations to develop or increase their fleet size to submit a ‘Fleet 
Development Plan’ (FDP).258 As of 2018, 19 IOTC members had submitted FDPs, the 
majority of which were IOCs.259 In 2018, Resolution 15/11 elapsed, so that caps on fishing 
capacity reverted to those set out in Resolution 03/01.260 It is unclear how the IOTC plans to 
address fishing capacity in the future.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter draws on fisheries management, international law, and political economy 
literatures to illuminate different facets of intragenerational equity in TRFMOs. It 
demonstrates that the fisheries management literature on TRFMO performance understates 
the impact of distributional issues in tuna fisheries on policy outcomes. As a result, equity in 
TRFMOs is an underdeveloped area of inquiry. Hanich and Ota provide an early attempt to 
discuss TRFMOs’ legal obligations with respect to equity issues. However, their conservation 
burden methodology is curiously similar to neoliberal solutions—such as rights-based 
management—offered by other studies. These solutions provide a technocratic response that 
elides, rather than addresses, intragenerational equity in TRFMOs.  
Looking to the international law literature on equity in IFL and differentiation in international 
environmental treaty regimes, the chapter boundaries this thesis’ analytical focus. As the 
Introduction states, this thesis’ objective is to examine intragenerational equity in TRFMOs 
 
256 IOTC, For the Conservation and Management of Tropical Tuna Stocks in the IOTC Area of Competence, 
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through the design and application of differentiation advantaging DCSs. This chapter 
distinguishes this analytical focus—which encompasses TRFMO members’ rights and 
responsibilities with respect to tuna fisheries—from CBDR. The chapter also traces the 
outlines of finer distinctions among differentiation provisions as they apply to central 
obligations, implementation, assistance, and institutional law.  
Finally, this chapter draws from political economy research to introduce the concept of a tuna 
GPN, showing that research indicates TRFMOs are implicated in distributional struggles 
among actors in the tuna industry. The chapter also sets out an initial overview and 
comparison of the WCPFC and IOTC, which demonstrates their distinct mandates and 
reveals that the WCPFC has a more developed regulatory system. The next chapter draws on 
this background to delve into the first phase of the thesis’ analysis of how IFL and TRFMO 
treaty law design differentiation.   
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CHAPTER 2: DIFFERENTIATION ADVANTAGING DEVELOPING 
COASTAL STATES IN INTERNATIONAL FISHERIES LAW 
Historically, differentiation has been enmeshed in the exercise of state power through 
international law. More recently, states have used differentiation as an instrument to stabilise 
legal relations between developing and industrialised states. In international environmental 
treaty regimes, differentiation plays an increasingly prominent role in brokering the diverging 
interests of these states.  
Differentiation in IFL functions similarly to balance the interests of DCSs and DWFSs. 
However, scholars of differentiation struggle to provide a common definition and display a 
surprising variety of ways to conceptualise it. Recognising the mutable quality of 
differentiation in international law, this chapter analyses how UNCLOS, UNFSA, and the 
treaty law of the WCPFC and IOTC provide for differentiation advantaging DCSs.  
This chapter argues that the development of IFL has led to a fragmented framework for 
differentiation. The fisheries instruments in this analysis set out distinct approaches to 
differentiation which have been heavily shaped by the historical periods in which they were 
adopted. UNCLOS and UNFSA display consistent, though separate, applications of 
differentiation to two topics: (i) conservation and management of transboundary fish stocks; 
and (ii) special assistance to developing states. While UNCLOS uses differentiation primarily 
to contextualise obligations, UNFSA establishes differentiation⎯in the form of the general 
principle of the ‘special requirements of developing states’⎯as an independent obligation 
with its own legal force.  
This chapter derives eight major principles for differentiation across UNCLOS and UNFSA. It 
then draws from these principles to identify three objectives for in IFL (first set out in this 
thesis’ Introduction).261 These objectives are: (i) the effective participation of DCSs in 
transboundary fisheries management; (ii) the protection of vulnerable and fisheries dependent 
populations within DCSs; and (iii) the promotion of DCSs’ access to high seas fisheries.   
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This chapter assesses the treaty law of the WCPFC and IOTC and demonstrates that both 
TRFMOs apply differentiation to their management decisions, decision-making, and internal 
processes. Apart from this basic similarity, however, the WCPFC and IOTC exhibit 
contrasting differentiation frameworks. Grounded in principles of transboundary fisheries 
management from UNFSA, the WCPFC differentiation framework is modern and elaborate. It 
is based on a framework obligation in the WCPF Convention recognising the special 
requirements of developing members, particularly those that are SIDS, territories, and 
possessions. Furthermore, the WCPFC differentiation framework balances the application of 
differentiation to all three areas of WCPFC management decisions, decision-making, and 
internal processes. By comparison, the IOTC differentiation framework is modelled on 
UNCLOS and contains no reference to special requirements in the IOTC Agreement. In 
comparison to the WCPFC, the IOTC differentiation framework is less elaborate and heavily 
weighted to focus on IOTC internal processes.  
Section I of this chapter chronicles how treaty regimes have used modern differentiation to 
achieve compromises in legal relations between developing and industrialised states. The 
section also reviews the differentiation literature to identify five central characteristics of 
differentiation in treaty regimes. Sections II and III set out detailed analyses of differentiation 
in IFL and WCPFC and IOTC treaty law. With a map of differentiation advantaging DCSs in 
hand, this chapter concludes with substantial legal evidence for TRFMOs and their members 
to address equity issues through differentiation in their work. 
I BACKGROUND ON DIFFERENTIATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A History of Differentiation in International Law 
Differentiation has a long and divisive history in international law. States have used 
differentiation where extra-legal factors require a treaty regime to strategically advantage one 
or more states. In early international law, differentiation served the interests of colonial 
powers.262 More recently, it has addressed the special circumstances of developing states.263 
As a legal tool, differentiation has proven resilient to several transformations in international 
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law and survives as a common practice in treaty regimes today. The following section argues 
three shifts can be observed in how states have historically used differentiation. These shifts 
provide evidence that differentiation has played a historical role in the exercise of state power 
through international law. 
1 Shift I: Early Uses of Differentiation in Unequal Treaties 
Differentiation was first used in unequal treaties in the mid to late 19th century. During this 
period, unequal treaties were imposed by powerful states as a form of legal subjugation.264 
The earliest examples of differentiation are set out in a series of unequal treaties concluded 
primarily between Western and East Asian states, including Japan, Siam (now Thailand) and 
China.265 Craven examines similarities in the use of differentiation within these treaties to 
advantage Western states through favourable trade terms, the granting or leasing of land to 
foreign enterprises, and special protections for foreign nationals and missionaries.266 Craven 
observes that multilateral differentiation—or the large-scale, non-reciprocal nature of these 
unequal treaties—distinguished them from earlier forms of legal subjugation found in treaties 
with the Ottoman Empire, North Africa, and Asia.267  
While notable, the pre-modern use of differentiation in unequal treaties is not typically 
included in accounts of the history of differentiation in international law.268 The reason for 
this omission may be attributed to a wider disciplinary understanding that unequal treaties are 
not considered valid agreements under modern international law.269 Craven argues that legal 
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scholars are reluctant to revisit these treaties and the broader questions they invite concerning 
power asymmetries and notions of equality in treaty relations among states.270 While 
differentiation is associated with unequal treaties, it is not typically considered in light of its 
role in colonial power relations by differentiation scholars like Rajamani and Cullet.  
De Jonge discusses early differentiation in unequal treaties in her genealogy of scholarly 
discourse on ‘equality and inequality in treaty relations’.271 She tracks how states and 
scholars have discussed equality through time, from its negation in unequal treaties to its 
transformation into differentiation provisions within international trade and environmental 
treaty regimes. De Jonge claims that while international law has never sought to produce 
equality among states, over time it has evolved to prevent the most ‘egregious forms of 
inequality’, particularly in the areas of bargaining power and freedom of consent during 
treaty formation.272 She argues that over this evolution, scholarly focus has shifted from 
‘highlight[ing] the injustices of the (mostly bilateral) “unequal treaties” signed during the pre-
war colonial era’ to ‘the need to develop tools for ensuring that the burden of tackling global 
problems such as climate change were shared between parties in a manner that was perceived 
to be “just”, if not technically “equal” by parties to the relevant (multilateral) treaty’.273 This 
shift, highlighted in the historical arc drawn by De Jonge, demonstrates how historical uses of 
differentiation have often been enmeshed in the exercise of power and politics through 
international law.  
2 Shift II: Differentiation Favouring Developing States in the International Law of 
Development and New International Economic Order (NIEO) Movement 
Most scholarship on differentiation in international law begins with the mid-20th century as 
broader transformations were rippling through the inter-state system.274 Decolonisation 
following World War II (roughly between 1945 and 1960) initiated a mass withdrawal of 
colonial rule and the formal emancipation of three dozen newly-formed states across Asia 
and Africa. The creation of these states introduced a new dimension to global politics, in 
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which complex and tense relations arose along a deep socio-economic fault line partitioning 
the newly branded ‘international community’.275 This division has been variously described 
as the difference between ‘third and first worlds’ or a ‘global North and South’ and remains, 
in various guises, a defining feature of the global political landscape today.276 At the 
precipice of this transformation, formerly colonised and dependent states organised to pursue 
a collective political program that recognised their experiences of colonial rule and the 
disadvantages and obstacles to their economic development moving forward.277  
Early examples of activism among these states were primarily focused on the achievement of 
substantive equality. Developing states highlighted a rupture between the traditional dogma 
of formal equality in international law and the persistence of unequal economic conditions 
and trade relations among states.278 De Jonge points out that concerns for substantive equality 
emerged as early as the drafting and adoption of the UN Charter in 1945. De Jonge shows 
that both Mexico and Brazil raised issues concerning whether over time, treaties might 
‘become unjust’ while appearing formally equal.279 In two interventions, these states advised 
that the UN General Assembly (UNGA) be given powers to revise or terminate a treaty if 
such a case eventuated.280 While unsuccessful, these arguments demarcate an early example 
of developing states drawing considerations of equality and justice into the orbit of formal 
international law. 
Ultimately, the incorporation of formal differentiation into international trade law marked the 
earliest successes of developing state activism during this period. The gradual incorporation 
of ‘special and differential treatment’ provisions into international trade law began with the 
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Havana Charter in 1948.281 A few years later, between 1954 and 1955, the WTO modified an 
article of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to allow specific trade 
concessions for developing states.282 The revision applied to developing states ‘which can 
only support low standards of living and are in the early stages of development’.283 
Recognising that these states may ‘implement programmes and policies of economic 
development designed to raise the general standard of living of their people’, the modification 
applied to tariff protections for the establishment of new industries and quantitative 
restrictions for balance of payment purposes.284 Notably, this example of differentiation was 
the first in international law to allow developing states to derogate from binding obligations 
on the basis of economic disadvantage. 
Over the ensuing decade of the 1960s, developments in international trade regulation further 
advanced differentiation explicitly advantaging developing states.285 These developments 
took place within a transformed international political and legal context, where theory and 
praxis on economic divisions within the international community had reached a critical mass 
and were emerging at the forefront of negotiations for various international legal 
instruments.286   
In the 1960s, developing states and an emerging school of primarily French legal scholars 
began to advocate for a new ‘international law of development’, or Droit International du 
developpement.287 This school presented a revised approach to international law and included 
differentiation as one of a number of key principles undergirding it.288 At its core, the 
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international law of development challenged former conceptions of sovereignty, equality, and 
substantive reciprocity in legal relations among states.  
Indeed, in her account of the international law of development, Rajamani argues that 
differentiation was essential to the vision elaborated by legal scholars. She claims that a 
central figure, Maurice Flory 
envisaged that most multilateral treaties dealing with economic matters would distinguish 
between developed and developing countries, in order to settle different rules of treatment for 
each of them. Instead of one single set of regulations for all kinds of states and instead of a 
single body of rules, there would be a multiplicity of rules.289  
Ultimately, the concept of differentiation as rule rather than exception invited some of the 
strongest challenges to advocates of the international law of development. Essentially, legal 
scholars were divided on how this use of differentiation complicated the relationship between 
international law and state practice. Rajamani documents how critics levelled accusations that 
the school confused lex lata and lex ferenda (that is, the law as it is, and the law as it should 
be) and in doing so undermined the stability of the international legal order.290 In contrast, 
advocates claimed that differentiation was already so pervasive a practice within treaty 
regimes that this was merely an exercise in resolving lex generalis and lex specialis (that is, 
the law governing general and specific matters).291  
Despite its critics, the movement to transform modern international law gathered momentum, 
and by the 1970s, developing states began calling for a ‘New International Economic Order’ 
(NIEO). Drawing from the political power of their voting majority in the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA), developing states facilitated the adoption of a number of international 
legal instruments within the framework of a concrete political program. This political 
program was inspired by a dawning reality that decades after decolonisation, many former 
colonies continued to experience underdevelopment despite continuing aid from former 
colonisers.292  
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Developing state cooperation formed the basis of the NIEO movement. During this period, 
developing states engaged in patterns of cooperation that strengthened their negotiating 
positions in international fora. Initially, this cooperation focused on international recognition 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. In 1962, developing state activism led to the 
adoption of a UNGA resolution entitled Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.293 
By 1967, developing state cooperation was formalised in the first Ministerial Meeting of the 
G-77 and documented in the Charter of Algiers.294 In 1974, the NIEO was formally 
promulgated in three nonbinding instruments passed by the UNGA. These instruments were 
the Declaration on the Establishment of the NIEO, the Programme of Action on the 
Establishment of a NIEO, and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.295  
Through the NIEO program, developing states campaigned for an international legal regime 
that supported their economic needs and autonomy concerning trade and debt-related issues. 
This was to be achieved through positive discrimination and non-reciprocity in the law, both 
of which would take the form of express differentiation advantaging developing states.296 
Perhaps most notably, the NIEO movement proposed that differentiation would 
operationalise its call for distributive justice among developing and industrialised states.297  
The NIEO movement was the first effort to address economic disparities between developing 
and industrialised states through international law. However, the fading of the NIEO 
movement underscored that industrialised states were not prepared to accept non-reciprocal 
legal obligations to address structural economic issues.298 By the 1990s, the rhetoric of the 
NIEO movement lapsed into disuse in political discourse and was absent from even 
seemingly relevant UNGA resolutions on economic cooperation and development.299 
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Explanations for the demise of the NIEO movement include the declining legitimacy of 
UNGA resolutions, the debt crisis in 1982 and greater economic globalization and 
liberalization following the collapse of the Soviet Union.300 Whatever the reason for its 
decline, the NIEO established a role for differentiation in legal contestation between 
developing and industrialised states.  
3 Shift III: Modern Uses of Differentiation in International Environmental Regimes 
Scholars contend that differentiation did not expire with the fading of the NIEO movement. 
Rather, Cullet and Rajamani claim that while differentiation has declined in the wider 
political landscape of general international law, it has been resurrected and is rising in 
importance within specific regimes in IEL.  
After the NIEO movement, both scholars note the absorption of NIEO themes into the arena 
of human rights law and the gradual dilution of differentiation in international trade law.301 
During the same period, states began to formally recognise their increased ecological and 
economic interdependency.302  The dual spectres of a rising number of international 
environmental issues and increasingly complex economic links forged through globalisation 
highlighted this interdependency at the close of the 20th century. Locked into conditions of 
interdependence, states realised their common need, but unequal capacities, to address 
environmental problems. Within this context, differentiation developed into a vital aspect of 
cooperation on international environmental problems between developing and industrialised 
states. Differentiation played an integral role in acknowledging and addressing asymmetries 
among states with respect to their financial and technological resources, levels of economic 
development, and contributions to environmental problems.303 
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The connection established in this period between environmental protection and economic 
development are evident in foundational instruments of IEL such as the Stockholm 
Declaration and the Rio Declaration.304 For example, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration 
prefaces its list of Principles with an acknowledgement of the under-development of 
developing countries and its relationship to environmental problems; provides an early 
definition of the inter-related concepts of intergenerational and intragenerational equity; and 
calls on international cooperation to support developing states in addressing their 
environmental responsibilities.305 Beyond these prefatory references, Principles 8 through 12 
establish a basis for regarding environmental and economic development issues as inter-
related.306 In addition, Principles 20 and 23 set out early rationales for differentiation in IEL 
concerning the need for scientific research and development in developing countries and for 
considering whether the application of standards to address environmental problems would 
transfer an ‘unwarranted social cost’ onto developing countries.307  
Decades later, the early thinking that braided environmental and economic concerns together 
in the Stockholm Declaration was further formalised in the Rio Declaration. Principles 3 and 
4 asserted the ‘right to development’ and defined the concept of ‘sustainable development’ as 
a marriage of environmental protection and economic development.308 Principle 6 prioritised 
the special situation and needs of developing countries, while Principle 11 restated the need 
to consider whether standards impose an ‘inappropriate’ and ‘unwarranted economic and 
social cost’ to developing countries in particular.309 Lastly, the Rio Declaration instantiated 
the principle of CBDR in IEL for the first time in Principle 7, which stated that ‘States have 
common but differentiated responsibilities’ with respect to the global environment.310 Cullet 
and Rajamani point to these and other important issue-specific instruments such as the 
Montreal Protocol and UNFCC as evidence of differentiation’s roots in IEL. Against this 
historical backdrop, differentiation advantaging developing states has played a key role in 
shaping TRFMO treaty regimes today.   
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B History of Differentiation in Negotiations for IFL Instruments 
Couched within the broader landscape of international law, international fisheries instruments 
show a subtle shift in how states have approached differentiation within the context of 
transboundary fisheries management. The following section examines the negotiating 
histories of UNCLOS and UNFSA to show how rules and principles regarding the application 
of differentiation to fisheries management have changed over time. A transition can be 
observed from more general calls for fish stocks to play a role in redistributing wealth among 
states in UNCLOS in the 1970s and 1980s, to focused and specific requests for assistance 
with implementation and capacity building in fisheries management in UNFSA in the 1990s. 
Some elements of differentiation in IFL have remained more constant however, such as 
references to the special interests and needs of developing states as defined by considerations 
for food security and coastal state dependency on fish stocks.  
1 UNCLOS III, Developing State Activism and Differentiation Based on Coastal State 
Dependence 
(a) Historical Context for UNCLOS Negotiations: UNCLOS III and the NIEO  
The provisions on transboundary fish stocks within the 1982 UNCLOS are a product of a 
wider negotiation that occurred between developed and industrialised states concerning the 
distribution of ocean resources. To describe the contours of negotiations for these specific 
provisions, it is necessary to outline the broader negotiating context, of which living marine 
resources were only a part. The text of UNCLOS was negotiated over a nine-year period at 
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), between 1973 
and 1982.311 Contemporaneous with the rise of the NIEO movement, this period observed 
growing political activism among developing states for a more equitable global economic 
system. UNCLOS III heralded the Convention as a new legal order for the oceans and set the 
stage for developing state activism to permeate the area of oceans law.312 Indeed, within 
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oceans law, developing state activism at UNCLOS III distinguished negotiating conditions 
from earlier attempts to form a legal order for the oceans under the UN.313  
(b) UNCLOS III Negotiations: Procedures, Food Security, and Coastal State Dependence 
The altered political climate for UNCLOS III was apparent in how the Conference 
established its negotiating procedures. Okereke observes that these procedures reflected an 
aspiration to broker balanced negotiations between developing and industrialised states.314 
These included the notion of the Convention as a ‘package deal’, consensus decision-making, 
and developing state representation in the leadership of various committees.315 Perhaps as a 
testament to their value, these procedures continue to be used within TRFMOs today.316 As a 
result of the rise of developing state activism during UNCLOS III, one could argue (as 
Okereke has) that UNCLOS III ‘was the very first global environmental conference where 
contestations for international justice played a major role in shaping discussions, text and 
policies’.317  
Developing state activism during UNCLOS III concentrated on creating an equitable 
worldwide allocation of marine resources (both living and mineral). With respect to fisheries, 
this activism focused primarily on the special interests of developing states in fisheries 
resources due to increasing food security concerns.318 Developing states argued that under 
conditions of rising populations and entrenched underdevelopment, it would be necessary to 
draw on fisheries resources to meet forecasted gaps in world food supply.319 These concerns 
were poignantly captured in discussions about the equitable incorporation of land-locked and 
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geographically disadvantaged states into the new legal framework.320 During discussions of 
UNCLOS III’s Second and Third Committees, developing states underscored the present and 
future significance of fisheries to their national food resources.321  
Developing states’ claims were framed by significant changes being made to extend coastal 
state jurisdiction at the time. The emergence of the EEZ concept leading up to UNCLOS III 
partly resulted from momentum generated by a series of individual and regional EEZ 
declarations issued by DCSs across Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East.322 While 
these jurisdictional claims to the use of ocean space were made with the ‘organic unity of 
living and non-living marine resources’ in mind, fisheries resources were a core consideration 
for developing states.323 Following the expansion of industrial-scale fishing practices after 
World War II, many DCSs were disturbed by the increasing number and efficiency of foreign 
fishing vessels operating off their coasts.324 These states argued that coastal fishing 
communities, dependent upon fisheries resources and using traditional fishing technology, 
could not compete with foreign, industrial-scale fishing operations.325  
The dual concerns for food security and coastal state dependence were not new issues to 
international fisheries negotiations. These concerns were raised as early as the first United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in 1958.326 Adopted at UNCLOS I, 
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas 
prioritised food security in its objectives section (albeit in the non-binding phrase ‘should’) 
stating that ‘Conservation programmes should be formulated with a view to securing in the 
first place a supply of food for human consumption’.327 At the same Conference, states 
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adopted a Resolution on ‘Special situations relating to coastal fisheries’.328 The Resolution 
described populations ‘overwhelmingly dependent upon coastal fisheries for their livelihood 
or economic development’ and recommended that measures to limit fish stocks, ‘recognize 
any preferential requirements of the coastal State resulting from its dependence’.329 The 
notion of preferential coastal state rights to fish stocks became an increasingly complicated 
point in future negotiations and remains a source of debate in negotiations on catch 
allocations in IFL today.330 
(c) Differentiation in UNCLOS: The Zonal Approach and the Special Requirements of 
Developing States  
UNCLOS III negotiators ultimately devised a highly ambiguous, and in places conflicting, 
legal framework for the conservation and utilisation of marine living resources that sought to 
strike a balance between DCSs and traditional DWFSs.331 Widespread acceptance of the 200 
nautical mile (nm) EEZ concept during UNCLOS III negotiations rendered questions 
surrounding shared fish stocks less relevant, as it was believed that the new regime would 
place up to 99% of fisheries resources under coastal state jurisdiction.332 Negotiators believed 
management of the remaining 1% of high seas fish stocks would be unproblematic, merely 
posing a technical question for fisheries managers seeking to manage fish stocks throughout 
their range.333 As for differentiation, UNCLOS introduced the foundational concept of the 
‘special requirements of developing states’.334 These requirements were to be considered in 
state-led conservation and management of marine living resources both within EEZs and the 
high seas. The language of developing states’ ‘requirements’, which reflects language from 
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the Stockholm Declaration, indicate how broader international discourse on the environment 
conditioned UNCLOS III negotiations.335 
The zonal framework of maritime boundaries set out in UNCLOS, which included coastal 
state rights to EEZ fisheries resources and freedom of fishing on the high seas, helped shape 
the tenuous balance between coastal and DWFS interests. Negotiators feared that further 
elaboration of the framework on living marine resources would threaten the equilibrium 
devised in UNCLOS between these two groups. As a result, Balton claims, ‘Relatively little 
attention flowed to the development of rules concerning fishing on the high seas or rules for 
living marine resources occurring in both areas’.336 In the years after UNCLOS was adopted, 
it became increasingly apparent that the level of ambiguity within the provisions on living 
marine resources would come to threaten the stability of the overall UNCLOS legal 
framework.  
2 UNFSA Negotiations: Implementing Fisheries-Related Provisions within UNCLOS 
(a) Historical Context for UNFSA Negotiations 
Similar to UNCLOS, UNFSA was shaped by the era and political context in which its text was 
negotiated. The need for an UNCLOS implementing agreement on fisheries emerged after a 
series of conflicts between coastal states and DWFSs revealed weaknesses in UNCLOS 
provisions concerning tuna and other migratory fish stocks.337 UNFSA negotiations were 
instigated by states with existing interests in migratory fish stocks, which at the time were 
largely coastal states from the Northern hemisphere and Latin America.338 Consequently, 
UNFSA negotiations tended not to contour around distributive issues for developing states as 
they had during UNCLOS III.339  
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UNFSA negotiations occurred towards the end of the 20th century, during the third shift in 
states’ use of differentiation and the introduction of the concept of sustainable development. 
In particular, UNFSA negotiations were viewed by some negotiators as originating and 
operating under the broader context of the work on sustainable development being 
undertaken by the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development 
(UNCED).340 Despite this setting, development issues were not the focus of negotiations. 
Instead distributive and procedural issues for developing states were discussed primarily in 
relation to the principle of the special requirements of developing states. Under this principle, 
states focused on specific areas of assistance for developing states which would enable them 
to participate both in the conservation and management, and crucially, in the sustainable use 
of migratory fisheries. Ultimately, differentiation in UNFSA reflects this focus on the special 
requirements of developing states and marks a shift away from NIEO-era themes of 
redistributive justice for developing states. 
(b) Conflicts Between Coastal States and DWFSs Lead to UNFSA Negotiations  
In the years following the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982, coastal states became increasingly 
frustrated with the actions of DWFSs concerning straddling fish stocks.341 Coastal states 
argued that fisheries management undertaken in their EEZs was being undermined by fishing 
activities in adjacent high seas areas. A number of these coastal states proposed further 
extension of their marine jurisdiction to ensure adequate management of migratory fish 
stocks.342 Frictions between coastal states and DWFSs escalated so that policy makers feared 
it may undermine the newly formed UNCLOS framework. During this time, Balton argued 
that ‘Heightened tensions over straddling and highly migratory fish stocks represent the most 
destabilising force in the modern law of the sea’.343  
Meanwhile, technological developments in the fishing sector that were not anticipated at the 
time of UNCLOS negotiations had also enabled DWFS fleets to significantly enhance their 
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efficiency and mobility.344 Fleets supposedly displaced by the new zonal framework were 
now intensively harvesting high seas fisheries and accounting for a far greater percentage of 
world catch.345 Furthermore, alarming trends in world fisheries were becoming increasingly 
apparent in the decade after the adoption of UNCLOS.346 Consensus began to develop in 
policy making spaces that there was an impending ‘crisis’ in world fisheries.347 For these 
reasons, several states, galvanised by Canada and Chile, began to consider negotiating an 
implementing agreement of UNCLOS for migratory fish stocks.348  
(c) UNFSA Negotiation Process 
The first step towards a migratory fish stocks agreement was undertaken through Agenda 21, 
a landmark document adopted by the UNCED in 1992.349 Chapter 17 called for an 
intergovernmental conference to be convened on high seas fisheries.350 Later that year, this 
request was followed up by the adoption of a UNGA Resolution. At its 47th session, the 
UNGA adopted Res 47/192, which contained a mandate for states to convene the ‘United 
Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’.351   
Leading up to the Conference, tensions increased between coastal states and DWFSs with 
interests in migratory fish stocks.352 Coastal states such as Argentina, Canada, Chile, Iceland, 
Norway, Peru, and Russia argued that a binding treaty should be negotiated at the Conference 
which would place new restrictions on high seas fishing activities.353 Conversely, DWFSs 
such as EU, Japan, Korea, China, and Poland argued that the Conference should produce non-
binding guidelines on fisheries management to apply within EEZs and high seas.354 While 
non-Latin American DCSs were not hugely implicated in these conflicts, their interests were 
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raised at two technical conferences held in preparation for the Conference, which noted the 
challenges developing states face to participating in high seas fisheries.355 
With the stage set tenuously for an agreement, negotiations were convened over the course of 
six Conference sessions between 1993 and 1995. Initially, considerable debate was held over 
the legal status of the agreement to be negotiated. Some states argued that a new fisheries 
instrument might be inconsistent with the UNCLOS right of freedom of fishing on the high 
seas.356 Coastal states and DWFSs were of considerably divergent minds regarding whether 
any agreement coming out of the Conference would be binding or non-binding.357 Eventually, 
a compromise was reached. DWFSs agreed to the negotiation of a binding treaty. Coastal 
states agreed that the new treaty would require regulatory measures within their EEZs that 
were compatible with improved controls on fishing activities in the high seas.358 In 1995, 
UNFSA was adopted at the final session of the Conference and entered into force in 2001. 
(d) Developing State Scepticism and UNFSA 
In contrast to UNCLOS III, developing states were not a major negotiating bloc in 
Conference sessions. After the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982, many developing states faced 
difficulties participating in fisheries for migratory fish stocks.359 Lacking active fishing 
interests in the conflicts impacting migratory fish stocks, a large number of DCSs did not 
actively participate in UNFSA negotiations. Sydnes observes:  
Most developing countries had a low-key role during the UN Fish Stocks Conference...If one 
analyses the list of documents from the UN Fish Stocks Conference, Africa was virtually 
absent, as were the Asian coastal States without distant water fishing interests and a number 
of Latin American States.360  
Sydnes argues that among DCSs, there was also ‘a general scepticism towards the regional 
approach’ espoused during UNFSA negotiations.361 DCSs feared that entering into regional 
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arrangements to manage migratory fish stocks with DWFSs would undermine their sovereign 
rights to living marine resources within EEZs. In the absence of the redistribution of 
economic benefits from marine resources heralded by states at UNCLOS III, UNFSA 
negotiations reflected the existing balance of power among fishing states at the end of the 20th 
century.   
(e) Differentiation in UNFSA: The Principle of the Special Requirements of Developing 
States 
Despite the conspicuous lack of developing state participation, differentiation was discussed 
during UNFSA negotiations and incorporated into the final agreement. At the second session 
of the Conference in July 1993, several PICs and Australia submitted a document on the 
‘Special requirements of developing countries in relation to straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks’.362 This document represented the first attempt to define the special 
requirements of developing states in IFL. 
This submission significantly influenced Part VII on the ‘Requirements of Developing States’ 
of UNFSA. The document is prefaced with references to the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 
which acknowledge the special needs of developing states, particularly SIDS.363 In this 
respect, the document states that ‘In exercising their rights and fulfilling their obligations 
with respect to living marine resources, including straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks, developing countries have special requirements and need special assistance’.364 
The document identifies types,365 areas,366 and means367 of assistance to developing states.  
The most discussed and controversial elements of the proposal related to distributive equity 
for developing states. This was best encapsulated in the last ‘area’ of assistance identified in 
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the proposal, which concerned developing states’ access to high seas fisheries. Under this 
area, PICs had proposed preferential access rights to high seas fisheries for developing states 
and free market access.368 The ensuing negotiations on this area of assistance produced a 
paragraph in article 25 of UNFSA which requires that states ‘enable’ developing states ‘to 
participate in high seas fisheries…including facilitating access to such fisheries’.369 Legal 
scholarship is divided on whether article 25 grants preferential rights to developing states in 
high seas allocations.370 However, the reluctance with which states broached distributive 
equity concerns for developing states during UNFSA indicates how the political climate had 
shifted in IFL. Ultimately, this history informs the way differentiation is circumscribed in 
UNFSA, which provides limited guidance to TRFMO members for addressing distributive 
equity concerns for DCSs.  
3 Discursive Shifts on Differentiation in IFL: From Distributive to Procedural Equity for 
Developing States  
The negotiating histories of UNCLOS and UNFSA reflect discursive shifts in how states have 
approached differentiation in IFL. During UNCLOS III, developing states campaigned for 
explicit references to equity and emphasised distributive justice themes. By comparison, 
developing states were less engaged in negotiations at the negotiating Conference for 
UNFSA. Moreover, the Conference emphasised procedural justice themes and minimised 
specific obligations to advance developing state participation in high seas fisheries. This 
thesis will demonstrate that this trend in IFL characterises the approach taken by TRFMOs, 
which are reluctant to engage in discussions concerning distributive equity for DCSs.  
II LEGAL POLICY ANALYSIS OF DIFFERENTIATION IN UNCLOS AND UNFSA: THREE 
PRINCIPLES 
A Sources of IFL 
While multiple sources of law govern TRFMOs, this chapter focuses on UNCLOS, UNFSA, 
and TRFMO treaty law.371 The chapter assesses UNCLOS and UNFSA to identify the central 
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principles for differentiation in IFL. The chapter then analyses the WCPFC and IOTC’s treaty 
and institutional law. This includes tuna fisheries regulations in conservation and 
management measures and administrative procedures and budgetary arrangements in rules of 
procedure and financial regulations. Consequently, this thesis relies primarily on binding 
treaty law to inform its analysis of differentiation in IFL.  
A number of potentially relevant sources of law, examined in other analyses of equity in IFL, 
are excluded from this analysis.372 For example, multiple international and regional non-
binding legal instruments bear relevance to TRFMO work.373 While helpful for elaborating 
best practices and region-specific principles for transboundary fisheries management, a 
scoping study for this thesis found that few refer to differentiation.374 Moreover, no 
international legal cases have been brought, either to the International Court of Justice or 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, to instruct states as to how TRFMOs should 
design and apply differentiation. 
B Preambular Language in UNCLOS and UNFSA: Historical Contexts 
The preambular paragraphs of UNCLOS and UNFSA introduce distinct approaches to 
differentiation, speaking to the historical eras in which they were adopted. Preambular 
language contextualises legal instruments and introduces the shared factual and normative 
understandings of signatories.375 UNCLOS puts forth this stirring declaration:  
Bearing in mind that the achievement of these goals will contribute to the realization of a just 
and equitable international economic order which takes into account the interests and needs of 
mankind as a whole and, in particular, the special interests and needs of developing 
countries, whether coastal or land-locked.376  
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This paragraph evokes the NIEO movement and developing states’ calls for a fundamental 
restructuring of international economic relations.  
 
In contrast, references to differentiation in UNFSA’s preamble are anchored in three specific, 
interrelated principles⎯specific assistance, effective participation, and sustainable use of fish 
stocks: 
Recognizing the need for specific assistance, including financial, scientific and technological 
assistance, in order that developing States can participate effectively in the conservation, 
management and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.377  
Adopted in 1995, UNFSA shifts its focus away from themes of economic redistribution and 
instead emphasises assistance for developing states. The preamble provides a dual purpose 
for this assistance. One is procedural—for developing states to participate effectively in 
managing transboundary fish stocks, and the other is distributive—for developing states to 
participate effectively in the sustainable use of transboundary fish stocks. The preambles 
embody the dichotomy of approaches to differentiation presented by Rajamani.378 The 
UNCLOS preamble describes the culpability/entitlement premise, whereas the UNFSA 
preamble indicates a shift to the consideration/capacity premise.379 The differences in 
preambular language referring to differentiation in UNCLOS and UNFSA are a preview to 
differences in the main body of their texts.  
C Differentiation in UNCLOS  
Fisheries-related differentiation is expressed in three main topics within UNCLOS: (i) 
conservation and utilisation of marine living resources; (ii) marine scientific research; and 
(iii) transfer of marine technology.380 The first topic differentiates central obligations, 
whereas the second and third topics are directed at implementation and assistance. Under 
these topics, UNCLOS contains repeated references to the special requirements of developing 
states, though it foregoes a definition. According to Magraw’s distinction between 
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differential treatment and contextual norms, the special requirements of developing states is a 
contextual norm to condition legal obligations in UNCLOS.  
1 Conservation and Utilisation of Marine Living Resources 
Differentiation concerning the conservation and utilisation of marine living resources apply 
to areas both within (EEZs) and outside (high seas) national jurisdiction in UNCLOS. 
(a) Differentiation within EEZs: Coastal State Obligations to Take Measures to Achieve MSY 
and Distribute Surplus TAC 
UNCLOS uses implicit and explicit differentiation to contextualise coastal state obligations 
within EEZs. UNCLOS vests coastal states with sovereign rights to explore, exploit, 
conserve, and manage living (and non-living) natural resources (such as fish stocks) within 
their EEZs.381 Along with these rights, UNCLOS creates a duty for coastal states to set a TAC 
for EEZ living resources with a view to achieving MSY.382  
This duty is qualified by differentiation that implicitly and explicitly favours developing 
states. According to article 61, the measures coastal states take to achieve MSY are to be 
‘qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors’.383 UNCLOS’s characterisation of 
‘economic factors’ includes the ‘economic needs of coastal fishing communities and the 
special requirements of developing States’.384  
Article 62 further applies differentiation to the utilisation of EEZ living resources and sets out 
several economic factors for coastal states to consider in utilising and distributing EEZ living 
resources.385 Coastal states are bound in exercising their sovereign rights to EEZ living 
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resources by the duty to consider the rights and duties of other states to those resources.386 In 
light of this duty, UNCLOS requires a coastal state to determine its capacity to harvest the 
TAC it has set within its EEZ.387 In cases where the coastal state is unable to fully harvest the 
TAC, it is obliged to give other states access to the surplus catch.388  
UNCLOS contextualises a coastal state’s duty to provide other states access to surplus TAC 
with explicit differentiation advantaging developing states and implicit differentiation 
advantaging DWFSs.389 UNCLOS obliges coastal states to grant access to surplus TAC 
according to ‘all relevant factors’.390 Among these factors, UNCLOS includes the special 
requirements of developing states ‘in the subregion or region’, as well as ‘the need to 
minimize economic dislocation in States whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone 
or which have made substantial efforts in research and identification of stocks’.391 This 
provision would refer to DWFSs that have historically targeted many commercially valuable 
fish stocks, including tuna.  
Koh explains that during UNCLOS III, article 62 was intended to reconcile competing 
interests for EEZ fisheries resources.392 This is reflected in the multiple interests coastal states 
are obliged to consider in determining TAC and distributing surplus TAC. However, article 
62 ultimately leaves the determination of weighing these factors (including the national 
interests of the coastal state, the special requirements of developing states, and the fishing 
interests of DWFSs) to the discretion of the coastal state. As a result, Burke concludes that 
‘The message could hardly be clearer—in choosing those states to be allowed access to its 
fisheries the coastal state is entitled to select on the basis of which will provide the most 
benefit to its interests’.393 Consequently, legal scholars argue that article 62 has little 
relevance to actual state practice.394 
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(b) Differentiation on the High Seas: The Duty to Cooperate to Conserve High Seas Living 
Resources 
Differentiation provisions concerning the high seas in UNCLOS mirror differentiation 
provisions contextualising coastal state obligations within EEZs. For migratory fish stocks, 
UNCLOS links obligations within EEZs to the high seas.395 While guaranteeing the traditional 
freedoms of fishing on the high seas to all states, UNCLOS qualifies these freedoms with the 
need to conserve living resources.396 UNCLOS entrenches the duty to cooperate between 
coastal and fishing states in the conservation and management of high seas living 
resources.397 UNCLOS provides that measures to conserve high seas living resources are to be 
‘qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors’⎯including the special 
requirements of developing states (as within EEZs).398  
In summary, UNCLOS contextualises states’ obligations to conserve, manage, and utilise 
marine living resources with differentiation that implicitly and explicitly favours developing 
states. This differentiation takes the form of the obligation to consider the special 
requirements of developing states in the conservation and management of EEZ and high seas 
living resources. However, differentiation is included among a range of other factors to be 
considered by states in these articles and provides only the weakest expressions of 
differentiation for developing states’ benefit. 
2 Marine Scientific Research and Transfer of Marine Technology 
Two other UNCLOS topics contain provisions expressing differentiation⎯marine scientific 
research and transfer of marine technology. Recent scholarship links states’ abilities to 
effectively exploit and regulate fish stocks with their capacity to carry out marine scientific 
research and to access fishing technology.399 From this perspective, Parts XIII and XIV are 
related in that they regulate differentiation with respect to marine research and technology. 
Salpin et al and Morgera and Ntona argue that these provisions are part of a greater 
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international legal commitment to the sustainable development of DCSs.400 These scholars 
contend that UNCLOS enshrines enhancing the marine scientific research and technological 
capacities of developing states.  
This section assesses differentiation provisions on marine scientific research and technology 
transfer in UNCLOS, which primarily focus on assistance for developing states. These 
provisions are couched in language that softens legal obligation, evident in the repeated use 
of ‘promote’ as opposed to a straightforward statement of legal obligation.401 At the same 
time, they provide strong support for explicit differentiation. Article 266 provides one 
striking example, obliging states to promote marine scientific and technological capacity 
‘with a view to accelerating the social and economic development of the developing 
States’.402  
Morgera and Ntona discuss technology transfer provisions in UNCLOS in light of their poor 
implementation by states. The authors note that these provisions were intended to devise ‘a 
technology transfer regime based on the diffusion of scientific and technological expertise 
and the creation of a policy environment to facilitate the transfer of useful marine 
technologies at the regional level’.403 They review debate among legal scholars as to the 
bindingness of these provisions.404 The authors also note the lack of an administrative system 
within UNCLOS to facilitate technology transfer.405 Morgera and Ntona argue for shifting 
away from current fragmented, ad hoc approaches to technology transfer and ‘towards a more 
concerted, partnership-based and integrated approach’.406 
(a) Part XIII Marine Scientific Research: Transfer of Knowledge to Developing States 
UNCLOS uses explicit differentiation to contextualise states’ obligations with respect to 
marine scientific research. Under article 244, all states are obliged to ‘promote’ the sharing 
(publication and dissemination) of data, information, and knowledge resulting from marine 
 
400 Ibid; Charlotte Salpin et al, ‘Marine Scientific Research in Pacific Small Island Developing States’ (2018) 95 
Marine Policy 363. 
401 Morgera and Ntona (n 399) 299. 
402 UNCLOS (n 9) art. 266(2). 
403 Morgera and Ntona (n 399) 299. 
404 Ibid. 
405 Ibid.  
406 Ibid 304. 
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scientific research.407 In the context of knowledge transfer, this provision obliges states to 
promote ‘the autonomous marine scientific capabilities of developing States’.408 This 
obligation is to be met, inter alia, through education and training programmes for personnel 
from developing states.409 
(b) Part XIV Transfer of Marine Technology 
Article 266 of UNCLOS links marine science and technology by obliging states ‘to promote 
actively the development and transfer of marine science and marine technology on fair and 
reasonable terms and conditions’.410 Implicit differentiation qualifies this obligation, as states 
are to transfer marine science and technology ‘in accordance with their capabilities’.411 Article 
266 then sets out explicit, differentiation by obliging states to ‘promote the development of 
the marine scientific and technological capacity of States which may need and request 
technical assistance in this field, particularly developing States’.412 This form of 
differentiation is framed by the overriding objective of ‘accelerating the social and economic 
development’ of developing states.413 Article 266 does not, however, delineate what forms 
such a transfer of knowledge and technology to developing states should take. This ambiguity 
is deepened by the obligation to ensure transfers of marine science and technology take place 
‘for the benefit of all parties concerned on an equitable basis’.414 While article 266 refers 
strongly to fisheries-related differentiation, significant uncertainty surrounds how these 
provisions apply to state practice. 
UNCLOS provides several conduits for international cooperation on the transfer of marine 
science and technology, including new and existing international organisations,415 and 
‘bilateral, regional, or multilateral programmes’416. Three forms of cooperation are also 
provided, two of which expressly set out differentiation. The first includes, inter alia, 
establishment of technical programmes; conclusion of transfer agreements; convening 
 
407 Ibid art 244(1). 
408 Ibid art 244(2). 
409 Ibid. 
410 Ibid art 266(1). 
411 Ibid art 266(2). 
412 Ibid. 
413 Ibid. 
414 Ibid art 266(3). 
415 Ibid arts 269, 270. 
416 Ibid art 268. 
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scientific and technical events, such as ‘conferences, seminars and symposia’; and promoting 
projects and joint ventures.417 Technical programmes are to work with developing states who 
‘have not been able either to establish or develop their own technological capacity in marine 
science and in the exploration and exploitation of marine resources or to develop the 
infrastructure of such technology’.418  
The second modality for cooperation in UNCLOS is described in the establishment of 
national and regional research centres.419 The promotion of national centres is ‘to stimulate 
and advance the conduct of marine scientific research by developing States and to enhance 
their national capabilities to utilize and preserve their marine resources for their economic 
benefit’.420  
Third, UNCLOS obliges fishing states to obey coastal state laws and regulations, including 
potential ‘requirements for the training of personnel and the transfer of fisheries technology, 
including enhancement of the coastal State’s capability of undertaking fisheries research’.421 
While not explicit differentiation, this third modality for cooperation would almost certainly 
apply to a DCS with lower marine scientific and technical capabilities. 
(c) Annex VI: Resolution on Development of National Marine Science, Technology and 
Ocean Service Infrastructures 
The non-binding, final Annex of UNCLOS applies explicit, differential treatment to the 
development of marine scientific and technological capabilities of developing states. 
Described as ‘an often overlooked aspect of UNCLOS’, the non-binding, ‘Resolution on 
Development of Marine Science, Technology and Ocean Service Infrastructure’ 
contextualises Parts XIII and XIV of UNCLOS.422 The Resolution reinforces the transfer of 
marine science and technology provisions and calls upon developing states to establish 
programmes for the promotion of technical cooperation among themselves.423 Para 3 ‘Urges 
the industrialized countries to assist the developing countries in the preparation and 
 
417 Ibid 
418 Ibid art 269(a).  
419 Ibid arts 275, 276. 
420 Ibid art 275(1). 
421 Ibid art 62(4)(j). 
422 UNCLOS (n 9) ann VI; Salpin et al (n 400) 369. 
423 UNCLOS (n 9) ann VI. 
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implementation of their...development programmes’.424 To this end, it recommends several 
finance mechanisms through international organisations such as the World Bank and United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP).425 While Annex VI does not grant formal legal 
obligations onto UNCLOS parties, it provides a concrete direction for the more legally 
inchoate provisions of Parts XIII and XIV.  
D Differentiation in UNFSA 
UNFSA sets out a legal framework to support states’ implementation of transboundary 
fisheries provisions in UNCLOS, providing a pathway for states to implement their duty to 
cooperate.426 UNFSA contains differentiation provisions that span central obligations, 
implementation and assistance. UNFSA enhances UNCLOS’s approach to differentiation by 
developing the principle of the special requirements of developing states, to which it devotes 
the whole of Part VII.427 UNFSA conceptualises this principle as having its own legal force, 
in contrast to its role contextualising central obligations within UNCLOS. According to 
Magraw’s typology, ‘special requirements’ is transformed from a contextual norm in 
UNCLOS to a differential treatment norm in UNFSA.  
While UNFSA advances UNCLOS’s differentiation provisions, its approach remains rooted 
within the UNCLOS legal framework. Therefore, differentiation provisions mostly 
contextualise central obligations in UNFSA as they do in UNCLOS. Moreover, like UNCLOS, 
the greater part of explicit, binding differentiation provisions in UNFSA concern assistance 
for developing states (albeit with a more express objective to improve their capacity to 
participate in transboundary fisheries and their management processes).  
UNFSA’s most striking contribution to differentiation is its emphasis on the ‘participation’ of 
developing states as fisheries users and managers. This emphasis on participation, reflected in 
language in both the preamble and substantive articles of UNFSA, speak to elements of 
procedural equity that are not contained within UNCLOS. As will be shown in Chapter 6, 
 
424 Ibid para 3 (emphasis in original).  
425 Ibid para 4. 
426 See ibid art 118. 
427 UNFSA (n 10) pt VII.  
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differentiation provisions concerning both procedural and distributive equity dimensions are 
often core to contestation within the WCPFC and IOTC.  
1 Contextual Differentiation of Central Obligations in UNFSA 
UNFSA applies weak—contextual and implicit— forms of differentiation to states’ central 
obligations. These obligations concern general principles,428 application of the precautionary 
approach,429 compatibility of conservation and management measures,430 institutional 
arrangements,431 and determination of the participatory rights of new members or participants 
in shared fisheries432. Only provisions on general principles and participatory rights contain 
differentiation explicitly referring to developing states. In ‘General principles’, UNSFA 
mirrors language in UNCLOS on the conservation and management of shared fish stocks. 
States are obliged to: 
ensure that [conservation and management] measures are...designed to maintain or restore 
stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental and economic factors, including the special requirements of developing 
States.433  
States are further obliged to ‘take into account the interests of artisanal and subsistence 
fishers’.434 
(a) Part VII: Requirements of Developing States 
Part VII of UNFSA formulates the special requirements of developing states to provide: (i) a 
legal framework for explicit differentiation advantaging DCSs based on a duty to cooperate; 
 
428 Ibid art 5(b), (i).  
429 UNFSA obliges states to consider (with other geographical and biological indicators), ‘existing and 
predicted ... socio-economic conditions’ when implementing the precautionary approach: ibid art 6(3)(c). 
430 To adopt compatible conservation and management measures across EEZs and high seas areas, states must 
consider ‘the respective dependence of the coastal States’: ibid art 7(2)(e). 
431 According to UNFSA, states must agree on an ‘area of application’ that is cognizant of relevant ‘socio-
economic, geographical and environmental factors’: at art 9(1)(b).  
432 In considering the participatory rights of newcomers to shared fisheries, states are required to take into 
account ‘the needs of coastal fishing communities which are dependent mainly on fishing for the stocks’; ‘the 
needs of coastal States whose economies are overwhelmingly dependent on the exploitation of living marine 
resources’; and ‘the interests of developing States from the subregion or region in whose areas of national 
jurisdiction the stocks also occur’: ibid art 11(d), (e), (f) (emphasis added).  
433 Ibid art 5(b). 
434 Ibid art 5(i). 
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(ii) forms of cooperation for implementing this framework; and (iii) types of assistance and 
funding to DCSs.  
Article 24 contains binding recognition of the special requirements of developing states,435 
requires that sources of financial assistance be made available for this purpose,436 and defines 
special requirements in light of states’ duty to cooperate for the conservation and 
management measures of transboundary fish stocks437. States are obliged to consider three 
factors in applying the special requirements of developing states to conservation and 
management decisions. Para 2 lists these factors as: (i) the particular vulnerability of a DCSs, 
based on their dependence on the relevant fish stocks, particularly for the purposes of food 
security;438 (ii) ‘the need to avoid adverse impacts’ on dependent populations within DCSs 
and ensure fisheries access to specific groups, such as subsistence, small-scale, and artisanal 
fishers, women fishworkers and indigenous peoples, particularly within SIDS;439 and (iii) the 
obligation of not, ‘transferring, directly or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of 
conservation action’ onto DCSs440.  
Para 2 of article 24 operationalises references to contextual differentiation in UNCLOS.441 
UNFSA sets out an eclectic mix of factors for states to consider using largely negative legal 
language. Sub-paras (a) and (b) can be collapsed together to form an obligation not to impact 
the food security of vulnerable and dependent populations within DCSs. Sub-para (c) requires 
a more complex application to (T)RFMO decision-making. The obligation to avoid 
‘disproportionate burden’ potentially applies to (T)RFMO decisions that require members to 
broker an equitable balance between the interests of DCSs and DWFSs.442  
Article 24 does not address distributive equity for DCSs. Instead, it provides cautionary legal 
language on preventing the worsening of vulnerabilities, impacts, and burdens on DCSs.443 
 
435 Ibid art 24(1). 
436 Ibid. 
437 Ibid art 24(2). 
438 Ibid art 24(2)(a). 
439 Ibid art 24(2)(b). 
440 Ibid art 24(2)(c). 
441 UNCLOS (n 9) arts 61(3), 62(3), 119(1)(a). 
442 See Hanich and Ota (n 90); Kamal Azmi et al, ‘Defining a Disproportionate Burden in Transboundary 
Fisheries: Lessons from International Law’ (2016) 70 Marine Policy 164. 
443 Two paragraphs in Part VII refer to the distributive equity issue of increasing the participation of DCSs in 
transboundary fisheries: UNFSA (n 10) art 24(1), 25(a), (b).  
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Therefore, while providing a direct, explicit, and binding obligation to address differentiation, 
‘special requirements’ only constitutes an obligation for states to refrain from actions on the 
basis of possible impacts on DCSs. In reality, the rather ambiguous references to food 
security and proportionality in these provisions have led to a lack of consensus among states, 
particularly members within the WCPFC and IOTC, on how to implement these obligations.  
Article 25 sets out specific obligations on ‘forms of cooperation’ with DCSs.444 Part VII links 
‘special requirements’ to the duty to cooperate in UNCLOS. Article 25 builds on this link, 
requiring states to focus cooperation on three objectives: (i) to ‘enhance’ developing states’ 
ability to conserve and manage transboundary fish stocks and develop their own fisheries; (ii) 
to ‘assist’ them in participating in high seas fisheries; and (iii) to ‘facilitate’ their participation 
in (T)RFMO processes.445  
Despite strong support for differentiation in para 1, there is a disconnect with article 25’s 
remaining paragraphs, which narrowly focus the duty to cooperate on implementation and 
assistance. For example, para 2 obliges states to provide financial and technical assistance for 
the purposes of fisheries management and development.446 However, para 3 specifies that this 
assistance be prioritised (‘directed specifically towards’) for fisheries management activities 
such as data collection, scientific research, and monitoring, control and surveillance 
(MCS).447 In this way, differentiated cooperation in Part VII is winnowed down from 
increasing DCSs’ participation in transboundary fisheries and their management, to technical 
assistance for DCSs to implement their coastal state obligations. 
The conflicted relationship between the paragraphs of article 25 has important implications 
for (T)RFMOs. Para 1 refers to obligations to increase developing states’ participation in the 
management of transboundary fisheries and enhance their ability to participate in (harvest) 
such fisheries. Article 25’s lack of clarity casts uncertainty in many fully exploited tuna 
 
444 Ibid art 25.  
445 Ibid art 25(1) sub-paras (a)−(c). These paragraphs emphasise cooperation with LDCs and SIDS.  
446 Specifically, ‘financial assistance, assistance relating to human resources development, technical assistance, 
transfer of technology, including through joint venture arrangements, and advisory and consultative services’: 
ibid art 25(2). 
447 Ibid art 25(3), sub-paras (a)−(c). Annex I of UNFSA on ‘Standard Requirements for the Collection and 
Sharing of Data’ also requires assistance to be provided to developing states ‘in order to build capacity in the 
field of conservation and management of living marine resources’: at ann I art 1(2).  
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fisheries as to whether historical DWFSs are obliged to cede portions of high seas fisheries to 
allow for increased participation by developing states.448 
Article 26 requires the establishment of special funds to aid developing states’ 
implementation of UNFSA, including the costs of its compulsory dispute settlement 
scheme.449 Para 2 calls on states and international organisations to assist in helping 
developing states to establish or strengthen existing (T)RFMOs.450 
Article 26 establishes the ‘Part VII Fund’, which is currently administered under a joint 
arrangement between the United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea 
(UNDOALOS) and FAO.451 The Fund is allocated through an FAO trust fund account and 
governed primarily by para 14 of its Terms of Reference (TOR).452 Nowhere in the TOR is 
funding made available for the distributive equity elements granted by UNFSA to DCSs for 
creating domestic fisheries for transboundary fish stocks or increasing their participation in 
high seas fisheries.453 At the time of writing, the fund was depleted and not accepting 
applications.454 
E Objectives for Differentiation Advantaging DCSs in IFL 
Provisions governing differentiation in UNCLOS and UNFSA reveal eight central principles 
emanating from these instruments. These principles fall into two categories: (i) the 
 
448 See above (n 78). 
449 UNFSA (n 10) 26(1). Article 3(3) obliges states to consider DCSs’ ‘respective capacities’ and ‘need for 
assistance’ in applying their obligations within EEZs: ibid art 3(3). UNFSA’s link between financial assistance 
and implementation blurs Rajamani’s distinction between the two. 
450 Ibid art 26(2). This is the only paragraph in Part VII not phrased in legally binding language. The 
‘bindingness’ of this obligation is important to consider in light of the current depleted status of the Part VII 
Fund.  
451 In 2002, the UNGA called for the establishment of a voluntary fund to fulfil the promise of assistance under 
Part VII: [UNFSA], GA Res 57/143, UN Doc A/RES/57/143 (adopted 12 December 2002).  After developing a 
TOR in 2003, the UNGA established the ‘Assistance Fund under Part VII of the Agreement’: Sustainable 
Fisheries, Including Through [UNFSA] and Related Instruments, GA Res 58/14, UN Doc A/RES/58/14 
(adopted 24 November 2003). The Part VII Fund TOR was revised in 2019. See: UNDOALOS, Fourteenth 
Round of Informal Consultations of States Parties to [UNFSA], ICSP14/UNFSA/INF.3, 2−3 May 2019, 
[80]−[86]; ann II (‘Part VII TOR’). See also UNDOALOS, Assistance Fund Under Part VII of [UNFSA] (Web 
Page, 2020) <https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/fishstocktrustfund/fishstocktrustfund.htm>. 
452 Part VII TOR (n 451) [14].  
453 UNFSA (n 10) art 25(1) sub-paras (a), (b). 
454 UNDOALOS (n 451). The Fund’s depleted status questions whether article 26(1) of UNFSA is binding on 
states, given that the Fund relies on states’ voluntary contributions. While UNFSA requires states to establish 
these funds, it does not appear to require states to provision them, often leading to funding gaps as Chapter 6 
Section I will show.  
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conservation and management of shared fish stocks; and (ii) special assistance for developing 
states.  
Under the first category, four principles provide implicit and explicit forms of differentiation 
that contextualise states’ obligations to conserve and manage transboundary fish stocks. They 
are: (i) consideration of relevant socio-economic factors; (ii) prevention of adverse impacts 
on vulnerable coastal populations in DCSs; (iii) avoidance of transferring a disproportionate 
burden of conservation action onto DCSs; and (iv) promotion of DCSs’ access to high seas 
fisheries.  
In the second category, four principles set out explicit, direct forms of differentiation 
concerning the provision of special assistance to developing states. These principles are: (v) 
effective participation of DCSs in fisheries management; (vi) provision of financial assistance 
to DCSs for this purpose; (vii) human capacity development in DCSs in the areas of marine 
scientific research, data collection, and compliance-related activities; and (viii) transfer of 
marine technology to enable DCSs to develop their own fisheries. 
The eight principles from this section are undergirded by the broader principle of the special 
requirements of developing states, introduced in UNCLOS and elaborated in UNFSA. 
UNCLOS and UNFSA define special requirements as the particular aspirations, interests, and 
needs of DCSs with respect to transboundary fisheries, which may range from dependence 
upon fisheries for food security and livelihoods, to capacity building needs for implementing 
fisheries management actions.  
This section combines its analysis of UNCLOS and UNFSA to derive three central objectives 
for differentiation in IFL. These objectives guide the thesis’ examination of how TRFMOs 
apply differentiation to their law and practice and are drawn across the eight principles set out 









Objective I: The effective participation of 
DCSs in transboundary fisheries 
management 
(v) Effective participation of DCSs in fisheries 
management 
(vi) Provision of financial assistance to DCSs 
(vii) Human capacity development in DCSs in 




Objective II: The protection of vulnerable 
and fisheries dependent populations within 
DCSs 
(i) Consideration of relevant socio-economic 
factors 
(ii) Prevention of adverse impacts on vulnerable 
coastal populations in DCSs 
(iii) Avoidance of transferring a disproportionate 
burden of conservation action onto DCSs 
Objective III: The promotion of DCSs’ 
access to high seas fisheries 
(iv) Promotion of DCSs’ access to high seas 
fisheries 
(viii) Transfer of marine technology to enable 
DCSs to develop their own fisheries 
III TRFMO TREATY LAW: DIFFERENTIATION FRAMEWORKS OF THE WCPFC AND IOTC 
Drawing from an examination of the WCPFC and IOTC founding agreements, institutional 
law, and conservation and management measures, the following section sets out the 
principles and processes that guide differentiation in the treaty law of both TRFMOs.455 The 
section describes this as each TRFMO’s ‘differentiation framework’, which applies 
differentiation to management decisions, decision-making, and internal processes.  
  
 
455 This section only analyses WCPFC and IOTC conservation and management measures that focus expressly 
on differentiation. While other measures may apply differentiation to particular management topics (e.g. fishing 
regulations for particular tuna stocks) they do not elucidate either TRFMO’s overall approach to differentiation.  
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A WCPFC Differentiation Framework 
1 Overview 
The WCPFC differentiation framework is set out in the WCPF Convention,456 WCPFC Rules 
of Procedure (WCPFC ROP),457 WCPFC Financial Regulations (WCPFC FR),458 one 
Resolution,459 three Conservation and Management Measures (CMMs)460 and an annually 
updated ‘Checklist’461. The WCPFC differentiation framework applies to four broad areas of 
treaty law: the special requirements of developing states (particularly WCPO SIDS, 
territories, and possessions); WCPFC management decisions; WCPFC decision-making; and 
WCPFC internal processes.  
  
 
456 WCPF Convention (n 46).  
457 WCPFC ROP (n 226). 
458 WCPFC, Financial Regulations, 2nd reg sess, updated 20 January 2014 (‘WCPFC FR’). 
459 WCPFC, Resolution on Aspirations of SIDS and Territories, Resolution 2008-01, 8−12 December 2008 
(‘Resolution 2008-01’). 
460 WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure on the Criteria for the Consideration of Conservation and 
Management Proposals, CMM 2013-06, 10th reg sess, 2−6 December 2013 (‘CMM 2013-06’); WCPFC, 
Conservation and Management Measure on the Special Requirements of SIDS and Territories, CMM 2013-07, 
10th reg sess, 2−6 December 2013 (‘CMM 2013-07’). See also WCPFC, Conservation and Management 
Measure for Compliance Monitoring Scheme, CMM 2018-07, 15th reg sess, 10−14 December 2018 (‘CMM 
2018-07’). The WCPFC recently replaced CMM 2018-07: WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure 
for Compliance Monitoring Scheme, CMM 2019-06, 16th reg sess, 5−11 December 2019 (‘CMM 2019-06’). 
461 WCPFC, Checklist of SIDS Special Requirements to WCPFC12, WCPFC12-2015-DP01, 12th reg sess, 3−8 
December 2015 (‘WCPFC12 SIDS Checklist’).  
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For a visual representation of the WCPFC differentiation framework, see Figure 4 below. 
Figure 4: Mapping the WCPFC Differentiation Framework462 
 
2 Special Requirements of WCPO Developing States (Central Obligations) 
(a) WCPF Convention Part VIII and Article 30 
Most of the WCPFC differentiation framework emanates from the special requirements of 
WCPO developing states, reflecting the close relationship between the WCPF Convention 
and UNFSA.463 The WCPF Convention devotes the entirety of Part VIII and its constituent 
article 30 to defining the Commission’s binding legal obligations with respect to the special 
requirements of developing states.464 Article 30 requires that the Commission give full 
recognition to the special requirements of developing states and take into account specific 
elements of these requirements when establishing CMMs.465 Article 30 further obliges the 
Commission to establish a fund for  effective participation and defines three types of 
activities towards which targeted assistance may be provided to Pacific Island countries and 
 
462 Dr. Indiah Hodgson-Johnston helped format this figure. 
463 UNFSA (n 10) pt VII. See also above (n 46). 
464 WCPF Convention (n 46) pt VIII.  
465 Ibid art 30(1), (2). 
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territories (PICTs).466 The activities nominated by article 30 relate to assistance with the 
fisheries management cycle: including data collection and verification; stock assessments and 
scientific research; and MCS, compliance, and enforcement.467  
Article 30 sets out five elements of the special requirements of developing states in the 
WCPFC differentiation framework. Three elements concern distributive equity and two 
procedural equity for PICTs. The first three are the WCPFC’s obligation to consider the 
following elements of special requirements in adopting CMMs: (i) the vulnerability and 
dependency of PICTs on fish stocks, in particular for food security; (ii) the need to avoid 
impacts and ensure fisheries access for specific populations within PICTs; and (iii) the need 
to ensure decisions do not result in the direct or indirect transfer of a disproportionate burden 
of conservation action onto PICTs.468 The remaining two elements require the WCPFC to 
provide institutional and financial support to PICTs.469 They are: (iv) the effective 
participation of PICTs in the Commission’s work; and (v) targeted financial and capacity 
building assistance for PICTs.   
The elements of the special requirements of developing states contained in article 30 of the 
WCPF Convention can be condensed into three central objectives. The first of these 
objectives is that, in adopting management decisions, the Commission must recognise the 
dependence of PICTs on WCPO tuna stocks⎯which specifically includes particular coastal 
populations’ dependence on fish stocks for food security. The notion of coastal state 
dependence has been a central, though contested, principle of IFL since the adoption of 
UNCLOS.470  
 
466 Ibid art 30(3), (4). The remainder of this section refers to PICTs to highlight the WCPFC differentiation 
framework’s focus on WCPO SIDS and territories. Only two WCPO DCSs are not PICTs—Indonesia and 
Philippines. 
467 Ibid art 30(4). 
468 Ibid art 30(2). 
469 Ibid art 30(3), (4). 
470 The principle of ‘coastal state dependence’ on fish stocks was first raised at UNCLOS I in 1958, which 
adopted a Resolution on ‘Special situations relating to coastal fisheries’: Final Act of the Conference, Res VI, 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Volume II: Plenary Meetings, 3rd Comm, 16th plen mtg, 
A/CONF.13/L.58 (26 April 1958). This resolution discussed populations ‘overwhelmingly dependent upon 
coastal fisheries for their livelihood or economic development’ and recommended that measures to limit fish 
stocks ‘recognize any preferential requirements of the coastal State resulting from its dependence’: at Preamble 
para 2, [1]. Preferential coastal state rights to fish stocks remains a source of debate in negotiations on catch and 
effort allocations among states in (T)RFMOs today. 
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The second objective is that the Commission must ensure that its management decisions do 
not result in the direct or indirect transfer of a disproportionate burden of conservation action 
onto PICTs. To date, the question of what constitutes a disproportionate burden has been the 
most discussed element of the WCPFC differentiation framework and is frequently 
referenced by PICTs in Commission negotiations. In recent negotiations, PICTs have argued 
that a disproportionate burden of conservation action can include both the administrative 
burden of participating in Commission processes and the economic burden of conservation 
actions that lead to loss of government revenue from tuna catches.471  
The third objective is that the Commission is obliged to provide financial and technical 
support to PICTs for the purpose of their effective participation. The concept of effective 
participation encompasses both PICTs’ attendance to Commission-related meetings and their 
capacity (in terms of technical knowledge, human resources, and technology) to implement 
Commission management decisions.472 As will be discussed in Chapter 6, the conceptual 
framing of ‘special requirements’ and its three constituent objectives—coastal state 
dependence, disproportionate burden, and effective participation—provide a basis for how 
WCPFC members approach and discuss differentiation.  
(b) CMM 2013-07 
In 2013, the WCPFC adopted two CMMs to operationalise its obligations with respect to 
PICTs’ special requirements.473 CMM 2013-07 sets out specific obligations for WCPFC 
members to cooperate with PICTs in the areas of: capacity development of personnel; 
technology transfers; fisheries conservation and management; MCS; and support for the 
domestic fisheries sector and tuna fisheries-related businesses and market access.474  
CMM 2013-07 is almost entirely devoted to ensuring PICTs’ effective participation in tuna 
management. The measure obliges WCPFC members to: provide technical assistance and 
financial support for the capacity development of nationals in fisheries science and 
 
471 WCPFC, Working Papers for WCPFC Workshop on Disproportionate Burden, WCPFC11-2014-DBW-05, 
Implementation of CMM 2013-06 and Disproportionate Burden Workshop, 3 November 2014, 3.  
472 WCPF Convention (n 46) Preamble para 7, art 30(3). 
473 See above (n 460). 
474 CMM 2013-07 (n 460). 
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management;475 promote the development and transfer of fisheries science and technology;476 
and enhance participation in WCPO monitoring, control, surveillance and enforcement 
activities.477 It also requires members to assist PICTs with implementing their obligations 
under the Commission, including through the provision of fisheries data.478  
One of the final sections of CMM 2013-07 has a second objective, which is to assist PICTs in 
maximising economic benefits from the development of their tuna resources.479 At 
WCPFC10 in 2013, this section was revised to express a softer legal obligation for WCPFC 
members.480 WCPFC members are obliged to provide technical and economic support to the 
development of PICTs’ domestic fishing sectors and to ensure that their actions do not 
undermine onshore investments in PICTs.481 Beyond these broad obligations, WCPFC 
members ‘shall endeavour’ to take the following actions: ensure that domestic fishing 
accounts for at least half of total WCPO tuna catch;482 encourage local employment and 
onshore economic activities;483 eliminate trade barriers in fish and fisheries products;484 and 
identify and promote other development activities485. 
Unsurprisingly, the WCPFC has made little progress reaching agreement on how to 
operationalise these obligations, such as determining the dependence of DCSs and their 
communities on fish stocks and defining a disproportionate burden of conservation action. 
The Commission has initiated and failed to conclude a number of policy processes, such as a 
disproportionate burden workshop, to address these obligations.486 
  
 
475 Ibid [4], [5]. 
476 Ibid [6], [7]. 
477 Ibid [10], [11]. 
478 Ibid [8], [9].  
479 Ibid [12]−[18]. 
480 ‘The concerns of some CMMs about the creation of obligations were addressed by including language stating 
that developed CCMs will endeavour to cooperate’: WCPFC, Summary Report, 10th reg sess, 2−6 December 
2013 [368] (emphasis added). 
481 CMM 2013-07 (n 460) [12], [14].  
482 Ibid [13]. 
483 Ibid [15] 
484 Ibid [17]. 
485 Ibid [18]. 
486 WCPFC, Summary Report of the Implementation of CMM 2013-06 and Disproportionate Burden Workshop, 
WCPFC11-2014-11_rev1, 3 March 2015. 
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3 WCPFC Management Decisions (Central Obligations) 
(a) WCPF Convention, Articles 5, 6, and 10 
The second component of the WCPFC differentiation framework applies differentiation to 
the Commission’s management decisions. Articles 5, 6, and 10 of the WCPF Convention 
incorporate differentiation into the design of CMMs, the application of the precautionary 
approach, and the development of criteria for allocating TAC/TAE.487 Article 5 requires 
WCPFC members to consider the special requirements of developing states and interests of 
subsistence and artisanal fishers in adopting CMMs.488 Article 6 ensures that in applying the 
precautionary approach, WCPFC members take into account present and future uncertainties 
related to socio-economic conditions (among others).489 Article 10 governs the development 
of criteria for allocating TAC/TAE of WCPO tuna stocks.490 Article 10 sets out factors that 
the WCPFC must consider in determining allocation criteria for TAC/TAE, including: the 
needs of PICTs;491 the fishing interests and aspirations of coastal states;492 and the needs of 
coastal communities dependent on the stocks to be allocated493. Differentiation in articles 5, 
6, and 10 is largely implicit and functions mostly to contextualise WCPFC members’ 
obligations.494  
(b) Resolution 2008-01 
Article 10 contains the only reference in the WCPF Convention to the fishing aspirations of 
WCPO coastal states.495 In fact, article 30 of the WCPF Convention differs from Part VII of 
UNFSA in that it does not refer to assisting developing states to develop domestic and high 
 
487 Article 8 provides that in establishing compatible measures on the high seas, the WCPFC is to ‘take into 
account the respective dependence of the coastal States and the States fishing on the high seas on the stocks 
concerned’: WCPF Convention (n 46) 8(2)(d) (emphasis added). Given that the article refers to an unspecified 
balance between coastal with fishing state dependence on the high seas, it is not included in this analysis.  
488 Ibid art 5(b), (h). 
489 Ibid art 6(1)(b). 
490 Ibid art 10(1)(g), (3), (4).  
491 Ibid art 10(3)(d). 
492 Ibid art 10(3)(j). 
493 Ibid art 10(3)(g).  
494 Article 10 lists another factor to be considered in determining TAC/TAE that could be construed as a form of 
weak differentiation. This is consideration of ‘the respective interests, past and present fishing patterns and 
fishing practices of participants in the fishery and the extent of the catch being utilized for domestic 
consumption’: ibid 10(3)(b). It is unclear whether this paragraph would advantage PICTs, given that DWFSs 
dominate the WCPO tuna fishery and markets for commercial tuna catch. However, PICs’ local tuna 
consumption is projected to increase in the near future: see (n 27). Given the lack of clarity concerning 
differentiation in this paragraph, it is not included in this analysis.  
495 Ibid art 10(3)(j).  
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seas fisheries.496 CMM 2013-07 appears to address this gap in its final (non-binding) section 
by providing for the development of the domestic tuna sector within PICTs.497  
The Commission nevertheless addressed the fishing aspirations of PICTs in 2008 through the 
adoption of a non-binding Resolution.498 Resolution 2008-01 sets forth concrete 
commitments for industrialised members, such as encouraging them ‘to reduce and or 
restructure their fleet[s]’ to allow for the development of domestic fisheries and to invest in 
fishing vessels and related onshore facilities.499 The measure commits WCPFC members to 
ensuring that WCPO developing members receive a greater share of the total catch and value 
of WCPO fish stocks by 2018.500 It is clear from the non-binding character of provisions that 
address WCPO DCSs’ fishing aspirations that this remains a contested feature of the WCPFC 
differentiation framework. 
4 WCPFC Decision-Making (Implementation) 
The third part of the WCPFC differentiation framework incorporates legal differentiation into 
the decision-making processes of the Commission.  
(a) CMM 2013-06 
CMM 2013-06 devises a formal process by which the Commission is required to consider the 
potential impacts of new proposals on PICTs.501 The measure is structured in two parts: the 
first provides a series of questions which the Commission is to apply when considering new 
proposals and their impact on PICTs;502 the second nominates a list of actions the 
Commission may take in cases where a PICT demonstrates that the impact of a proposal 
constitutes the transfer of a disproportionate burden of conservation action.503 The 
Commission has had mixed success implementing this measure. WCPFC meeting records 
convey that some industrialised members do not regard the procedure set out by the measure 
 
496 UNFSA (n 10) arts 24(1), 25(1) sub-paras (a), (b). 
497 CMM 2013-07 (n 460) [12]−[18]. 
498 Resolution 2008-01 (n 459). 
499 Ibid [2]. 
500 Ibid [4]. This goal is reiterated in CMM 2013-07 (n 460) [13]. 
501 CMM 2013-06 (n 460).  
502 Ibid [3]. These questions centre on: how the proposal is to be implemented; what assistance is available to 
PICTs to implement the proposal; how the proposal might affect PICTs, in terms of development opportunities, 
aspirations and access to resources; and what options are available to mitigate or avoid a disproportionate 
burden of conservation action on PICTs. 
503 Ibid [4]. These actions include differentiated obligations, implementation, and assistance for PICTs. 
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as a binding obligation.504 Therefore, only some members have carried out consultative 
processes with PICTs in the development of new proposals to address the considerations set 
out in CMM 2013-06. 
(b) WCPFC SIDS Checklist 
Since 2012, the Commission has also adopted a non-binding ‘living document’ in the form of 
an annually updated ‘SIDS Checklist’ which links specific issues at Commission negotiations 
to PICs’ special requirements.505 Proposed by FFA members in 2014 and adopted the 
following year, the SIDS Checklist was intended to guide the Commission in identifying and 
targeting specific areas of assistance for PICs. The WCPFC has continued to update the SIDS 
Checklist in subsequent annual sessions. 
5 WCPFC Internal Processes (Implementation and Assistance) 
The fourth element of the WCPFC differentiation framework integrates differentiation into 
WCPFC internal processes which are governed by the WCPFC ROP, WCPFC FR, and two 
CMMs (and, to a limited extent, the WCPF Convention). They can be roughly divided into 
‘administrative’ and ‘institutional’ activities.  
(a) WCPFC Administrative Activities: Budget, Special Requirements Fund, and Part 2 
Reporting Requirements 
The WCPF Convention and WCPFC FR set out a budgetary contribution scheme based 
partially on members’ development status.506 The scheme incorporates a cap on a national 
wealth fee for SIDS507 and a discount on a variable catch-based fee for developing states and 
 
504 See WCPFC, Summary Report, 14th reg sess, 3−7 December 2017, 91-2, 94-5 (‘WCPFC14 Summary 
Report’). 
505 See WCPFC, Special Requirements of Small Island Developing States, WCPFC9-2012-DP32, 9th reg sess, 
2−6 December 2012 (‘WCPFC9 SIDS Checklist’); WCPFC, FFA Members: Letter on Special Requirements of 
Small Island Developing States, WCPFC10-2013-DP02, 10th reg sess, 2−6 December 2013 (‘WCPFC10 SIDS 
Checklist’); WCPFC, FFA Members Paper on Areas of Assistance for SIDS, WCPFC11-2014-DP20 Rev2, 11th 
reg sess, 1−5 December 2014 (‘WCPFC11 SIDS Checklist’); WCPFC, Checklist of SIDS Special Requirements 
to WCPFC12, WCPFC12-2015-DP01, 12th reg sess, 3−8 December 2015 (‘WCPFC12 SIDS Checklist’); 
WCPFC, Views on SIDS Checklist, WCPFC13-2016-DP16, 13th reg sess, 5−9 December 2016 (‘WCPFC13 
SIDS Checklist’). 
506 WCPF Convention (n 9) art 18(2); WCPFC FR (n 458) reg 5.2. In addition to these fees, the budgetary 
scheme also sets out an equal basic fee for all members.  
507 WCPFC FR (n 458) reg 5.2(b)(ii). 
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territories.508 The FR requires funding for one PICT representative to all Commission-related 
meetings.509 Both the Convention510 and FR511 also provide for the establishment and 
governance of the Special Requirements Fund (SRF).512 The SRF’s objective is to facilitate 
the effective participation of developing members through: attendance to Commission-related 
meetings;513 financial assistance for human resources development, technical assistance, and 
transfer of technology; and capacity building in the areas of MCS, data collection, and 
scientific research.514 In accordance with a provision in CMM 2013-07, the WCPFC also 
incorporates differentiation into its reporting requirements by ensuring industrialised 
members describe how they have implemented their obligations with respect to the special 
requirements of PICTs in annual reports submitted to the WCPFC Secretariat.515 
(b) WCPFC Institutional Activities: Standing Agenda Item and Public Website on Special 
Requirements, SRF Strategic Investment Plan, and CMS Capacity Development Plans 
Institutional activities denote several ongoing practices and policies used by the Commission 
to implement its obligations with respect to the special requirements of developing states. 
One practice is the inclusion of a standing agenda item on special requirements at every 
annual session of the Commission. This practice has been elaborated since 2013 to include 
reviews of the implementation of CMM 2013-07 and annual updates to the SIDS Checklist.516 
The Commission also recently developed a public website maintained by the Secretariat to 
publish information on how the Commission and its members implement their obligations 
under article 30 of the WCPF Convention.517  
The WCPFC has also developed processes to address the capacity needs of developing 
members. Article 7 of the WCPF Convention requires that coastal states apply the core 
principles for conservation and management set out by the Convention within areas under 
 
508 Ibid reg 5.2(c). 
509 Ibid reg 3.5. 
510 WCPF Convention (n 9) art 30(3). 
511 WCPFC FR (n 458) reg 7. 
512 See also WCPFC, Principles, Guidelines and Operational Procedures for the Commission’s Special 
Requirements Fund, 3rd reg sess, 11−15 December 2006 (‘SRF Operational Guidelines’). 
513 WCPF Convention (n 9) art 30(3). 
514 WCPFC FR (n 458) reg 7.1. 
515 CMM 2013-07 (n 460) [19].  
516 WCPFC ROP (n 226) r 2(2)(h). 




national jurisdiction.518 With respect to this obligation, the Convention obliges the 
Commission to consider the respective capacities of DCS members and their need for 
assistance.519 CMM 2013-07 reinforces this obligation by requiring WCPFC members to 
assist PICTs with implementing Commission obligations.520  
Two interrelated processes have emerged within the WCPFC addressing the capacity needs 
of developing members. The first process concerns the Commission’s administration of the 
SRF. In 2018, the Commission adopted a three-year ‘Strategic Investment Plan’ (SIP) for the 
SRF to target financial assistance for the capacity needs of developing members.521 That year, 
the Commission incorporated a second distinct, but related, process to identify the capacity 
needs of developing members into its Compliance Monitoring Scheme (CMS).522 CMM 
2018-07 sets out a procedure for when, in the process of being assessed by the CMS, 
developing members may report that they cannot meet a particular obligation due to a lack of 
capacity.523 Section V requires the member to submit a ‘Capacity Development Plan’ (CDP) 
to the Secretariat containing an anticipated time-frame for addressing their capacity needs.524 
The CMS will then assess the obligation as ‘Capacity Assistance Needed’ for that member 
until the Commission is notified that their capacity needs have been met.525 The SRF SIP 
identifies funding sources to assist developing members in carrying out their CDPs.526 
  
 
518 WCPF Convention (n 9) art 7(1). 
519 Ibid art 7(2). 
520 CMM 2013-07 (n 460) [8]. 
521 WCPFC, Report from the Chair of the Special Requirements Fund Intersessional Working Group (SRF IWG, 
WCPFC15-2018-FAC_SRF IWG, 9 November 2018, att 1 (‘SRF SIP’). See also Chapter 6 Section IIA.  
522 See WCPFC, Compliance Monitoring Scheme (Web Page, 2 May 2019) <https://www.wcpfc.int/compliance-
monitoring>. 
523 CMM 2018-07 (n 460) s 5. This represents the adoption of a softer approach to non-compliance for DCSs; 
number (iv) of Rajamani’s categories for differentiated implementation: see Chapter 1 Section II B1.  
524 Ibid. 
525 Ibid.  
526 SRF SIP (n 521) att 1 [5]. 
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B IOTC Differentiation Framework 
1 Overview 
The IOTC’s differentiation framework is set out in the IOTC Agreement,527 IOTC ROP,528 
IOTC FR,529 one Recommendation530 and five Resolutions531. The design of the IOTC 
differentiation framework differs substantially from that of the WCPFC, providing a less 
systematic approach to differentiation. One indication of this is the scarcity of differentiation 
provisions in the IOTC Agreement; most differentiation provisions are set out in IOTC 
Resolutions. See Figure 5 for a visual representation of the IOTC differentiation framework 
below. 
 
527 IOTC Agreement (n 47). 
528 IOTC, Rules of Procedure, 18th reg sess, updated June 2014 (‘IOTC ROP’). 
529 IOTC, Financial Regulations, 23rd reg sess, amended June 2019 (‘IOTC FR’). See also IOTC, Report for the 
23rd Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2019-S23-R_rev1[E], 17−21 June 2019, app 5 (‘IOTC23 Summary Report’). 
530 IOTC, On the Best Available Science, Recommendation 12/15, 12th reg sess, 7−11 June 2012 
(‘Recommendation 12/15’).  
531 IOTC, On the Recording of Catch and Effort Data by Fishing Vessels in the IOTC Area of Competence, 
Resolution 15/01, 19th reg sess, 27 April−1 May 2015 (‘Resolution 15/01’); IOTC, To Promote Implementation 
of IOTC Conservation and Management Measures, Resolution 16/10, 20th reg sess, 23−27 May 2016 
(‘Resolution 16/10’); IOTC, On Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing, Resolution 16/11, 20th reg sess, 23−27 May 2016 (‘Resolution 16/11’); Resolution 17/02 
(n 246); IOTC, On a Scoping Study of Socio-Economic Data and Indicators of IOTC Fisheries, Resolution 
18/09, 22nd reg sess, 21−25 May 2018 (‘Resolution 18/09’).  
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Figure 5: Mapping the IOTC Differentiation Framework532 
 
Whereas the WCPFC has adopted binding measures to develop its differentiation framework, 
the IOTC relies mostly on non-binding internal processes to address differentiation. IOTC’s 
focus on these processes has led to an almost exclusive emphasis on implementation and 
assistance to developing members in its differentiation framework. However, recent IOTC 
Resolutions contain increasing references to differentiation in non-binding preambular 
language. The IOTC differentiation framework shares some similarities to the WCPFC, 
however, such as an emphasis on differentiation advantaging SIDS. Likewise, the IOTC 
applies differentiation to provisions across its management decisions, decision-making, and 
internal processes. 
2 IOTC Management Decisions (Core Obligations) 
(a) IOTC Agreement Article V 
The first component of the IOTC differentiation framework incorporates differentiation into 
IOTC management decisions. The IOTC Agreement sets out the Commission’s functions and 
 
532 Dr. Indiah Hodgson-Johnston helped format this figure. 
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responsibilities, two of which address differentiation.533 One responsibility is that the 
Commission must ‘encourage, recommend and coordinate research and development 
activities’ for IO DCSs.534 These activities include ‘transfer of technology’ and ‘training and 
enhancement’ for IOCs. The Commission is to carry out this responsibility while ‘having due 
regard to the need to ensure the equitable participation of Members of the Commission in the 
fisheries and the special interests and needs of members in the region that are developing 
countries’.535 The second responsibility of the Commission is ‘to keep under review the 
economic and social aspects’ of fisheries under the IOTC Agreement. The Commission is to 
execute this responsibility, ‘bearing in mind, in particular, the interests of developing coastal 
states’.536 These two obligations provide explicit differentiation in the form of stand-alone, 
binding obligations for the IOTC to address the special needs and interests of IOCs through 
capacity building activities and the review of socio-economic data on relevant fisheries. 
3 IOTC Decision-Making (Implementation) 
The second element of the IOTC differentiation framework applies differentiation to IOTC 
decision-making. This element is relatively recent and reflects the IOTC’s establishment of 
working groups to advise the Commission on the two core obligations discussed previously.  
(a) IOTC Working Parties 
In 2017, the IOTC established a subsidiary body dedicated to addressing implementation 
issues associated with IOTC measures⎯the WPICMM. The WPICMM was established to 
advise the Commission on implementation and compliance matters.537 One of the  
WPICMM’s objectives is to ‘enhance the technical capacity’ of members and cooperating 
non-members of the Commission ‘to understand and implement’ IOTC measures.538 The 
WPICMM is also required to develop capacity building mechanisms and activities to assist 
the implementation of IOTC measures.539 
 
533 IOTC Agreement (n 47) art V(2). 
534 Ibid art V(2)(b). The remainder of this section refers to ‘Indian Ocean countries’ (IOCs) to describe IO 
DCSs. 
535 Ibid.  
536 Ibid art V(2)(d). 
537 Resolution 17/02 (n 246) [1]. To date, the WPICMM has held three meetings 
538 Ibid ann I, [2] sub-para (b). 
539 Ibid [16], [17]. 
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In 2017, the IOTC took first steps to keep under review the economic and social aspects of 
fisheries under its mandate. At IOTC21 Seychelles proposed establishing a ‘Working Party 
on the Socio-Economic Aspects of the Fisheries in the IOTC Areas of Competence’.540 The 
proposal provided that the Working Party would advise the Commission on socio-economic 
impacts resulting from the implementation of IOTC measures, as well as recommendations 
by the SC.541 While choosing not to adopt the proposal, members agreed to engage an expert 
to conduct a scoping study on socio-economic data and indicators of IOTC fisheries in 
2018.542 Resolution 18/09 sets out a TOR for this consultancy and requires the IOTC to 
determine whether a Working Party should be established at its next annual session.543 While 
the scoping study was completed in 2019, the IOTC has yet to adopt a methodology the 
IOTC to collect and incorporate socio-economic data into its decision-making processes.544   
4 IOTC Internal Processes (Implementation and Assistance) 
The application of differentiation to IOTC internal processes is the most developed part of its 
differentiation framework. The IOTC Agreement, IOTC FR, IOTC ROP, five Resolutions, 
and one Recommendation set out administrative and institutional activities providing 
differentiation. 
(a) IOTC Administrative Activities: Budget, Meeting Participation Fund, Capacity Building 
Fund (CBF), and Equitable Representation in Commission Leadership 
Relevant administrative activities include the IOTC’s differentiated budget and Commission 
leadership. Like the WCPFC, the IOTC Agreement545 and IOTC FR546 set out a budgetary 
contribution scheme and special fund that reflect the development status of IOCs and provide 
financial assistance for their effective participation. The IOTC budgetary scheme derives 
member contributions from four categories.547 Each category accounts for a different 
percentage of the total budget. Two categories incorporate the development status of IOTC 
 
540 IOTC, Working Party on Socio-Economic Aspect of the Fisheries in the IOTC Area of Competence, IOTC-
2017-S21-PropG[E], 21st reg sess, 21 April 2017.  
541 Ibid [1], [3] sub-para (c).  
542 IOTC, Report of the 21st Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2017-S21-R[E], 22−26 May 2017, [119] (‘IOTC21 
Summary Report’). 
543 Resolution 18/09 (n 531) ann I. 
544 See IOTC23 Summary Report (n 529) [103]−[110].  
545 IOTC Agreement (n 47) art XIII(3)(b). 
546 IOTC FR (n 529) annex [3], [4].  
547 Ibid.  
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members.548 One is based on how members are classified under the World Bank classification 
of high-, middle-, and low- income states and the other discounts an assessment based on 
catch for members that are not part of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).549  
The IOTC ROP establishes and governs the use of the ‘Meeting Participation Fund’ (MPF) 
which supports the participation of IOC delegates to Commission-related meetings.550 The 
IOTC ROP prioritises funding for attendance to science-related meetings.551 Another 
financial resource is the Capacity Building Fund (CBF).552 Resolution 16/10 provides that the 
CBF is to focus on improving data collection and implementation of IOTC Resolutions.553 
Last, the IOTC Agreement requires the Commission to observe ‘equitable representation from 
among the Indian Ocean States’ in electing Commission leadership, such as Chairpersons and 
Vice-Chairpersons.554 
(b) IOTC Institutional Activities: IOTC Secretariat Capacity Building for DCSs in Science, 
Data and Compliance 
Most of IOTC’s differentiated internal processes are institutional activities undertaken by the 
Secretariat to build IOCs’ capacities in the areas of science, data, and compliance. As a result, 
the IOTC differentiation framework emphasises implementation.  
To address obligations contained in the IOTC Agreement, the Secretariat carries out science-
related capacity building workshops; data-related projects and regional workshops; and a 
significant amount of compliance-related programming, including compliance support 
missions, reviews of members’ fisheries legislation and compliance-related regional 
workshops.555 An important element of the Secretariat’s compliance work concerns the 
 
548 Ibid [1]−[2]. 
549 Ibid [3]−[4]. 
550 IOTC ROP (n 528) r XVI, app VII. 
551 Ibid rule XVI [5]. 
552 Resolution 16/10 (n 531) [1]−[3]. 
553 Ibid [2].  
554 IOTC Agreement (n 47) art VI (6).  
555 IOTC Agreement (n 47) art V(2)(b). See IOTC, Capacity Building: Science (Web Page, 2020) 
<https://www.iotc.org/science/capacity-building-science>; IOTC, Capacity Building Activities Implemented in 
Support of Developing Coastal States in the IOTC Area of Competence (Web Page, 2020) 




implementation of Resolution 16/11, particularly in light of members’ obligations under the 
FAO-led, binding Agreement on Port State Measures.556 Resolution 16/11 is the only 
measure adopted by the IOTC which refers to the special requirements of developing states 
within its binding (non-preambular) text.557 The IOTC Secretariat carries out PSM-related 
legal assistance, national and regional training courses and electronic PSM training.558 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has mapped the general territory of law that this thesis will be concerned with in 
relation to transboundary tuna management. It tracks the development of modern 
differentiation in international law and its key characteristics. In IFL, the chapter shows that 
UNCLOS and UNFSA set out separate, though consistent, approaches to differentiation, 
largely based on the principle of the special requirements of developing states. In UNCLOS, 
differentiation contextualises states’ obligations, whereas in UNFSA, it represents a stand-
alone obligation with its own legal valence.  
A comparison of WCPFC and IOTC differentiation frameworks demonstrates substantial 
differences between the two TRFMOs. Many of these differences are traced back to the 
reality that the WCPFC legal framework is based on UNFSA, while the IOTC’s is based on 
UNCLOS. The analysis shows that the WCPFC sets out a more modern and elaborate 
differentiation framework than the IOTC. Ultimately, the chapter provides robust evidence 
for procedural and distributive equity-related principles in its analysis of differentiation in 
UNCLOS, UNFSA, and the treaty law⎯including institutional law⎯of the WCPFC and 
IOTC.  
 
556 Resolution 16/11 (n 531) Preamble para 8; Agreement on Port State Measures to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, opened for signature 22 November 2009, UNTS I-
54133 (entered into force 5 June 2016). 
557 Resolution 16/11 (n 531) pt 6.  








CHAPTER 3: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GLOBAL TUNA 
INDUSTRY 
This chapter situates TRFMOs within the broader political economy of the global tuna 
industry. It addresses a significant gap in TRFMO research by modelling how members and 
their positions on points of law are informed by interactions with the tuna industry. The 
chapter links differentiation within TRFMOs to members’ engagements with the tuna 
industry through ‘distributional struggles’ that occur between states acting as economic 
players within tuna production chains. The chapter then identifies two areas of distributional 
struggle in particular—regional allocations and funding for DCS members’ effective 
participation—that affect distributive and procedural equity for DCSs. The chapter argues 
that these distributional struggles centre points of conflict between DCS and DWFS members 
in TRFMO negotiations concerning differentiation.  
The tuna industry reflects trends in food production systems observed by political economy 
scholars. A handful of globally significant, vertically integrated lead firms play a central role 
coordinating global tuna fishing, processing, and retail. Their economies of scale and scope 
allow these firms to profit from high-volume, low-cost tuna products while driving down 
prices⎯and thus margins⎯for more numerous suppliers. The result of this economic logic is 
that, as tuna goes from fish to can to consumer, most of the surplus value is retained in 
industrialised economies where lead firms are based.559 Conversely, DCSs tend to engage in 
tuna production as sources of raw material and low-wage labour. In this context, DCSs have 
had limited success exercising resource sovereignty to ‘upgrade’ their roles in tuna 
production chains. 
Transboundary tuna management is an important element of the tuna industry’s 
‘environmental conditions of production’.560 Negotiations between TRFMO members 
determine critical components of the tuna business (such as catch limits, resource rents, and 
 
559 In this thesis, the term ‘surplus value’ refers to its traditional meaning Marx’s theory of capitalist 
exploitation: Karl Marx, A History of Economic Theories (Langland Press, 1st ed, 1952) (‘Capital: Volume IV’). 
Coe and Yeung provide a succinct definition: ‘Surplus value [that] is created through a production process 
converting labour power into products and services to be exchanged for more than the labour value embedded in 
those commodities’: Coe and Yeung (n 198) 16.  
560 See above (n 203).  
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fisheries access agreements), and thus indirectly influence the distribution of value capture 
among firms and states in the tuna industry. From the perspective of economic development, 
DCSs have had success using subregional cooperation to improve their negotiating positions 
in TRFMOs. This reveals the extent to which transboundary tuna management (and the laws 
forming the basis of its operation) can be an intervening factor in the ability of DCSs to use 
tuna resources to drive economic development. 
Section I of this chapter introduces the GPN framework, a mode of political-economic 
analysis which will be used to describe the tuna industry. This section describes the four 
‘nodes’ of tuna GPNs: fishing, processing, trading, and retailing. Section II outlines a 
typology for TRFMO members based on their engagement with tuna GPNs. Building on 
preceding sections, Section III argues that TRFMOs can be understood as sites of political-
economic contestation, or ‘distributional struggles’ over value capture in tuna GPNs. It then 
describes how DCSs are using subregional strategies and institutions to increase their 
collective negotiating power. 
I GLOBAL PRODUCTION NETWORK THEORY AND THE TUNA INDUSTRY 
A Political Economy Theory, GPNs, and Development of the Tuna Industry 
GPN theory emerges from political economy research examining the interface of 
globalisation and economic development. Since the 1970s, political economists have sought 
to understand how the increasingly complex and fragmented global economic system has 
altered development pathways in the global South.561 A brief history of this research is 
necessary to understand the research program from which GPN theory emerges.562  
 
561 See, e.g., Gary Gereffi, ‘Global Production Systems and Third World Development’ in Barbara Stallings 
(ed), Global Change, Regional Response: The New International Context of Development (Cambridge 
University Press, 1995) 100. 
562 Several histories have been written of the development of economic geography research. See, e.g., Jennifer 
Bair, ‘Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward’ (2005) 9(2) Competition and 
Change 153. See also generally Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Commodity Chains in the World-
Economy Prior to 1800’ (1986) 10(1) Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 157; Gary Gereffi, ‘The Organization 
of Buyer-Driven Global Commodity Chains: How US Retailers Shape Overseas Production Networks’ in Gary 




Inquiry into ‘economic geography’,563 began under the ‘world-system framework’ proposed 
by Immanuel Wallerstein.564 Wallerstein organised national economies into an international 
division of labour based on economic relations established during the colonial period and 
divided states into the ‘core’, ‘semi-periphery’, and ‘periphery’. As globalisation unfurled in 
the latter decades of the 20th century, economic geographers recognised that the world system 
was changing in ways that challenged the conceptual category of the state and the neat 
divisions in Wallerstein’s framework. 
In the 1990s, Gereffi and Korzeniewicz proposed a new analytical mode for understanding 
the international division of labour through ‘global commodity chains’ (GCCs).565 GCC 
research focuses on ‘sets of interorganization networks clustered around one commodity or 
product’.566 Focusing on commodities revealed impressive variance in how the world 
economy linked networks of ‘households, enterprises, and states’ across geographies.567 In 
the early 2000s, Gereffi and his colleagues advanced their theory by shifting analytical focus 
again, this time to ‘global value chains’ (GVCs).568 GVC research examined the creation of 
value rather than commodities.569 The new research program underscored how multinational 
firms captured value through the increasingly complex governance of fragmented supply 
chains across borders.570  
GPN theory emerged from this lineage of research and is summarised in Coe and Yeung's 
seminal text, Global Production Networks: Theorizing Economic Development in an 
Interconnected World.571 Coe and Yeung propose another analytical shift to the ‘global 
production network’, defined as ‘an organizational arrangement, comprising interconnected 
 
563 This thesis refers interchangeably to the fields of ‘economic geography’ and ‘political economy’.  
564 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European 
World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (University of California Press, 1974). 
565 Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz, ‘Introduction: Global Commodity Chains’ in Gary Gereffi and 
Miguel Korzeniewicz and Roberto Korzeniewicz (eds), Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism (Praeger 
Publishers, 1994) 95.  
566 Ibid 2.  
567 Ibid.  
568 Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey and Timothy Sturgeon, ‘The Governance of Global Value Chains’ (2005) 
12(1) Review of International Political Economy 78.  
569 Ibid 86−7. 
570 Ibid 90−6. 
571 Coe and Yeung (n 198). 
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economic and non-economic actors, coordinated by a global lead firm, and producing goods 
or services across multiple geographical locations for worldwide markets’.572  
GPN research focuses primarily on interactions between firms, local economic actors, and 
the places they inhabit (framed as subnational ‘regions’).573 GPN theory is distinguished from 
GVC research in that its outlook is broader than the details of how firms coordinate supply 
chains (termed ‘inter-firm governance’).574 Rather, the GPN framework examines firms and 
their actions through the core concepts of value,575 power,576 and embeddedness577⎯all of 
which require researchers to consider ‘extra-firm’ actors and relations.578 The progressive 
development and broadening of GCC, GVC, and GPN research and their associated units of 
analysis exhibit how researchers of economic geography have sought to refashion their 
theories in accordance with an increasingly dynamic and globalised economic system.  
Research from GPN theory and its predecessors offer valuable insights for examining the 
development of the tuna industry and its interaction with states. The first is how this area of 
theory building has tracked and articulated trends in the global economy and its changing 
spatial organisation. Coe and Yeung provide an excellent overview of these changes over the 
20th century.579 They draw attention to transformations which occurred in the 1970s, as a 
focus on ‘Fordism’ (or the concentration of manufacturing in the global North) shifted 
towards increasingly flexible and dispersed modes of economic organisation coordinated by 
major firms.580 The emergence of major firms responsible for orchestrating these changes 
occurred concomitantly with the rise of East Asian economies.581 Motivated by the three 
 
572 Ibid 1−2.  
573 Ibid 20−1, 167-9.  
574 Ibid 11.  
575 For a discussion of the concept of value in GPN theory, see ibid 35−7.  
576 ‘Power in a production network context can be thought of as the ability of one actor to affect the behaviour 
of another actor in a manner contrary to the second actor’s interests. It can also reflect the ability of one actor to 
resist an unwanted imposition by another actor’: ibid 17 (emphasis in original). 
577 ‘[T]he embeddedness of [GPNs are] how they are constituted and are reconstituted by the ongoing economic, 
social and political arrangements in the places they inhabit’: ibid 16 (emphasis in original). Please note the 
similarities between GPN theory’s notion of embeddedness and Havice and Campling’s discussion of the 
‘environmental conditions of production’: see above (n 203). 
578 For an overview of these concepts, see Coe and Yeung (n 198) 16−8. 
579 Ibid 2−8.  




drivers of cost, flexibility, and speed, major firms employed strategies to lower production 
costs (such as outsourcing) and capture increasing value at later stages of supply chains.582  
The rise of industrial tuna fishing in tropical regions reflects these trends in the global 
economy. When industrial tuna fishing began in the 1950s, it was conducted by fishermen 
from the global North—primarily Japan and the US—in the Pacific, where they could 
reliably land and process fish.583 The boats, fishing gear, and processing equipment of these 
fishermen were heavily subsidised by their home governments, partly due to strategic 
geopolitical and food security considerations.584 Tuna fishing related activities did not 
typically involve the local economies or nationals from island states that served as bases for 
fishing and processing operations during this period.585  
In the 1970s, technological innovations in fish tracking and storage enabled industrial tuna 
fishing to expand to other tropical regions and a new generation of tuna fishermen from 
distant waters emerged.586 This introduced vessels flagged to European countries—France 
and Spain in particular—which established tuna fisheries off West Africa in the Atlantic and, 
eventually East Africa in the Indian Ocean.587 It also included new participants in Pacific and 
Indian Ocean tuna fisheries from newly industrialised East Asian states, such as China, South 
Korea, and Taiwan.588  
In the 1980s, as tuna fishing activities became increasingly global, firm coordinated 
governance of supply chains for tuna products also became more fragmented.589 Industrial 
tuna fishing, trading, processing, and retail now involved highly concentrated, vertically 
integrated lead firms seeking to capture surplus value from tuna. During this period, firms 
 
582 Ibid. 
583 Robert Gillett, A Short History of Industrial Fishing in the Pacific Islands (FAO Regional Office for Asia 
and the Pacific No 22, 2007); Kate Barclay, ‘History of Industrial Tuna Fishing in the Pacific Islands’ in Joseph 
Christensen and Malcolm Tull (eds), Historical Perspectives of Fisheries Exploitation in the Indo-Pacific 
(Springer, 2014) 153 (‘History of Industrial Tuna Fishing’). 
584 Norio Fujinami, ‘Development of Japan’s Tuna Fisheries’ in David J. Doulman (ed), Tuna Issues and 
Perspectives in the Pacific Islands Region (East-West Center, 1987) 57.  
585 Gillett (n 583) 4.  
586 Peter Miyake, ‘A Brief History of the Tuna Fisheries of the World’ in William H. Bayliff, Juan Ignacio de 
Leiva Moreno and Jacek Majkowski (eds), Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity: Conservation and Socio-
Economics (FAO Fisheries Proceedings No 2, 2005) 23, 31. 
587 Ibid.  
588 Ibid. 
589 Makoto Peter Miyake et al, Recent Developments in the Tuna Industry: Stocks, Fisheries, Management, 
Processing, Trade and Markets (FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No 543, 2010). 
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from the retail sector⎯specifically supermarkets⎯became central players in the increasingly 
competitive, high-volume, low-margin dynamics of the (canned) tuna industry.590  
While the trajectory of the tuna industry followed broader trends in food production in the 
latter half of the 20th century, one key change distinguished the industry and its relationship 
to economic development outcomes. This was the shift in the political-economic context for 
tuna that occurred when UNCLOS codified the EEZ-concept and extended coastal state 
resource rights to 200 nm offshore.591 The timing of this development in oceans law meant 
that lead firms were becoming central actors in tuna supply chains just as the role of states in 
tuna production was asserted. Campling and Havice describe this transition: 
The development of property relations through the EEZ⎯an “alien force” that disrupts the 
movement of capital in the sea⎯marked the possibility of states capturing ground-rent, 
primarily in the form of an access payment, which firms pay to fish in a state’s EEZ. 
Following UNCLOS, the struggle over surplus profits was no longer exclusively between 
capitalists.592 
In tropical regions, DCSs were now believed to have resource rights over the majority of 
global tuna stocks. This transformation established the contemporary elements of the political 
economy of the tuna industry and what this thesis argues are the conditions for contestation 
over legal differentiation in TRFMOs today. 
B Tuna Industry GPNs, Tuna GPN Nodes, and Value Capture 
GPNs for tuna products connect distant locales in the long journey through tuna fishing, 
processing, distribution, and retail. As tuna moves through these channels, it is transformed 
into a commodity and accrues economic value. As noted in the Introduction, tuna catches are 
responsible for adding over 40 billion USD to the global economy annually.593 Lead firms 
that specialise in coordinating stages of this journey are influential actors in tuna GPNs. 
Commercial struggles among these and other firms structure how value is distributed as tuna 
 
590 Amanda Hamilton et al, Markets and Industry Dynamics in the Global Tuna Supply Chain (Pacific Islands 
Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) Report, June 2011) <www.ffa.int/node/567>. 
591 UNCLOS (n 9) pt V, art 56.  
592 Campling and Havice, Problem of Property (n 203) 716. 
593 Macfadyen (n 1).   
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products move along supply chains. The outcomes of TRFMO negotiations play a part in 
shaping these competitive inter-firm dynamics.  
This section draws upon political economy research conducted by Havice and Campling (a 
body of research which spans over a decade and draws from over 500 interviews594) to 
describe how networks of firms and states interact in the production and consumption of tuna 
products.595 It is important to note that this section is not an exhaustive description of tuna 
GPNs; rather, it illustrates interactions between firms and the competitive strategies they 
employ to capture value within tuna product supply chains.  
1 Tuna Products: Canned Tuna and Raw Tuna GPNs 
The major tuna products are canned tuna, katsuobushi,596 ‘value-added’ tuna products,597 and 
sashimi598. These tuna products range in sale price from inexpensive protein to auctioned 
delicacy.599 Markets differentiate tuna products according to tuna species, fishing, and 
processing techniques.600 The two major tuna GPNs are primarily dedicated to canned and 
sashimi tuna markets. Responsible for over 60% of global tuna catch averaging 2.5 million 
 
594 See Havice and Campling, Articulating Upgrading (n 203); Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the 
Canned Tuna GVC (n 202). See also Elizabeth Havice and Liam Campling, ‘Shifting Tides in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishery: The Political Economy of Regulation and Industry Responses’ (2010) 
10(1) Global Environmental Politics 89 (‘Shifting Tides’); Liam Campling and Elizabeth Havice, ‘The Global 
Environmental Politics and Political Economy of Seafood Systems’ (2018) 18(2) Global Environmental Politics 
72 (‘Political Economy of Seafood Systems’). 
595 Unless otherwise noted, Section II B draws principally from Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in 
the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202). 
596 Katsuobushi is a condiment in Japanese cuisine. It is made using cheaper tuna meat (skipjack) that has been 
filleted, dried, fermented, and smoked: Hamilton et al (n 590) 43. 
597 Value added tuna products refer to a range of shelf-stable and frozen items. Shelf-stable, value added tuna 
products include pre-packaged tuna salad, pouches, and burgers—these are included in the canned tuna GPN. 
Frozen, value added tuna products describe cuts of ‘sashimi-grade’ tuna, such as loins, fillets, ‘saku blocks’, and 
tuna steaks—these are included in the raw tuna GPN. Frozen value-added tuna products typically come from 
tuna carcasses that are not considered acceptable for sashimi. The markets for these products have expanded in 
recent years: ibid 320-7. 
598 Sashimi is prepared from high value cuts of tuna that come either fresh or frozen at temperatures below 
minus 40 degrees Celsius. Tuna carcasses that are not considered acceptable for sashimi are sold in the tuna 
steak market: Camillo Catarci, ‘The World Tuna Industry⎯An Analysis of Imports and Prices, and of Their 
Combined Impact on Catches and Tuna Fishing Capacity’ in William H. Bayliff, Juan Ignacio de Leiva Moreno 
and Jacek Majkowski (eds), Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity: Conservation and Socio-Economics (FAO 
Fisheries Proceedings No 2, 2005) 235, 243. 
599 To a lesser extent, byproducts from tuna processing may be smoked and dried for jerky or used for oil and 
animal feed: ibid 243. 
600 Ibid 243.  
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metric tonnes (mt) annually, the global canned tuna market is the largest.601 In contrast, the 
sashimi market demands a lower volume of catch, averaging 500,000 mt annually.602  
2 Tuna GPN Nodes 
Havice and Campling describe three core nodes in the canned tuna GPN:603 retail, processing, 
and fishing.604 Intense, competitive dynamics across and within nodes characterise the 
canned tuna GPN. An overriding logic drives inter-firm relations, which Havice and 
Campling stress is the ‘imperative to maintain high volumes of raw material throughput’.605 
The need for a high volume of tuna supply to extract increasingly thin margins shapes the 
behaviour of firms and the strategies they employ to capture value within the canned tuna 
GPN.  
The following description of tuna GPN nodes illustrates the competitive dynamics that 
structure and drive tuna production and consumption practices. This description also 
elaborates on Havice and Campling’s work by inserting an additional node—the ‘trading 
node’—to describe the critical role played by tuna trading firms. As a result of competitive 
dynamics among firms, patterns of integration, centralisation, and concentration are observed 
in most nodes of the canned tuna GPN.606  
(a) Retail Node: Supermarkets and Restaurants 
The retail node is where most consumers interact with the tuna industry. In the canned tuna 
GPN, firms at the retail node are supermarkets, whereas in the raw tuna GPN, firms are in the 
 
601 Hamilton et al (n 590) 18. 
602 Ibid 263. 
603 This section focuses on the canned tuna GPN. This GPN has received the most attention in the literature due 
to its dominance in catch and market share and is the focus of Havice and Campling’s recent work using GPN 
theory. Where possible, illustrations of the raw tuna GPN have been included.  
604 Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 304. The use of the term ‘node’ 
is from the original characterisation of a global commodity chain, set out by Gereffi, Korzeniewicz and 
Korzeniewicz: 
Specific processes or segments within a commodity chain can be represented as boxes or nodes, linked 
together in networks. Each successive node within a commodity chain involves the acquisition and/or 
organization of inputs (e.g., raw materials or semifinished products), labor power (and its provisions), 
transportation, distribution (via markets or transfers), and consumption: Gereffi, Korzeniewicz and 
Korzeniewicz (n 565) 2 (emphasis added).  
605 Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 302. 
606 Miyake et al note an increasing concentration of capital in the hands of a smaller number of actors involved 
in vessel ownership, tuna trading, processing, and buying, as well as the relocation of tuna processing to 
developing states to cut labour and transportation costs: Miyake et al (n 589) xix. 
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restaurant sector, and comprise concentrated retailers such as sushi bar chains. Firms in the 
retail node wield substantial power over firms in upstream607 nodes of tuna GPNs. Lead firms 
in this node shape consumer behaviour and influence competitive dynamics among other 
firms.  
Supermarkets, in particular, cultivate the competitive logic that operates in the canned tuna 
GPN. Aware that customers who buy canned tuna spend more on average than other 
customers during a shopping trip, supermarkets utilise canned tuna as a ‘loss leader’ to 
increase customer expenditures in their stores. Traditionally, supermarkets put canned tuna 
on promotion at prices low enough to produce thin or even negative margins to attract ‘high 
volume’ customers. They then pass the costs of these promotions on to their suppliers. 
Supermarkets are able to employ this strategy due to the power they wield over suppliers. 
Using strategies such as ‘slotting’,608 ‘delisting’,609 and the creation of their own private 
labels,610 supermarkets place downward price pressure and encourage competition among 
suppliers.611 Supermarkets thus ‘squeeze’ canned tuna suppliers into lowering their prices and 
reducing their margins to remain competitive.612 Havice and Campling argue that these 
tactics reveal how supermarkets ‘nurture high volume, low price production practices’ in the 
retail node of the canned tuna GPN.613  
(b) Trading Node: Trading Firms and Vertical Integration 
The trading node involves complex interactions among firms in the middle segments of tuna 
production chains. Firms in this node are trading firms and⎯similar to supermarkets at the 
retail node⎯are highly integrated and centralised.  
 
607 The network perspective of supply chains adopted by GPN scholars describes ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ 
flows across supply chain nodes. While definitions vary, Havice and Campling refer to networks of tuna 
suppliers in upstream nodes and networks of tuna distributors and retailers in downstream nodes: Havice and 
Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 294, 302−3, 305, 308−9.  
608 Slotting refers to the practice of supermarkets renting out premium shelf space to suppliers in which 
additional payment is sometimes required to maintain ‘shelf real estate’: ibid 297. 
609 Supermarkets may threat to delist (i.e. discontinue) a brand from a supplier, if its products do not generate 
sufficient revenue: ibid 297−8. 
610 Supermarkets sell their own ‘private labels’ more cheaply than their suppliers. They can utilise shelf space to 
take away market share from their suppliers through the sale of private label canned tuna: ibid 298-9. 





Trading firms—also described as ‘supply management firms’—oversee the middle segments 
of tuna production chains.614 This includes transactions where fishing firms supply tuna catch 
to processing firms. It also includes transactions where processing firms supply loined and 
canned tuna to retailers. These firms govern upstream flows of tuna product and essentially 
act as the ‘middle men’ of the tuna trade. In the process of sourcing and distributing tuna 
product, trading firms leverage economies of scale to manage risk associated with 
fluctuations in tuna supply for both fishers and processors.615 Trading firms have sought to 
vertically integrate some of these transactions and some are engaged in the entire tuna supply 
chain, which encompasses fishing, processing, and retailing tuna product.  
In the first category of transactions, trading firms depend upon relationships they build with 
other firms at the fishing and processing nodes to provide their services. Trading firms 
purchase catch from vessel operators and coordinate reefer carriers to tranship the catch for 
sale and delivery to processing firms.616 Trading firms build longstanding relationships with 
vessel owners and operators, and, in some cases, are involved in voyage or vessel financing 
and support to secure catch for processing.617 Trading firms then rely on relationships with 
processors to provide them with raw material, often through advance purchase contracts.618 
The coordinating role trading firms play in tuna production chains allows them ‘to sell raw 
material for higher than the purchase price’ by providing functional advantages to both 
fishing and processing firms.619 In the second category of transactions, trading firms supply 
loined and canned tuna to brands and retailers.620 A key element of these transactions is 
again, the relationships trading firms develop with canned tuna brands and buyers.  
 
614 See generally Hamilton et al (n 590) 137−9; Liam Campling, Antony Lewis and Mike McCoy, The Tuna 
Longline Industry in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean and its Market Dynamics (FFA Report, 2017) 
<www.ffa.int/node/2025> 87−97; Liam Campling, Elizabeth Havice, and Vina Ram-Bidesi, Pacific Island 
Countries, The Global Tuna Industry and the International Trade Regime⎯A Guidebook (FFA Report, April 
2007) 226−34.  
615 Campling, Havice, and Ram-Bidesi (n 614) 231.  
616 Hamilton et al (n 590) 137−8.  
617 Ibid; Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 303. 
618 See above (n 616). 
619 Hamilton et al describe how trading firms simplify interactions between fishing and processing firms. For 
fishing firms, ‘Engaging a trader enables vessel operators to channel their energies into fishing, rather than 
having to deal with the financial, administrative and logistical hassle and risk associated with marketing catch’: 
ibid 137. For processing firms, ‘purchasing raw material from tuna traders removes the complexities of dealing 
with a large number of vessel owners selling small volumes of catch. Working with trading companies ensures 
that processors have continued access to large volumes of raw material’: at ibid.  
620 See, e.g., Hamilton et al (n 590) 139.  
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The sourcing and integration strategies of trading firms have generated opportunities for 
vertical integration across the nodes of tuna production chains. These opportunities are 
created through the commercial relationships trading firms establish between fishers, 
processors, brands, and retailers. At the fishing node, a trading firm may directly purchase 
boats or provide alternative financial support to fishing firms through supply contracts and 
vessel financing (thus avoiding the financial risk of boat ownership).621 At the processing 
node, a trading firm may enter into a joint venture with a coastal state government. In this 
case, a trading firm assumes direct partial ownership of a processing plant as part of the terms 
of a fisheries access agreement (FAA).622 This agreement may enable either the trading firm’s 
boats or associated fishing firm to enjoy exclusive and longer-term access to turn resources 
within the coastal state’s EEZ. This arrangement also has the effect of providing an 
uninterrupted supply of raw material to the processing plant. Finally, at the retail node, 
complete integration may be achieved if a lead firm also owns a trading firm with processing 
plants and fishing boats. This level of vertical integration exists in the canned tuna GPN 
through the Bolton Group’s ownership of Tri Marine and in the raw tuna GPN through 
Mitsubishi’s ownership of Toyo Reizo.  
It is debatable whether trading firms can be considered lead firms within tuna GPNs. Trading 
firms operate within what political economists refer to as a ‘bottle neck’, or point of corporate 
concentration, within tuna production chains⎯eight top trading firms operate within canned 
and raw tuna GPNs.623 This level of concentration allows trading firms to wield substantial 
power over the upstream sale of raw and processed tuna. Some evidence exists in canned and 
raw tuna GPNs that trading firms engage in price manipulation.624 For example, Havice and 
Campling have documented a ‘common concern’ among processing firms that trading firms 
 
621 Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 303. 
622 Havice describes this arrangement in her discussion of ‘second-generation’ FAAs in the WCPO: Elizabeth 
Havice, ‘The Structure of Tuna Access Agreements in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean: Lessons for 
Vessel Day Scheme Planning’ (2010) 34 Marine Policy 979, 981−3. First-generation or ‘cash for access’ FAAs 
are where a foreign firm or state pays an agreed price for the right to fish in a coastal state EEZ: at 981. Second-
generation FAAs are where a foreign firm secures access to a coastal state EEZ by registering their vessels to 
the coastal state or locally investing in onshore facilities such as processing plants: at 982. For examples of this 
practice in Fiji, PNG, the Solomon Islands, and Seychelles see Havice and Campling, Articulating Upgrading (n 
203) 2619−23. 
623 Steven Adolf, Simon Bush, and Sietze Vellema, ‘Reinserting State Agency in Global Value Chains: The 
Case of MSC Certified Skipjack Tuna’ (2016) 182 Fisheries Research 79, 81. See below Section II D.   
624 For an example in the raw tuna GPN, see the following report on accusations of Mitsubishi stockpiling 
bluefin tuna: Marina Walker Guevara and Martin Foster, ‘Part III: Bluefin, Inc.’ (7 November 2010) The Centre 
for Public Integrity <https://publicintegrity.org/environment/part-iii-bluefin-inc/>.  
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manipulate the selling price of frozen tuna for canning.625 In this scenario, trading firms 
stockpile frozen tuna in an attempt to ‘narrow or widen supply so as to achieve a better 
price’.626 Havice and Campling are dubious as to whether higher prices for processors are 
indicative of price manipulation and instead point to higher fuel costs and dwindling tuna 
stocks as alternative explanations.627 As discussed previously however, increasing vertical 
integration has blurred this distinction where lead firms like Bolton Group and Mitsubishi 
own top trading firms.  
(c) Processing Node: Branded and Nonbranded Manufacturers and Processing Plants 
Firms in the processing node include branded and nonbranded manufacturers. The top canned 
tuna brands are owned by a small number of branded manufacturers. Havice and Campling 
note that branded manufacturers are increasingly centralised as a result of mergers and 
acquisitions under food multinationals such as Heinz and Mitsubishi.628 Pointing to corporate 
concentration, Havice and Campling observe that all major canned tuna brands in North 
American and EU markets (the primary markets for canned tuna) are controlled by just six 
firms.629 To address high labour costs, branded manufacturers either locate their processing 
plants in developing states or import frozen cooked ‘loins’ (a common intermediary form of 
tuna products) to market states for canning.630 Food multinationals use centralisation to 
increase their economies of scope and scale, enabling them to source tuna supply from 
multiple oceans and increase their buying power.631 The degree of centralisation among 
branded manufacturers accounts for their significant buying and lobbying power.632  
Upstream from these highly concentrated branded manufacturers are what Havice and 
Campling refer to as ‘nonbranded manufacturers’.633 These firms engage with the 
increasingly centralised brands and supermarket private labels to supply finished product 
 
625 Campling, Havice, and Ram-Bidesi (n 614) 232.  
626 Ibid 233.  
627 Ibid.  
628 Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 300. 
629 Ibid. Corporate concentration in this context refers to the number of lead firms with a share in the grocery 
market. 
630 Loining requires hand processing techniques that entail skinning, boning, cutting, and packing cuts of tuna 
caracasses: Kate Barclay, ‘Impacts of Tuna Industries on Coastal Communities in Pacific Island Countries’ 
(2010) 34(3) Marine Policy 406, 407.  
631 Ibid.  
632 For example, US canned tuna brands have historically lobbied their government for favourable trade 
conditions. See, e.g., Campling, Havice, and Ram-Bidesi (n 614) 358−9.  
633 Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 299. 
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(canned tuna). Nonbranded manufacturers are by nature ‘less concentrated’, ‘geographically 
dispersed’, and ‘export-oriented’.634 These shared characteristics enable lead firms to 
maintain supply despite fluctuations that often result from environmental and political-
economic factors in different regions.635  
This portion of the processing node represents a juncture in how the canned tuna GPN is 
spatially organised: nonbranded manufacturers are located largely in the developing world, in 
locales (such as Thailand, Philippines, Ecuador, and Indonesia) that offer cheap and efficient 
labour and/or geographic proximity to tuna stocks.636 Nonbranded manufacturing firms own 
the majority of tuna processing plants worldwide, which numbered upwards of 240 plants in 
2012.637  
Tuna processing plants may function as either canning or loining plants. The labour-intensive 
nature of loining drives firms to locate loining plants in locales with a skilled, low-cost 
workforce.638 Branded firms in the canned tuna GPN often outsource loining to nonbranded 
manufacturers and then import frozen cooked loins to their home state (typically a developed 
state) for canning in order to capture surplus value from (mechanical) processing.639 
Alternatively, fresh and frozen uncooked loins are imported for retailers in the raw tuna GPN, 
which sell tuna products requiring limited processing.640  
Nonbranded manufacturers experience sustained downward price pressure from their buyers 
(supermarkets and branded firms). Buyers play nonbranded manufacturing firms against one 
another in negotiations through such strategies as ‘cost plus’ formulas, in which buyers cover 
 
634 Ibid. 
635 Ibid 302; Hamilton et al (n 590) 157−8.  
636 Hamilton et al (n 590) 154−234.  
637 Ibid 301. 
638 Hamilton et al (n 590) 157. See also Campling on the ‘logic of loining’. Campling argues:  
It should be noted that this aspect of the new international division of labour⎯the “logic of loining”⎯is not 
solely about the search for cheap labour as popularly depicted, but also for ready access to tuna fisheries, 
more lax labour standards and environmental regulations, reduced transportation costs and access to existing 
ocean-going networks, and, importantly…access to EU and US trade preferences’: Liam Campling, ‘Trade 
Politics and the Global Production of Canned Tuna’ (2016) 69 Marine Policy 220, 224 (citation omitted) 
(‘Trade Politics’). 
639 Hamilton et al (n 590) 157. 
640 Ibid 82; Campling, Lewis, and McCoy (n 614) 57−9. 
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the costs to establish a processing plant in exchange for a ‘predetermined profit margin’, 
which they then use as leverage in subsequent negotiations.641  
Despite synergies between centralised lead firms and nonbranded manufacturers, this node of 
the canned tuna GPN exhibits perverse competitive dynamics which culminate in 
overcapacity. Havice and Campling point to a 30% gap between processing capacity and 
consumption in the canned tuna GPN in the 1990s, which, they claim, has worsened in 
subsequent years.642 Nonbranded manufacturers tend to reflect the overriding logic initiated 
at the retail node and reinforced by buyers because they also rely on high volumes of tuna 
supply to maintain profits. The processing node exhibits a power differential between buyers 
and suppliers. This differential motivates competitive dynamics that have created 
overcapacity at this node and enhanced demand for increasingly high volumes and 
uninterrupted tuna supply.  
(d) Fishing Node: Fishing Firms and Competitive Pressures 
Firms in the fishing node are subject to multiple regulatory and commercial pressures. These 
pressures include the competitive dynamics of downstream nodes, as well as regulations 
implemented by coastal states and TRFMOs. At the nexus of these pressures, firms in the 
fishing node face continuing tensions between the imperatives of tuna GPNs and the 
conservation objectives of tuna management.  
The fishing node is the least concentrated node of tuna GPNs. It is populated by fishing firms 
with highly mobile fleets and increasing numbers of vessels.643 At this node, fishing firms 
with diffuse and often opaque ownership control the global tuna fishing fleet.644 Industrial 
 
641 Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 301. 
642 Ibid 299.  
643 There is a substantial literature on overcapacity issues in global tuna fisheries. See, e.g., James Joseph, 
Managing Fishing Capacity of the World Tuna Fleet (FAO Fisheries Circular No 982, 2003) <www.fao.org/3/a-
y4499e.pdf>; Aranda, Murua and de Bruyn (n 72). 
644 The issue of identifying ‘beneficial owners’ of industrial-scale fishing vessels is discussed in the literature on 
IUU fishing and its possible linkages with transnational crime. There is currently no formal definition of a 
‘beneficial owner’, but the term is used to clarify the individual or company that enjoys the benefits of 
ownership of the fishing vessel. For a discussion of beneficial ownership issues in the context of tuna fisheries, 
see Yann-huei Song, ‘The Efforts of ICCAT to Combat IUU Fishing: The Roles of Japan and Taiwan in 
Conserving and Managing Tuna Resources’ (2009) 24 The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 
101, 125−28. The Implementation Guidelines for the FAO International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and 
Eliminate IUU Fishing state that: 
The vessels that conduct IUU fishing are, by nature, highly mobile platforms that often operate in marine 
areas far from land and in places where effective [MCS] are lacking. The beneficial owners of the vessels 
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tuna fishing vessels are infamously large (both in terms of vessel size and capacity) and 
opportunistic, with the ability to follow migrating tuna stocks for months at sea.645 Multiple 
factors inform the directives of fishing firms and the behaviours of vessel operators in tuna 
GPNs. Havice and Campling argue that, ‘Lead firms put intense⎯though, most frequently, 
indirect⎯commercial pressure on boat owners to fish harder, faster, and further. Competition 
among fishing firms is sharp because ownership is not concentrated’.646 In this dynamic, the 
retail node generates an imperative for high levels of catch at the lowest possible cost through 
downward price pressure on processing firms.  
Conditions at the processing node enhance this pressure due to worldwide processing 
overcapacity and the related need to source increasing numbers of processing plants with raw 
material. Responding to these forces and managing additional issues concerning ‘fuel and 
fish price volatility, labour, and insurance costs’, tuna fishing operations have intensified 
their fishing practices.647 Over time, these vessels have modified their gear, increased their 
size and holding capacity, and expanded their geographic range to cope with these pressures. 
Consequently, conditions within the fishing node are highly influenced and constrained by 
firms and economic logics operating at other nodes within tuna GPNs.  
C Distribution of Value in Tuna GPNs, the Role for TRFMOs, and the State 
Tuna GPN nodes form a complex supply chain that links the extraction of tuna from fishing 
grounds in the developing world to the sale of tuna products in the developed world. Within 
this chain, value flows predominantly from the developing world to lead firms based in 
 
often succeed in preventing fisheries managers and law enforcement officials from ascertaining their 
identities: FAO, Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, 
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (FAO Technical Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries No 9, 2002) 4.  
645 Industrial-scale vessels are not the only vessels that supply tuna GPNs. Small- and medium-sized vessels, 
categorised as ‘semi-industrial’ vessels also supply tuna GPNs. For a discussion of semi-industrial tuna fishing 
vessels see Chapter 5 Section II E. These vessels carry out single to multiple day or week fishing trips. Some are 
small (5-15 GRT), artisanal vessels from Indonesia and Philippines. Others are medium-sized (under 24 GRT), 
modern longliners with chilling capacity from Taiwan and China which deliver fresh catch to sashimi markets. 
See Edison D. Macusi and Widhya Nugroho Satrioajie, ‘Characterising Small-Scale Tuna Fisheries from 
Indonesia and the Philippines: A Review’ (Conference Paper, MARE Conference People and the Sea VII, 27 
June 2013); Richard Banks, Katherine Short and Seremaia Tuqiri, WWF, South West Pacific Longline Caught 
Albacore: Going, Going, Gone? (Policy Brief, 25−29 March 2012) 14−5.  
646 Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 304.  
647 Ibid 302. 
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industrialised states.648 Figure 6 provides an overview of nodes and actors within tuna GPNs 
below. 
Figure 6: Overview of Tuna GPN Nodes and Actors649 
 
The unique political economy of tuna complicates the power wielded by lead firms within 
tuna GPNs. Lead firms are forced to act within the context of what Havice and Campling 
refer to as the ‘environmental conditions of production’.650 These background conditions are 
‘the ever-shifting combination of regulatory, commercial and ecological conditions that shape 
and are shaped by dynamic resource extraction processes’.651 Key ‘extra-firm’ actors such as 
coastal and market states, TRFMOs, and NGOs contribute to the environmental conditions of 
production for the tuna industry.652 Havice and Campling highlight that the relationship of 
 
648 Österblom et al have documented the ‘keystone’ role played by lead firms in the seafood industry: Österblom 
et al, ‘Transnational Corporations as “Keystone Actors” in Marine Ecosystems’ (2015) 10(5) PLoS One 
0127533: 1−15. 
649 Dr. Indiah Hodgson-Johnston helped format this figure.  
650 See above (n 203). 
651 Ibid. 
652 See Coe and Yeung (n 198) 47−50, who explain that: 
[L]ead firms must [also] engage with extra-firm actors such as the state, international organizations, labour 
groups, consumers, and civil society organizations in the diverse localities that are articulated into these 
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states and TRFMOs to tuna GPNs is mutually constitutive (they ‘shape and are shaped by’ 
one another).653 Therefore, the competitive logics that drive the canned tuna GPN tend to 
condition the motivations of states and by extension, TRFMO management decisions.  
Havice and Campling conclude that TRFMOs are not simply a form of state-led 
transboundary tuna management; rather, they are ‘indirectly engaging in the management of 
interests across tuna value chains’.654 The authors ascertain that ‘the well-documented 
failures of tuna fisheries management organizations can be explained in part by the failure to 
recognize that they are regulating not only boats or even fishing nations but the competitive 
effects of downstream interfirm relations’.655  
Havice and Campling demonstrate that TRFMOs are engaged in competitive dynamics 
between lead firms and other firms within tuna GPNs. The authors establish this in direct 
examples of the tuna industry interacting with TRFMO management processes. This includes 
the positions advocated by observing industry associations at TRFMO meetings.656 This 
thesis argues for additional evidence of this connection in indirect examples of states 
interacting with the tuna industry. Referenced, but not discussed, by Havice and Campling, 
these interactions come to bear on members’ positions within TRFMO negotiations.657 While 
these interactions are complex and at times opaque, they demonstrate that states are 
implicated in both the flow of value within tuna GPNs and TRFMO management decisions.  
II TYPOLOGY OF STATE INTERACTIONS WITH TUNA GPNS 
The political economy of tuna locates states in a complex web of interactions within tuna 
GPNs. This section describes how state participation in tuna GPNs informs the positions they 
take as TRFMO members. By isolating the most typical and frequent interactions between 
states and firms at different nodes, this section illustrates how both developing and 
 
networks. These state and non-state institutions can be highly significant extra-firm actors shaping value 
activity in different global production networks: at 47 (emphasis in original). 
653 Havice and Campling, Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 294. 
654 Ibid 302.  
655 Ibid (citations ommitted).  
656 Ibid. 
657‘These examples of interfirm strategies are not exhaustive; for example, financialized mechanisms are 
missing from the analysis here, and we focus on interfirm relations to the exclusion of thorough analysis of firm 
relations with states (eg through political lobbying) and other institutional actors (such as tuna RFMOs)’: ibid 
309 (emphasis added).  
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industrialised states are implicated in tuna GPNs. In order to focus the following discussion, a 
typology has been devised for state-GPN interaction. This typology includes coastal, fishing, 
processing, trading, and market states. It is important to note that this typology is not fully 
representative of the complex interactions between states and tuna GPNs. Rather, it provides 
a heuristic for considering the multifaceted interface between states and the tuna industry, 
particularly with a view to their differing levels of economic development. Moreover, not all 
possible overlaps across these ‘types’ have been included in the discussion below. The 
overlapping identities that might apply to a single state are complicated and therefore too 
intricate to cover here, though they produce interesting tensions for the positions states take 
in TRFMO negotiations.  
A Coastal States 
Coastal states interact with tuna GPNs as independent economic actors, which positions them 
in direct conflict with both firms and other states over surplus value from tuna products. As a 
result of rights granted to them under the EEZ regime, coastal states receive government 
revenue from the direct sale of access to tuna stocks that migrate through their EEZs. Coastal 
states sell fisheries access through negotiated licensing658 and chartering659 agreements with 
various economic actors in tuna GPNs.660 These actors are domestic and foreign fishing 
firms, as well as fishing states.  
Coastal states contribute to the environmental conditions of production for tuna GPNs by 
implementing fisheries regulations to manage tuna stocks in their EEZs. These regulations 
are typically contained in the terms of FAAs. Coastal states also function as ‘port states’ in 
regional and global efforts to end illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing. In this 
 
658 Access to EEZ tuna fisheries are granted through fishing licenses distributed and administered by a coastal 
state. A licensing agreement typically requires vessel operators to pay a fee for fisheries access. 
659 There is currently no common definition of a chartering agreement in the TRFMO literature. Crigler states 
that ‘In the global tuna industry … the term [chartered vessel] is generally applied to describe a commercial 
fishing vessel operating under the control of a party in a nation other than the nation to which it is flagged’: 
Crigler (n 80) 10−1. Foreign vessel operators enter into charter agreements with coastal states and adopt the flag 
of the coastal state to gain access to their EEZ. In some cases, such as in PNG, coastal states require a charter 
agreement for foreign fishing vessels to gain access to their EEZ. Coastal states benefit from these agreements 
because it expands their control over foreign vessels operating in their EEZs and increases their domestic fishing 
capacity: at 1; Valentin J. Schatz, ‘The Contribution of Fisheries Access Agreements to Flag State 
Responsibility’ (2017) 84 Marine Policy 313. For a discussion of various types of charters and flagging 
practices in industrial scale fisheries, see also: Crigler (n 80) 14−6.   
660 Licensing and chartering agreements are types of FAAs.  
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capacity, coastal states exercise their rights under international law to prohibit fishing vessels 
suspected of IUU fishing from entering their ports.661 
In the various roles of economic actor and regulating authority, coastal states are positioned 
within tuna GPNs to represent their commercial and political interests in tuna fisheries. In 
multiple studies, Campling and Havice explore the complex orientation of coastal states 
towards tuna GPNs from a Marxist perspective of capitalist processes of resource extraction 
from the oceans.662 They contend that: ‘As state-landed property, coastal states sit at the 
nexus of rent appropriation and other distributional struggles around surplus value, 
(perceived) “national interest”, geopolitics, resource management and industry regulation in 
EEZs’.663 Indeed, coastal states are often motivated by a conflicting combination of 
commercial and public interests with respect to tuna fisheries.  
Coastal states engage in interminable struggles for surplus value with fishing firms and, by 
extension, nearly every other actor involved in tuna GPNs. This is because coastal states 
receive government revenue insofar as they manage to capture surplus value from tuna 
production—a motivation that drives all other economic actors competing within tuna GPNs. 
For coastal states, this value typically takes the form of resource rents.664 Coastal states 
receive access payments based on the rent they derive from tuna stocks.665 Havice and 
Campling stress that the concept of rent is constructed, and therefore historically and 
institutionally contingent.666 The authors maintain that this conception of rent is particularly 
 
661 See UNFSA (n 10) 23, 21(8).   
662 See, e.g., Campling and Havice, Problem of Property (n 203); Campling and Havice, Political Economy of 
Seafood Systems (n 594). 
663 Campling and Havice, Problem of Property (n 203) 715. 
664 According to the World Bank, ‘The resource rent is a measure of the net economic benefits from the harvest 
of wild fish stocks’: Ragnar Arnason, Kieran Kelleher, and Rolf Willmann, The Sunken Billions: The Economic 
Justification for Fisheries Reform (World Bank No 2596, September 2009) 30 
<https://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARD/Resources/336681-1224775570533/SunkenBillionsFinal.pdf>. 
Campling and Havice carefully articulate why the World Bank’s definition is flawed: Campling and Havice, 
Problem of Property (n 203) 709−11. 
665 Stephen Mbithi Mwikya, Fisheries Access Agreements: Trade and Development Issues (International Centre 
for Trade and Sustainable Development Issue Paper No 2, April 2006) 15−6 
<https://www.ictsd.org/downloads/2008/04/mbithi_2006.pdf>. 
666 Campling and Havice describe how a theory of rent was originally developed by economists in relation to 
property ownership: Campling and Havice, Problem of Property (n 203) 709−13. Neoclassical economic policy 
revised this conceptualisation of rent to be the economic benefits derived from exclusive access to natural 
resources: ibid. Campling and Havice argue that, by decoupling the relationship between rent and property, the 
neoclassical definition makes rent ‘a given ... determined by the market ... a “normal” or “natural” payment for 
the differential productivity of land and other resources’: at 710. Following other Marxist scholars, Campling 
and Havice argue that rent is neither ‘ahistorical’ nor ‘normal’, but, rather, dependent ‘upon historically and 
socially specific relations between capitalists and landlords’: at 720. 
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important to understanding the political economy of coastal states’ juridical rights over 
EEZs.667 
A grounded understanding of rent articulates the relationship between coastal states and firms 
within tuna GPNs. Because ground-rent is contingent, it is the site of intense contestation. 
Campling and Havice define ground-rent as ‘the portion of surplus value taken by modern 
landed property [coastal states]’.668 In the context of tuna fisheries, the authors classify 
coastal states as landlords (or, in Marxist terms, ‘landed property’) due to the resource rights 
granted to them in EEZs under international law. Through the concept of ground-rent, 
Campling and Havice re-establish the connection between property and resource rights 
articulated in early economic theories of rent. From this outlook, ‘The capitalist fishing 
enterprise pays the coastal state ground-rent for the right to access a parcel of the ocean and 
extract the resource’.669 Campling and Havice argue that neoliberal studies of resource rent in 
tuna fisheries are naïve to conflicts between coastal states and fishing firms over ground-rent. 
Consequently, coastal states are in a continuous struggle with firms and fishing states because 
they are driven to increase the ground-rent that forms the basis of fisheries access 
negotiations. While access fee payments are still not widely published and numbers in the 
literature vary, some estimates are available. On average, coastal states currently receive 
access fee payments for tuna that approximate 3% of the total value of the catch.670 Mwikya 
argues that, in comparison to resource rents for comparable resource extraction activities, ‘it 
is difficult to justify resource rent levels below 30% of the value of the catch’.671  The 
significant disparities reflected in how little access fee payments often correspond to the 
actual value of tuna resources reinforces Campling and Havice’s contention that ground-rent 
is not predetermined by the market but a negotiated construct in tuna fisheries.  
Many coastal states depend upon access payments for government funding of fisheries 
administrations within the most economically challenged economies in the world. For 
 
667 Ibid 713.  
668 Ibid. 
669 Ibid 722. 
670 Mwikya (n 665) 16. Unless otherwise specified, this and other descriptions of the value of tuna catch in this 
thesis refer to the landed value, that is, the value of the catch at the first point of sale when it leaves the vessel 




developing states, ‘fish for aid’ agreements can complicate their ability to demand adequate 
ground-rent in fisheries access negotiations.672 In TRFMO negotiations, commentators have 
suggested that government delegations from developing states are often silent or unwilling to 
take strong positions to regulate DWFS fleets as a result of their reliance on aid and revenue 
from FAAs.673 Campling and Havice nevertheless demonstrate that DCSs have improved 
their relative position in fisheries access negotiations:  
Over time, coastal states have deepened their individual and collective bargaining power as 
landed property to strengthen the terms and conditions of FAAs and their capture of surplus 
value...Coastal states’ (in)ability to capture or increase their portion of surplus value over time 
indicates that resource access relations are a site of political and social struggle among states 
and firms, not a technical category determined by the market.674 
Despite the significant challenges posed to DCSs from conflicts over ground-rent, Havice and 
Campling claim they have gained increasing traction in fisheries access negotiations with 
other economic actors in tuna GPNs.675  
B Fishing States 
Fishing states traditionally provide support for lead firms to counter the economic interests of 
coastal states in conflicts over surplus value in tuna GPNs. These states exhibit close 
coupling with fishing firms in the form of both political and economic sponsorship. Fishing 
states can sponsor firms through: (i) representation in fisheries access negotiations; and (ii) 
direct and indirect subsidies. Through this type of sponsorship, governments of DWFSs have 
historically forged close bonds with major fishing firms in the tuna industry.676 Fishing states 
therefore tend to conflict with coastal states in access negotiations. In this context, coastal and 
fishing states are both ‘active players in struggles over the creation and distribution of surplus 
value from the production of fisheries commodities, and are involved in meditating domestic 
and foreign interests and the relations among them’.677 
 
672 Elizabeth Petersen, ‘The Catch in Trading Fishing Access for Foreign Aid’ (2003) 27 Marine Policy 219, 
221−5.  
673 See, e.g., Mialy Andriamahefazafy, Christian A. Kull and Liam Campling, ‘Connected by Sea, Disconnected 
by Tuna? Challenges to Regionalism in the Southwest Indian Ocean’ (2019) 15(1) Journal of the Indian Ocean 
Region 58, 67−8.   
674 Campling and Havice, Problem of Property (n 203) 719. 
675 See Section III C below. 
676 Havice and Campling, Shifting Tides (n 594) 99−102, 108. 
677 Campling and Havice, Problem of Property (n 203) 715. 
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Fishing states also act as ‘flag states’ under international law and are responsible for the 
actions of fishing vessels flying their flag, both within coastal state EEZs and on the high 
seas.678 Fishing vessel operators sometimes evade the domestic regulations of their fishing 
states by chartering or reflagging to a developing state with limited capacity to carry out 
MCS and other enforcement activities.679 Traditional DWFSs claim that developing states 
who allow this practice⎯commonly known as the use of ‘flags of convenience’⎯680 are 
‘exclusively interested in economic revenue and not in their responsibilities’.681 Molenaar 
points out that, ‘The irony is, of course, that the responsibility for the abuse of flags of 
convenience lies to a considerable extent with these “traditional fishing” states’ own nationals 
and companies’.682 Irrespective of their ability to effectively perform their duties as flag 
states, the major fishing states in tuna GPNs represent a mix of industrialised and developing 
states. 
The geographic distribution of major fishing states in tuna GPNs reflects relatively recent 
changes in the spatial organisation of the industry. In the 1950s, tuna fishing states were 
composed entirely of developed states, namely Japan and the US.683 Changes in the global 
economy altered the composition of tuna fishing states as newly industrialised states from 
 
678 See UNCLOS (n 9) arts 94, 217; UNFSA (n 10) pt V, arts 19, 20. 
679 A substantial literature discusses the relationship between IUU fishing and the use of flags of convenience. In 
her concise description of these issues, DeSombre states:  
When faced with either domestic or international fishery regulations, some fishing vessels choose to flag in 
states that do not belong to the relevant international agreements or are unlikely to uphold them. They can 
thereby legally harvest as much of the resource in question as they are able. In doing so, they make 
conservation more difficult, and perhaps even impossible, for other states and undermine the conservation 
gains of those who have agreed to limit resource extraction: Elizabeth R. DeSombre, ‘Fishing Under Flags of 
Convenience: Using Market Power to Increase Participation in International Regulations’ (2005) 5(4) Global 
Environmental Politics 73, 73.  
For a discussion of this topic specific to tuna fisheries, see the following study on how Taiwan’s lack of political 
recognition has required Taiwanese tuna fishing firms to adopt flags of convenience: Kuo-Huan Ting, Ching-
Hsiewn Ou, and Wen-Hong Liu, ‘The Management of the Distant Water Tuna Fishery in Taiwan’ (2012) 36 
Marine Policy 1234.  
680 The term ‘flag of convenience’ refers broadly to what Rayfuse describes as ‘any flag which is adopted for the 
purposes of political and/or practical expediency’: Rosemary Rayfuse, Non-Flag State Enforcement in High 
Seas Fisheries (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004) 25. In fact, flags of convenience are generally adopted 
through technically legal, open registries. To distinguish the flags of states with an open registry and states 
whose flags are commonly used to violate international fisheries regulations, RFMOs have shifted their 
language from targeting ‘flags of convenience’ to ‘flags of non compliance’: Darren S. Calley, Market Denial 
and International Fisheries Regulation: The Targeted and Effective Use of Trade Measures Against the Flag of 
Convenience Fishing Industry (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2012) 17.  
681 Erik Jaap Molenaar, ‘Participation, Allocation and Unregulated Fishing: The Practice of Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations’ (2003) 18(4) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 457, 461. 
682 Ibid.  
683 See generally Peter Miyake, ‘A Brief History of the Tuna Fisheries of the World’ in William H. Bayliff, Juan 
Ignacio de Leiva Moreno and Jacek Majkowski (eds), Management of Tuna Fishing Capacity: Conservation 
and Socio-Economics (FAO Fisheries Proceedings No 2, 2005) 23, 31−3. 
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East Asia (including China, South Korea, and Taiwan) expanded their fishing fleets. More 
recent changes in tuna GPNs have introduced new players from DCSs with large (and, in the 
case of PNG, foreign owned) regional fleets.  
Currently, the top ten tuna fishing states are Indonesia, Japan, Taiwan, the US, South Korea, 
Philippines, Spain, Ecuador, PNG, and France.684 Over half of these states represent 
industrial fishing fleets that harvest tuna in distant waters, moving across all major ocean 
basins and landing tuna at ports around the world (Japan, Taiwan, US, South Korea, Spain, 
and France).  By contrast, DCSs in this list⎯Indonesia, Philippines, Ecuador, and 
PNG⎯represent extensive local or regional fleets that fish waters within and adjacent to their 
EEZs.685   
There are sharp differences among fleets flagged to the top ten tuna fishing states. The top 
fishing state, Indonesia, flags a fleet with vastly different characteristics from a DWFS fleet 
like that flagged by the US. Indonesia’s tuna catches are contained largely within its own 
EEZ and its fleet is comprised almost entirely of coastal fishermen in traditional, small- and 
medium-sized wooden boats.686 Conversely, the US represents a fleet that harvests tuna 
almost entirely in other states’ EEZs, or distant waters, and is comprised of highly efficient, 
steel, industrial-scale fishing vessels with substantial holding capacity.687 In contrast to these 
two examples, the PNG fleet is almost entirely foreign-owned fishing vessels that have been 
reflagged to PNG under the terms of FAAs.688 While it is important to consider the wide 
variation among fishing states and the fleets they represent, this typology focuses on DWFSs 
 
684 Grantly Galland, Anthony Rogers and Amanda Nickson, ‘Netting Billions: A Global Valuation of Tuna’ 
(PEW Charitable Trusts Report, May 2016) 4 <https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/reports/2016/05/netting-billions-a-global-valuation-of-tuna>.  
685 Ibid 3.  
686 Rahmadi Sunoko and Hsiang-Wen Huang, ‘Indonesia Tuna Fisheries Development and Future Strategy’ 
(2014) 43 Marine Policy 174. 
687 Robert Gillett, Mike A McCoy, and David G Itano, Status of the United States Western Pacific Tuna Purse 
Seine Fleet and Factors Affecting Its Future (University of Hawaii Joint Institute for Marine and Atmospheric 
Research Contribution No 02-344, 2002) 
<http://imina.soest.hawaii.edu/PFRP/soest_jimar_rpts/gpa_amer_samoa.pdf>. 
688 Elizabeth Havice and Kristin Reed, ‘Fishing for Development? Tuna Resource Access and Industrial Change 
in Papua New Guinea (2012) 12(2−3) Journal of Agrarian Change 413. 
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to discuss the particularly intimate relationship these states have formed with major fishing 
firms in tuna GPNs.689  
Additional background on FAAs is required to demonstrate the extent to which DWFSs 
support fishing firms. In tuna FAAs, access is generally defined as ‘permission to use a 
defined fishing effort in an EEZ for a particular period’.690 Most tuna FAAs are between the 
government of a DCS⎯a ‘host state’ with limited capacity to fish tuna stocks in its own 
EEZ⎯and either a DWFS government or fishing firm (or association) headquartered in a 
DWFS. The terms of FAAs often include licensing fees as well as sustainability and 
compliance requirements for the fishing fleet being granted access.691 The negotiating process 
for FAAs can vary and may involve both government and industry actors. FAAs are often 
bilateral, though one exception is a multilateral agreement between the US and 17 PICs.692 
FAA negotiations are often closed to observers and their terms may not be available to the 
public.693 As was mentioned in Section II A, ‘fish for aid’ FAAs tie bilateral aid payments 
and programs for DCSs to fisheries access for DWFS fleets. This arrangement is understood 
as a form of ‘subsidisation’ of a DWFS’s tuna fishing industry.694  
 
689 At the national level, DWFSs provide fuel, shipbuilding, and financing subsidies to support their DWF 
industries. A substantial literature examines WTO negotiations to discipline these fisheries subsidies. See, e.g., 
Margaret Young, The ‘Law of the Sea’ Obligations Underpinning Fisheries Subsidies Disciplines (International 
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Reference Paper, 14 November 2017). 
690 Mwikya (n 665) ix.  
691 ‘[FAAs] outline fishing provisions for distant water vessels and define vessel operators’ responsibilities, 
including inter alia: vessel and/or effort limits, licensing procedures, reporting requirements and vessel 
identification requirements’: Havice (n 622) 981. 
692 Known as the ‘US Multilateral Treaty’ or ‘South Pacific Tuna Treaty’, the US multilateral FAA with PICs 
was first signed in 1987: Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the 
Government of the United States of America, opened for signature 2 April 1987, [1987] PITS 2 (entered into 
force 15 June 1988) as at 3 December 2016 (‘South Pacific Tuna Treaty’). It has been renewed four times and 
the current renewal period extends to 2022: see Agreed Record on Amendments to the Treaty on Fisheries 
Between the Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States of America 
(Senate Treaty Document 115-3) <https://www.congress.gov/treaty-document/115th-congress/3/document-
text>. The combination of fisheries access fees and development assistance provided to PICs in the treaty has 
risen from 12 million to 98 million USD per year: Ministry of Commerce, Industry, Labour and Immigration, 
Solomon Islands, Re-Negotiated US Tuna Treaty Provides More Benefits for Pacific (Ministry Updates, 7 
December 2016) <https://www.commerce.gov.sb/activities-updates/news/ministry-updates/53-re-negotiated-us-
tuna-treaty-provides-more-benefits-for-pacific.html>. See generally Jope Tarai, ‘The New Pacific Diplomacy 
and the South Pacific Tuna Treaty’ in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte (eds), The New Pacific Diplomacy (Australian 
National University Press, 2015) 237.  
693 Mwikya distinguishes between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ FAA negotiations: ‘A negotiation for fishing access is 
termed “closed” when the public is not informed of the negotiation process, there is no real consultation prior to 
the negotiation, and the details of the ensuing agreement are not published’: Mwikya (n 665) 9.  
694 Mwikya distinguishes between ‘access fee subsidies’ and other subsidies associated with access:  
Access fees, shipbuilding subsidies and financial subsidies are the main subsidies associated with fisheries 
access agreements in most countries. There are myriad of other subsidies associated with fishing access, 
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The diversity of FAAs reflects different negotiating strategies among the major DWFSs and 
fishing firms. For instance, the EU only enters into bilateral FAAs.695 EU 
FAAs⎯(re)branded ‘Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreements’⎯consist of financial 
compensation for fishing a defined quantity of tuna.696 As was noted earlier, the US, by 
comparison, has entered into the only multilateral FAA, which involves the payment of a 
lump sum for a fishing period, with no limitation on catch during this period.697 Both the EU 
and US FAAs for tuna are between governments and the terms are published;698  70-80% of 
access fees contained in the EU and US FAAs are paid by governments.699 In contrast, 
private sector associations and fishing firms from Japan and other East Asian states negotiate 
bilateral FAAs with coastal state governments and pay access fees directly.700 The 
governments of these states attend negotiations as observers.701 Commentators argue that 
government observers in these negotiations ‘formally and informally couple aid to access 
negotiation outcomes’.702 In this negotiating modality, access fee payments are based on 
catch reported at agreed landing ports in the region and the terms for the agreements are not 
published.703 Perhaps as a consequence of these different negotiating strategies, the resource 
rents reflected in tuna FAAs with DWFSs are believed to vary between 2% and 8% of the 
 
including vessel transfer subsidies, subsidies for joint ventures [second-generation FAAs], transhipment and 
landing subsidies and subsidies associated with the processing of catch obtained from access agreements: 
ibid 21. 
Mwikya notes that in the WTO context, it is debatable whether access fee subsidies can be considered a 
straightforward subsidy (as compared to other subsidies associated with access) because many coastal state 
fleets operate in their EEZs without paying fees. According to Mwikya, ‘Assigning subsidy status to access fees 
needs to take into account a broad analysis of the taxation context within which both the domestic and DWF 
fleets operate’: at 22.  
695 Ibid 10−1; Havice (n 622) 983−4.   
696 Mwikya (n 665) 5. 
697 See above (n 692). Over time, the treaty has incorporated limits on fishing effort in the form of ‘vessel days’: 
see Havice (n 622).  
698 Mwikya (n 665) 9.  
699 Ibid 21.  
700 China, Japan, and Taiwan’s FAAs are typically either with industry associations (multiple firms) or 
individual firms and considered private agreements with the coastal state: ibid 8. (Although the Chinese 
government appears to have entered into some bilateral FAAs with DCSs in the 1980s: cf Tabitha Mallory, 
‘China’s Distant Water Fishing Industry: Evolving Policies and Implications’ (2013) 38 Marine Policy 99, 101.) 
Major industry associations in these states are: the Chinese Overseas Fisheries Association, the Japan Tuna 
Fisheries Co-operative Association, and the Taiwanese Deep-Sea Tuna Longline Boat Owners and Exporters 
Association. While the governments of China, Japan, and Taiwan only observe FAA negotiations, they actively 
maintain close relationships with their DWF firms. See, e.g., Marcus Haward and Anthony Bergin, ‘Taiwan’s 
Distant Water Tuna Fisheries’ (2000) 24 Marine Policy 33, 39−40; Marcus Haward and Anthony Bergin, ‘The 
Political Economy of Japanese Distant Water Tuna Fisheries’ (2001) 25 Marine Policy 91, 96. 
701 Mwikya (n 665) 8. 
702 Havice and Campling, Articulating Upgrading (n 202) 719.   
703 Mwikya (n 665) 7−8. 
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value of the tuna resource.704 The form and content of FAAs thus show wide variation, 
though DWFS governments provide direct and indirect support to fishing firms in all cases.  
A problematic aspect of the support provided by DWFS governments to fishing firms is the 
continuing practice of embedding foreign aid in FAAs. These ‘access fee subsidies’ are one 
of many fisheries subsidies paid by DWFS governments to support fishing firms.705 Sumaila 
et al estimate that worldwide fisheries subsidies totalled approximately 35 billion USD in 
2016.706 Fisheries subsidies contribute to overcapacity in DWFS fleets by artificially enabling 
these fleets to extend their range to distant waters around the globe without market 
feedback.707 Petersen contends that access fee subsidies are particularly disadvantageous to 
DCSs seeking higher resource rents because of the ‘large financial risks associated with the 
possibility of aid withdrawal’.708 Petersen surmises that fish for aid FAAs constrain DCSs’ 
ability to capture greater surplus value and utilise tuna fisheries as a source of economic 
development.709 In this vein, Mwikya concludes that, ‘In their current form, the agreements 
tend to be exploitative and are not in line with international agreements on poverty 
eradication and sustainable development’.710 FAA negotiations thus reveal how DWFSs 
engage with tuna GPNs to counter the interests of coastal states. These states mediate the 
economic relations between coastal states and fishing firms in a way that mingles geopolitical 
dynamics (like the provision of foreign aid) with commercial struggles over surplus value.  
C Processing States 
Major processing states in tuna GPNs are closely associated with lead firms, much like 
fishing states. Two areas in which processing states interact with tuna GPNs are international 
trade policy and government ownership of processing plants. In the first instance, major 
 
704 Published figures on resource rents in FAAs are generally not specific to tuna. Resource rent figures for the 
US are not adjusted for the most recent iteration of its multilateral treaty with PICs. Mwikya estimates that 
resource rents in Japan FAAs are 5% and FAAs with Taiwan and China are 6%: ibid 8. Adjusting for unreported 
catch, Belhabib et al estimate resource rents in FAAs with EU and China are 4% and 8% respectively: Dyhia 
Belhabib et al, ‘Euros vs. Yuan: Comparing European and Chinese Fishing Access in West Africa’ (2015) 10(3) 
PLoS One 0118351: 1−22.  
705 Mwikya estimates that ‘DWF fleets rarely pay more than 30 percent of the total access fee’: Mwikya (n 665) 
21.  
706 Ussif Rashid Sumaila et al, ‘Global Fisheries Subsidies: An Updated Estimate’ (2016) 69 Marine Policy 189. 
707 Ussif Rashid Sumaila et al, ‘The World Trade Organization and Global Fisheries Sustainability’ (2007) 88 
Fisheries Research 1. 
708 Petersen (n 672) 227. 
709 Ibid. 
710 Mwikya (n 665) 16.  
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processing states attempt to negotiate a favourable international tuna trade regime with 
market states.711 In the second, minor processing states enter into joint ventures to establish 
onshore processing in their coastal communities, typically as part of a second-generation 
FAA. In this scenario, minor processing states interact with various branded or nonbranded 
manufacturers and trading firms. In general, processing states are interested in the capture of 
surplus value from the middle portion of tuna GPNs, whether it be through direct government 
revenue or indirect economic benefits (for example, employment in coastal communities) 
from processing plants.  
It is currently estimated that over forty states around the world host tuna processing plants.712 
Thailand and Philippines are major processing states in tuna GPNs. Thailand alone processes 
up to one-quarter of the world’s canned tuna.713 Originally, the dominant players in tuna 
processing were the EU, US and Japan.714 After the early 1980s, however, canned tuna 
production in these states was overtaken by highly efficient, strategically-situated 
archipelagic states with low-cost labour (such as Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines), as 
well as emerging East Asian states (such as South Korea and Taiwan).715 As has been 
discussed, SIDS, such as Seychelles in the IO and PNG in the WCPO, have also leveraged 
preferential trade agreements granting them duty-free access to end markets and proximity to 
tuna resources to entice onshore investment in processing plants through second-generation 
FAAs.716  
Processing states seek to protect their processing operations through the positions they take in 
international trade negotiations. In these states, processing plants not only generate revenue 
for national economies, but also provide a source of employment and further spin-off work 
(such as in transport and secondary markets) to coastal populations.717 International trade 
agreements undergird the economic viability of processing plants in developing states. The 
international tuna trade regime offers preferential access to markets in developed states such 
 
711 Campling, Trade Politics (n 638).  
712 Campling, Havice, and Ram-Bidesi (n 614). 
713 Hamilton et al (n 590) 155. 
714 Ibid153. 
715 Ibid 156. 
716 Campling, Trade Politics (n 638) 226.  
717 Barclay, History of Industrial Tuna Fishing (n 583) 409−10.  
153 
 
as in the EU and US for different classes of DCSs.718 For instance, there are currently 
separate tuna trading regimes between the EU and major processing states in Southeast Asia, 
on the one hand (under the EU Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) regime), and minor 
processing states in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific (referred to as ACP states under 
Economic Partnership Agreements), on the other.719 These differences have formed the basis 
of controversial negotiations at the WTO, including subsequent arbitrations with the EU 
instigated by Thailand and Philippines.720 Processing states actively endeavour to shape the 
environmental conditions of production for tuna GPNs through attempts to influence the 
structure of the international tuna trade regime.  
Processing states that enter into joint ventures with lead firms are directly implicated in the 
processing node of tuna GPNs. Joint ventures are most common in SIDS, where states 
attempt to capture additional surplus value by tying onshore investment in processing plants 
to long-term access to tuna stocks in their waters through second-generation FAAs.721 SIDS 
typically face major challenges achieving economies of scale to host processing plants. They 
utilise fisheries access to incentivise firms to invest in onshore processing plants that are less 
efficient than processing operations in the archipelagic ‘hubs’ (Thailand or Philippines).722 
Examples of the challenges SIDS face include less-skilled and efficient labour,723 limited 
infrastructure, constrained water resources, and high costs for transport and freight fees 
(including for importing processing materials, such as cans, and exporting finished products 
to end markets).724 Havice and Campling have investigated examples of joint ventures in 
several case studies.725 Their work demonstrates that the economic and social outcomes of 
 
718 ‘The EU and US tariff regimes play a major role in shaping the structure of global tuna production. Tuna 
canneries in Africa, Latin America and the Pacific islands tend to focus on the EU market, largely as a direct 
result of tariff preferences, while those in Southeast Asia supply the US, Japan and the EU’: Campling, Trade 
Politics (n 638) 224 (emphasis in original). 
719 Ibid 222.  
720  See Elizabeth Bennett, Helene Rey-Valette, and Zhen Kun Wang, ‘Analysis of the Impact of Opening Up 
the EU Import Market for Canned Tuna on ACP Countries’ in Roman Grynberg (ed), WTO at the Margins: 
Small States and the Multilateral Trading System (Cambridge University Press, 2006) 562. 
721 See above (n 622). 
722 ‘For most investors, fishing, not onshore activities, is the investment incentive; those firms that invest in 
processing plants will require more licenses than are necessary to supply the plant. The longevity of the 
investment depends on the operational costs, available labor force, product quality and market access 
considerations’: ibid 982.  
723 Hamilton et al (n 590) 156; Campling, Havice, and Ram-Bidesi (n 614) 21.  
724 Kate Barclay and Ian Cartwright, Capturing Wealth From Tuna: Case Studies from the Pacific (Australia 
National University Press, 2007) 12−3. 
725 See Havice and Campling, Articulating Upgrading (n 203); Campling, Upgrading in Seychelles (n 203); 
Havice and Reed (n 688). Campling and Havice explore another case study of ‘upgrading’ in American Samoa 
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these joint ventures are often mixed for SIDS, especially in cases where they are dealing with 
lead firms in tuna GPNs.726 
In summary, major processing states focus on the terms of the international tuna trade regime 
and its implications for firms within tuna GPNs. These states express the interests of 
firms⎯typically nonbranded manufacturers⎯in international trade negotiations with market 
states. Conversely, minor processing states, particularly SIDS, leverage their role as coastal 
states to ‘upgrade’ in tuna production chains in the hope of capturing additional surplus value 
from tuna production.727 In these cases, SIDS typically enter into a joint venture with lead 
firms in tuna processing and/or trading. Ideally, joint ventures provide SIDS with an 
opportunity to leverage the commercial expertise and trading infrastructure of lead firms.728 
Empirical studies have revealed that these attempts have yielded mixed results in terms of 
both value capture and socio-economic outcomes for SIDS. In both cases, processing states 
interface with, and in the case of major players such as Thailand, represent the interests of 
lead firms in tuna GPNs.  
D Trading States 
The top trading firms in canned and raw tuna GPNs are headquartered in Taiwan, the US, and 
Japan. This analysis uses the category of a ‘trading state’ to assist in describing the 
geographic distribution of tuna GPNs. However, it acknowledges that the interactions 
between trading firms and the governments of states in which they are headquartered is not 
well studied. Furthermore, while trading firms regularly observe TRFMO negotiations and 
even participate in FAA negotiations, the nature of their relationships with state actors is 
unclear.  
 
in: Liam Campling and Elizabeth Havice, ‘Industrial Development in an Island Economy: US Trade Policy and 
Canned Tuna Production in American Samoa’ (2007) 2(2) Island Studies Journal 209. 
726 For a discussion of the social and environmental impacts of joint ventures on coastal communities in SIDS, 
see also Barclay, History of Industrial Tuna Fishing (n 583). 
727 Havice and Campling define the concept of ‘upgrading’ in political economy research as the following: ‘In 
its ideal-typical, linear formulation, upgrading, and capturing associated “development” gains, involves linking 
with lead firms in a particular chain and moving “up” the chain to more rewarding functional positions or to 
making products that have more value added and provide better returns to producers’: Havice and Campling, 
Articulating Upgrading (n 203) 2614. The authors adopt a critical view of the concept of ‘upgrading’ by arguing 
against a linear view of economic development: at 2614−6. 
728 See H.F. Campbell and A.J. Hand, ‘Joint Ventures and Technology Transfer: The Solomon Islands Pole-and-
Line Fishery’ (1998) 57 Journal of Development Economics 421, 422−3. 
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The three major trading firms in the canned tuna GPN are FCF Fishery Co. Ltd. (originally 
Fong Cherng Fishery Company Ltd.), Tri Marine (owned by the Bolton Group), and 
Itochu.729 These firms concentrate their operations in the WCPO, however the larger 
two⎯FCF and Tri Marine⎯also have operations in the IO.730 All three are multinational 
corporations and exhibit complex organisational structures. Trading states are identified 
according to the location of each trading firm’s global headquarters: FCF is headquartered in 
Taiwan; Tri Marine in the US (while Bolton Group headquarters are in Amsterdam); and 
Itochu in Japan.  
Whereas trading firms in the canned tuna GPN include multinational ownership, lead trading 
firms in the raw tuna GPN are exclusively headquartered in Japan. This is because tuna 
destined for sashimi markets does not require as much processing and therefore trading in 
sashimi-grade tuna occurs largely within Japan, where the largest sashimi market is located. 
Campling, Lewis, and McCoy estimate that, in 2006, four trading companies supplied 
approximately 65% of sashimi-grade tuna to the Japanese market.731 The authors identify the 
‘big four’ sashimi trading firms as Toyo Reizo (a subsidiary of Mitsubishi), Try Sangyou, 
Fukuichi, and Yamafuku.732 
E Market States 
Market states are motivated by two (often conflicting) forces which link them with tuna 
GPNs. The first motivation is the connection between market states and lead firms in the 
retail node of tuna GPNs. These firms wield enormous downward pressure on other nodes. 
Market states represent the interests of these firms through the negotiating positions they take 
on the international tuna trade regime concerning terms and standards for tuna product 
imports, often countering the efforts of processing states described in the previous section. 
Second, market states are home to the majority of consumers for tuna products, who are 
increasingly sensitive to the environmental impacts of industrial tuna fishing activities. The 
 
729 These trading firms are listed in order of the magnitude of the tuna catch they trade: Hamilton et al (n 590) 
137−152.  
730 Ibid 146, 140, 149. See also Cliff White, ‘Tri Marine Sold to Bolton Group’ Seafood Source (Web Page, 8 
July 2019) <https://www.seafoodsource.com/news/business-finance/tri-marine-sold-to-bolton-group>. See also 
FCF Co., Ltd., Learn Who We Are (Web Page, 2020) <http://www.fcf.com.tw/program/who-we-are/>; Tri 
Marine, About Us (Web Page, 2020) <http://www.trimarinegroup.com/about-us-2-2/>. 
731 Campling, Lewis, and McCoy (n 614) 88. 
732 Ibid.  
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governments of market states are, therefore, responsible for conveying the normative 
concerns of consumers in domestic and international fisheries policy.  
The major end markets for tuna products are located in the EU, US, and Japan. Known as the 
global ‘Triad’, these three markets in the developed world consume the bulk of 
internationally traded fish.733 Campling notes that the Triad has continued to dominate the 
international fish trade, even while new markets have emerged among the expanding middle 
classes of Asia.734 These three market states are also among the original fishing states for tuna 
species, having initiated government-sponsored industrial tuna fishing activities in the 1950s. 
After the 1980s, however, their dominance in industrial tuna fishing has waned even as they 
have maintained market power.735 
The three core market states interact with different tuna GPNs as a result of their 
consumption of different tuna products. For example, the major end markets for canned tuna 
continue to be the EU and US, where demand developed in the 1950s after diminished 
sardine stocks and rising canned salmon prices created consumer markets for canned tuna.736 
Of these two markets, the EU is the largest. The EU imports both canned tuna and pre-cooked 
frozen loins, which processors use for domestic canning. Within the EU, the top three 
markets are Spain, Italy, and France.737 The major suppliers of canned and processed tuna to 
the EU market (outside of the EU) are Ecuador, the Philippines, Mauritius, Seychelles, PNG, 
and China.738 Hamilton et al estimate that the average level of corporate concentration with 
respect to firms selling canned tuna in the grocery market of EU member countries is 
67.3%.739 The firms that make up this corporate concentration are well-known national 
brands (such as John West, Princes, and Calvo), as well as the private brands of major 
supermarkets like Tesco and Carrefour.740 
 
733 Campling, Trade Politics (n 638) 221.   
734 Ibid. 
735 Ibid. 
736 Hamilton et al (n 590) 241.  
737  FAO, Maria Catalano et al, Globefish Highlights: A Quarterly Update on World Seafood Markets October 
2018 Issues with Jan-Jun 2018 Statistics (Globefish Highlights Series No 4, October 2018) 23 
<http://www.fao.org/3/ca2830en/CA2830EN.pdf> ‘Globefish Highlights’. 
738 Ibid. 




The US is the second largest market for canned tuna. Like the EU, the US imports canned 
tuna and pre-cooked frozen loins for domestic canning. The US also dominates global 
consumption of canned albacore (approximately 55% to 60%).741 Major suppliers of canned 
and processed tuna to the US market are Thailand, China, Ecuador, and Vietnam.742 
Corporate concentration is also high in the US market. While there are competitive dynamics 
between national brands and supermarket private labels, 80% of canned tuna sales in US 
retail markets still flows to the so-called ‘big three’ brands: Bumble Bee, StarKist, and 
Chicken of the Sea.743 Demand for canned tuna in these markets has stabilised, though future 
growth is expected in emerging developing regions⎯including in Latin America, the Middles 
East, and Eastern Europe⎯where the largest tuna fishing grounds are not located.744  
The sashimi market is concentrated in Japan, which comprises 80% of the global market.745 
Campling, Lewis, and McCoy estimate that Japan annually imports approximately 160,000 
mt of sashimi-grade tuna.746 Japan’s sashimi market is supplied by a combination of domestic 
landings by Japanese-flagged vessels and imports. As this traditional Japanese delicacy has 
grown in popularity since the 1990s, smaller markets have also proliferated across the US, 
EU, and other parts of Asia.747 In recent years, the US has constituted an additional 8-10% of 
the market.748  
Campling, Lewis, and McCoy break down the Japanese sashimi market into two types of 
‘channels’ through which sashimi-grade tuna is distributed in Japan.749 The first are 
‘traditional channels’, through which mostly fresh sashimi-grade tuna is traded in 
government-regulated wholesale markets.750 In these wholesale markets, either whole, or 
gilled and gutted individual fish are traded via auction sales.751 Buyers at these auctions 
include: intermediate wholesalers (who are licensed to resell in a shop or stall in the market 
area); third party unlicensed buyers (who are from smaller supermarkets or convenience 
 
741 Ibid 170.  
742 Globefish Highlights (n 737) 23. 
743 Hamilton et al (n 590) 176. 
744 Ibid. 
745 Ibid 303. 
746 Campling, Lews and McCoy (n 614) 14.  
747 Hamilton et al (n 590) 303. 
748 Ibid. 
749 Campling, Lewis and McCoy (n 614) 83−4.   




stores); and authorised buyers (who include major firms, such as sashimi trading companies, 
supermarkets, processing firms, and restaurant chains).752  
The second are ‘unofficial channels’ through which frozen sashimi-grade tuna bypasses (or 
only partly flows) through the government-regulated wholesale markets.753 Campling, Lewis, 
and McCoy have documented the increasing dominance of the ‘big four’ tuna trading 
companies in the Japanese sashimi market. The authors estimate that these large trading 
companies use unofficial channels for up to 80% of their sales.754 These researchers contend 
that commercial relationships between the ‘big four’ trading firms and large retailers and 
supermarkets (which control approximately 70% of the retail food market in Japan) have 
shifted the sale and distribution of sashimi-grade tuna in Japan away from the 
traditional⎯and more transparent⎯government-regulated wholesale markets.755  
Market states like the EU, US, and Japan leverage their buying power to forge links between 
their DWF fleets, national processors, and domestic markets (i.e. lead firms). Havice and 
Campling use the term ‘production system’ to describe these links, which are ‘often cemented 
commercially through financial or contractual relationships, and by government policy 
through protective tariffs on imported competition and strict rules of origin for preference 
receiving competitors [e.g. ACP states]’.756 Part of the way market states create production 
systems is through the imposition of quality standards on tuna imports. This is particularly 
true for the EU and US markets in the canned tuna GPN. One example is the EU’s ‘rules of 
origin’ (RoO) in tuna trade agreements with ACP states.757 Another is the EU’s ‘IUU 
Regulation’ which is directed at preventing the import of IUU fish into the EU market.758 The 
EU argues that these rules are intended to promote the development of ACP countries and 
deter IUU fishing, but scholars like Campling and Tsamenyi et al have demonstrated that 
they often have the consequence of advantaging the EU DWF fleet.759  
 
752 Ibid. 
753 Ibid.  
754 Ibid 87.  
755 Ibid 95. ‘With the growing dominance of trading companies and large retailers in the trade of frozen sashimi-
grade tuna, distribution systems have become increasingly complex and opaque’: at 89.  
756 Campling, Havice, and Ram-Bidesi (n 614) 225.  
757 For a description of EU RoO, see Campling, Upgrading in Seychelles (n 203) 225−36.  
758 See generally Martin Tsamenyi et al, Fairer Fishing? Trade and Fishing Policy Implications for Developing 
Countries of the European Community Regulation in Illegal Fishing (Commonwealth Secretariat, 2009).  
759 Campling argues the following: 
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At the same time as they support the dominant positions of lead firms (and the perverse 
economic logics they perpetuate), market states also advocate for normative concerns on 
behalf of consumers. These concerns are reflected in increasing consumer awareness 
regarding the sustainability of tuna GPNs as well as their environmental (for example, 
bycatch and related species) and social (for example, IUU fishing, human trafficking and 
forced labour) impacts.760  
Fishery certification programs and their associated eco-labels, like that of the Marine 
Stewardship Council (MSC), have leveraged consumer awareness to place pressure on actors 
in the tuna industry to improve their production practices and thereby gain access to premium 
markets.761 The rising profile of these issues and their interface with tuna GPNs has resulted 
in attempts at normative leadership from market states like the EU across different policy 
arenas. Miller et al describe how the EU has attempted, through both trade regulations and 
normative leadership, to integrate new regulations concerning IUU fishing in the canned tuna 
production network of the WCPO.762 
To conclude, market states located in the developed world interface with both lead firms and 
consumers in tuna GPNs. This often produces fundamental tensions between their 
representation of lead firm interests and rising concerns among consumers over the various 
adverse impacts of tuna fisheries on the marine environment and the wellbeing of vulnerable 
coastal populations. The major market states also have overlapping identities as major fishing 
states, which often place pressure on them to advance lead firm interests (and the high-
volume/low-cost economic logics these firms perpetuate), while striving to be perceived as 
 
Rules of origin determine the extent to which a trade preference can be commercially utilised or not, and EU 
RoO for fish (especially in relation to tuna) were a source of contention in ACP-EU trade relations since the 
1970s. The evidence firmly suggests that EU RoO for fish were designed and enforced as a commercial 
support for the EU DWF: Campling, Upgrading in Seychelles (n 203)  248.  
Campling concludes this because EU RoO ‘make ACP-based processors captive buyers of the [EU] fleet’s raw 
material sales’: at 313. See also Tsamenyi et al (n 758) 65−6. 
760 WWF, Greenpeace and PEW have carried out consumer awareness campaigns to achieve sustainable and 
socially responsible tuna fisheries. See, e.g., ‘2017 Tuna Shopping Guide’, Tuna Shopping Guide (Web Page, 
2017) <http://www.greenpeace.org/US/oceans/tuna-guide/>. These NGOs regularly attend TRFMO meetings as 
observers. One classic example of the impact of consumer awareness on tuna management actions is the 
influence of the ‘dolphin-safe’ eco-label on US policy in the 1990s: see Elizabeth DeSombre, Domestic Sources 
of International Environmental Policy: Industry, Environmentalists, and U.S. Power (MIT Press, 2000).  
761 See Alice Miller and Simon Bush, ‘Authority Without Credibility? Competition and Conflict Between 
Ecolabels in Tuna Fisheries’ (2015) 107 Journal of Cleaner Production 137.  
762 Alice Miller, Simon Bush, and Arthur Mol, ‘Power Europe: EU and the Illegal, Unreported and Unreported 
Tuna Fisheries Regulation in the West and Central Pacific Ocean’ (2014) 45 Marine Policy 138.  
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environmentally responsible. Finally, a visualisation of the distribution of global tuna stocks 
and major fishing, processing, and market states in tuna GPNs is provided in Figure 7 below. 
Figure 7: Map of Major States in Tuna GPNs763 
 
III TRFMOS, ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS OF PRODUCTION FOR TUNA GPNS AND 
DISTRIBUTIONAL STRUGGLES AMONG STATES 
Because TRFMO members negotiate and implement regulatory regimes for tuna fishing 
activities in multiple oceanic regions, TRFMO members are in the critical position of 
contributing to the environmental conditions of production for tuna GPNs. Consequently, 
TRFMO members bring their engagement with tuna GPNs to bear on the positions they take 
in TRFMO negotiations. This section investigates instances where these positions produce 
areas of contestation within the purview of work undertaken by TRFMOs. These areas reflect 
conflicts, primarily between DCSs and DWFSs attempting to capture surplus value from tuna 
GPNs.  
 
763 Dr. Indiah Hodgson-Johnston helped format this figure. 
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A Overview of TRFMOs and the Fishing Node within Tuna GPNs 
TRFMOs have developed increasingly sophisticated and responsive regulatory approaches to 
the management of transboundary tuna fisheries. These approaches cover a range of 
functions, from contentious negotiations regarding levels and distributions of catch and effort 
limits to the practical and often technical tasks of data collection and MCS activities. While it 
is difficult to capture the full range of TRFMO functions and regulatory techniques, this 
section provides a brief overview. It shows that TRFMOs directly impact the fishing node of 
tuna GPNs through the application and enforcement of fishing regulations, as well as the 
collection of critical data from tuna fishing vessels.  
TRFMOs engage in the full cycle of fisheries management, which includes devising, 
monitoring, and enforcing tuna fisheries regulations in the oceanic regions under their 
jurisdiction.764 TRFMOs establish regulatory frameworks to limit levels of tuna catch 
(number of fish taken from the fishery) and/or effort (number of different types of fishing 
vessels operating in the fishery).765 As part of setting these limits, TRFMOs are involved in 
deciding how limits will impact on different states in their memberships. To enforce these 
regulatory frameworks, TRFMOs develop compliance procedures to assess how well states 
conform to their regulatory commitments.766 TRFMOs and their Secretariats, in particular, 
derive compliance data through a triangulation of self-reporting from members, tuna trading 
data, and sophisticated MCS tools.767 As part of this task, TRFMOs also participate in 
enforcement, enacting remedial procedures against violators, including through prohibitions 
on specific vessels confirmed to have participated in IUU fishing.768  
These regulatory processes directly shape the fishing node in tuna GPNs. Fishing regulations 
adopted by TRFMOs limit the number of tuna fishing vessels and the size of their catch. If 
they do not obey TRFMO regulations, tuna fishing vessel operators risk exclusion from the 
 
764 See Allen (n 26) 8.  
765 See Quentin Grafton et al, ‘The Economics of Allocation in Tuna Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations’ in Robin Allen, James Joseph, and Dale Squires (eds), Conservation and Management of 
Transnational Tuna Fisheries (Blackwell Publishing, 2010) 155, 156-7; Lodge et al (n 66) ch 4. For an updated 
review of the approaches to allocation adopted by the five TRFMOs, see also Katherine Seto et al, ‘A Global 
Analysis of Allocation in Transboundary Tuna Fisheries Management’ (forthcoming). 
766 See Lodge et al (n 66) ch 5.  
767 Ibid.  
768 The practice of ‘blacklisting’ non-member (and, in some instances, member) vessels that have been engaged 
in IUU fishing (‘IUU vessel lists’) is common practice in the TRFMOs: see ibid 61. 
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fishery. Vessel operators must also collaborate with fishing firms and states to provide data to 
TRFMO Secretariats for both scientific and compliance purposes. On an ultimate level, 
TRFMO fishing regulations limit the total volume of raw material supply within tuna GPNs. 
On a proximate level, the precise distribution of catch and/or effort limits between EEZs 
(areas under national jurisdiction) and high seas (areas beyond national jurisdiction) in 
TRFMOs has enormous implications for relations between actors in tuna GPNs, most 
obviously between coastal and fishing states negotiating fisheries access. These examples 
show only a minimum of the different ways in which TRFMOs are integral to the flow of 
value within tuna GPNs.  
B TRFMOs: A Site of Distributional Struggle Over Value Capture 
As this chapter has discussed, Havice and Campling demonstrate that TRFMOs indirectly 
manage interests in tuna GPNs through their contribution to the environmental conditions of 
production. As a consequence of this role, TRFMOs tend to be sites where actors engage in 
‘distributional struggles’ to directly and indirectly influence tuna production. Havice and 
Campling refer to the concept of distributional struggle to describe conflicts among actors 
seeking to increase the surplus value they capture from tuna production.769 
Consequently, TRFMOs are implicated in distributional struggles among economic actors 
within tuna GPNs. Both states and firms affect, and are affected by, TRFMO negotiations 
that shape the flow of value within tuna GPNs. As TRFMO members, states are in complex 
positions as regulators and economic actors in tuna GPNs. By contrast, firms attempt to 
indirectly influence TRFMO negotiations through inclusion on government delegations and 
by leveraging their collaborations with the state in tuna GPNs.770 Firms directly (and more 
transparently) engage in TRFMO decision-making through industry associations, which are 
often included as observers in TRFMO meetings. These dynamics establish the field for 
distributional struggle within TRFMOs. 
According to Havice and Campling, states, firms, and industry associations engage in 
distributional struggles within tuna GPNs. While distributional struggles occur among a 
 
769 See above (n 203). 
770 Matilda Tove Petersson et al, ‘Patterns and Trends in Non-State Actor Participation in Regional Fisheries 
Management Organizations’ (2019) 104 Marine Policy 146.  
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diversity of economic actors, this section focuses on distributional struggles between DWFSs 
and DCSs at the fishing node of tuna GPNs. This focus reflects the primary occupation of this 
thesis, which is to examine state behaviour regarding differentiation within TRFMOs. 
Consequently, the concept of distributional struggle in this thesis critically frames TRFMO 
negotiations with the political economic drivers that condition members’ negotiating 
positions and the policy outcomes that follow.  
1 Areas of Distributional Struggle within TRFMO Work that Impact on DCSs 
This thesis is primarily concerned with how the outcomes of legal debates concerning 
differentiation impact on intragenerational equity for DCSs within TRFMOs. 
Intragenerational equity for DCSs is closely related, in GPN parlance, to the ability of these 
states to capture surplus value from tuna GPNs. While TRFMO negotiations influence many 
aspects of tuna GPNs, this section therefore focuses on TRFMO debates concerning the 
ability of DCSs to capture surplus value at the fishing node of tuna GPNs.  
States seeking to capture value at the fishing node are impacted by two central factors related 
to TRFMO work: (i) regional tuna allocations; and (ii) control over both knowledge of tuna 
stocks and information on tuna fishing activity in the region. These factors reflect 
fundamental parts of TRFMO work; namely, how TRFMOs allocate tuna catch and/or effort 
to their members and provide financial assistance for technical capacity building activities to 
developing members.  
The link between these areas of TRFMO work and value capture can generate protracted 
debate among members in TRFMO negotiations. These debates reflect the distributional 
struggles that can potentially underwrite TRFMO decision-making between DCSs and 
DWFSs. In order to strengthen their negotiating position in these debates in the TRFMOs, 
DCSs have devised subregional strategies and institutions to independently address these 
factors. In doing so, DCSs have increased the value they capture from tuna stocks in their 
waters. The following section sets out the two main areas for distributional struggle between 
DCSs and DWFSs in TRFMO decision-making and reviews how DCSs have responded to 
these issues over time.  
2 Area of Distributional Struggle I: Tuna Catch and/or Effort Allocations 
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Regional allocations are a contested area of TRFMO work that directly shapes distributive 
struggles among actors in tuna GPNs.771 TRFMOs set overall limits on levels of catch and/or 
effort within tuna fisheries.772 These limits translate directly to the total supply of raw 
material to tuna GPNs. In turn, allocations of these limits among TRFMO members influence 
the amount of value states and firms are able to capture from tuna stocks. The distribution of 
allocations inside or outside areas under coastal state jurisdiction determines the amount of 
value captured by coastal states and fishing firms. When allocations are inside areas under 
the jurisdiction of coastal states, FAAs are required, and coastal states capture a portion of 
value through ground-rents. Conversely, when allocations are outside areas under the 
jurisdiction of coastal states, no FAAs are required. Fishing firms enjoy the entire value 
captured from these allocations and the degree to which coastal states capture value is limited 
to their highly constrained (less numerous and efficient) domestic fleets.773 TRFMOs 
therefore face significant challenges in determining members’ allocations due to contestation 
over their distributive implications for coastal and fishing states.  
TRFMOs employ two possible approaches to regional allocation. The first approach involves 
the adoption of catch and/or effort limits in specific conservation and management measures. 
This approach is usually based on the historical catches and/or effort levels of TRFMO 
members and is necessarily fragmented, ad hoc, and short term. The second approach entails 
the establishment of a general system for allocation based on specific, predetermined 
criteria.774 This approach is systematic, long term, and uses a previously agreed basis for 
present and future allocation decisions. Most TRFMOs operate on the basis of the former 
approach. The only TRFMO that determines allocation using a systematic approach is 
 
771 For a condensed review of the early development of allocation frameworks in RFMOs and their distributive 
impacts on states, see Palma (n 81) 73−6.  
772 TRFMOs have several options for setting and allocating limits for tuna fisheries. For instance, a TRFMO 
may choose to set output (i.e. catch) or input (i.e. effort) controls or provide explicit (i.e. assigning limits to 
individual members) or implicit (i.e. de facto limits for a particular reference period) allocations to members. 
For an overview, see ibid 114−5.  
773 Douglas McCauley et al, ‘Wealthy Countries Dominate Industrial Fishing’ (2018) 4(8) Science Advances  
eaau2161: 1−9. 
774 This practice generally constitutes ‘rights-based management’ in tuna fisheries. For a discussion of the types 
of rights and allocations that can form the basis of this system in tuna fisheries, see Robin Allen et al, ‘Rights-
Based Management in Transnational Tuna Fisheries’ in Robin Allen, James Joseph, and Dale Squires (eds), 
Conservation and Management of Transnational Tuna Fisheries (Blackwell Publishing, 2010) 65.   
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CCSBT, which due to the nature of the SBT stock, does not exhibit the same pattern of 
contestation between coastal and fishing states as other TRFMOs.775  
This area of distributional struggle is linked to distributive equity for DCSs. The two 
approaches to regional allocation forecast radically different distributive outcomes for DCSs. 
This is because regional allocations based on historical catch and/or effort tend to favour 
established DWF fleets.776 As Chapter 2 discussed, most examples of differentiation in IFL 
avoid directly addressing distributive equity for DCSs.777 However, in the context of high 
seas allocations, UNFSA provides a notable exception by obliging states to ‘facilitate’ DCSs’ 
access to high seas fisheries.778 This provision may provide a basis for preferential high seas 
catch and/or effort allocations for DCSs.779 However, it should be noted that neither the 
WCPFC nor IOTC differentiation frameworks incorporate this obligation. Chapter 6 explores 
Policy Examples concerning the WCPFC and IOTC’s efforts to implement longer-term 
approaches to regional allocations.780 In this context, distributional struggles focus on a 
classic case of clashing interests between DCSs and DWFSs.  
3 Area of Distributional Struggle II: Increased Funding for the Effective Participation of 
Developing States 
The ability of states to translate their interests into outcomes at TRFMO negotiations partly 
depends on the nature and extent of their involvement in tuna fisheries management 
processes. This includes the deliberative, scientific, and compliance-related procedures 
undertaken by TRFMOs. The procedural power states gain through their participation in 
these processes shapes how well they represent their interests at TRFMO meetings and 
indirectly impacts upon their ability to capture value from tuna GPNs.  
 
775 Seto et al (n 765).  Allocations are determined, to varying degrees, by periodic, direct negotiations among 
members in all five TRFMOs and are heavily influenced by historical catch levels. CCSBT is unique among the 
TRFMOs because it has a small membership and is responsible for a single tuna stock. CCSBT allocations are 
based on a management procedure—the Cape Town Procedure (formerly known as the Bali Procedure)—which 
sets a global TAC every three years and assigns relative catch limit allocations to members and non-members in 
the SBT fishery. See CCSBT, Resolution on the Adoption of a Management Procedure, 26th reg sess, 14−17 
October 2019; CCSBT, Resolution on the Allocation of the Global Total Allowable Catch, 24th reg sess, 9−12 
October 2017.  
776 See also Chapter 1 Section I C.  
777 Chapter 2 Section II.  
778 UNFSA (n 10) art 25(1)(b).  
779 See Chapter 2 Section I B2(e).  
780 See Chapter 6 Section I.  
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TRFMOs and their Secretariats oversee funding and training programs for developing 
members to increase their competencies in different areas of tuna fisheries management.781 
The majority of this work in TRFMOs remains uncontroversial and is categorised as capacity 
building or development activities. Debates among members occur, however, with respect to 
funding for more effective and increased participation of DCSs in TRFMO deliberative 
processes. From the perspective of value capture in tuna GPNs, these debates reflect the 
possibility that DWFSs are circumspect about enhancing the ability of DCSs to effectively 
represent their interests at TRFMO meetings.  
It is clear to most observers of TRFMO meetings that there are glaring asymmetries in the 
size and capacities of government delegations.782 DWFS delegations often include a large 
number of well-briefed government officials from various fisheries and foreign affairs 
departments, as well as industry representatives. Conversely, DCS delegations are 
appreciably smaller and often face challenges in sending more than one delegate to the 
various meetings convened by TRFMOs and their subsidiary bodies throughout the year. 
These delegations do not typically include representatives from different government 
departments or industry.  
DCSs can struggle to effectively represent their interests in TRFMO meetings which require 
institutional knowledge of the relevant TRFMO, scientific expertise, and technical know-how 
in fisheries management.783 The limited size of DCS delegations also poses a challenge when 
TRFMOs convene simultaneous working groups and other informal negotiations that require 
delegations to spread delegates across simultaneous meetings. The financial resources 
available to assist DCSs to increase the size of their delegations is often constrained within 
 
781 There is currently no review of the capacity building activities and programs undertaken by all five 
TRFMOs.  
782 See, e.g., the lists of participants in the meeting reports of recent regular sessions of the WCPFC and IOTC: 
WCPFC, Summary Report, 15th reg sess, 10-14 December 2018, 81-131 (‘WCPFC15 Summary Report’); IOTC, 
Report for the 23rd Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2019-S23-R_rev1[E], 17-21 June 2019, 24-9 (‘IOTC23 Summary 
Report’). 
783 Havice and Campling highlight this issue: 
On a more day-to-day level, [PICs] struggle with the Commission policy making process, including: the 
costs associated with attending meetings, engaging in multiple negotiating issues, and diplomatic 
coordination to develop regional positions among a range of island states. The effect is that [PICs] are unable 
to fully participate in Commission negotiations: Havice and Campling, Shifting Tides (n 594) 104.  
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TRFMOs, despite the unique challenges DCSs (and, in particular, SIDS) face in their ability 
to perform as enfranchised negotiators at TRFMO meetings.  
Finally, access to digestible scientific knowledge and compliance information concerning 
tuna stocks and fishing activities also determines the ability of states to represent their 
interests at TRFMO negotiations. A disparity in this area also arises in TRFMO memberships 
between well-briefed DWFSs, with delegates who specialise in science and compliance, and 
DCSs with smaller, less-specialised delegations who might attend meetings without formal 
briefings.  
TRFMOs do not directly address this disparity. Rather, TRFMO Secretariats convene training 
workshops for scientists and fisheries managers from DCSs. They also support and fund tuna-
related data collection activities in DCSs. In addition, data input services for TRFMO 
Secretariats often employ DCS nationals in TRFMO MCS activities. While the institutional 
disadvantages of DCSs in TRFMOs do not directly concern value capture at the fishing node, 
they are an important procedural element of distributional struggle because the ability of 
members to advocate for their interests in TRFMO negotiations corresponds with their ability 
to shape the environmental conditions of production.   
This area of distributional struggle is associated with procedural equity for DCSs. It strikes at 
DCSs’ perceptions of whether TRFMO decision-making is fair and legitimate, which, as 
Chapter 2 showed, was a concern for DCSs when the ‘regional approach’ was originally 
espoused during UNFSA negotiations.784 An element of effective participation, DCS 
participation in TRFMO meetings is referred to in both UNFSA and the differentiation 
frameworks of the WCPFC and IOTC.785 Chapter 6 explores Policy Examples related to the 
financing of special funds that address negotiating asymmetries among DCSs and DWFSs.786 
Like regional allocations, the full and effective participation of DCSs in TRFMO meetings is 
also part of classic distributional struggles between DCSs and DWFSs.  
 
784 See Chapter 2 Section I B2(d). 
785 Chapter 3 Section III.  
786 See Chapter 6 Sections II, III.  
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C Subregionalism: A Response to Distributional Struggles in TRFMOs 
Distributional struggles within TRFMOs produce mixed results, both for transboundary tuna 
management and for brokering divergent interests among actors attempting to capture value 
in tuna GPNs. DCSs have responded by strengthening subregional strategies and institutions 
to address the contestation arising from distributional struggles with DWFSs, and have 
consequently improved their ability to capture value. Subregionalism accomplishes this 
primarily through strengthening the collective bargaining power of DCSs and expanding their 
institutional capacity to: (i) effectively participate in TRFMO deliberative processes; (ii) 
contribute to the depth of scientific data and knowledge on regional tuna stocks; and (iii) take 
part in the collection of compliance data on regional tuna fishing activity.  
Studies that investigate how DCSs leverage subregionalism to push against power 
asymmetries with DWFSs document these subregional processes and focus on the ways these 
dynamics impact FAAs and TRFMO allocations.787 The next section previews this 
literature’s assessment of subregionalism among DCSs and expands the scope of these 
studies to include the institutional aspects of subregional strategies, which indirectly 
empower coastal states to better represent their interests by making them more informed and 
coordinated negotiators in TRFMOs.  
Subregional strategies enable coastal states to wield their collective bargaining power in tuna 
fisheries. These strategies can empower them to increase the value of ground-rent in fisheries 
access negotiations, constrain fishing activity in areas outside of national jurisdiction, and 
strengthen their negotiating positions concerning the compatibility of region-wide allocations 
at TRFMOs. In the WCPO, a subregional grouping of DCSs called the Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement (PNA) has accomplished these three outcomes through collective action. By 
combining fisheries access to their waters and charging for access through their ‘Vessel Day 
Scheme’ (VDS), PNA members have increased the ground-rent for their tuna resources from 
 
787 See, e.g., Havice (n 622); Miller, Bush, and van Zweiten (n 213); Transform Aqorau, ‘How Tuna is Shaping 
Regional Diplomacy’ in Greg Fry and Sandra Tarte (eds), The New Pacific Diplomacy (Australian National 
University Press, 2015) 223; Quentin Hanich, Hannah Parris and Martin Tsamneyi, ‘Sovereignty and 
Cooperation in Regional Pacific Tuna Fisheries Management: Politics, Economics, Conservation and the Vessel 
Day Scheme’ (2010) 2(1) Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 2; Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and 
Campling (n 673). 
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3% to 13%.788 In addition, they have linked access to their combined waters with a ban on 
fishing in the high seas ‘pockets’ between their EEZs, effectively constraining fishing outside 
areas under their jurisdiction.789 Finally, PNA members have also used this access 
arrangement to make arguments for compatible measures on the high seas at their relevant 
TRFMO, the WCPFC.790 Notably, the PNA has emerged from a complex and multi-decadal 
legacy of tuna-related subregionalism and institution-building among DCSs in the WCPO.791  
Subregional institutions empower coastal states to participate in TRFMOs as enfranchised 
negotiators. Subregionalism has taken on increasingly permanent institutional forms in recent 
years to include Secretariats. These Secretariats and their staff engage with coastal states to 
ensure their effective participation in TRFMO negotiations. Subregional institutions may 
provide separate funding streams to sponsor the attendance of DCS delegates to TRFMO 
meetings. In addition, these institutions may also lead in-depth briefings on points of 
common interest among DCSs prior to TRFMO meetings. Subregional institutions may 
further specialise in particular aspects of transboundary tuna management, such as scientific 
research or MCS activities. The work of these institutions both feeds information to DCSs 
and engages in capacity development activities which further enhance their ability to 
represent their interests at TRFMO negotiations. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter describes the structure of the global tuna industry and the role TRFMOs play in 
determining how key actors capture value from tuna production. The chapter finds that the 
outcomes of TRFMO negotiations influence the ability of states and firms to capture value 
from the tuna industry. It demonstrates that states interact with the nodes of tuna GPNs, both 
as independent economic actors and representatives of firm interests. The roles states play in 
tuna GPNs converge on TRFMO negotiations and inform core distributional struggles 
between DCSs and DWFSs. It also points to the ways in which some DCSs have leveraged 
 
788 World Bank, John Virdin, Pacific Possible: Tuna Fisheries (World Bank Pacific Possible Working Paper No 
1, 25 August 2017) <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/966441503678446432/Tuna-fisheries> 63 
(‘Pacific Possible’). But see FFA, Tuna Fishery Report Card 2019 (Tuna Fishery Report Card No 5, August 
2019) <https://www.ffa.int/system/files/tuna%20fishery%20report%20card%202019%20WEB.pdf> 3. The 
World Bank’s estimate of resource rents in the WCPO purse seine fishery is derived from 2014 figures. In 2019, 
the FFA reported that overall resource rents for WCPO tuna fisheries are likely to increase to 25% by 2020. 
789 See Miller, Bush and van Zweiten (n 213) 11−4. 
790 Ibid 10−1.  
791 See Chapter 4 Section III C2. 
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subregionalism to increase their bargaining power and negotiating competency at TRFMO 
meetings. With the strategies of DCSs in mind, the next chapter investigates how 
distributional dynamics in tuna GPNs likely inform contestation among members of the 
WCPFC and IOTC.   
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WESTERN AND 
CENTRAL PACIFIC OCEAN TUNA INDUSTRY       
This chapter introduces the first regional case study for comparing how TRFMOs design and 
apply legal differentiation. The WCPO region presents an exceptional context for studying 
the political-economic dynamics of transboundary tuna management because it contains the 
world’s largest and most valuable tuna fishery and greatest concentration of SIDS. With the 
political economy of WCPO tuna production in the foreground, this chapter establishes the 
link, discussed in Chapter 3, between distributional struggles between DCSs and DWFSs and 
differentiation within TRFMOs. The chapter provides a record of PICs and DWFSs 
implicating the WCPFC in distributional struggles between them and demonstrates that 
differentiation within the WCPFC may relate to these states’ economic interests in WCPO 
tuna production.  
PICs command access to the majority of WCPO tuna resources through a vast network of 
EEZs. Representing the majority of DCSs in the WCPO, PICs play an active role in bilateral 
and multilateral levels of transboundary tuna management. Over time, PICs have looked to 
exercise their sovereign rights to tuna resources in pursuit of economic development and tuna 
conservation objectives. With the aspiration of driving tuna-led economic development, PICs 
have employed multiple strategies to increase their value capture from WCPO tuna 
production. They have pursued these strategies, with varying degrees of success, in the 
context of shifting commercial and regulatory environments.  
PICs have engaged in distributional struggles with DWFSs and foreign firms to increase their 
value capture and expand their participation across all tuna GPN nodes. This chapter 
discusses literature examining the viability of tuna-led economic development in PICs, 
shedding light on how the political power exercised by DWFS governments on behalf of their 
fishing fleets and the shifting economic organisation of the tuna industry have insinuated 
barriers to their ability to derive economic gains from tuna resource rights. In particular, work 
by Havice and Campling reveals that WCPFC negotiations have been underwritten by 
distributional struggles between PICs and DWFSs in tuna GPNs.  
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This chapter examines the current state of knowledge concerning political economic 
dynamics in the WCPO tuna industry. Section I summarises the WCPO tuna fishery and its 
contemporary fleet dynamics. Section II sets out a brief, state-focused overview of the 
WCPO tuna industry (using the typology devised in Chapter 3), providing a profile of how 
WCPFC members interact with the WCPO tuna industry.792 Section III investigates how 
WCPFC members’ economic interests in the WCPO tuna industry generate distributional 
struggles between PICs and DWFSs over value capture. The chapter demonstrates that, by 
endeavouring to advantage their economic interests through the WCPFC, PICs and DWFSs 
implicate WCPFC policy outcomes in distributional struggles within tuna GPNs. This case 
study reveals that distributional struggles among states within the WCPO tuna industry are 
likely to inform how the WCPFC applies differentiation advantaging PICs.  
I OVERVIEW OF WCPO TUNA FISHERY 
In terms of both volume and value, the WCPO tuna fishery is the largest and most significant 
in the world for global tuna production. The multi-species, multi-gear nature of the fishery 
enables it to dominate tuna production for both canned and raw tuna GPNs. In 2018, tuna 
catch in the WCPO accounted for 55% of worldwide commercial tuna catch.793 Since 1994, 
the WCPO has consistently produced approximately 50% of global tuna supply.794 For the 
top four commercial tuna species, the WCPO has contributed, on average, over 60% to global 
skipjack catches, over 50% to albacore catches, 35% to yellowfin catches, and 25% to bigeye 
catches.795 The WCPO’s regular contribution to the bulk of global tuna supply, as well as its 
significant contribution to high-value sashimi markets, distinguishes the region’s tuna fishery 
as the most productive and valuable in the world. 
Despite year-to-year fluctuations, the volume and value of total tuna catch in the WCPO has 
followed a fairly consistent upward trajectory since the 1980s. In 2017, the total volume of 
tuna catch in the WCPO was estimated to be over 2.5 million mt796 (compared with the 
 
792 See Chapter 3 Section II. 
793 WCPFC, Peter Williams and Chris Reid, Overview of Tuna Fisheries in the WCPO Including Economic 
Conditions⎯2018, WCPFC-TCC15-2019-IP05, 15th reg sess, 25 July 2019, 2 
<https://www.wcpfc.int/node/43832> (‘Overview of WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2018’).  
794 The percentages in the report by Campling, Havice, and Ram-Bidesi are based on worldwide tuna catches up 
to 2007: Campling, Havice, and Ram-Bidesi (n 614) 15.  
795 Ibid. 
796 Overview of WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2017 (n 51) 2. 
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highest catch on record⎯over 2.8 million mt in 2014797). The value of WCPO tuna catch has 
risen precipitously, from 375 million USD in 1982798 to a recent valuation of 5.84 billion 
USD in 2017799. The industrial tuna fishery looms large over other fisheries in the region, in 
terms of both economic importance and magnitude. A study by the Asian Development Bank 
estimates that the WCPO tuna fishery is valued at seven times more than, and produces 10 
times the catch of, all other fisheries in the region combined.800  
Contemporary fleet dynamics and trends in tuna-related commercial activity in the WCPO 
began in the 1980s with additional entrants to the fishery and increasingly aggressive fishing 
practices. Whereas gradual rises in catch characterised the fishery for the majority of the 20th 
century, expansions in the purse seine and longline fisheries in the 1980s resulted in 
exponential catch increases that have been maintained to the present day, exhibiting only a 
slight dip in the late 2000s.801 New entrants, such as China, Philippines, Indonesia, and 
recently, a number of PICTs, have further expanded and diversified the fishery.802 In both 
purse seine and longline fisheries, intense competition drives fishing practices. This includes 
the use of fish aggregating devices (FADs) in the purse seine fishery,803 and a pattern of 
increasing effort on new species, novel locations, and deeper areas of the water column in the 
longline fishery.804 
II STATE-FOCUSED OVERVIEW OF WCPO TUNA INDUSTRY 
Reflecting its importance in tuna GPNs, WCPO tuna production chains have been 
summarised in multiple studies on the political geography of tuna production⎯many of 
 
797 Ibid. 
798 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Robert Gillett et al, Tuna: A Key Economic Resource in the Pacific Islands 
(Pacific Studies Series No 121000, March 2001) 7 (‘Tuna: A Key Economic Resource’).  
799 Overview of WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2017 (n 51) 3. 
800 Ibid 12.  
801 Barclay, History of Industrial Tuna Fishing (n 583) 154; Overview of WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2017 (n 51) 2. 
802 Overview of WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2017 (n 51).  
803 The use of targeted ‘fish aggregating devices’ (FADs), or man-made floating objects in tuna fisheries, started 
in the Atlantic Ocean in the early 1990s, and then expanded to the Indian and Pacific Oceans: Makoto Peter 
Miyake, Naozumi Miyabe, and Hideki Nakano, ‘Historical Trends of Tuna Catches in the World’ (FAO 
Fisheries Technical Paper No 467, 2004) 3. During this period, vessel operators and fishing companies observed 
that they could increase tuna catch by using floating objects for schools of tuna to associate with: Tim Davies, 
Chris Mees, and EJ Milner-Gulland, ‘The Past, Present and Future Use of Drifting Fish Aggregating Devices 
(FADs) in the Indian Ocean’ (2014) 45 Marine Policy 163, 165−6. Today, most FADs are fitted with a buoy and 
location-tracking technology (e.g. radio beacon or GPS) and can either be anchored or drifting. Since the 1990s, 
increasingly sophisticated FAD technology has increased the efficiency of purse seine vessels in the Pacific and 
Indian Oceans: Miyake et al (n 589) 29−30. 
804 Barclay, History of Industrial Tuna Fishing (n 583) 161. 
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which include Havice and Campling as contributors. The following section draws on these 
studies to convey the complex political-economic drivers that underlie negotiations among 
WCPFC members.805 Recalling the GPN framework from Chapter 3, a state-focused 
overview of WCPO tuna production is provided. This overview is modelled on the state-
based typology provided in Chapter 3 to map WCPO tuna production chains, including major 
coastal, fishing, processing and trading, and market states.806 By investigating where WCPFC 
members fall in this typology of interactions with tuna GPNs, this section establishes a 
foundation for discussing how economic interests inform WCPFC policy, including how the 
WCPFC applies differentiation advantaging PICs to its management decisions.  
A WCPO Coastal States 
According to the UN, the WCPO region includes 13 SIDS, four archipelagic states, four 




805 Aside from updating catch and effort data to reflect recent numbers, the following section does not present 
new data, analysis, or findings on the WCPO tuna industry, but merely reflects the current state of knowledge on 
the political economy of WCPO tuna production. WCPO catch and effort data, largely from 2016, was collated 
from recent versions of three primary sources. Unless otherwise noted, Section II is based on these sources: 
Overview of WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2017 (n 51); SPC, WCPFC Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2017 (Tuna Fishery 
Yearbook Series, 3 November 2018); FFA, Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2017 (Value of WCPO Tuna 
Fisheries Series, 5 July 2017). This overview excludes the WCPO pole and line and trolling fisheries because 
catches in these fisheries are either stagnating or declining, and comprise only a small portion of overall WCPO 
tuna fishery catch: Overview of WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2017 (n 51) 22−3, 34. Since the time of writing, updates 
to these publications and WCPO catch and effort data have been made available for 2018. See Overview of 
WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2018 (n 793); SPC, WCPFC Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2018 (Tuna Fishery Yearbook 
Series, 5 November 2019) <https://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-tuna-fisheries-yearbook-2017>; FFA, Value of 
WCPO Tuna Fisheries 2017 (Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries Series, 5 July 2017) 
<https://www.ffa.int/node/425>.   
806 The following analysis of state engagement with tuna GPNs is intended as a heuristic for considering how 
states interact with GPNs in the context of WCPO tuna production. It provides a general overview, of states that 
contribute significantly to WCPO tuna production and consumption and are major players within tuna GPNs. It 
is not an exhaustive description of all links between states and tuna GPNs, nor does it provide a complete 
analysis of how state and non-state actors relate with respect to WCPO tuna production. Rather, this typology 
simply draws together some of the current knowledge in political economy on the competing interests and 
commercial dynamics that may inform states’ interests within WCPFC negotiations.  
807 For the purposes of this thesis, the ‘WCPO region’ refers to the boundaries of the WCPFC’s area of 
application: WCPF Convention (n 46) art 3. Therefore, the following discussion excludes the South China Sea 
and its coastal states.  
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Table 2: List of WCPO Coastal States808 
WCPO SIDS (PICs) Other WCPO 
DCSs  
WCPO Territories & 
Dependencies 
Industrialised WCPO 
Coastal States  
Cook Islands Indonesia* American Samoa Australia 
FSM Philippines*  Northern Mariana Islands New Zealand 
Fiji*  French Polynesia Japan  
Kiribati  Guam  
RMI  New Caledonia   
Nauru  Tokelau   
Niue    
Palau    
PNG*    
Samoa    
Solomon Islands    
Tonga    
Tuvalu     
Vanuatu    
There are 11 recognised high seas areas within the WCPFC’s area of application. Figure 8 
provides an illustration of WCPO EEZs, indicated in dark blue shading, and high seas areas. 
As the map indicates, the WCPFC has assigned each high seas area a code. The four ‘high 
seas pockets’ (high seas areas that are completely enclosed by PIC EEZs) in the WCPO are: 
I1, I2, I8 and I9.   
 
808 States in bold are LDCs. States with an asterisk (*) were approved as archipelagic states at UNCLOS III.  
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Figure 8: EEZs and High Seas Areas in the WCPFC Area of Application809 
 
In 2016, approximately 56% of overall WCPO tuna catch was taken from PIC EEZs. The 
largest catches were taken in Kiribati, PNG, FSM, Solomon Islands, Nauru, and Tuvalu. In 
non-PIC EEZs, substantial catches were also taken in Indonesia, Philippines, and Japan. By 
comparison, only 11% of the total catch was taken in high seas areas. 
In identifying major coastal states in the WCPO region, it is important to distinguish between 
the purse seine and longline fisheries. The WCPO purse seine fishery is concentrated largely 
in PIC EEZs, where fleets track the migrations of tropical tuna species such as bigeye, 
skipjack, and yellowfin. In 2016, approximately 75% of total purse seine catch was taken 
from PIC EEZs and 9% from high seas areas. By contrast, the WCPO longline fishery is 
geographically dispersed⎯it has a tropical and southern component⎯and more evenly 
distributed between EEZs and high seas areas. In 2016, approximately 42% of total longline 
catch was taken from PIC EEZs and 20% from high seas areas. The tropical portion of the 
 
809 Senina et al (n 28) 11.  
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WCPO longline fishery targets bigeye and yellowfin, largely in the EEZs of FSM, Kiribati, 
Palau, Solomon Islands, and high seas areas. The southern portion targets albacore, 
principally in the EEZs of Cook Islands, Fiji, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, and subtropical high 
seas areas. PICs currently exercise jurisdiction over a majority of the region’s tuna resources, 
ranging from 42% to 75% of total catch of the WCPO longline and purse seine fisheries in 
2016. Through the creative exercise of their tuna resource rights over time, PICs have 
actively leveraged these resources to provide both direct and indirect contributions to their 
national economies.810  
Access fees play a particularly important role in the national economies of PICs. However, 
wealth from (and dependence on) access fee payments is unevenly distributed, both across 
the region and between the purse seine and longline fisheries. Mapping the distribution of 
access fees in 2014, Gillett estimates that PICs which received the largest payments were: 
Kiribati, PNG, FSM, Solomon Islands, RMI, and Tuvalu.811 In certain PICs, such as Kiribati, 
Tuvalu, and Tokelau, access fee payments regularly account for over 50% of government 
revenue.812 The value PICs capture from access fees in the purse seine fishery is dramatically 
higher than from the longline fishery. In 2015, the World Bank estimated that PICs earned 
approximately 13% of the value of purse seine caught tuna in their EEZs through access 
fees.813 By comparison, the World Bank has estimated that PICs annually earn between 3% 
and 5% of the value of longline caught tuna in their EEZs⎯or approximately 10 to 15 million 
USD.814 As major coastal states in the WCPO region, PICs face traditional struggles to 
capture surplus value from the tuna resources caught in their waters. This theme⎯the degree 
 
810 The Asian Development Bank study identified several ways industrial tuna fishing contributes to PIC 
economies: Gillett et al, Tuna: A Key Economic Resource (n 798) 11−34. These economic benefits include: 
access fee payments; foreign exchange earnings, taxes, and fines from tuna exports; direct employment in the 
tuna fishing and processing sectors; indirect employment in industries that support these sectors (e.g. transport 
and vessel servicing); port-based economic activities stimulated by locally based vessels and at-port 
transshipments; and commercial sport fishing: at 34. See also Robert Gillett, Fisheries in the Economies of 
Pacific Island Countries and Territories (SPC, 2nd ed, 2016) 
<https://coastfish.spc.int/component/content/article/462?lang=en> (‘Fisheries in PICT Economies’); Robert 
Gillett and Mele Ikatonga Tauati, Fisheries of the Pacific Islands: Regional and National Information (FAO 
Fisheries and Aquaculture Technical Paper No 625, 2018).   
811 Gillett and Tauati (n 810) 37.  
812 According to Gillett, access fees comprise 75%, 58.3%, and 52.6% of government revenue for Kiribati, 
Tuvalu, and Tokelau, respectively: Gillett, Fisheries in PICT Economies (n 810) 488.  
813 Virdin, Pacific Possible (n 788) 38.  
814 Ibid.  
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to which PICs are successful in capturing surplus value from WCPO tuna production⎯is 
discussed at length in Section III.  
B WCPO Fishing States 
Industrial tuna fishing in the WCPO is carried out by a wide variety of fishing vessels. 
Multiple characteristics distinguish these vessels from one another, including their gear type 
and mode of fishing, target species, location of origin, operating base, and flag state. An 
important feature of vessels in the region is whether they fall into one of three categories 
based on their beneficiary vessel ownership and flagging arrangements:815 (i) domestic PIC-
flagged vessels; (ii) foreign PIC-flagged vessels (either locally based or chartered);816 and 
(iii) DWFS-flagged vessels. These categories influence fleet dynamics in the WCPO by 
affecting the ability of different fleets to access the tuna rich EEZs of PICs. In 2017, domestic 
PIC-flagged vessels caught approximately 25% of total catch, while DWFS-flagged vessels 
caught 43%. In the same year, the most productive fishing fleets in the region were flagged to 
Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Taiwan, the US (and its territories), PNG, 
Kiribati, and China.817  
C WCPO Processing and Trading States: Thailand, Taiwan, the US, and Japan 
The lead processing and trading states in the WCPO are defined by their interconnectedness 
with other nodes in tuna GPNs. Thailand dominates processing in the WCPO and sources 
approximately 90% of its catch from the region.818 In 2010, Thailand processed 700,000 mt 
 
815 Crigler (n 80) 14, 45−6.  
816 According to Crigler’s analysis, Cook Islands, FSM, Fiji, Kiribati, RMI, Palau, PNG, Samoa, and Solomon 
Islands chartered a total of 120 foreign flagged (purse seine and longline) vessels in 2017: ibid 45−6.  
817 It is estimated that a total of 2,689 purse seine and longline vessels operated in the WCPO region in 2017: 
WCPFC Tuna Fishery Yearbook 2017 (n 805) 115. While Indonesia and Philippines represent major fishing 
fleets in the WCPO due to their large domestic tuna fisheries, there is limited information available on the 
number of vessels flagged to these two states: at 108−113.  
818 Ibid 159. 
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of tuna from the WCPO.819 The majority of tuna processed in Thailand is destined for 
markets in the US, EU, and Middle East.820  
As Chapter 3 discussed, trading firms play an integral role in both the canned and raw tuna 
GPNs.821 The three major trading firms in the canned tuna GPN⎯FCF, Tri Marine, and 
Itochu⎯reportedly source 70% of the catch they handle from the WCPO.822 In contrast, 
major trading firms in the raw tuna GPN source more widely from multiple oceans and there 
is limited data available on the degree to which they source from the WCPO.  
D WCPO Market States: the EU, US, and Japan 
The majority of WCPO-sourced tuna products are destined for either canned tuna or sashimi 
markets. As Chapter 3 discussed, these markets represent the two major tuna GPNs, though 
there are minor markets in other ‘value-added’ tuna products.823 The task of parsing out the 
total amount of WCPO-sourced tuna that flow into individual markets is difficult due to the 
complexity of tuna production chains. However, reflecting recent efforts to track commercial 
tuna catch from harvest to final point of sale, Drakou, Virdin, and Pendelton have attempted 
to map the destination of WCPO canned tuna production.824 Their study estimates that the 
final markets for WCPO canned and processed tuna are distributed roughly as follows: the 
EU (30%), the US (19%), Asia (15%), Latin America (13%), the Middle East (6%), Australia 
and New Zealand (3%), Africa (2.7%), Eastern Europe (1.6%), and all other countries 
(7.5%).825 
 
819 Evangelia Drakou, John Virdin, and Linwood Pendleton, ‘Mapping the Global Distribution of Locally-
Generated Marine Ecosystem Services: The Case of the West and Central Pacific Ocean Tuna Fisheries’ (2018) 
31 Ecosystem Services 278, 283. The majority of purse seine caught tuna in the WCPO is thus sold to Thailand 
for processing. The remainder is processed in Japan, South Korea, PNG, and the Philippines. To a lesser extent, 
Ecuador, Vietnam, and Indonesia also process WCPO-caught tuna: at ibid.  
820 Hamilton et al (n 590) 164. 
821 Chapter 3 Section II D. 
822 Hamilton et al (n 590) 138.  
823 Chapter 3 Section II D.  
824 Drakou, Virdin, and Pendelton (n 819).   
825 Ibid 283.  
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E Interests of Member States of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(WCPFC) 
The state-focused description of WCPO tuna production in this thesis establishes a starting 
point for examining the political-economic drivers that underwrite WCPFC negotiations. 
Table 3 lists the major coastal, fishing, processing and trading, and market states involved in 
WCPO tuna production.826 
Table 3: WCPFC Member States' Interactions with Tuna GPNs 






WCPO Coastal States 
Canned Tuna GPN Kiribati, PNG, FSM, 
Solomon Islands, 




Raw Tuna GPN Kiribati, Solomon 




WCPO Fishing States 
Canned Tuna GPN PNG, FSM, RMI 
Solomon Islands 
Indonesia South Korea, US, 
Taiwan, Japan 
Raw Tuna GPN Fiji, Samoa, Vanuatu, 
Cook Islands, Palau, 
New Zealand, RMI, 
FSM 
 Japan, China, US, South 
Korea 
WCPO Trading States 
Canned Tuna GPN   Taiwan, US, Japan 
Raw Tuna GPN   Japan 
WCPO Processing States 
Canned Tuna GPN  Thailand  
Raw Tuna GPN   Japan 
WCPO Market States 
Canned Tuna GPN   EU, US 
Raw Tuna GPN   Japan 
Figure 9 provides a map of PICs’ engagement with tuna GPNs as coastal and fishing states 
below.  
 




Figure 9: Map of PICs' Engagement with Tuna GPNs827 
 
Table 3 and Figure 9 illustrate that the majority of WCPO tuna catches are harvested from the 
EEZs of island states, processed in nearby archipelagic states with economies of scale to 
support large-scale processing, traded by industrialised states with entrenched knowledge and 
longstanding relationships across tuna GPN nodes, and delivered to markets in developed 
states. 
The description of the global tuna industry in Chapter 3 matches the patterns of engagement 
between states and the WCPO tuna industry shown in Table 3 and Figure 9. PICs and other 
DCSs are engaged with WCPO tuna production primarily at the fishing and processing nodes 
 
827 This figure displays the regional scope of the WCPO tuna industry. Therefore, WCPFC members from 
outside of the region are not included. Minor regional players within canned and raw tuna GPNs are also not 
included in this figure. See above (n 806). Dr. Indiah Hodgson-Johnston helped format this figure. 
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of tuna GPNs. As coastal, fishing, and/or processing states, WCPO DCSs interact with the 
lower-value end of the tuna production chain, where firms are under some of the most 
competitive pressures observed in tuna GPNs. Conversely, WCPO DWFSs operate across all 
tuna GPN nodes. This includes the trading and retail nodes of tuna GPNs, which are the 
higher-value end of the tuna production chain, and to which a major portion of surplus value 
from tuna production flows.  
Lead trading and retail firms with significant coordinating power in the WCPO are 
headquartered in DWFSs. WCPO tuna production is therefore spatially organised to move 
tuna from the EEZs of the region’s most economically challenged DCSs⎯PICs⎯to the 
markets of developed states in Europe, the US, and Japan. The spatial organisation of WCPO 
tuna production informs patterns of distributional struggle between WCPFC members. As 
established in Chapter 3, distributional struggles within TRFMOs reflect states’ direct and 
indirect economic interests in tuna GPNs.828 In the WCPO, the economic interests of PICs 
and DWFSs forecast these distributional struggles. 
In a seminal study on transboundary tuna management in the WCPO, Hanich rigorously 
argues that members’ economic interests influence WCPFC policy.829 In the only detailed 
assessment of the commercial interests of members within a TRFMO, Hanich demonstrates 
that economic drivers constrain the political potentialities for tuna management within the 
WCPFC. He reviews the economic interests of states in the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries for 
bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin, and assesses whether the constellation of interests 
represented by the WCPFC membership is likely to lead to much-needed regulatory steps 
towards bigeye conservation.830 Hanich finds that conflicting interests between ‘purse-
seine/skipjack’ and ‘multiple gear’ states render conservation action difficult, requiring a 
more transparent discussion of how WCPFC members distribute the economic burden of 
conserving bigeye.831 Hanich essentially maps the vested interests of WCPFC members in the 
 
828 Chapter 3 Section III B. 
829 Quentin Hanich, ‘Interest and Influence⎯Conservation and Management in the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission’ (PhD Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2011). See also the following report 
summarising Hanich’s findings: Quentin Hanich, Interest and Influence⎯A Snapshot of the Western and 
Central Pacific Tropical Tuna Fisheries (Australian National Centre for Ocean Resources and Security Report, 
2011) (‘Interest and Influence in WCPO Snapshot’).  
830 Hanich, Interest and Influence in WCPO Snapshot (n 829) ii.  
831  Ibid iv, 25−7.  
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fishing node, though he notes other processing and market interests.832 Since Hanich’s 2011 
study, the WCPFC has taken steps to constrain bigeye catches in major revisions to its 
tropical tunas measure, which occurred most recently in 2017.833 That year, reflecting 
Hanich’s findings, WCPFC members agreed to adopt a tropical tunas measure that exceeded 
precautionary, scientifically recommended limits.834 As political economy research on the 
WCPO tuna fishery has developed since the 1980s, studies like Hanich’s and others have 
elucidated the inter-connections between WCPO tuna production and regulation.  
III DISTRIBUTIONAL STRUGGLE WITHIN THE WCPFC 
For over four decades, distributional struggles between PICs and DWFSs have shaped the 
political economy of WCPO tuna production. These distributional struggles predate the 
WCPFC, when they originally coalesced around contentious access relations in the early 
1980s. Since then, they have escalated to encompass not just the fishing node, but all tuna 
GPN nodes. The current pattern of distributional struggle in the WCPO reflects how PICs 
have expanded their engagement with the tuna industry as a result of government policies to 
pursue tuna-led economic development. To advance these policies, PICs have sought to strike 
a balance between countering DWFSs in asymmetrical negotiations and partnering with lead 
firms in tuna GPNs. An understanding of PICs’ commercial efforts and their precarious 
positioning within tuna GPNs is important to this thesis because the WCPFC differentiation 
framework explicitly focuses on increasing the economic benefits PICs receive from the 
WCPO tuna fishery. 
Over time, PICs and DWFSs have developed different strategies to advantage their economic 
interests in the WCPO tuna industry. Several of these strategies implicate the WCPFC in 
distributional struggles between PICs and DWFSs. The second half of this chapter explores 
the distributional struggles that pervade WCPO tuna production to illuminate how members’ 
 
832 Ibid v-vi. Hanich does not name processing and market states among the 14 with significant interests in the 
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries. He does, however, explore the canning and loining market interests of Thailand, 
the US, Japan, China, Philippines, South Korea, American Samoa, PNG, and Indonesia, as well as the interests 
of states with large consumer markets such as the EU, Japan, and the US: at 19−21.  
833 For an overview of the WCPFC tropical tunas measure, see Chapter 1 Section IV A. In 2018, the tropical 
tunas measure was revised to remove exemptions for some WCPFC members, though catch limits remained 
largely the same: WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye, Yellowfin and Skipjack Tuna in 
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, CMM 2018-01, 15th reg sess, 10−14 December 2018.  
834 Some WCPFC members argued for increasing these limits because of a cautiously optimistic stock 




interactions with the tuna industry inform WCPFC negotiations and are likely to influence 
how the WCPFC applies legal differentiation to tuna management.  
This section begins by reviewing how PICs have operated in tuna GPNs to increase the value 
they capture from tuna production. It describes the distributional struggles with DWFSs that 
have followed, and explores scholarly literature assessing their efforts in the context of the 
unique political economy of WCPO tuna production. The section then discusses how DWFSs 
and PICs have employed ‘interference’ and ‘cooperative’ strategies, respectively, to 
advantage their economic interests through WCPFC policy. 
A PICs within Tuna GPNs 
PICs have explored opportunities to capture value across all three nodes of tuna GPNs via 
access fees, onshore processing, and the direct marketing and sale of tuna products. At the 
fishing node, PICs have negotiated increasing access fee payments in bilateral and 
multilateral FAAs,835 and rapidly expanded PIC-flagged fishing fleets in recent years836. At 
the processing node, PICs have encouraged foreign investment in onshore processing.837 
These efforts began in the 1980s, when PIC governments began investing directly in joint 
ventures with foreign firms to establish locally based fishing fleets and processing 
facilities.838 After many of these joint ventures failed, PIC governments renewed their efforts 
in the early 2000s by linking FAAs to onshore investment.839 Under these FAAs, lead firms 
secured ongoing fishing access to some PIC EEZs in exchange for investments in local 
 
835 Adjusting for inflation, Gillett estimates that access fees payments to PICs have increased by over 800% 
from 15 million USD in 1982 to almost 350 million USD in 2014: Gillett, Fisheries in PICT Economies (n 810) 
8, 495. More recent estimates place access fee revenues for PICs at well over 450 million USD: FFA, Peter 
Terawasi and Chris Reid, Economic and Development Indicators and Statistics: Tuna Fisheries of the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean (Economic Indicators Report, 2017) 15 (‘FFA Economic Indicators Report’).  
836 No estimates are available for the economic benefits PICs receive from the tuna harvested by vessels they 
flag (both domestic and foreign). This is due to the fact that FFA reporting combines estimates of the economic 
contributions of PIC-flagged fishing fleets and PIC domestic processing operations to PIC GDPs: FFA 
Economic Indicators Report (n 835) 18. Even so, the FFA recently estimated that, in 2017, PIC-flagged fleets 
received 45% of the total share of WCPO tuna catch: FFA, Tuna Fishery Report Card 2018 (Tuna Fishery 
Report Card No 4, 2018) 2.  
837 Currently, 17 canneries and loining factories operate in PNG, Fiji, Solomon Islands, RMI, and Kiribati: 
Gillett, Fisheries in PICT Economies (n 810). It is estimated that less than 10% of WCPO purse seine catch is 
processed by PICs and that approximately 11,000 PIC citizens are employed in processing operations in the 
region: ibid.  
838 Rachel Schurman, ‘Tuna Dreams: Resource Nationalism and the Pacific Islands’ Tuna Industry’ (1998) 29 
Development and Change 107.  
839 Havice (n 622). 
185 
 
processing facilities and requirements for their vessel operators to tranship in PIC ports.840 At 
the retail node, one group of PICs—the PNA—directly sells and markets tuna to processing 
facilities and premium end markets.841 Though PICs continue to be primarily engaged at the 
fishing node of tuna GPNs like other DCSs, their expansion into other nodes represents a 
remarkable, multi-decadal feat of island states overcoming adverse odds in the highly 
competitive global tuna industry. 
B Studies on Tuna-Led Economic Development in PICs 
Despite increasing their value capture and expanding their engagement with WCPO tuna 
production nodes, PICs have struggled historically to establish their position in tuna GPNs. 
Amidst the competitive pressures of tuna production chains, PICs have experienced successes 
and failures in ‘upgrading’ their interactions with tuna GPNs. With a view to this, political 
economists have examined the outcomes of PIC government policies to derive economic 
development from tuna resources. Perhaps singularly among these scholars, Havice and 
Campling situate PICs and their efforts to drive tuna-led economic development in the 
context of distributional struggles with DWFS governments and foreign firms.  
PICs’ experiences at the fishing and processing nodes of tuna GPNs illustrate some of these 
challenges. PICs have had mixed success in capturing value at these nodes, epitomised by a 
string of commercial failures that occurred after several multinational firms pulled out of 
joint ventures established through large public investments in the region in the 1990s.842 
These events attracted considerable scholarly interest in the mid-2000s and inspired multiple 
 
840 Ibid.  
841 See PACIFICAL, About Pacifical (Web Page, 2020) <https://www.pacifical.com/about-pacifical/>. MSC 
certification plays an integral role in the ability of PICs to sell and market their tuna directly to high-value, 
premium markets: Agnes Yeeting et al, ‘Implications of New Economic Policy Instruments for Tuna 
Management in the Western and Central Pacific’ (2016) 63 Marine Policy 45. In addition to the PNA’s sale of 
MSC-certified ‘free school’ (caught by purse seiners without the use of FADs) skipjack and yellowfin, fishing 
firms in the Fiji Tuna Boat Owners Association (FTBOA) sell MSC-certified yellowfin, albacore, and bigeye 
caught in their longline fishery: MSC, ‘Fiji Albacore, Yellowfin and Bigeye Tuna Longline’ Marine 
Stewardship Council: Track a Fishery (Web Page, 2020) <https://fisheries.msc.org/en/fisheries/fiji-albacore-
yellowfin-and-bigeye-tuna-longline/@@view>. 
842 Schurman (n 838).  
186 
 
studies debating the design of PIC government policies for achieving tuna-led economic 
development.843  
Much of this research followed Schurman’s original study of PICs’ attempts to ‘domesticate’ 
their tuna industries through public investments.844 Schurman locates PICs’ efforts within the 
highly dynamic and competitive commercial environment of the tuna industry, concluding 
that, in the 1990s, PICs were poorly positioned to enter into tuna production chains.845 
Schurman argues that the choices made by PIC government officials at this time were not 
informed by knowledge of the industry but by ‘resource nationalism’, and that this policy 
orientation doomed their commercial efforts.846 Nearly a decade later, several studies 
authored by development economists argued that PICs’ weak domestic institutions, high 
operating costs, and lack of infrastructure diminished their comparative advantage to tuna 
resources to such an extent that PICs should abandon attempts to enter tuna production 
chains.847 Writing in the early 2000s, these scholars recommended that PICs focus instead on 
cooperating with DWFSs to maximise access fee payments for their tuna resources and 
develop the governance capacity of domestic and regional institutions to manage tuna 
fisheries.848 
 
843 See, e.g., Elizabeth Petersen, ‘Economic Policy, Institutions and Fisheries Development in the Pacific’ 
(2002) 26 Marine Policy 315; Ron Duncan, ‘Troubled Fishing in Pacific Waters’ (2006) 21(3) Pacific Economic 
Bulletin 98; Hannah Parris and R Quentin Grafton, ‘Can Tuna Promote Sustainable Development in the 
Pacific?’ (2006) 15(3) Journal of Environment and Development 269; Kate Barclay and Ian Cartwright, 
‘Governance of Tuna Industries: The Key to Economic Viability and Sustainability in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean’ (2007) 31 Marine Policy 348; Rögnvaldur Hannesson, ‘The Exclusive Economic Zone and 
Economic Development in the Pacific Island Countries’ (2008) 32 Marine Policy 886; Tim Stephens, ‘Fisheries-
Led Development in the South Pacific: Charting a “Pacific Way” to a Sustainable Future’ (2008) 39 Ocean 
Development and International Law 257; Havice and Reed (n 688).  
844 Schurman (n 838). Schurman states that in the 1990s, PIC government investments in the tuna industry 
included fishing vessels, aeroplanes, port infrastructure, and processing facilities: at 115.  
845 Schurman argues that as PICs made investments to enter the tuna industry in the 1990s, a spatial 
reorganisation of global tuna production was underway: ibid 120−3. Schurman shows that lead firms were 
moving away from a model of vertical integration and towards coordinating more dispersed modes of tuna 
production: at 122. In this new context, highly competitive players operating at low margins dominated tuna 
harvesting (e.g. firms based in South Korea, Taiwan, and later China) and tuna processing (e.g. firms in 
Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia): at 122−3. During this time, the most profitable nodes of tuna production 
chains were trading and retail, both of which required extensive industry experience and professional networks 
to enter⎯which PIC local operations did not possess: at 123.  
846 Ibid 127−8.  
847 See Petersen (n 843); Parris and Grafton (n 843); Satish Chand, R Quentin Grafton, and Elizabeth Petersen, 
‘Multilateral Governance of Fisheries: Management and Cooperation in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna 
Fisheries’ (2003) 18 Marine Resource Economics 329; Rögnvaldur Hannesson and John Kennedy, ‘Rent-
Maximization Versus Competition in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fishery’ (2008) 1(1) Journal of 
Natural Resources Policy Research 49.  
848 See, e.g., Petersen (n 843) 320, 322−3; Parris and Grafton (n 843) 281−4.  
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In a study that updates Schurman’s work by examining specific case studies of PIC 
government investments in tuna processing, Havice and Campling propose a broader 
perspective.849 The authors contextualise the difficulties PICs faced during their early 
experiences in the tuna industry with a description of wider, ‘mediating dynamics’ that 
condition tuna-related economic development.850 From Havice and Campling’s perspective, 
PICs’ mixed experiences reflect the non-linear development pathways of island states, which 
generally come at great political and financial cost to their governments.851 Havice and 
Campling contend that, like other developing states, PICs are subject to industry dynamics in 
the broader global economic system that generate moments of investment and divestment, 
inclusion and exclusion, and upgrading and downgrading in tuna production chains.852  
Havice and Campling also respond critically to the studies by development economists that 
suggest PICs shift their efforts away from entering tuna production chains.853 Their critique 
of these studies draws out another theme relevant to investigating equity issues in 
TRFMOs—the prevailing neoliberal logic operating in fisheries management and 
scholarship. According to Havice and Campling, these studies ‘assign blame’ to PIC 
governments for their past commercial failures without acknowledging the political-
economic forces that condition their engagement with tuna production chains.854 By 
suggesting weak domestic institutions are solely responsible for frustrating PICs’ efforts to 
achieve tuna-led economic development, these neoliberal studies fail to adequately account 
for the distributional struggles that characterise relations between PICs and other actors in 
tuna GPNs.855 Havice and Campling detail how neoliberal framings of institutional failure 
produce ‘methodologically and analytically weak’ analyses: 
 
849 Havice and Campling, Articulating Upgrading (n 203).  
850 Havice and Campling identify four ‘mediating dynamics’ that condition processes of inclusion and exclusion 
for developing states in commodity chains. They are world-market conditions; regulatory mechanisms; 
contingent state-firm relations; and environmental conditions of production: ibid 2617−8.  
851 Havice and Campling argue: 
The combination of mediating dynamics—in particular, small island states’ control over the environmental 
conditions of production (a factor frequently absent from commodity chain studies)—explains the puzzle of 
why small island economies have survived in this highly competitive chain over a forty-year period. The 
mediating dynamics [also] provide a lens for revealing several nuances associated with “upgrading”: that it 
is an historically highly changeable process, it is multiscalar and includes competition between production 
sites, and that its material outcomes are highly contingent: ibid 2624.  
852 Ibid 2616.  
853 Havice and Campling, Shifting Tides (n 594) 91−5.  
854 Ibid 91.  
855 Havice and Campling assert that: ‘[T]heir analysis lacks the framing of power relations required to explicate 
the underlying causes of this form of institutional failure. Further, to identify weak institutions as the primary 
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Methodologically, neoliberals blame domestic governments, but ignore the contexts within 
which they operate. This creates a false dichotomy between internal and external relations and 
processes in an undeniably global industry. Analytically, neoliberals fail to acknowledge how 
relational political and economic dynamics among states and firms in a global industry 
influence not only the formulation and behavior of institutions, but also the exercise of 
political power and the manipulation of economic advantage when analyzing institutions and 
institution building.856  
This compartmentalised, ahistorical view of WCPO tuna production and regulation is perhaps 
most apparent in these studies’ recommendations to PIC governments, which recommend that 
PICs devote their efforts to developing rights-based management in the WCPFC through 
cooperation with DWFSs.857 They maintain that, if the WCPO tuna fishery were rationalised 
at the WCPFC-level, PICs would achieve objectives such as rent maximisation, risk-sharing, 
and domestic, institutional capacity development.858 As Chapter 1 discussed, neoliberal 
approaches to fisheries management favour rights-based management because it presents a 
solution that achieves economic efficiency while eliding distributional issues among 
fishers.859 Havice and Campling articulate that, by recommending such a solution to PICs, 
these studies ignore the distributional struggles between PICs and DWFSs that have come to 
shape the political economy of WCPO tuna production.860  
Tellingly, PIC governments have not taken up the recommendations of development 
economists. Informed by their early experiences, PICs today are involved in all three nodes of 
tuna production chains. In 2011, the PNA entered the retail node in an initiative to exercise 
greater control over the distribution and sale of MSC-certified, purse-seine caught skipjack in 
the WCPO.861 PACIFICAL is a public-private partnership between the PNA and the Dutch 
trading company, ‘Sustunable’.862 The firm sells various products to processors and end 
markets in both the canned tuna and raw tuna GPNs.863 Adolf, Bush, and Vellema explain 
that PACIFICAL is the linchpin of a wider PNA strategy to exercise greater agency in tuna 
 
inhibitor of tuna-based socio-economic performance is too narrow to encapsulate the regulatory challenges 
presented by a global industry’: ibid 92. 
856 Ibid 92−3. 
857 See, e.g., Chand, Grafton, and Petersen (n 847).  
858 Parris and Grafton (n 843) 284−5.  
859 Mansfield, Neoliberalism in the Oceans (n 100). See Chapter 1 Section I C.  
860 For a description of these distributional struggles, see below Chapter 4 Section III C. 
861 Adolf, Bush, and Vellema (n 623).  
862 Ibid 82.  
863 PACIFICAL sells frozen skipjack and yellowfin in various forms to processors, as well as sashimi-grade and 
canned tuna direct to end markets: PACIFICAL (n 841).  
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GPNs and to challenge the coordinating power and considerable influence of lead firms.864 
The authors conclude that, ‘By re-positioning itself, the PNA seeks to shift economic control 
over their resources from buyers to the member states which own and supply tuna’.865 
PACIFICAL is the latest iteration of PICs’ efforts to address distributional struggles with 
DWFSs and foreign firms and thereby increase the value they capture from tuna GPNs.  
C The WCPFC and Distributional Struggles in Tuna GPNs 
Refocusing on distributive dynamics within the WCPFC, the next section looks to state 
behaviour within the WCPFC. This section demonstrates that specific strategies employed by 
DWFSs and PICs have implicated the WCPFC in broader distributional struggles within tuna 
GPNs. It argues that, over time, DWFSs have used ‘interference strategies’ and PICs have 
leveraged ‘cooperative strategies’ at the WCPFC-level to advance their interests in tuna 
GPNs.  
1 Interference Strategies: DWFSs 
To describe the behaviour of DWFSs in distributional struggles with PICs, this thesis uses the 
concept of ‘interference strategies’ as it relates to fisheries. Hanna first introduced the 
concept of ‘interference strategies’ in connection with competition among fishers.866 
Borrowing from Hirshleifer’s work translating insights from biology to economics—what he 
describes as the field of ‘natural economy’⎯867 Hanna describes the difference between 
scramble and interference competition.868 In the absence of property rights, Hanna postulates, 
scramble competition prevails, under which fishers are in a direct race against other fishers 
for resources. Conversely, Hanna argues that interference competition occurs when fishers 
employ strategies to indirectly interfere with the ability of other fishers to compete for fishery 
resources.869 Hanna thus makes a distinction between forms of direct versus indirect 
 
864Adolf, Bush, and Vellema (n 623) 82. 
865 Ibid 83. 
866 Susan Hanna, ‘Strengthening Governance of Ocean Fishery Resources’ (1999) 31 Ecological Economics 
275, 282. 
867 Jack Hirshleifer, ‘Competition, Cooperation, and Conflict in Economics and Biology’ (1978) 68(2) 
Economics and Biology 238. 
868 Hanna (n 866) 282. 
869 Ibid. More specifically, Hirshleifer characterises the distinction between scramble and interference 
competition as follows: 
Scramble competitors ignore one another, interacting only through depletion of resources. The winning 
organisms are those most efficient at extracting energy and other inputs from the external environment. 
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competition among fishers. Using these forms of competition to frame transboundary 
fisheries management, Hanna contends: 
The expansion of national jurisdiction and the development of layered national and 
international arrangements have limited the scope for scramble competition but have given 
rise to more interference competition, as groups attempt to garner political support for 
favourable management outcomes.870 
Hanna’s description of different forms of competition among fishers corresponds with Havice 
and Campling’s observation that distributional struggles among actors in tuna GPNs inform 
WCPFC policy. 
Havice and Campling demonstrate that DWFSs have deployed interference strategies at the 
WCPFC level—both in negotiations leading up to the establishment of the WCPFC and more 
recently—to advantage the interests of their fleets.871 The researchers argue that DWFSs have 
repeatedly sought to advantage their fishing interests in the WCPO, ‘even though these 
interests conflict with the environmental and economic objectives of [PICs]’.872 Havice and 
Campling focus on how DWFSs like Japan and Taiwan (and their respective tuna industries) 
have strategised at bilateral and multilateral levels to secure favourable fishing access in the 
WCPO tuna fishery.873 They point to specific instances in WCPFC negotiations where 
DWFSs have: advocated to weaken PICs’ ability to allocate tuna catches within their EEZs in 
favour of WCPFC-led allocations;874 argued to increase SC-recommended limits in WCPFC 
measures;875 and attempted to use aid payments to control PIC participation in pre-WCPFC 
negotiating processes876. Havice and Campling reveal that 
[D]istant water fishing nations exert pressure on management structures at both the national 
([PIC]) and international (Commission) levels, influencing fisheries management, but not 
necessarily in favour of conservation or economic development in the island states. Instead, 
distant water fishing nations insert their own diplomatic interests, and those of their fleets, 
into policy frameworks.877 
 
Interference strategists, in contrast, gain and maintain control over resources by fighting off or reducing the 
efficiency of rivals (emphasis in original): Hirshleifer (n 867) 239. 
870 Hanna (n 866) 282. 
871 Havice and Campling, Shifting Tides (n 594). 
872 Ibid 94. 
873 Ibid 98−102, 106−9.  
874 Ibid 108. 
875 Ibid 107.  
876 Ibid.  
877 Ibid 110.  
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Similarly, Havice and Campling indicate that fishing firms from DWFSs employ their own 
interference strategies, which include lobbying both their flag state governments and PICs for 
more favourable regulatory conditions.878 Finally, the interference strategies exhibited by 
DWFSs may indicate that they do not view important elements of the WCPFC differentiation 
framework as binding obligations. This includes increasing PICs’ share of the WCPO tuna 
fishery and promoting increased economic benefits for PICs from WCPO tuna production.879   
In this context, Havice and Campling argue that the establishment of the WCPFC itself 
permanently shifted the calculus of distributional struggles among states and firms in the 
WCPO. They show how the WCPFC expanded the ability of DWFSs to shape tuna 
management in the region, at the same time as it constrained the ability of PICs to regulate 
tuna fishing activity within their EEZs and provided DWFS fishing firms with broader scope 
to lobby for regulatory conditions that advanced their interests. Havice and Campling 
conclude that:  
The changes shifted decision-making power from [PICs] to international cooperative bodies, 
and ignited further political and economic maneuvering by states and firms with interests in 
the WCPO tuna fishery. [PICs] struggled to maintain regulatory control as distant water 
fishing nations advanced national agendas at the international level, arguably at the expense 
of [PICs’] environment and development priorities. Likewise, distant water fleets sought to 
adjust their operational strategies to be compatible with the changing terms of regulation; they 
negotiated with their home states and [PICs] to secure their strategic positions in the 
WCPO.880 
Havice and Campling’s characterisation of the behaviour of DWFSs within the WCPFC 
tracks Hanna’s application of the concept of interference strategies to transboundary fisheries 
management. Through the WCPFC, DWFSs have devised strategies to undermine the ability 
of PICs to capture value from WCPO tuna production and have advantaged the interests of 
lead fishing firms in tuna GPNs. In doing so, DWFSs have implicated WCPFC policy 
outcomes in their distributional struggles with PICs.  
2 Cooperative Strategies: PICs 
 
878 Ibid.  
879 See Chapter 2 Section III A 2(b), 3(b). 
880 Ibid 109.  
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In contrast to the interference strategies pursued by DWFSs, PICs have employed cooperative 
strategies (among themselves) to advance their interests within the WCPFC. These 
cooperative strategies have evolved primarily around fisheries access relations between PICs 
and DWFSs at the subregional level.  
PICs’ earliest cooperative strategies predate the WCPFC. In the 1980s and 1990s, the FFA 
mobilised PICs to formulate a series of legal frameworks and related enforcement tools to 
apply to DWFS vessels licensed to fish in their EEZs.881 These efforts included the adoption 
of region-wide, harmonised minimum terms and conditions (MTCs) for DWFS fishing access 
in 1982,882 and granting preferential fishing access to domestic and locally based fishing 
vessels through the FSM Arrangement in 1995.883 During this period, the FFA also developed 
a Regional Register of Foreign Fishing Vessels and completed negotiations for the Niue 
Treaty, which enables PICs to cooperate on MCS and enforcement activities through 
technology and information sharing.884 Guided by the FFA and premised on extensive 
cooperation among PICs, these initiatives sought to strike a balance between optimising the 
economic benefits PICs received from their sovereign rights to tuna resources and effective 
tuna management.  
Alongside FFA-led efforts in this period, PICs used cooperative strategies to improve their 
negotiating positions in fishing access relations with DWFSs. This resulted in the adoption of 
landmark multilateral FAAs in the WCPO, including the Nauru Agreement885 and its three 
 
881 See Quentin Hanich, Hannah Parris, and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘Sovereignty and Cooperation in Regional Pacific 
Tuna Fisheries Management: Politics, Economics, Conservation and the Vessel Day Scheme’ (2010) 2(1) 
Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 2. 
882 FFA, The Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions for Access by Fishing Vessels, FFC99, 4 July 2016 
<https://www.ffa.int/mtcs> (‘MTCs’). See Michael Lodge, ‘Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access: 
Responsible Fisheries Management Measures in the South Pacific Region’ (1992) 16(4) Marine Policy 277 
(‘MTCs in the South Pacific Region’). The FFA has periodically revised its MTCs (in 2003, 2005, and 2016) to 
reflect developments in regional access arrangements. 
883 Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access, opened for signature 30 
November 1994, [1994] PITS 19 (entered into force 23 September 1995) (‘FSM Arrangement’). See Transform 
Aqorau and Anthony Bergin, ‘The Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access’ 
(1997) 12(1) International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 27.  
884 Hanich, Parris, and Tsamenyi (n 881) 6−7. Since 2008, the FFA has operated its own VMS to track and 
monitor vessels in the Regional Register. The FFA VMS uses satellite technology to determine the position, 
speed and direction of registered vessels: FFA, FFA Vessel Monitoring System (Web Page, 20 August 2008) 
<https://www.ffa.int/vessel_registration>. After entering into an agreement with the WCPFC in 2009, 
information from both the FFA VMS and WCPFC VMS systems were combined as the ‘Pacific VMS’, which 
reports fishing activities within EEZs and on the high seas of the WCPO: WCPFC, Vessel Monitoring System 
(Web Page, 2020) <https://www.wcpfc.int/vessel-monitoring-system>. 
885 Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, opened for 
signature 11 February 1982, [1982] PITS 5 (entered into force 4 December 1982 (‘Nauru Agreement’). 
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implementing agreements,886 and the South Pacific Tuna Treaty887.888 In this era, tuna-related 
subregionalism emerged among PICs as a collective action response to efforts by DWFSs to 
play PICs against one another in fisheries access relations.889 In the post-WCPFC era, PICs 
continue to mobilise cooperative strategies to strengthen their engagement in WCPO tuna 
management and improve their collective negotiating positions in access relations with 
DWFSs.  
PICs leverage cooperative strategies in the WCPFC to combat DWFSs’ interference 
strategies. In doing so, PICs participate in implicating WCPFC policy outcomes in 
distributional struggles within tuna GPNs. As Chapter 3 discussed, one of the most successful 
examples of PICs’ efforts to shape WCPFC policy through cooperative strategies is the 
interdependence PNA PICs have forged between their management scheme—the VDS—and 
WCPFC measures.890 PNA PICs employ cooperation⎯combining fishing access to the most 
productive EEZs in the region⎯to counter bilateral negotiating pressures in FAAs with 
DWFSs, protect their control over WCPO tuna resources, and advance their interests at the 
WCPFC level.  
Miller, Bush, and van Zweiten demonstrate that the PNA and WCPFC exhibit a ‘creative 
tension’, whereby they mutually support the improvement of tuna management in the 
 
886 PNA, An Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Minimum Terms and Conditions of 
Access to Fisheries Zones of the Parties, 1983 <https://www.pnatuna.com/content/1st-pna-implementing-
arrangement>; PNA, A Second Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional 
Terms and Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties, 1991 
<https://www.pnatuna.com/content/2nd-pna-implementing-arrangement>; PNA, Palau Arrangement for the 
Management of the Western Pacific Fishery As Amended—Management Scheme (Purse Seine Vessel Day 
Scheme, 1995 (amended 2016) 
<https://www.pnatuna.com/sites/default/files/PS_VDS%20Txt_Amended_Oct2016_0.pdf> (‘Palau 
Arrangement Amended for LL VDS’); PNA, A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting 
Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties, 2008 (amended 2019) 
<https://www.pnatuna.com/sites/default/files/3IA%20%28as%20of%20May%202019%29.pdf>.  
887 See above (n 692). 
888 For background on the historical development of the Nauru Agreement, its implementing agreements, and the 
VDS, see Transform Aqorau and Anthony Bergin, ‘Ocean Governance in the Western Pacific Purse Seine 
Fishery—the Palau Arrangement (1997) 21(2) Marine Policy 173; Michael Lodge, ‘The Development of the 
Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery’ (1998) 22(1) Marine Policy 
1; Steve Dunn, Len Rodwell, and Glen Joseph, ‘The Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western 
Pacific Purse Seine Fishery—Management Scheme (Vessel Day Scheme)’ (Conference Paper, FAO Sharing the 
Fish ’06: Allocation Issues in Fisheries Management Conference, 27 February−2 March 2006) 
<http://www.fishallocation.com/papers/pdf/papers/GlenJoseph.pdf>; Elizabeth Havice, ‘Rights-Based 
Management in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishery: Economic and Environmental Change 
Under the Vessel Day Scheme’ (2013) 42 Marine Policy 259.  
889 Lodge, MTCs in the South Pacific Region (n 882) 280. 
890 Chapter 3 Section III C.  
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WCPO.891 However, like the development economists discussed in the previous section, these 
researchers focus on institutional rather than political responses to distributional issues in the 
WCPO tuna fishery. In reality, while PNA and WCPFC management measures may be 
mutually constitutive, Miller, Bush, and van Zweiten go one step further by claiming that 
their interplay is responsible for progressive innovations in WCPO tuna management. By 
emphasising institution-level rather than state-level interactions, Miller, Bush, and van 
Zweiten downplay the distributional struggles at the core of the ‘creative tension’ between 
the PNA and WCPFC.  
Recently, PICs have deployed cooperative strategies to focus on the WCPFC’s management 
of other fisheries in the region with mixed results. When the WCPFC delayed management 
action to limit fishing pressure on the South Pacific albacore (SPA) stock, six concerned PICs 
with significant portions of the SPA stock in their EEZs established Te Vaka Moana 
(TVM).892 TVM is a subregional organisation dedicated to the effective management of 
shared fisheries in the South Pacific. Collectively, TVM PICs presented their formal position 
on SPA management to the WCPFC in 2012.893 However, their efforts had little effect on 
WCPFC policy, and it appears TVM has ceased its activities.894 The FFA has since made 
efforts to organise a SPA management scheme with catch limits within PIC EEZs. While 
FFA members adopted the Tokelau Arrangement in 2014 for this purpose, SPA catch limits 
continue to be non-binding.895  
More recently, in 2016, the PNA amended the Palau Arrangement (a successor of the Nauru 
Agreement) to include a Longline Vessel Day Scheme (LLVDS), which encompasses the 
SPA fishery.896 While the LLVDS is referenced in the preamble of the WCPFC’s most recent 
 
891 Miller, Bush, and van Zweiten (n 213) 14.  
892 Cooperation Arrangement Between the Ministry of Marine Resources of the Cook Islands, the Ministry of 
Fisheries of New Zealand, the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Niue, The Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries of Samoa, The Ministry of Agriculture and Food, Forestry and Fisheries of Tonga, 
and Department of Economic Development Natural Resources and Environment of Tokelau, IEA Database 
Project No 4964 (signed and entered into force 1 January 2010) <https://iea.uoregon.edu/treaty-text/2010-
tevakamoanaarrangemententxt> [5.1] (‘Te Vaka Moana Arrangement’). 
893 WCPFC, Summary Report, 9th reg sess, 2−6 December 2012, 13−4, att O (‘WCPFC9 Summary Report’). 
894 While Te Vaka Moana represented initial efforts to marshal collective action among South Pacific PICs, the 
organisation did little to progress SPA management. At the time of this writing, the domain for the Te Vaka 
Moana website had expired: <http://www.tevakamoana.org>.   
895 Tokelau Arrangement for the Management of the South Pacific Albacore Fishery opened for signature 22 
October 2014 (entered into force 1 December 2014) <https://www.ffa.int/tka_public> (‘TKA’). 
896 Palau Arrangement Amended for LL VDS (n 886).  
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tropical tunas measure, it appears to have little relationship to current WCPFC policy.897 The 
slow and mixed progress of PICs’ cooperative strategies in the longline fishery indicate that 
the PNA’s success may be a function of their effective control over WCPO purse seine 
fishing grounds. This poses a difficulty for PICs in the longline fishery, which is distributed 
more widely over high seas areas in the WCPO.  
3 Implicating the WCPFC in Distributional Struggles within Tuna GPNs 
This section has shown that PICs are precariously positioned within tuna GPNs⎯a reality 
which situates their tenuous ability to capture value within tuna production chains. PICs have, 
nevertheless, managed to derive direct and indirect economic benefits across all nodes of tuna 
GPNs. As this section has also shown, PICs have achieved this feat over time at great 
financial and political cost. 
Extending Havice and Campling’s discussion of distributional struggle, this section has 
shown how interference strategies by DWFS and cooperative strategies by PICs implicate the 
WCPFC. Within the setting of distributional struggles within tuna GPNs, this thesis 
foregrounds these dynamics as likely to inform negotiations concerning differentiation 
provisions advantaging PICs within the WCPFC. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has described the political economy of the WCPO tuna industry to contextualise 
the economic interests that underwrite WCPFC negotiations. Section II provides a state-
focused overview of WCPO tuna production chains. Mapping how states interact with the 
WCPO tuna industry, it reveals that the economic interests of PICs and DWFSs are 
differently distributed over the nodes of WCPO tuna production chains⎯while PICs 
represent major coastal states, DWFSs represent major fishing, trading, and market states.  
In Section III, this chapter demonstrates how the spatial organisation of the WCPO tuna 
industry informs distributional struggles between PICs and DWFSs. Drawing from work by 
Havice and Campling, the chapter argues that PICs are engaged in distributional struggles 
with DWFSs and foreign firms as a result of government policies to pursue tuna-led 
 
897 CMM 2018-01 (n 232) Preamble para 12, att 1.  
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economic development. PICs’ positions within tuna production chains are conditioned by the 
challenging dynamics of economic development trajectories for island states in tuna GPNs. 
DWFSs and PICs have reflected these distributional struggles in negotiating positions for 
WCPFC policy, devising interference and cooperative strategies respectively to shape 
WCPFC policy outcomes in ways that advantage their economic interests.  
The distributional issues discussed in this chapter are consistent with the description of the 
role TRFMOs play in distributional struggles between DCSs and DWFSs from Chapter 3. By 
demonstrating that WCPFC policy is implicated in distributional struggles between PICs and 
DWFSs, this chapter strengthens the thesis’ overall proposition that political-economic 
drivers that underwrite WCPFC negotiations are likely to impact on the WCPFC’s 
application of legal differentiation advantaging PICs. The next chapter provides a similar 
discussion that bridges a description of political economic dynamics in the IO tuna industry 
with IOTC policy.    
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CHAPTER 5: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE INDIAN OCEAN TUNA 
INDUSTRY 
This chapter introduces the second regional case study, establishing a basis for this thesis’ 
comparison of differentiation within the IOTC and WCPFC. While there are marked 
differences between IO and WCPO tuna fisheries, DCSs in both regions have faced similar 
struggles to capture value from tuna production. The most significant difference lies in IO 
DCSs’ distinct geographies, cultures, and economic contexts which shape the operation of 
tuna production chains in the region. Paralleling Chapter 4, this chapter foregrounds the 
political economy of IO tuna production to establish a connection between distributional 
struggles between IOCs and DWFSs and differentiation within the IOTC. The chapter maps 
IOTC members’ economic interests in IO tuna production to set out a basis for discussing 
how these interests may affect IOTC negotiations concerning differentiation.  
The second largest tuna fishing grounds in the world, the IO tuna fishery exhibits multiple 
characteristics that distinguish it from the WCPO. The fishery possesses a greater variety of 
tuna stocks, which include not only the major commercial tuna species, but also four neritic 
tuna species (smaller, nearshore tuna species) that play a key role in food security for coastal 
communities. The fishery also displays a greater variety of fishers and gear types. 
Encompassing industrial, semi-industrial, and artisanal tuna fishing operations, IO fishing 
vessels employ an array of gear types and supply both international and local markets. 
Finally, a higher proportion of catches in the IO tuna fishery are harvested from high seas 
areas than in the WCPO.  
This chapter shows that IOCs interact in diverse ways with the IO tuna industry. This 
diversity enables IOCs to receive a broader range of economic benefits from tuna GPNs than 
PICs in the WCPO. However, only a minority of IOCs are significantly engaged in IO tuna 
production and IOCs have struggled to produce similar cooperative strategies as PICs in the 
WCPO.  
This chapter demonstrates that IOCs are siloed by the different production chains in which 
they participate. The chapter draws from recent studies to argue that IOCs’ particular 
interactions with tuna production chains generate competitive dynamics that create a barrier 
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to cooperation. As a consequence, IOCs have not had the same success in increasing the 
ground-rent of their tuna resources in fisheries access relations with DWFSs as PICs.  
More recently, IOCs have sought to improve their cooperative efforts through regional and 
subregional institution-building and by exhibiting solidarity in IOTC negotiations. These 
efforts have produced dynamics similar to those observed at the WCPFC and indicate that 
IOCs and DWFSs also implicate IOTC policy in distributional struggles among themselves.  
The structure of this chapter mirrors Chapter 4. Section I describes the IO tuna fishery and 
recent fleet dynamics. Section II provides a short, state-focused overview of the IO tuna 
industry, creating a profile of how IOTC members interact with IO tuna production and 
consumption. Section III discusses IOCs’ interactions with tuna GPNs, which for some IOCs 
involve critical fisheries access and aid relations with DWFSs. Recognising the dearth of 
literature on distributional struggle in the IO tuna industry, Section III draws from 
commentaries on recent IOTC negotiations to show that IOCs are increasingly leveraging 
cooperative strategies to confront DWFSs and advance their economic interests through the 
IOTC. The case study concludes that, similar to the WCPFC, these negotiating dynamics are 
likely to impact how the IOTC applies legal differentiation advantaging IOCs.  
I OVERVIEW OF INDIAN OCEAN TUNA FISHERY 
The IO tuna fishery is arguably the most diverse tuna fishery in the world by virtue of several 
characteristics unique to the region. These characteristics concern the breadth of the fishery’s 
tuna species, vessel operators, and gear types. The fishery can roughly be divided into an 
offshore, industrial-scale component and a nearshore, smaller-scale (in IOTC nomenclature, 
‘artisanal’) component.  
The industrial-scale component targets the four major commercial tuna species (albacore, 
bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin).898 Most vessel operators in this component are similar to 
those in other tuna fisheries: they operate large-scale purse seine and longline vessels and 
follow tuna migrations across vast distances for months at a time, stopping briefly to offload 
 
898 This chapter uses the term ‘commercial’ tuna species to distinguish these four species from neritic tuna 
stocks in the IO.  
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catch through transhipment, either at sea or in ports. These vessel operators harvest tuna 
primarily in the western and southern IO, where concentrations of tropical tuna species and 
SBT899 are found.900  
Other vessel operators in this component⎯sometimes referred to as ‘semi-industrial’⎯901 are 
unique to the IO and come from traditional tuna fisheries. Due to technological improvements 
in motorised boats and freezing capacity, these operators have developed the ability to 
harvest large quantities of tuna, specifically skipjack, for export.902 These vessels operate 
predominately in the central, northern, and eastern IO.903  
The artisanal component does not primarily target commercial tuna species, which are caught 
in concert with other pelagic species using less targeted gear deployed from smaller 
vessels.904 This component of the fishery is almost exclusively responsible for catches of 
neritic tuna species (bullet, frigate, kawakawa, and longtail) in the IO.905 Vessel operators in 
this component harvest tuna species in coastal areas for local markets, and employ a variety 
of fishing techniques, such as small-scale purse seining and longlining, handlining, and 
trolling.906 Most artisanal tuna fishing activity in the region is conducted in the eastern IO.907 
The IO is the second largest tuna fishing grounds in the world. In 2017, approximately 20% 
of global tuna catch was harvested from the IO.908 This catch amounted to 1.5 million mt of 
tuna and tuna-like species, 1.1 million mt of which comprised the four commercial tuna 
 
899 The SBT stock occurs in the southern portion of the IO. SBT is not included in this overview because it is 
primarily managed by CCSBT. 
900 IOTC Review of Data and Trends for Tropical Tunas (n 52).  
901 Currently, the IOTC only reports catch of industrial and artisanal vessels in the IO. Recently, there has been 
debate over whether the IOTC should introduce a semi-industrial category to its reporting of IO catch data. See 
Martín Aranda, ‘Description of Tuna Gillnet Capacity and Bycatch in the IOTC Convention Area’ (IOTC 
Report No IOTC-2017-WPEB13-18, 29 August 2017) 2; Guillermo Moreno and Miguel Herrera, ‘Estimation of 
Fishing Capacity by Tuna Fishing Fleets in the Indian Ocean’ (IOTC Report No IOTC-2014-SC16-INF03, 17 
November 2013) 14−5.  
902 IOTC Review of Data and Trends for Tropical Tunas (n 52) 17. 
903 Ibid.  
904 Moreno and Herrera (n 901) 18.  
905 IOTC, Review of the Statistical Data Available for Neritic Tuna Species, IOTC-2018-WPNT08-07, 8th sess of 
WPNT, 17 August 2018, 2 (‘IOTC Review of Data and Trends for Neritic Tunas’). Neritic tuna species dwell 
closer to shore and are generally smaller in size than commercial tuna species.  
906 Moreno and Herrera (n 901) 18. 
907 IOTC Review of Data and Trends for Tropical Tunas (n 52); IOTC Review of Data and Trends for Neritic 
Tunas (n 905). 
908 ISSF, Status of the World Fisheries for Tuna (ISSF Technical Report No 2018-21, October 2018) 74.   
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species.909 Catch levels of commercial tuna species have recently recovered from a dip after 
record setting catches in 2005.910 The total value of IO tuna catch is not well-documented or 
understood.911 A major source of uncertainty stems from lack of data on the artisanal 
component of the tuna fishery.912 The most recent estimate, however, values IO tuna 
resources at 4.76 billion USD in 2017.913  
Contemporary fleet dynamics in the industrial component of the IO tuna fishery have trended 
alongside tuna fishing grounds in other parts of the world.914 In the 1980s, IO tuna catches 
rose sharply after new entrants to the fishery and improvements in vessel technology 
intensified fishing activities.915 The fishery continued expanding in the 1990s and early 
2000s.916 A confluence of technological and environmental factors produced record catches 
in 2005.917 These factors included escalations in the use of FADs by industrial purse seiners, 
the increasing range of IOCs’ semi-industrial fleets, and variations in oceanographic 
conditions that improved the availability of tuna species, particularly yellowfin.918 Rising 
catch levels were arrested in the mid-2000s, however, when the threat of piracy off the coast 
of Somalia began to impact on the industrial component of the fishery.919   
 
909 IOTC, IOTC Nominal Catches Database (IOTC Nominal Catch by Species, Gear and Vessel Flag Reporting 
Country Series, December 2018) <https://www.iotc.org/data/datasets> (‘IOTC Nominal Catch Database’). 
910 IOTC Review of Data and Trends for Tropical Tunas (n 52). 
911 Colin Barnes and Kwame Mfodwo, A Market Price Valuation of Tuna Resources in the Western Indian 
Ocean—An Indicative Regional and Country/EEZ Perspective (WWF Report, February 2012) 75.  
912 IOTC, Estimation of EEZ Catches in the IOTC Database: Report on the Availability and Quality of Catch 
Estimates, IOTC-2017-SC20-INF05, 20th sess of SC, 20th November 2017 (‘EEZ Catch Estimates in the IOTC 
Database’). 
913 Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management, Graeme Macfadyen and Vincent Defaux, Scoping Study of Socio-
Economic Data and Indicators of IOTC Fisheries (IOTC/FAO Report No 1489-REG/R/02/B, May 2019) 9. It 
should be noted that this valuation includes SBT.  
914 Miyake, Miyabe, and Nakano (n 803) 33−46.  
915 Prior to 1980, the major fisheries in the IO were a combination of artisanal fisheries in IOCs and a diminutive 
industrial longline fishery operated by vessels from Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea: ibid. In the 1980s, the IO 
purse seine fishery was established as an alternative for European DWFSs, France and Spain, to transfer effort 
from the declining tuna fishery in the East Atlantic: ibid. See also Liam Campling, ‘The Tuna “Commodity 
Frontier”: Business Strategies and Environment in the Industrial Tuna Fisheries of the Western Indian Ocean’ 
(2012) 12(2−3) Journal of Agrarian Change 252 (‘The Tuna Commodity Frontier in the WIO’). In the 1990s 
and 2000s, tuna catches accelerated, following the intensive use of FADs and the construction of ‘super-seiners’ 
(over 2000 GRT) and ‘super super-seiners’ (over 3500 GRT) by European fishing companies: Davies, Mees, 
and Milner-Gulland (n 803) 166.  
916 IOTC Nominal Catch Database (n 909).  
917 Ibid.  
918 Campling, The Tuna Commodity Frontier in the WIO (n 915) 272−3; Aranda (n 901) 3.   
919 See Emmanuel Chassot et al, ‘Analysis of the Effects of Somali Piracy on the European Tuna Purse Seine 
Fisheries of the Indian Ocean’ (IOTC Report No IOTC-2010-SC-09, September 2010) 3.  
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II STATE-FOCUSED OVERVIEW OF IO TUNA INDUSTRY 
IO tuna production plays a keystone role in tuna GPNs. Tuna sourced from the IO 
supplements global tuna production, supplies premium canned tuna markets in Europe, and 
supports artisanal fisheries throughout the region. The vital global and local contribution of 
IO tuna production has invited a surge of new research in recent years, although it remains 
the case that much less is known about regional tuna production in the IO than in the WCPO. 
The following section draws from recent research on the IO tuna industry to provide a rough 
picture of the political-economic forces that converge on IOTC negotiations.920 It is based on 
conveying a state-focused description of IO tuna production.921 To make this overview 
comparable to that of the WCPO tuna industry, it pertains only to the four commercial tuna 
species which are integrated into tuna GPNs. Neritic tuna species have been excluded, as 
little information is available on the local markets they supply, no comparable markets exist 
in the WCPO, and the IOTC has yet to adopt measures to manage these stocks. However, this 
focus does not entirely exclude IO artisanal fleets and gear types, which export some of their 
catches of commercial tuna species to markets in tuna GPNs. This distinction reveals a major 
difference between IO and WCPO tuna production: whereas commercial tuna stocks are 
almost exclusively harvested by industrial-scale vessels in the WCPO, a combination of 
industrial, semi-industrial, and artisanal scale vessels harvest these tuna species and supply 
tuna GPNs in the IO.  
 
920 This section does not present new data, analysis, or findings on the IO tuna industry, but updates catch and 
effort data and conveys the state of research on the political economy of IO tuna production. IO catch and effort 
data, primarily from 2017, was taken from the IOTC dataset of nominal catches and IOTC Record of Authorised 
Vessels in 2018: IOTC Nominal Catch Database (n 909); IOTC, IOTC Record of Authorised Fishing Vessels 
(Web Page, 2018) <https://www.iotc.org/vessels>. Estimates of EEZ catches were derived from a report 
submitted by the IOTC Secretariat: EEZ Catch Estimates in the IOTC Database (n 912).  Additionally, most 
data on IO tuna production chains was taken from: IDDRI, Marie Lecomte et al, Indian Ocean Tuna Fisheries: 
Between Development Opportunities and Sustainability Issues (Diagnosis of the Tuna Industry in the Indian 
Ocean Report, November 2018 <https://www.iddri.org/en/publications-and-events/report/indian-ocean-tuna-
fisheries-between-development-opportunities-and>. Unless otherwise noted, Section II is based on these 
sources. 
921 The following analysis of state engagement with tuna GPNs is intended as a heuristic for considering how 
states interact with GPNs in the context of IO tuna production. It provides a general overview, of states that 
contribute significantly to IO tuna production and consumption and are major players within tuna GPNs. It is not 
an exhaustive description of all links between states and tuna GPNs, nor does it provide a complete analysis of 
how state and non-state actors relate with respect to IO tuna production. Rather, this typology simply draws 
together some of the current knowledge in political economy on the competing interests and commercial 
dynamics that may inform states’ interests within IOTC negotiations.  
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A IO Coastal States 
Coastal states in the IO are more geographically and culturally diverse than in the WCPO. 
The IO region encompasses 32 coastal states and 17 island territories with a variety of 
political statuses.922 Three subregions can be broadly identified to group IOCs: the 
southwestern IO, where East African littoral and island states are located; the northwest-
central IO, where Middle Eastern states are located; and the southeastern IO, where mostly 
South East Asian states are located. Among these states, there are five SIDS, eight LDCs, two 
territories, and one industrialised state. Table 4 provides an overview of these subregions, and 
groups IOTC members accordingly. 
Table 4: List of IO Coastal States923 
IO DCSs IO Territories  Industrialised IO Coastal States 
Southwest Subregion 
Comoros* French Overseas Territories (OT)  
Kenya  British Indian Ocean Territories 
(BIOT) 
 
Madagascar*   
Mauritius*   
Mozambique    
Seychelles *   
Somalia   
South Africa    
Tanzania    
Northwest-Central Subregion 
Bangladesh    
Eritrea    
India   
Iran   
Maldives*    
Oman    
Pakistan    
Sri Lanka   
Sudan   
Yemen   
Southeast Subregion 
Indonesia   Australia 
Malaysia    
Philippines    




922 For the purposes of this thesis, the ‘IO region’ refers to the boundaries of the IOTC’s Area of Competence: 
IOTC Agreement (n 47) art II.  
923 States in bold are LDCs. States with an asterisk (*) are SIDS.  
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Unlike in the WCPO, high seas areas cover a significant portion of ocean space in the IO, 
located in the heart of the region. Figure 10 illustrates this point by indicating Indian Ocean 
EEZs in dark blue shading: 
Figure 10: EEZs and High Seas Areas in the IOTC Area of Competence924 
 
Publicly available data on the catch of commercial tuna species in the IO is not divided into 
EEZs and high seas areas, nor is there regularly published catch data available for the 
individual EEZs of IOCs.925 Rather, regional-level catch data divides the fishery into two 
areas: the Western and Eastern IO.926 Though a comprehensive catch database for 
 
924 EEZ Catch Estimates in the IOTC Database (n 912) 3. Note that this map is indicative of EEZs in the Indian 
Ocean and does not refer to contested, joint or unsettled EEZs in the region.  
925 The IOTC Secretariat has discussed assigning catch data to EEZs and released (highly tentative) estimates of 
average catches from 2013 to 2017: ibid. 
926 This section relies on this convention to describe IO tuna fishery. The two subregions correspond with ‘FAO 
Major Fishing Areas’ 57 and 50, respectively, referred to in the IOTC Agreement’s definition of the IOTC Area 
of Competence: IOTC Agreement (n 47) art II.  
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commercial tuna species is unavailable for IOC EEZs, it is possible to highlight five coastal 
states with EEZs estimated to produce significant catches—over 60,000 mt on average⎯927 
of albacore, bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin (as well as swordfish). In order of descending 
magnitude, these IOCs are Indonesia, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Seychelles, and India.  
IO coastal states receive a range of direct and indirect economic benefits from their tuna 
resources. Direct benefits include government revenue from access fees and GDP created 
from tuna exports.928 Indirect benefits encompass tuna fishing sector-related employment in 
associated industries, such as vessel and port servicing.929 For coastal states like Indonesia, 
Maldives, Sri Lanka, and India, which have limited (or no) foreign fishing activities in their 
EEZs, direct economic benefits from FAAs with DWFSs are limited.930 Seychelles is the only 
major coastal state in the IO that receives significant economic benefits from FAAs.931 
Notably, no studies provide estimates of the total access fees paid to IOCs; numerous studies 
have commented on the difficulty of obtaining information on IO FAAs.932  
B IO Fishing States 
Fishing operations in the IO comprise industrial, semi-industrial, and artisanal vessels. Along 
with diversity in the scale and gear types of vessels, IO fishing fleets represent a broader 
spectrum of couplings with tuna GPNs. Publicly available data shows that the profile of these 
fishing fleets differs between the WIO and EIO. In the WIO, industrial-scale vessels 
dominate tuna catches. In 2017, the majority of the WIO catch of commercial tuna species 
(66% of the total) was attributed to industrial fleets. The gear type which contributed the most 
to this catch (46%) was industrial purse seiners. In 2017, the top five fleets reporting the 
 
927 In this chapter, the term ‘significant catches’ refers to catches over 60,000 mt.  
928 Macfadyen and Defaux (n 913) 8. 
929 Ibid 14.  
930 These states receive government revenue from licensing local vessels.  
931 Seychelles Fishing Authority, Fisheries Statistic Report (Semester 1 Report No SFA/FSR/05, 2016).  
932 The most comprehensive review was conducted by Mbendo in 2012: Jane Mbendo, Developing Regional 
Minimum Terms and Conditions for Granting Tuna Fishing Access in the Western Indian Ocean (WWF Report 
No CN63, September 2012) <https://wwf.panda.org/?208719/DEVELOPING-REGIONAL-MINIMUM-
TERMS-AND-CONDITIONS-FOR-GRANTING-TUNA-FISHING-ACCESS-IN-THE-WESTERN-INDIAN-
OCEAN>. See also Poseidon Aquatic Resource Management, Graeme Macfadyen and Alejandro Anganuzzi, 




highest catches of commercial tuna species in the WIO were Iran (22%), Spain (12%), 
Maldives (10%), Seychelles (10%), and India (10%).  
In the EIO, semi-industrial and artisanal vessels catch the largest volumes of tuna. In 2017, 
the majority of EIO catch of commercial tuna species (86% of the total) was attributed to 
artisanal fleets. By contrast, only 14% of this total was attributed to industrial-scale fleets. 
Due to the considerable numbers of artisanal fishing vessels in the EIO, catches of 
commercial tuna species are distributed across a broader range of gear types than in the WIO. 
In 2017, the gear types that contributed most to EIO catch of commercial tuna species were 
small purse seine vessels (22%); coastal longline vessels (19%); and gillnet vessels (18%). 
That year, the top three fleets reporting the highest catches of commercial tuna species in the 
EIO were Indonesia (55%), Sri Lanka (20%), and India (13%). 
C IO Processing and Trading States  
The IO tuna industry is comprised of six tuna production chains.933 Most of these production 
chains are integrated into canned tuna and raw tuna GPNs. Three are coupled with the canned 
tuna GPN: (i) industrial purse seine caught tuna destined for WIO canneries; (ii) semi-
industrial gillnet caught tuna destined for canneries in Iran; and (iii) semi-industrial pole and 
line caught tuna supplying canneries in Maldives and Thailand. Two are coupled with the raw 
tuna GPN: (i) industrial longline caught tuna transhipped and destined for sashimi markets; 
and (ii) tuna caught by artisanal gears landed fresh and destined for sashimi and tuna steak 
markets. Finally, tuna caught by artisanal gears and destined for local markets form the last 
tuna production chain, which is not incorporated into tuna GPNs.  
The processing node is critical for IO tuna production chains coupled with the canned tuna 
GPN. Some IOCs are chief tuna processors in the canned tuna GPN and host thriving 
domestic processing industries. These IOCs include SIDS in the WIO (Seychelles, Mauritius, 
Madagascar, and Maldives) and processing powerhouses in the EIO (Thailand and 
Indonesia).934 In the raw tuna GPN, IOCs in the WIO, such as Mauritius and Seychelles, 
 
933 Lecomte et al (n 920) 30. 
934 Iran has a minor domestic canning industry, which contributes to one of the six tuna production chains in the 
IO. Lecomte et al estimate that up to 30 Iranian canneries, supplied by semi-industrial gillnet fleets flagged to 
Iran and Pakistan, process a small portion⎯up to 200,000 mt⎯of tuna annually: Ibid 44−5.  
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provide ports for DWFS-flagged vessels to tranship their catches to sashimi markets. IOCs in 
the EIO, such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Maldives, (and India) source fresh tuna from semi-
industrial and artisanal fleets for minor onshore processing and export to sashimi markets.  
In contrast to WCPO-caught tuna, most IO-caught tuna is processed by IOCs within the 
region. Consequently, the proximity of landing ports to tuna processing hubs limits the need 
for trading firms in the IO. While trading firms are involved in the transhipment of catch and 
negotiations between fishing and processing firms, it is common for fishing firms in the IO to 
land catch and sell directly to processing firms that own local canneries.935 In comparison to 
the WCPO then, major trading firms play a less central role in IO tuna production.936 In the 
EIO, Lecomte et al observe that tuna traders play a role in the collection and distribution of 
catch from semi-industrial and artisanal vessels. 937The authors describe some vertical 
integration in which traders own and/or finance fishing vessels and voyages, however private 
individuals as opposed to trading firms are involved in this type of trading.938 
D IO Market States 
Major markets in the EU, US, and Japan import IO tuna products. These markets consume 
canned tuna and sashimi tuna, as well as fresh and frozen tuna and tuna steaks. Thailand may 
also be considered a major market state in the region, especially for MSC-certified Maldivian 
pole and line caught tuna. This allows Thai lead firms to enter premium markets for eco-
certified tuna products.939  
In addition to global markets in tuna GPNs, significant local markets are located in Indonesia, 
Comoros, Maldives, and Sri Lanka. Taken together, local markets in these states comprise 
56% of locally consumed tuna worldwide.940 The majority of tuna consumed in IO local 
markets are neritic tuna species. Lecomte et al estimate that approximately 282,250 mt of 
 
935 Macfadyen and Anganuzzi (n 932) 69. 
936 However, FCF and Tri Marine do report some operations in the IO, see above (n 730).  
937 Lecomte et al (n 920) 48−9. 
938 Ibid. 
939 The pole and line gear used by Maldivian fishing fleets has been marketed to consumers as a sustainable 
alternative to other forms of tuna fishing. This enables tuna caught in the Maldives to be sold in premium end 
markets for higher prices. The Thai market represents tuna that is not processed in Maldives, but frozen and 
exported for canning. The Maldivian skipjack fishery contributes one of the major sources of MSC-certified 
tuna for lead processing firms in Thailand such as Thai Union Group. 
940 Ibid 41.  
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tuna catch are consumed annually in these states.941 Estimates of the final value of these 
markets are up to 814 million USD.942 
E Interests of Member States of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) 
This description of IO tuna production conveys the complications inherent in examining the 
political-economic drivers that underlie IOTC negotiations. The scale and diversity of IO 
tuna production contrasts significantly with the simpler picture of WCPO tuna production 
from Chapter 4. Table 5 offers a visualisation of this information, listing the IO region’s 
major coastal, fishing, processing and trading, and market states.943  
Table 5: IOTC Member States' Interactions with Tuna GPNs 




IO Coastal States 
Canned Tuna GPN Maldives, Seychelles India  
Raw Tuna GPN  Indonesia, Sri Lanka  
IO Fishing States 
Canned Tuna GPN Seychelles, 
Mauritius, Maldives 
Iran, India Spain, France, South 
Korea 
Raw Tuna GPN  Indonesia, Sri Lanka (Taiwan) 
IO Trading States 
Canned Tuna GPN   Taiwan, US 
Raw Tuna GPN   Japan  
IO Processing States 
Canned Tuna GPN Mauritius, 
Madagascar, 
Seychelles 
Thailand, Indonesia  
Raw Tuna GPN Maldives Indonesia, Sri Lanka  
IO Market States 
Canned Tuna GPN  Thailand France, UK, Spain, Italy, 
US 
Raw Tuna GPN   Japan 
 








Figure 11: Map of IOCs' Engagement with Tuna GPNs944 
 
Table 5 and Figure 11 depict rough similarities between IOTC and WCPFC member state 
interactions with tuna GPNs, though with key differences. They convey that, as in the 
WCPO, some IOCs have substantial endowments of EEZ tuna resources. Commercial tuna 
species in IOC EEZs, are, to a large extent, harvested by industrial-scale vessels originating 
from DWFSs. As with the WCPO, the majority of IO commercial tuna products are exported 
to markets in DWFSs. In contrast to the WCPO, however, IOCs are significant players across 
all nodes of tuna GPNs, while DWFSs only participate in fishing and retail nodes.945 The 
broader representation of IOCs in tuna GPNs would appear to point to a more even 
distribution of economic benefits from regional tuna production to IOCs. However, the IOCs 
represented in Figure 11 only comprise a minority of coastal states in the region. As 
 
944 This figure depicts the regional scope of the IO tuna industry. Therefore, IOTC members from outside of the 
region are not included. Minor regional players within canned and raw tuna GPNs are also not included in this 
figure. See above (n 921). It should be highlighted that Indonesia is a coastal state in both IOTC and WCPFC 
Convention Areas. Dr. Indiah Hodgson-Johnston helped format this figure. 
945 Another important observation is that EU members like Spain, France, Italy, and the UK are more deeply 
engaged in IO tuna production chains than in the WCPO, while the converse is true for the US.  
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compared to the number of PICs involved in WCPO tuna production, this grouping represents 
only a small proportion of IOCs.  
According to Figure 11, the number of IOCs with domestic tuna industries that are coupled 
with tuna GPNs, and therefore significantly engaged in IO tuna production, is limited to nine 
states: India, Indonesia, Iran, Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, and 
Thailand. These states are engaged in different IO tuna production chains, set out in Table 6: 
Table 6: IOCs in IO Tuna Production Chains946 
Tuna GPN IO Tuna Production Chain IOCs 
 
 
Canned Tuna GPN 
Industrial purse seine tuna, 
destined for WIO canneries 
Madagascar, Maldives, 
Mauritius, Seychelles 
Semi-industrial gillnet tuna, 
destined for Iranian canneries 
Iran 
Semi-industrial pole and line 
tuna, supplying Thai canneries 
Maldives, Thailand 
 
Raw Tuna GPN 
Industrial longline tuna, 
transhipped in WIO, and 
destined for sashimi markets 
Mauritius, Seychelles 
Tuna caught by artisanal gears, 
landed fresh, and destined for 
sashimi and tuna steak markets 
Maldives, Sri Lanka, 
Indonesia, India 
The development statuses of the IOCs in Table 6 are almost evenly divided between SIDS 
(Madagascar, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles) and middle-income states (India, 
Indonesia, Iran, Sri Lanka, and Thailand).  
 
946 This table excludes the sixth IO tuna production chain, comprised of tuna caught by artisanal gears destined 
for local markets, which, again, is not coupled with tuna GPNs.  
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As in the WCPFC, IOTC negotiations are informed by members’ interactions with the tuna 
industry. However, the limited engagement of most IOCs in tuna GPNs and the complexity of 
IO tuna production confounds a simple explanation of these dynamics. One major source of 
difficulty in explaining the political economy of the IO tuna industry is the uncertainty 
associated with IO catch data. IOTC definitions exacerbate this issue by representing IO 
fishing fleets as a binary split between industrial and artisanal fleets. In reality, a much wider 
range of vessel types harvest IO tuna. This creates confusion, not only in terms of how IO 
catch data is presented, but also in the way analysts use this data to support arguments 
concerning management of the fishery.  
The IOTC’s definition of vessels is based on length and range. Industrial vessels, or those 
that are included on the IOTC Record of Authorised Vessels, must either be over 24 metres 
or conduct fishing activities outside of their flag state EEZ. Artisanal vessels, which are 
exempt from multiple IOTC Resolutions, are under 24 metres. Significantly, this dichotomy 
of vessels does not sufficiently describe the diversity of IOC-flagged vessels operating in the 
IO. According to Aranda, the IOTC definition ‘includes under the same category vessels with 
very different technical and economic characteristics, market niches, and fishing power’.947 
Moreno and Herrera point out that, under the IOTC definition of an artisanal vessel, 
subsistence and offshore vessels flagged to IOCs are grouped into a single category, with no 
reference to differences in motor, communications, and fish holding capabilities.948 They 
recommend that the IOTC define a third category of ‘semi-industrial vessels’, which would 
encompass vessels between 15 and 24 metres in length that fish exclusively inside their flag 
state EEZ.949  
Improving the precision of IO catch data is a critical issue because this data is often used by 
analysts to justify claims concerning the nature of the fishery and its implications for IOTC 
management. For example, most analysts claim that the IO tuna fishery is roughly divided 
between industrial and artisanal fishing fleets.950 This claim is true for overall IO tuna catches 
which combine catches of commercial and neritic tuna species. Analysts like Lecomte et al 
argue that industrial fishing fleets flagged to DWFSs do not harvest the majority of IO tuna 
 
947 Aranda (n 901) 2.  
948 Moreno and Herrera (n 901) 14.  
949 Ibid. According to Moreno and Herrera, artisanal vessels would be vessels below 15 metres: ibid.  
950 See, e.g., Lecomte et al (n 920) 22, 31.  
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catches and therefore should not be the exclusive focus of IOTC regulatory actions.951 This 
emphasis on the industrial component of the IO tuna fishery, they contend, produces 
unnecessary ‘polarisation’ among IOTC members.952 They argue that IOC-flagged fishing 
fleets have a significant impact on IO tuna stocks of both commercial and neritic species, and 
require greater regulation, monitoring and enforcement by the IOTC.953  
These arguments fail to acknowledge the realities of IOTC management. Over its history, the 
IOTC has focused on regulating the region’s four commercial tuna stocks. This is because, in 
repeated negotiations for proposals to adopt a measure on neritic tuna stocks, IOCs have 
taken the position that the IOTC is not empowered to manage nearshore, neritic tuna species. 
They argue that these species are exclusively targeted by artisanal vessels within IOC EEZs 
and therefore fall under the remit of either national or subregional management organisations.  
If one acknowledges this reality and focuses on catch data for the four commercial tuna 
stocks, it becomes clear why the industrial component of the IO tuna fishery remains central 
to IOTC negotiations. In 2017, 81% of catches of the four commercial tuna stocks in the IO 
were harvested by industrial vessels using gillnets, purse seines, and longlines.954 The 
majority of this catch (76%) was attributed to industrial purse seine and longline vessels, 
which, in the IO, are generally either flagged to or financed by actors in DWFSs.955  
Multiple publications rely on the fallacy of ‘overall’ catch data to argue that the IOTC ought 
to focus its efforts on IOC-flagged fishing fleets and artisanal fisheries. These analysts are 
correct to suggest that IOC-flagged fishing fleets require greater oversight. However, they 
downplay the reality that the IOTC may not be the appropriate forum to adopt, implement, 
and enforce regulatory actions for neritic tuna species⎯which will depend on the specific 
and sometimes highly localised characteristics of artisanal fleets.  
Currently, four IOC-flagged fishing fleets harvest significant catches of commercial tuna 
species and defy the IOTC’s artisanal-industrial dichotomy. These fleets are the Maldivian 
 
951 Ibid 73−5.  
952 Ibid 74. 
953 Ibid.  
954 IOTC Nominal Catch Database (n 909). 
955 Ibid; Lecomte et al (n 920) 26.   
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pole and line fleet, Iranian offshore gillnet fleet, Indonesian longline fleet, and Sri Lankan 
longline fleet.956 In different ways, these fleets frustrate categorisation due to their extensive 
range, substantial catches, and—in the case of the latter two—orientation to export markets. 
A semi-industrial category could encompass these four fleets, but would need to extend 
beyond Moreno and Herrera’s suggestion that such a category should only correspond to the 
size of the fishing vessel. A semi-industrial category could refer to IOC-flagged vessels that 
are between 15 and 24 metres and either export over 50% of their catch, or fish outside their 
flag state EEZ. By focusing on this slice of IOC-flagged fleets, the IOTC might isolate and 
improve the management of specific fleets with a measurable impact on commercial tuna 
stocks in the IO.  
Much confusion remains regarding tuna fishing activities in the IO and it cannot be denied 
that this opacity informs the negotiating environment within the IOTC. While difficult, the 
following section nevertheless attempts to elucidate some of the distributional dynamics that 
influence IOTC negotiations.  
III DISTRIBUTIONAL STRUGGLE WITHIN THE IOTC 
This chapter has demonstrated the diversity of ways in which IOCs and DWFSs are engaged 
in IO tuna production chains. As a result of this diversity, which includes different tuna 
resources and interactions with tuna production chains, some IOCs receive substantially 
higher economic benefits from IO tuna resources than others. This section focuses on the 
commercial efforts of IOCs to situate their interactions with tuna GPNs.  
This section takes a closer look at IOCs within tuna GPNs because the IOTC differentiation 
framework explicitly refers to the socio-economic role of tuna fisheries in IOC national 
economies. However, there is limited region-wide information on the contribution of tuna 
resources to IOCs’ national economies. It is therefore difficult to determine the extent to 
which IOCs currently capture value from IO tuna production.  
 
956 IOTC Nominal Catch Database (n 909). 
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In the scant literature on the subject, it is generally understood that most IOCs have been 
unable to maximise economic benefits from their EEZ tuna resources.957 Several studies 
suggest possible reasons for this. Some suggest factors related to the domestic institutional 
capacity of IOCs, including a lack of capacity in fisheries administrations; lack of adequate 
MCS systems; and insufficient domestic legal frameworks.958 Others emphasise broader 
issues in the region, such as the inequitable and non-transparent terms of FAAs, IUU fishing 
activities, and the lack of onshore and port infrastructure.959  
Most studies nonetheless highlight the potential for IOCs to use cooperative strategies at 
regional and subregional levels to increase their value capture from IO tuna production.960 
These studies highlight how cooperative strategies can allow IOCs to develop institutional 
capacity, pool resources, and leverage collective action in negotiations with DWFSs, as has 
been done among PICs in the WCPO.961 Recent work looks more closely at the fact that 
despite the potential benefits, IOCs continue to face significant barriers to forms of 
subregional and regional cooperation.962  
Despite these barriers, IOCs are taking an active interest in cooperative strategies as an 
avenue to maximise the economic benefits they receive from IO tuna resources. This is 
apparent in recent institution-building efforts that focus on tuna resources at the regional and 
subregional levels. The rise of tuna-related regionalism among IOCs has come to bear on 
recent IOTC negotiations. As in the WCPFC, there is evidence that both IOCs and DWFSs 
have consequently implicated IOTC policy in distributional struggles among themselves.  
A IOCs within Tuna GPNs 
A small group of IOCs plays a central role in IO tuna production and management. As the 
previous section discussed, nine IOCs have employed a range of strategies to develop into 
significant players across all tuna GPN nodes. Therefore, the situation in the IO contrasts 
 
957 See, e.g., Edward Kimani, Gladys Okemwa, and Johnson Kazungu, ‘Fisheries in the Southwest Indian 
Ocean: Trends and Governance Challenges’ in Ellen Laipson and Amit Pandya (eds), The Indian Ocean: 
Resource and Governance Challenges (The Henry L Stimson Center, 2009) 4. 
958 Ibid 9−13. 
959 Mbendo (n 932) 82−3. 
960 Mbendo (n 932); Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling (n 673). 
961 Mbendo (n 932) 74−5. 
962 Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling (n 673).  
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with the WCPO, where PICs have struggled with limited success to ‘upgrade’ to other nodes 
in tuna GPNs. It nonetheless remains the case that both regions exhibit wide disparities in the 
distribution of benefits from tuna production among coastal states.  
The nine IOCs with a major stake in IO tuna production have developed individualised 
strategies to capture value within tuna GPNs. Indonesia and Thailand, two IOCs which 
capture the greatest surplus value, have leveraged their economies of scale and proximity to 
IO and WCPO fishing grounds to dominate regional fishing and processing nodes. A number 
of IO SIDS, particularly Maldives and Seychelles, have developed domestic tuna and related 
industries based on substantial EEZ tuna resources. Other middle-income IOCs, such as Iran, 
Indonesia, and Sri Lanka, have developed semi-industrial fishing fleets and established 
export-oriented processing sectors for fresh and frozen tuna. 
Despite these apparent successes, very few published studies have elucidated the role of IO 
tuna production in IOC economies. This is especially the case for IOCs that fall outside the 
core nine and have current and future legitimate interests in the IO tuna fishery. Importantly, 
the lack of socio-economic information (including both data and indicators) has been 
identified as an area of recent work for the IOTC, which engaged experts to publish a 
preliminary report in 2019.963 The recent work by the IOTC indicates that further research 
into the IO tuna industry and its interactions with IOC economies is needed.  
The available studies show that IOCs capture value across all three nodes of tuna GPNs in 
similar and different ways to PICs in the WCPO. While the overview provided in Section II 
focuses on the nine core IOCs involved in IO tuna production, in reality many more are 
engaged in the IO tuna industry. At the fishing node, some IOCs receive access fee payments 
through FAAs with DWFSs, while other IOCs directly export tuna caught by domestic 
fishing fleets. Outside the major coastal states, this includes Comoros, Kenya, Mozambique, 
Oman, South Africa, and Tanzania.964 At the processing node, other IOCs have invested in 
minor processing operations; for example, in Kenya and Oman.965 Finally, as has already 
been discussed, Maldives processes and exports a small portion of its MSC-certified pole and 
 
963 Macfadyen and Defaux (n 913).  
964 Macfadyen and Anganuzzi (n 932) 27−8. 
965 Ibid 70−2. 
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line skipjack tuna directly to premium retail markets.966 Sharing some similarities with the 
direct sale of MSC-certified tuna by the PNA through PACIFICAL, Maldives has relied on a 
combination of government involvement through MIFCO and eco-certification to enter 
premium markets at the retail node of the canned tuna GPN.967  
B Studies on IOCs’ Efforts to Maximise Economic Benefits from Tuna Resources 
A small collection of studies, published largely by inter-968 and non-governmental969 
organisations, discusses the economic benefits IOCs derive from tuna resources. The majority 
focus on WIO IOCs, largely because tropical tuna stocks pass through the EEZs of these 
states on seasonal migrations (referred to colloquially as the ‘yellowfin tuna belt’).970 The 
relevant literature describes a number of challenges WIO IOCs face in maximising the 
economic benefits they receive from tuna resources. Kimani, Okemwa, and Johnson point to 
domestic institutional constraints, including: a lack of technical expertise and human capacity 
in fisheries administrations;971 inadequate MCS systems;972 and inappropriate domestic 
fisheries legislation973. 
Many of these studies discuss the nature of WIO FAAs. An extensive literature has 
developed criticising these FAAs—particularly EU FAAs—for not delivering adequate 
economic and broader social benefits to WIO IOCs.974 In a proposal for WIO IOCs to adopt 
 
966 Ibid 71; Lecomte et al (n 920) 54−8. 
967 See Barclay and Parris (n 109) 25−6. 
968 See Arthur Neiland, Characterisation of the Fisheries Sector in the Indian Ocean: With Particular Reference 
to Tuna Fisheries in the Bay of Bengal: Environmental and Economic Aspects (OPP-BOBP Report No 
BOBP/WB/OPP/REP 07, 12 May 2016); Philip Townsley, Characterisation of the Fisheries Sector in the 
Indian Ocean: With Particular Reference to Tuna Fisheries in the Bay of Bengal: Social and Institutional 
Aspects (OPP-BOBP Report No BOBP/WB/OPP/REP 18, 26 October 2016). 
969 See Barnes and Mfodwo (n 911); Jane Mbendo, Developing Regional Minimum Terms and Conditions for 
Granting Tuna Fishing Access in the Western Indian Ocean (WWF Report No CN63, September 2012) 
<https://wwf.panda.org/?208719/DEVELOPING-REGIONAL-MINIMUM-TERMS-AND-CONDITIONS-
FOR-GRANTING-TUNA-FISHING-ACCESS-IN-THE-WESTERN-INDIAN-OCEAN>. 
970 Kimani, Okemwa, and Johnson (n 957) 11. 
971 Ibid 13. 
972 Ibid. 
973 Ibid 9. 
974 See Frédéric Le Manach et al, ‘European Union’s Public FAAs in Developing Countries’ (2013) 8(11) PLOS 
ONE e79899; Frédéric Le Manach et al, ‘Who Gets What? Developing a More Equitable Framework for EU 
Fishing Agreements’ (2013) 38 Marine Policy 257; Antonius Gagern and Jeroen van den Bergh, ‘A Critical 
Review of Fishing Agreements with Tropical Developing Countries’ (2013) 38 Marine Policy 375; Cecilia 
Hammarlund and Anna Andersson, ‘What’s in it for Africa? European Union FAAs and Fishery Exports from 
Developing Countries’ (2019) 113 World Development 172. 
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harmonised MTCs, Mbendo provides a detailed review of WIO FAAs.975 In the context of 
these agreements, Mbendo articulates a set of limitations that interfere with the ability of 
WIO IOCs to capture value from EEZ tuna resources, including: IUU fishing activities; a 
lack of port infrastructure and processing plants; transhipment and exporting practices by 
East Asian DWFS fleets; and low resource rents.976 
This literature argues that IOCs in the WIO could significantly increase economic benefits 
from FAAs through subregional cooperation. Pointing to models in other subregions, these 
studies suggest that IOCs in the WIO could collectively increase the economic benefits they 
receive by harmonising the terms of their FAAs with DWFSs.977 Additionally, the literature 
suggests that cooperative tuna management could improve the capacity of WIO IOCs in a 
range of other relevant areas, such as negotiating leverage and expertise, and MCS 
capabilities.978 Mbendo goes so far as to suggest that, once in place in the WIO, region-wide 
MTCs could be developed to extend across the totality of IOCs’ FAAs with DWFSs.979  
From this literature it can be concluded that IOCs face two primary categories of challenges 
to increasing their value capture from tuna production. The first is domestic capacity 
development in the areas of fisheries administration, law, and enforcement; the second is the 
development of cooperative strategies focused on tuna fisheries access relations with DWFSs. 
C IOC (Sub)Regionalism: Current Barriers and Institution-Building 
Since the 1980s, IOCs have increased their engagement in tuna GPNs, developing a keen 
awareness of the potential for tuna resources to contribute to their economic development. 
Some of the starkest examples of this phenomenon are illustrated in IOCs which have 
managed to capture enough value from tuna GPNs to contribute significantly to their national 
economies, such as in Indonesia, Maldives, and Seychelles. In other IOCs, stock depletions of 
inshore and coastal fisheries have encouraged governments to turn towards the development 
 
975 Mbendo (n 932). In her study, Mbendo examines FAAs in Comoros, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, 
Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa, and Tanzania. See also Mialy Andriamahefazafy and Christian Kull, 
‘Materializing the Blue Economy: Tuna Fisheries and the Theory of Access in the Western Indian Ocean’ 
(2019) 26(1) Journal of Political Ecology 403.  
976 Ibid 9. 
977 Mbendo draws lessons from the PNA, TVM and Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission: ibid 11, 74−5.  
978 Ibid 70−3. 
979 Ibid 82−3. 
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of offshore tuna fisheries, as Kimani, Okemwa, and Johnson suggest is the case in East 
African IOCs like Kenya, Tanzania, and Mozambique.980 A number of these IOCs, 
particularly in the WIO, have initiated reforms in domestic fisheries administration and law to 
accommodate this shift in focus to tuna fisheries.981  
At both subregional and regional levels, IOCs have started mobilising political will and 
resources towards multiple forms of tuna-related cooperation at regional and subregional 
levels. Cooperative efforts are currently underway through the Indian Ocean Commission 
(IOC),982 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA),983 and Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries 
Commission (SWIOFC)984. SWIOFC, in particular, has marshalled efforts to develop 
harmonised MTCs in the southwestern subregion of the IO. In 2014, these efforts led to the 
Maputo Declaration, a set of non-binding MTCs adopted by Kenya, Mozambique, and 
Tanzania.985  In 2012, the SWIOFC established a working party to adopt subregion-wide 
MTCs and to draft an agreement to institutionalise cooperative management of shared fish 
stocks (similar to the FFA).986 While these efforts signal that IOCs are prepared to cooperate 
to increase their value capture from EEZ tuna resources and improve IO tuna management 
 
980 Kimani, Okemwa and Johnson (n 968) 4. 
981 Ibid 15-6. See also Judith Swan, Harmonization of Fisheries Legislation and Assessment of the 
Implementation of Fisheries Management Plans and Rights Based Management in the South West Indian Ocean 
(SWIOFP Report, 21 October 2012).  
982 See Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling (n 673) 59, 64−5, 68. The IOC represents a coalition of island 
states and territories in the southwest subregion of the IO. Their work is based on four pillars of cooperation 
related to diplomacy, security, environment, and identity building: at 58. The IOC’s members are Comoros, 
Madagascar, Mauritius, Reunion, and Seychelles: IOC, Presentation of the IOC (Web Page, 2020) 
<https://www.commissionoceanindien.org/presentation-coi/>. 
983 Under the guidance of Nelson Mandela, IORA was established in 1997 as a strategic platform for IOCs to 
discuss their common political aims: IORA, About IORA (Web Page, 2020) 
<https://www.iora.int/en/about/about-iora>. IORA currently has 21 members, the majority of which are IOTC 
members. IORA recently established a Fisheries Support Unit in Oman: IORA, Fisheries Management (Web 
Page, 2020) <https://www.iora.int/en/priorities-focus-areas/fisheries-management>. 
984 Like the IOTC, SWIOFC was established under FAO auspices in 2004. See Aubrey Harris and Domingos 
Gove, Ten Years Promoting and Strengthening Regional Cooperation for Securing Sustainable Fisheries in 
South West Indian Ocean (SWIO) Region (WWF Information Booklet, 10 November 2015).  
985 See WWF, Tanzania Makes Strides in Implementing 2014 Maputo Declaration on Fisheries (Blog Post, 28 
September 2015) <https://wwf.panda.org/?253570/Tanzania-makes-strides-implementing-2014-Maputo-
declaration-on-fisheries>. 
986 See SWIOFC, Policy Brief on a Possible Southwest Indian Ocean Fisheries Framework Agreement, 
SWIOFC/WPCCTF/19/4 E, 9th sess, 29 September 2019. In 2019, the SWIOFC also adopted a document setting 
out non-binding guidelines on MTCs for members: SWIOFC, Final Approval of the Guidelines on Minimum 
Terms and Conditions (MTC) for Foreign Fisheries Access in the SWIOFC Region, SWIOFC/WPCCTF/19/Inf 
5 E, 9th sess, 29 September 2019.  
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more broadly, some commentators have outlined significant barriers to the ability of IOCs to 
leverage regionalism to increase their economic benefits from access relations with DWFSs.  
Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling explore these challenges from the perspective of the 
IOC, which brings together island states in the southwest IO.987 The authors focus 
specifically on tuna-based regionalism among a sub-set of IOC members: Madagascar, 
Mauritius, and Seychelles. They argue that a combination of factors inhibits these IOCs from 
fully engaging in strong, tuna-related subregional cooperation.988 The factors they identify 
are: fraught relations among the three states, which reflect their different socio-economic 
contexts; dependence on IO tuna production; and relationships with DWFSs.  
Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling examine different cases of multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations where the IOCs in their study exhibited a lack of cooperation. One theme from 
their analysis is how, across negotiating contexts, the three IOCs continue to be influenced by 
their relations with DWFSs⎯what the authors refer to as, ‘[historical] geopolitical and 
economic entanglements’.989 Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling highlight three ways in 
which these relations limit the development of tuna-related subregional cooperation among 
IOCs. The first concerns the dependence of several IOCs on aid payments tied to FAAs.990 
The authors argue that the dependence of IOCs on aid payments (which other studies have 
found comprise nearly the entire budget for some national fisheries administrations)991 
explains why some IOCs are either silent or unable to support region-wide positions within 
the IOTC.992 The uneven dependence of IOCs on this form of aid creates barriers for 
countries like Madagascar to serious participation in subregional cooperation, which has the 
potential to jeopardise relationships with development partners.   
The second concerns how, in the absence of a region-wide approach to FAAs (such as the 
harmonised MTCs suggested by Mbendo), IOCs are positioned in competition with one 
 
987 Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling (n 673) 58. See also Mialy Andriamahefazafy et al, ‘The Paradox of 
Sustainable Tuna Fisheries in the Western Indian Ocean: Between Visions of Blue Economy and Realities of 
Accumulation’ (2020) 15 Sustainability Science 75.  
988 Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling (n 673) 64. 
989 Ibid 67. 
990 See Chapter 3 Section II A for a broader discussion of ‘fish for aid’ agreements.  
991 Mills Elyse et al, ‘EU FAAs: Cheap Fish for a High Price’ (Policy Brief, Transnational Insitute, Afrika 
Kontakt, Masifundise for Hands on the Land, November 2017). 
992 Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling (n 673) 66−7. 
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another in the same tuna production chains. Competition among IOCs in the study is 
heightened by the fact that all three island states capture value through FAAs and port 
activities.993 This drives individual relations with DWFSs so that IOCs compete to obtain 
FAAs and encourage catch landings in their ports.994 The authors add that the uneven 
distribution of tuna resources in different IOCs’ waters during seasonal migrations 
exacerbates this competition. The variability in productivity implies that countries have 
different levels of leverage in their FAA negotiations, again undermining a common 
approach to access.995 
The third and most oblique way is through the financial assistance DWFSs provide to IOCs 
to improve tuna management through MCS activities and scientific data collection. By 
funding successful cooperative efforts among IOCs, DWFSs also ensure that these efforts 
indirectly benefit their industry interests⎯as the authors contend is the case for EU funding 
of the Regional Fisheries Monitoring Program (PRSP).996 In discussing subregional 
cooperation among IOCs, authors in this literature draw attention to the complex dynamics 
among IOCs and the wider ‘geopolitical economy’ of IO tuna production (of which IOTC is a 
part). 
It remains an open question as to whether greater formal cooperation will lead to increased 
economic benefits for IOCs. As has been discussed, approximately half of the IO tuna fishery 
occurs within high seas areas, which undermines the level of control IOCs are able to exert 
over regional tuna resources. This presents a similar case to the challenges PICs in the WCPO 
longline fishery face to maximising economic benefits from their tuna resources.997 It is 
likelier that WIO IOCs, which share significant skipjack and yellowfin tuna resources in their 
EEZs, could stand to benefit greatly from increased cooperation. Subregional cooperation 
among these IOCs could enable these IOCs to address at least two of the core issues Mbendo 
describes as affecting their ability to capture value: IUU fishing practices and low resource 
 
993 Ibid 67.  
994 Ibid 70. 
995 Ibid.  
996 The authors comment that ‘The contribution of the EU serves its own interests in that the French and Spanish 
boats dominate the regional purse seine fishery. With its flagged vessels operating in the waters of IOC 
members, funding the PRSP largely benefits EU fishing operators, whose catches are protected from other non-
EU entities fishing illegally in the region.’: ibid 68. 
997 See Chapter 4 Section III C2. 
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rents.998 While some regional MCS efforts, such as the PRSP led by the IOC, are underway, 
formal cooperation through an FFA-style MCS system could allow WIO IOCs to more 
effectively address IUU fishing in their subregion.999 Moreover, collective negotiations for 
FAAs, meaning binding MTCs that WIO IOCs commit to enforcing in negotiations, could 
potentially increase the resource rents these states currently receive from EEZ tuna resources. 
D The IOTC and Distributional Struggles in Tuna GPNs 
IOCs have a broad range of interactions with tuna production chains. As the previous section 
shows, this diversity impacts on their ability to use cooperative strategies to increase their 
value capture from tuna production and, in some cases, positions IOCs in competition with 
each other. Consequently, diversity among IOCs shapes the distributional struggles they 
experience⎯with each other and with DWFSs in tuna GPNs.  
The dearth of studies on distributional struggles among IOCs, DWFSs, and foreign firms 
makes it difficult to provide a precise description of distributional struggle in the IO. 
Currently, most studies focus on distributional dynamics in bilateral FAAs with DWFSs, 
particularly with the EU. Emphasising broader security considerations, other studies suggest 
that geopolitical drivers which lie outside the scope of competitive dynamics within the tuna 
industry may motivate fisheries relations between IOCs and DWFSs.1000 Consequently, it is 
difficult to describe any specific interference and cooperative strategies that DWFSs and 
IOCs have used to advantage their positions in tuna GPNs.  
It is, however, possible to introduce recent negotiations on prospective catch and effort 
allocations in the IOTC in light of a broad conception of distributional struggle. One 
challenge IOCs face in maximising their value capture from tuna production, individually and 
collectively, is their dependence on the IOTC to effectively manage tuna resources on the 
high seas. Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling explain that the physical distribution of 
commercial tuna stocks in the IO, which are at least evenly weighted across EEZs and high 
 
998 See above (n 976). 
999 Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling (n 673) 68; see also above (n 884). 
1000 Thean Potgeiter, Institute for Security Studies (Paper No 236, August 2012); Michelle Voyer et al, 
‘Maritime Security and the Blue Economy: Intersections and Interdependencies in the Indian Ocean’ (2018) 
14(1) Journal of the Indian Ocean Region 28, 37−41. See also Liam Campling and Alejandro Colás, ‘Capitalism 
and the Sea: Sovereignty, Territory and Appropriation in the Global Ocean’ (2018) 36(4) Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 776, 787−9.  
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seas areas, means that IOCs are ultimately dependent on equitable and effective tuna 
management by the IOTC—more so, for example, than PICs who control the majority of 
regional tuna resources within their EEZs.1001 
IOCs have recognised this common issue and are seeking to cooperate through collective 
negotiating positions at the IOTC, particularly in the context of long-term catch and effort 
allocations.1002 Much of this cooperation has been embodied in IOCs’ efforts to present joint 
negotiating positions to the IOTC as the G16 Group of Like-Minded Coastal States in the 
IOTC.1003 Similar to the WCPFC, this would indicate that the IOTC is implicated in wider 
distributional struggles concerning tuna production in the IO.  
Recent commentaries on IOTC deliberations apply differing perspectives to G16 negotiating 
positions, which primarily focus on the need for the IOTC to regulate the industrial portion of 
the IO tuna fishery more effectively and to address IOCs’ legitimate fishing aspirations. For 
example, Lecomte et al identify four ‘leaders’ among IOCs, who, they suggest, ‘constitute the 
main coastal States bloc that provides the main proposals for management measures’.1004 
These regional leaders are South Africa, Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles.1005 The authors 
propose that these IOCs’ negotiating positions have had the effect of ‘polarising’ IOTC 
deliberations on short-term regulatory measures and longer-term negotiations for a quota 
allocation system. The authors claim that IOCs have ‘demonised’ industrial purse seiners 
flagged to DWFSs and their use of FAD technology.1006 They conclude that, ‘The black-and-
white view of the two blocs can be summarized as: a distant industrial fleet motivated solely 
by profit versus a mainly artisanal coastal fleet that guarantees food security and livelihoods 
in coastal areas’.1007 Lecomte et al argue that IOCs’ negotiating positions do not reflect the 
realities of the IO tuna fishery, where artisanal fishing activities have a significant impact on 
 
1001 Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling (n 673) 71. 
1002 See, e.g., Andriamahefazafy et al (n 987). 
1003 The G16 are Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Oman, Pakistan, Seychelles, South Africa, Sri Lanka, and Tanzania. Since 2010, the Australian 
government has funded and supported the G16 and its activities, which include caucusing prior to IOTC annual 
sessions and skills development workshops. See Australian High Commission, Australia Supports Sustainable 
Fisheries Management in Indian Ocean Countries (Web Page, 3 April 2019) 
<https://mauritius.embassy.gov.au/plut/OZsupportssustainablefisheriesmgmtinIOcountries2019.html>. 
1004 Lecomte et al (n 921) 73.  
1005 Ibid 74. 
1006 Ibid.  
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tuna resources; they also place too much emphasis on the impacts of the industrial fleet.1008 
As shown in Section II E, these claims by Lecomte et al might be premised on the misleading 
way in which the IOTC categorises fishing fleets. 
Conversely, Hussain argues that DWFSs have attempted to systematically undermine the 
legitimate development aspirations of IOCs at the IOTC.1009 Hussain characterises DWFSs’ 
negotiating positions on determining the role of historical catch in a quota allocation system 
as colonialist and imperialist. Hussain’s observation reflects demands by DWFSs that 
historical catch by their vessels within the EEZs of IOCs be attributed to them as part of 
determining future catch allocations. Similar to Lecomte et al, Hussain identifies a group of 
states that has helped marshal IOCs’ collective negotiating positions, including South Africa, 
Maldives, and Seychelles, as well as Indonesia and Australia. Alluding to the fraught 
relationship explored by Andriamahefazafy, Kull, and Campling concerning some IOCs’ 
dependence on aid from DWFSs, Hussain notes that ‘many coastal developing countries 
depend on the developed nations for assistance … This muddies the waters among coastal 
states, whereby differing levels of dependence on the developed countries lead to differing 
strategies and priorities’.1010  
While it is difficult to ascertain the precise implications for IOTC negotiations of 
distributional struggles in the IO, it is reasonable to conclude that the prospective nature of 
these negotiations has a direct, potential impact on future competitive dynamics among states 
and firms in the IO tuna industry. As the commentaries by Lecomte et al and Hussain show, 
this has invited significant debate among IOTC members. Consequently, this thesis considers 
the application of differentiation by the IOTC in light of distributional struggles among states 
and firms in IO tuna production. 
 
1008 Ibid. 
1009 Sinan Hussain, ‘Colonialism and Imperialism Still Strong in One of World’s Largest Tuna Fisheries 
Regions’, Indian Ocean Observatory (Web Page, 10 June 2018) 
<https://www.theioo.com/index.php/en/diplomacy/item/527-colonialism-and imperialism-still-strong-in-one-of-
world-s-largest-tuna-fisheries-regions>. 




This chapter has examined the political economy of the IO tuna industry to elucidate the 
economic interests that inform IOTC negotiations. Section II reviews IOTC members’ 
engagement with tuna GPNs and provides insights for comparing and contrasting the political 
economies of the IO and WCPO tuna industries. The chapter finds that the IO tuna industry 
encompasses a total of six production chains, the majority of which feed canned and raw tuna 
GPNs.  
The chapter demonstrates that IOCs are major players across all nodes of IO tuna production 
chains, while DWFSs participate primarily in fishing and retail nodes. Consequently, DCSs 
receive a wider range of economic benefits and DWFSs exhibit a narrower set of economic 
interests in the IO tuna industry than in the WCPO. The chapter also shows that, in 
comparison to PICs in the WCPO, only a minority of IOCs—nine in total—receive 
significant economic benefits from IO tuna production.  
In reviewing IOTC catch and effort data, the chapter further argues that there is a clear and 
pressing need to improve how the IOTC and commentators characterise semi-industrial 
fishing fleets in the IO. It also demonstrates that confusion regarding vessel categories in the 
data has allowed commentators to present claims that distort presentations of the tuna fishery, 
such as the claim that artisanal fleets flagged to IOCs have a similar impact on commercial 
tuna stocks as industrial fleets either flagged to or financed by capital from DWFSs.  
Section III discusses recent research on challenges IOCs face in maximising the economic 
benefits they receive from EEZ tuna resources. The chapter finds that, in comparison to the 
WCPO, there is currently a scarcity of studies on the contribution of IO tuna production to 
IOC national economies. Concomitantly, there is also little research on distributional 
struggles between IOCs and DWFSs in tuna GPNs. Nevertheless, the chapter focuses on 
research that argues IOCs could benefit greatly from cooperative strategies (as PICs in the 
WCPO have) in fisheries access relations with DWFSs. This research also describes the 
substantial challenges IOCs face to engaging in such strategies.  
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Scholars note several barriers to tuna-related cooperation among IOCs, including limitations 
to domestic institutional capacity in fisheries administration, law, and enforcement and 
competitive dynamics arising from some IOCs’ fraught relations with DWFSs, who are 
viewed as development partners. In the face of these challenges, the chapter highlights recent 
legal and institution-building efforts among IOCs at regional and subregional levels, 
particularly in the area of fisheries access relations. The chapter demonstrates that 
distributional struggles between IOCs and DWFSs are playing an increasing role in IOTC 
negotiations, as evidenced by the IOTC’s recent discussions on a quota allocation system.  
This chapter shows that, while there are differences between WCPO and IO tuna fisheries 
and industries, the regions share striking similarities in their patterns of distributional 
struggle. Perhaps the most critical similarity is that distributional struggles between DCSs 
and DWFSs implicate TRFMO policies in both regions. As both case studies show, this is 
because DWFSs and DCSs attempt to advantage their economic interests in tuna GPNs via 
interference and cooperative strategies through TRMFO negotiations. Along with Chapter 4, 
this chapter confirms that political-economic dynamics between DWFSs and DCSs 
underwrite TRFMO negotiations. With an understanding of distributional struggle in both 
regions to background its analysis, the next chapter examines how the WCPFC and IOTC 








CHAPTER 6: DIFFERENTIATION IN PRACTICE WITHIN THE WCPFC 
AND IOTC 
This chapter examines the application of differentiation within the law and policy of the 
WCPFC and IOTC. Using the three objectives for differentiation in IFL to structure this 
examination, the chapter evaluates Policy Examples in both TRFMOs. The Policy Examples 
have been chosen to compare three issue areas relevant to differentiation: (i) special funds 
that support the participation of DCSs in TRFMO-related meetings and other capacity 
building-related funding; (ii) management decisions based on consideration for socio-
economic impacts on coastal communities in DCSs; and (iii) allocation negotiations relevant 
to DCSs’ high seas fishing aspirations. Each issue area captures elements of procedural and 
distributive equity for DCSs.  
This chapter compares differentiation provisions in WCPFC and IOTC treaty law with actual 
policy outcomes. For each Policy Example, the chapter provides a description of the case (in 
light of the relevant objective in IFL), examines relevant TRFMO treaty law, and discusses 
the policy outcome.  
I OBJECTIVE 1: EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION AND MEETING FUNDS FOR DCSS 
The first objective of differentiation in IFL is DCSs’ effective participation in transboundary 
fisheries management. This principle is supported by UNCLOS, UNFSA, and WCPFC and 
IOTC treaty law. An element of effective participation is the ability of DCSs to fund the 
attendance of delegates to TRFMO-related meetings.  
This section examines evidence for the application of the principle of effective participation 
by the WCPFC and IOTC. It describes the application of this principle through an analysis of 
special funds for DCS delegates to attend Commission-related meetings of both TRFMOs. 
The section explores how both funds have experienced difficulties maintaining funding 
levels. Issues with resourcing both funds have required the WCPFC and IOTC to discuss the 
nature and availability of financial assistance to developing members.  
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A Policy Example A: WCPFC Special Requirements Fund (SRF) 
1 Effective Participation of PICTs within the WCPFC  
Chapter 2 showed that the effective participation of PICTs is a cornerstone of the WCPFC 
differentiation framework.1011 According to the WCPF Convention, effective participation is 
part of the special requirements of developing states.1012 Under article 30, effective 
participation includes attendance to meetings of the Commission and its subsidiary bodies, 
with a particular focus on supporting PICTs.1013 In addition, effective participation refers to 
financial assistance for capacity building activities that enhance the ability of PICTs to 
engage in the scientific and technical work of the Commission.1014 According to WCPFC 
treaty law, effective participation can be interpreted as encompassing both the narrow 
objective of supporting the attendance of PICTs to Commission-related meetings, as well as 
the broad objective of supporting their capacity to implement the Commission’s management 
decisions. 
2 History of the SRF 
The WCPFC Special Requirements Fund (SRF) was created to address article 30(3) of the 
WCPF Convention, which describes its purpose as facilitating the effective participation of 
PICTs in the work of the Commission.1015 The Commission officially established the SRF 
through the adoption of the WCPFC FR in 2004.1016 Before 2010, the balance of the SRF 
steadily increased through voluntary contributions largely from the US.1017  
The Commission originally gave minimal guidance regarding how the SRF should be used, 
though it assisted developing members and territories in implementing the FAO Guidelines to 
Reduce Sea Turtle Mortality in Fishing Operations.1018 To address this lack of guidance and 
 
1011 See Chapter 2 Section III A. 
1012 WCPF Convention (n 46) art 30.  
1013 Ibid art 30(3).  
1014 Ibid art 30(4).  
1015 Ibid art 30(3).   
1016 WCPFC FR (n 458) 5 [7.1]. The starting balance of the SRF⎯16,892.30 USD⎯was from a fund that 
sponsored the attendance of DCS delegates to negotiations to establish the WCPFC: WCPFC, Final Report of 
the Preparatory Conference Organizational Fund, WCPFC/Comm.1/9, 1st reg sess, 15 March 2005, 1 [3]. 
1017 See, e.g., WCPFC, Summary Report, 2nd reg sess, 12−16 December 2005, 10 [68]. 
1018 WCPFC, Resolution to Mitigate the Impact of Fishing for Highly Migratory Species on Sea Turtles, 
Resolution 2005-04, 2nd reg sess, 16 December 2005, 54 [9]. 
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clarify the relationship between the SRF and capacity building activities, the WCPFC 
adopted operational guidelines for the SRF in 2006.1019  
3 Use of the SRF and Other Funding Sources 
Over time, the Commission has devoted the majority of SRF funds to covering the costs of 
meeting attendance for PICT delegates to sessions of the WCPFC plenary, SC, and TCC, as 
well as various WCPFC and SPC-led workshops, trainings, and working group meetings. The 
WCPFC budget already provides funding for one delegate from developing members to 
attend meetings of the WCPFC and its subsidiary bodies. The primary use of SRF funds has 
supported the attendance of additional delegates from these members. To a lesser degree, the 
SRF has also funded various capacity building projects and consultancies by fisheries 
development professionals.1020  
A description of the SRF balance, contributions, and expenditures from 2004 to 2019 is 
provided in Table 7. Table 7 shows that the greatest contributors to the SRF have been the US 
and Canada. The first time the SRF was used to fund the participation of PICT delegates to a 
tuna management-related meeting was in 2010, when it enabled four delegates to attend an 
SPC Preparatory Tuna Stock Assessment Workshop.1021 FAC documents indicate a growing 




1019 SRF Operational Guidelines (n 512). 
1020 In addition to the SRF, voluntary funding streams supported by industrialised members have been added to 
the Commission’s financial resources over the years. This includes the establishment of the Japanese Trust Fund 
in 2005 and the Chinese Taipei Trust Fund in 2016. Both Trust Funds have each secured funding of 
approximately 2 million USD over five-year periods to conduct capacity building projects. See, e.g., WCPFC, 
Japan Trust Fund Summary of Projects 2012 to Date, 11 April 2019; WCPFC, Establishment of the Chinese 
Taipei Trust Fund, Circular No. 2016/23, 20 May 2016. 
1021 WCPFC, Report on the Status of Other Funds for 2010, WCPFC7-2010-FAC4/06, 4th sess, 7 November 
2010. 
1022 Cf ibid; WCPFC, Report on the Status of Other Funds for 2013, WCPFC10-2013-FAC7-06, 7th sess, 1 
November 2013; WCPFC, Report on the Status of Other Funds for 2019, WCPFC16-2019-FAC13-06 Rev 1, 
13th sess, 3 December 2019. 
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Table 7: SRF Balance, Expenditures and Contributions 2004-20191023 
Year SRF Balance (USD) SRF Expenditures SRF Contributions 
2004 $16,892 $0 $0 
2005 $34,999 $20 $10,000 (FSM) 
$25,000 (US) 
2006 $56,500 $34,000 $55,000 (US) 
2007 $53,650 $4,042 $0 
2008 $146,547 $0 $50,000 (US) 
2009 $153,564 $3,069 $15,000 (US) 
2010 $212,465 $48,483 $46,960 (Australia) 
$30,000 (US) 
2011 $236,161 $32,951 $0 
2012 $179,445 $57,133 $0 
2013 $94,838 $51,781 $0 
2014 $83,982 $0 $0 
2015 $2,554 $75,342 $0 
2016 $32,456 $0 $20,000 (US) 
2017 $179,273 $54,579 $50,000 (Canada) 
$35,000 (US) 
2018 $99,267 $144,183 $70,000 (Canada) 
$30,000 (US) 
2019 $279,549 $157,773 $67,892 (Australia) 
$50,000 (Canada) 
$30,000 (South Korea) 
$50,000 (US) 
4 Historical Discussions on the SRF 
The WCPFC regularly discusses the SRF under a standing agenda item on the special 
requirements of developing states.1024 Over the Commission’s history, members have raised 
two central issues associated with the SRF. The first was put forward by FFA members in 
2012 in relation to SRF funding for ‘core’ Commission work. PICs argued that the SRF 
should not be used to fund delegates to undertake meetings and capacity building activities 
associated with the Commission’s SC and NC.1025 The WCPFC resolved this issue by 
adopting a FAC recommendation that the NC develop budgetary funding to regularly 
provision the costs of attendance for developing members, including five SIDS, to NC 
meetings.1026  
 
1023 Derived from annual reporting by the WCPFC Secretariat to the FAC. See, e.g., above n 1022. 
1024 The WCPFC ROP obliges the Commission to consider the special requirements of developing members 
during its regular sessions: WCPFC ROP (n 226) 5 [2(2)(h)].  
1025 WCPFC, Summary Report, 8th reg sess, 26−30 March 2012, 20 [161]. 
1026 WCPFC9 Summary Report (n 893) [94]−[104]. The FAC agreed core funding would be provided by NC 
members who were non-developing states, giving priority to RMI, FSM, and Palau: WCPFC, Summary Report 
and Recommendations of the Sixth Session of the FAC (FAC6), WCPFC9-2012-22, 6 December 2012, 
[25]−[26]. For a more detailed account of the FAC’s discussion, see also: at [21]−[27].  
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The second, far more deliberated issue for the WCPFC has been ensuring the sustainability of 
SRF funding. Secondary to this issue has been whether the SRF should be resourced from 
mandatory contributions by developed members. FFA members first raised this issue in 2014, 
proposing that a mandatory ‘SIDS assistance fee’ of 10,000 USD be added to the budgetary 
contributions of developed members to maintain funding for the SRF.1027  
While the Commission did not adopt the FFA’s proposal, the resourcing issue gained salience 
when SRF funds became depleted in 2015. In 2016, the FAC deliberated on possible options 
for increasing SRF funding and creating a sustainable funding stream.1028 Some options 
included drawing from a proportion of the overall Commission budget, using participation 
fees levied on observers, and imposing a mandatory assessed contribution on developed 
members.  
In 2016, the FFA (re)submitted a proposal to maintain the SRF balance at 300,000 USD 
through mandatory assessed contributions from developed members and focus on funding for 
a second PICT delegate to WCPFC, SC, and TCC meetings.1029 The FFA argued that the 
Commission had already established a precedent for using mandatory contributions to 
support meeting participation after agreeing to use NC core budget funding for SIDS’ 
participation in 2012.1030 Furthermore, the FFA claimed that the breadth and complexity of 
issues now covered by the Commission, and the associated expansion of obligations on 
members, now required at least two PICT delegates to participate in meetings.1031 
 
1027 WCPFC, Summary Report and Recommendations of the Eight Session of the FAC (FAC8), WCPFC11-
2014-23, 5 December 2014, [52]−[55]. 
1028 WCPFC, Summary Report and Recommendations of the Tenth Session of the FAC (FAC10), WCPFC13-
2016-FAC10, 9 December 2016, [87]−[109] ‘FAC10 Summary Report’.  
1029 Ibid [87]. The FFA derived this figure from WCPFC Secretariat estimates that the cost to support PICs’ 
participation to one meeting was approximately 90,000 to 100,000 USD and that this should be tripled to 
include participation in the WCPFC, SC, and TCC annual sessions: at [94]. 
1030 WCPFC, FFA Proposal to Ensure the Sustainability of the Special Requirements Fund, WCPFC13-2016-
DP17, 13th reg sess, 4 November 2016, [17]−[20].  
1031  Ibid [14]. In their proposal, the FFA argued that: 
it must be recognised that the Commission has ever-increasing obligations placed on all CCMs [members], 
in particular SIDS. The environment today is quite different from what it was in 2004 when the Commission 
first started. The complexity and diversity of issues have expanded and evolved, so it must also be 
recognised that it is impossible for one representative to cover all the issues at these meetings: at 13. 
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The FFA proposal negotiations produced both short- and long-term actions. In the short term, 
the Commission replenished the SRF through a voluntary contribution from Taiwan,1032 and 
by transferring funds from another stand-alone fund.1033 In the long term, the Commission 
agreed that members required clarification around core elements of the SRF, including ‘its 
scope of use, prioritization, allocation authority, securing of funding at an appropriate level, 
and transparency of operation’.1034 Therefore, the Commission established a virtual 
intersessional working group to review the SRF.1035 
In 2017, the WCPFC reviewed the work of the SRF working group and approved a proposal 
to develop a ‘Strategic Investment Plan’ (SIP).1036 The SIP’s objectives were defined as 
follows: to support the ‘full input and participation’ of developing members in meetings of 
the Commission; to support the development of the fisheries management and technical 
‘capability and capacity’ of these members to implement CMMs (as identified through the 
Commission’s internal processes, such as the CMS process, SIDS checklist and other 
capacity needs identified by the Commission and Secretariat); and to explore funding models 
to provide adequate and sustainable funding for the SRF.1037 The SRF working group 
proposed that a gap and needs analysis first be conducted to guide the development of the 
SIP.1038 Once developed, the SIP would be submitted to the Commission for approval on a 
trial basis over three years.1039  
During the course of WCPFC14 discussions on the SRF, the Commission returned to the 
theme of supporting the effective participation of developing members through funding for a 
second delegate.1040 In this vein, the FFA had submitted a proposal to amend the WCPFC FR 
to provide funding for two delegates to WCPFC-related meetings.1041 FFA members argued 
that mandatory contributions to the SRF would not be required (as had been repeatedly 
 
1032 It should be noted that a trend, contemporaneous with the depletion of the SRF, was observed in the rise of 
extra-budgetary contributions by DWFSs. This trend indicates that, rather than voluntarily contribute to the SRF 
at a time when funds were depleted, DWFSs opted to earmark individual contributions to the Commission.  
1033 FAC10 Summary Report (n 1028) [105]−[108]. 
1034 Ibid [109]. 
1035 Ibid. 
1036 See SRF SIP (n 521).  
1037 WCPFC, Summary Report and Recommendations of the Eleventh Regular Session of the FAC (FAC11), 
WCPFC14-2017-FAC11, 7 December 2017, [45] (‘FAC11 Summary Report’). 
1038 Ibid [47].  
1039 Ibid [46]. 
1040 WCPFC14 Summary Report (n 834) [132]−[135]. 
1041 WCPFC, Special Requirements Fund, WCPFC14-2017-DP07, 14th reg sess, 3 November 2017. 
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proposed in previous years) if second delegates were supported by the WCPFC budget.1042 
The proposal did not succeed however, due to resistance by industrialised members.1043 
5 Policy Outcome 
At WCPFC15 in 2018, the Commission followed up on commitments to adopt the SIP, 
resolve the need for a sustainable funding model, and systematise its approach to the 
governance and use of SRF funds.1044 In the process of addressing these action items, the 
Commission established a stronger and more direct relationship between the SIP, SRF, and 
implementation of article 30. The Commission remained divided, however, on the issue of 
amending the WCPFC FR to include a second delegate as a means of addressing effective 
participation⎯which was proposed for the second year by the FFA.1045  
The actions of the Commission were informed by recommendations of the SRF working 
group. The working group reported on an analysis undertaken to identify the capacity needs 
of PICTs and to seek funding options available both within and outside the WCPFC 
administrative framework to address these needs. The SRF working group reported that the 
analysis ‘demonstrated that most capacity development needs had associated support 
mechanisms already’, though some members continued to assert that ‘effective participation 
was inadequately supported by the Commission’.1046 On the basis of this analysis, the SRF 
working group had developed the SIP, noting the need for flexibility, funds for second 
delegates, ‘in-country’ capacity building activities, and greater transparency in the SRF’s 
administration.1047  
At WCPFC15, the Commission adopted the SIP and secured annual funding for its 
implementation in the WCPFC budget at a ‘target base level’ of 150,000 USD.1048 The 
Commission also directed the Secretariat to annually update the SIP and report on its 
 
1042 Ibid [3].  
1043 FAC11 Summary Report (n 1037) [48]−[52].   
1044 WCPFC, Summary Report, 15th reg sess, 10-14 December 2018, 23-7 [128]−[157] (‘WCPFC15 Summary 
Report’). 
1045 WCPFC, Proposal to Amend the Financial Regulations for the Effective Participation of SIDS, WCPFC15-
2018-DP25, 15th reg sess, 10−14 December 2018.  
1046 WCPFC15 Summary Report (n 1044) 23−4 [134]. 
1047 Ibid. 
1048 Ibid 27 [154]; WCPFC, Summary Report and Recommendations of the Twelfth Regular Session of the FAC 
(FAC12), WCPFC15-2018-FAC12-14, 14 December 2017, [120]. 
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implementation to the Commission.1049 Finally, the Commission made information from 
internal processes relevant to identifying the developing members’ capacity needs public 
domain data, which has been uploaded to a public webpage on ‘Implementation of Article 30 
of the Convention’.1050 
After considerable debate since 2015, the WCPFC adopted a plan for securing sustainable 
funding and ensuring that their fund addresses the specific needs articulated by PICs in the 
context of the Commission’s work. It remains to be seen whether this new approach will 
address concerns expressed by PICs on the need to secure funding for an additional delegate 
to attend Commission meetings. 
6 Comparison with WCPFC Differentiation Framework 
The SRF was established to address article 30(3) of the WCPF Convention, which obliges the 
WCPFC to establish a fund to facilitate the effective participation of developing members. 
Article 30(3) provides that effective participation encompasses Commission ‘meetings and 
those of its subsidiary bodies’.1051 Obligations concerning the governance and administration 
of the SRF are elaborated in the WCPFC FR and the SRF Operational Guidelines.   
Central negotiating issues have been sustainable resourcing and the use of SRF funding to 
support a second PIC delegate to WCPFC-related meetings. Both issues are not explicitly 
connected to binding obligations under the WCPFC differentiation framework. The only 
binding obligation is for the Commission to establish a fund for the purpose of facilitating 
effective participation.1052 Therefore, although the Commission allowed the SRF to become 
depleted in 2015, it was not in violation of relevant provisions in WCPFC treaty law.  
This reality highlights the curious legal status of the SRF (and as Chapter 2 noted, provisions 
on special assistance to developing states more generally in IFL).1053 While WCPFC treaty 
law obliges states to establish the SRF, it does not oblige them to maintain adequate 
resourcing for it. PICs underscored the resourcing issue in their SIDS Checklist, which 
 
1049 WCPFC15 Summary Report (n 1044) 27 [154]. 
1050 Ibid [157]. 
1051 WCPF Convention (n 46).  
1052 Ibid. 
1053 Chapter 2 Section III D1. 
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included their proposal to add a ‘SIDS assistance fee’ of 10,000 USD to the budgetary 
contributions of developed members.1054 Ultimately, the Commission addressed this 
resourcing issue in the policy outcome by funding the ongoing SIP through a line item in the 
budget.  
The Commission’s actions have failed to address PICs’ arguments that additional resourcing 
is required, through the SRF or otherwise, to fund their effective participation. These 
arguments emanate from a sense of the broader objective contained in article 30 and the 
preamble of the WCPF Convention that PICs require specific financial assistance.1055 As 
Chapter 3 discussed, significant asymmetries in size and negotiating capacity between PIC 
and DWFS national delegations continue to be observed at WCPFC meetings.1056 As PICs 
have demonstrated, this pattern continues at the same time as the complexity and number of 
conservation and management issues handled by the WCPFC have risen. This has resulted in 
an increasing number of working groups convening simultaneously on the margins of 
meetings and a greater need for multiple, expert negotiators on PIC delegations to represent 
their interests. Therefore, while the WCPFC has secured a long-term strategy for funding the 
SRF and followed black letter law in this respect, it does not appear to provide adequate 
financial support for PICs’ effective participation.  
B Policy Example B: IOTC Meeting Participation Fund (MPF) 
1 History of the MPF  
The IOTC Meeting Participation Fund (MPF) was established to respond to low levels of 
participation of developing members in scientific meetings. Prior to the MPF, the IOTC 
relied on training activities through bilateral capacity building programs with the EU and 
Japan to address the persistent trend of developing members’ low participation.1057 This issue 
was first identified in 1999 at IOTC41058 and gained salience a decade later, when the IOTC’s 
first Performance Review recommended that it consider ‘establishing a special fund to 
 
1054 WCPFC12 SIDS Checklist (n 505) [xiii]. 
1055 WCPF Convention (n 46) art 30(1), Preamble paras 7−8. 
1056 See Chapter 3 Section IIIB 1(b).  
1057 See, e.g., ibid.  
1058  IOTC, Report of the Fourth Session of the IOTC, IOTC/S/04/99/R[E], 13−16 December 1999, [49].  
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facilitate participation [of developing states] in the Commission’s work’.1059  Subsequently, 
the Commission established the MPF in 2010.1060 Resolution 10/05 defines the MPF’s 
purpose as follows: ‘[to] support scientists and representatives from IOTC Contracting 
Parties and Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties (CPCs) who are developing States to attend 
and/or contribute to the work of the Commission, the IOTC Scientific Committee and its 
Working Parties’.1061 In 2012, the IOTC adopted a MPF ROP1062 and made it a standing 
SCAF agenda item1063.  
2 Use of the MPF 
When it established the MPF, the IOTC transferred 200,000 USD of accumulated funds to 
‘seed’ the Fund and agreed it would be sustained by accumulated funds, voluntary 
contributions, and other sources of funding identified by the Commission.1064 The IOTC also 
committed to agree to a long-term plan to maintain the MPF by 2011 at IOTC15.1065 Between 
2011 and 2013, the Commission maintained the MPF at 200,000 USD through transfers of 
accumulated funds, including extra-budgetary contributions from Australia, China, and other 
intergovernmental projects.1066 During this time, the Commission observed a significant rise 
in the participation of developing members in meetings of the SC and its working parties.1067  
  
 
1059 IOTC, Report of the Thirteenth Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2009-S13-R[E], 30 March−3 April 2009, app V 
(II).  
1060 IOTC, On the Establishment of a Meeting Participation Fund for Developing IOTC Members and Non-
Contracting Cooperating Parties (CPCs), Resolution 10/05, 14th reg sess, 1−5 March 2010 (‘Resolution 10/05’). 
This Resolution is no longer active. In 2014, a Compendium Working Group recommended that Resolution 
10/05 (along with other ‘administrative’ measures) be incorporated into the Commission’s revision of its ROP: 
IOTC, On the Removal of Obsolete Conservation and Management Measures, Resolution 14/01, 18th reg sess, 
1−5 June 2014, [2(d)]. The MPF ROP is in the IOTC’s revised ROP: IOTC ROP (n 528) r XVI, app VIII. 
1061 Resolution 10/05 (n 1060) [1]. The same language is in Rule XVI: IOTC ROP (n 528) r XVI [1].  
1062 IOTC, Report of the Sixteenth Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2012-S16-R[E], 22−26 April 2012, 54−56 app XI.  
1063 See, e.g., IOTC, Report of the Ninth Session of the SCAF, IOTC-2012-SCAF09-R[E], 24-26 April 2012, 6 
[15]−[18]. Before 2012, MPF discussions were limited to Secretariat reports to the SCAF which addressed a 
reporting requirement in the MPF ROP: IOTC ROP (n 528) r XVI [4].  
1064 Resolution 10/05 (n 1060) [2]. Data on MPF expenditures is difficult to obtain. In 2016, the SCAF 
recommended that the Secretariat annually prepare a document on the MPF’s financial status, including 
historical expenditures: IOTC, Report of the 13th Session of the SCAF, IOTC-2016-SCAF13-R[E], 19−20 May 
2015, 9 [40] (‘SCAF13 Report’). 
1065 Resolution 10/05 (n 1060) [2].  
1066 See IOTC, IOTC Meeting Participation Fund Status, IOTC-2019-SCAF16-06[E], 16th sess, 12−13 June 
2019 (‘MPF Status’). 




An overview of the MPF balance, contributions, expenditures, and number of funded meeting 
participants from 2010 to 2018 is included in Table 8.  
Table 8: MPF Balance, Expenditures and Funded Participants 2010-20181068 
Year MPF Balance (USD) MPF 
Expenditures 
No. of MPF 
Funded 
Participants* 







2010 $57,429 $57,429 − − − 
2011 $157,186 $157,186 − − − 
2012 $126,010 $195,502 − − − 
2013 $240,547 $315,952 − − − 
2014 $118,517 $242,517 89 63% 37% 
2015 $118,656 $207,073 87 66% 34% 
2016 $211,022 $285,088 121 57% 43% 
2017 $182,945 $202,945 118 67% 33% 
2018 $200,000 $250,903 122 48% 52% 
 
In 2014 and 2015, the Commission reduced MPF funds to over half of previous levels. Part of 
the reason for this decision was the shortfall created in 2013, when the MPF was 
overspent.1069 The IOTC was also experiencing broader budgetary issues that required it to 
seek cost-saving measures in the budget.1070 In 2014, the Commission reduced MPF funds to 
60,000 USD and requested that the Secretariat ‘strictly adhere’ to Rule XVI, para 5 of the 
IOTC ROP that only 25% of MPF funds be used for ‘non-scientific meetings’.1071 The 
Commission also agreed to exclude MPF funding for the participation of cooperating non-
members.1072 Noting a reduction in developing members’ delegates, the SC recommended the 
MPF be raised to the previous level of 200,000 USD.1073  
In 2016, the IOTC underwent a second Performance Review, which recommended the 
Commission incorporate the MPF into the budget indefinitely for its ‘continuation and 
 
1068 Derived from annual reporting by the IOTC Secretariat to the SCAF. See MPF Status (n 1066) 2. It is 
difficult to determine the number of MPF-funded participants to scientific and non-scientific meetings between 
2010 and 2013 due to inconsistent reporting by the IOTC Secretariat. Cf IOTC, Progress Report of the 
Secretariat, IOTC-2013-SCAF10-03[E], 10th sess, 6 April 2013; IOTC, Progress Report of the IOTC 
Secretariat, IOTC-2014-SCAF11-04[E], 11th sess, 15 April 2014.  
1069 IOTC, Report of the Eleventh Session of the SCAF, IOTC-2014-SCAF11-R[E], 29−31 May 2014, 7 [19]. 
1070 Ibid [15].  
1071 Report of the Eighteenth Session of the IOTC (n 1067) 18 [90].  
1072 Ibid [91].  
1073 IOTC, Report of the Seventh Session of the IOTC SC, IOTC-2014-SC17-R[E], 8−12 December 2014, 35−6 
[118]−[119]. See generally ibid 35-36 [112]−[123].  
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optimisation’ and ‘to create a more balanced attendance to both science and non-science 
meetings of the Commission’.1074 Subsequently, the IOTC agreed to fund the MPF through 
its budget and raised funding to 150,000 USD for 2016 and 200,000 USD for 2017.1075 This 
decision was five years overdue; the Commission repeatedly elapsed the deadline set in 
Resolution 10/05 to agree on long-term MPF funding by 2011.  
3 Historical Discussions on the MPF  
IOTC members have discussed two central issues associated with the MPF. Since the 
establishment of the MPF, the Commission has specified that 75% of its expenditures are to 
be used for participation in ‘scientific meetings’,1076 while the remaining 25% are to be used 
for ‘non-scientific meetings’.1077 This 75:25 ratio for MPF allocations was intended to reflect 
the IOTC’s priority that MPF funds support participation in the scientific work of the 
Commission. Table 8 provides indicative numbers for MPF funding of participants to 
scientific versus non-scientific meetings. It appears the MPF has not always been allocated 
according to this ratio. The most recent audit by the FAO Office of the Inspector General in 
2019 nevertheless concluded that the Secretariat is administrating the MPF in accordance 
with the IOTC ROP.1078  
In 2019, the IOTC Secretariat noted a rise in the number of subsidiary bodies served by the 
MPF. The Secretariat advised that the increasing number of IOTC non-scientific subsidiary 
bodies ‘may require the current 25% allocation of the MPF to non-scientific meetings […] to 
be reassessed in the future’.1079 While members have not discussed revising the MPF 
allocation ratio, MPF discussions over the years have highlighted the ratio as a critical aspect 
of the MPF.  
 
1074 IOTC, Report of the 2nd IOTC Performance Review, IOTC-2016-PRIOTC02-R[E], 2−6 February, 14−18 
December 2015, 43 [211]. 
1075 IOTC, Report of the 20th Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2016-S20-R[E], 23−27 May 2016, 22 [105], app XV 
101 [31].  
1076 According to Commission practice, ‘scientific meetings’ have included the SC and its associated working 
parties. 
1077 IOTC ROP (n 528) rXVI 8 [5]. According to the MPF ROP ‘[n]on-scientific meetings are regular and 
special Sessions of the Commission, including Sessions of the Compliance Committee and the Standing 
Committee on Administration and Finance, and other non-scientific subsidiary bodies of the Commission’: at 
app VIII 22 [1]. 
1078 IOTC, Report on the Audit of the IOTC Secretariat by FAO, IOTC-2019-SCAF16-10[E], 16th reg sess, 




The second issue concerned the use of extra-budgetary contributions to cover shortfalls in the 
MPF budget. Table 9 provides an overview from 2010 to 2018 of the MPF budget, actual 
balance, expenditures, and extra-budgetary contributions.  
Table 9: MPF Budgetary Shortfalls and Extra-Budgetary Funding Sources1080 








2010 $200,000 $57,429 $57,429 $0 − 
2011 $200,000 $157,186 $157,186 $0 − 
2012 $200,000 $126,010 $195,502 $69,492 Australia 
(FAO)* 
2013 $200,000 $240,547 $315,952 $75,405 Australia 
2014 $60,000 $118,517 $242,517 $124,000 Australia, Bay of 
Bengal Large Marine 
Ecosystem Project, 
FAO-GEF ABNJ Tuna 
Project 
2015 $60,000 $118,656 $207,073 $88,417 Australia, China, 
FAO-GEF ABNJ Tuna 
Project 
2016 $150,000 $211,022 $285,088 $74,066 Australia, China, 
FAO-GEF ABNJ Tuna 
Project 
2017 $200,000 $182,945 $202,945 $20,000 China 
2018 $250,842 $200,000 $250,903 $50,903 Australia, China 
Average MPF Budgetary Shortfall = $55,809 
Table 9 shows that, on average, MPF expenditures have exceeded the IOTC’s planned budget 
by over 50,000 USD. To cover these shortfalls, the Commission has relied on extra-budgetary 
funding. Since 2016, the SCAF has encouraged the Secretariat to seek extra-budgetary MPF 
funding.1081 In the past two years, the SCAF also noted the important role played by extra-
budgetary contributions in meeting demand for MPF funding.1082 In 2019 the Commission 
adopted a SCAF recommendation to increase the MPF budget to 250,000 USD.1083 
  
 
1080 The information contained in this table was compiled from IOTC budgets in SCAF annual reports, as well 
as IOTC Secretariat reporting to the SCAF. See, e.g., IOTC, Report of the 16th Session of the SCAF, IOTC-
2019-SCAF16-R[E], 12−13 June 2019, 16 (‘SCAF16 Report’). 
1081 See, e.g., SCAF13 Report (n 1064) 9 [38]. 
1082 IOTC, Report of the 15th Session of the SCAF, IOTC-2018-SCAF15-R[E], 16−17 May 2018, 7 [22]; 
SCAF16 Report (n 1080) 8 [31].  
1083 SCAF16 Report (n 1080) 8 [32]. 
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4 Policy Outcome 
After calls from two Performance Reviews and repeated delays in determining a long-term 
funding scheme between 2011 and 2015, the IOTC now resources its fund through a line item 
in its budget. Several ongoing sources of debate associated with the MPF remain, however, 
such as the proviso that no more than 25% of funding be used for non-scientific meetings.  
5 Comparison with IOTC Differentiation Framework 
The IOTC ROP provides that the objective of the MPF is to support the attendance of 
delegates from IOCs to IOTC-related meetings.1084 The IOTC ROP further emphasises 
support for the attendance of scientists from IOCs.1085 In both these respects, the MPF differs 
from the SRF, which has a wider remit (as was shown, the IOTC budget has a separate line 
for capacity building activities) and does not explicitly focus on scientist participants or 
science-related meetings of the WCPFC.  
The IOTC differentiation framework does not oblige the Commission to maintain resourcing 
for the MPF. As was the case for the WCPFC, therefore, the IOTC was not in violation of its 
treaty law when MPF funds fell below half of previous levels in 2014 and 2015, resulting in a 
fall in IOC delegates’ participation in science-related meetings. 
The IOTC was also not in violation of treaty law when the Commission took an additional 
four years to agree to long-term resourcing for the MPF. This was because the relevant 
paragraph was non-binding in Resolution 10/05: ‘The Commission will identify, at its 15th 
Session, a procedure for supplying funds to the MPF in the future’.1086 Since this time, the 
Commission has responded to funding needs, indicated in the most recent increase to the 
MPF budget.  
Ultimately, the IOTC addressed its differentiation framework and the needs of IOCs through 
its policy outcome by securing long-term funding for the MPF. It remains to be seen how the 
 
1084 IOTC ROP (n 528).  
1085 Ibid.  
1086 Resolution 10/05 (n 1060) (emphasis added).  
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IOTC will respond to potential issues associated with the MPF in the future, such as possible 
revisions to the ratio of expenditures for scientific versus non-scientific meetings. 
II OBJECTIVE 2: PROTECTION OF VULNERABLE AND FISHERIES DEPENDENT COASTAL 
POPULATIONS AND IMPACTS OF MANAGEMENT ACTIONS ON INDUSTRIES WITHIN DCSS 
The second objective of differentiation in IFL is the protection of dependent and vulnerable 
coastal populations. This principle refers to the special interests of certain coastal populations 
(small-scale, artisanal, and indigenous fishers and fishworkers) in transboundary fish stocks 
to support their food security and livelihoods. UNFSA further obliges states to consider the 
interests of, and impacts on, these coastal populations in adopting conservation and 
management measures.1087 Recently, SIDS in both TRFMOs have argued that specific 
management decisions have adversely impacted coastal populations dependent on tuna stocks 
for their livelihoods. In these Policy Examples, SIDS have called for the TRFMOs to take 
immediate, short-term action, as well as make long-term commitments to alleviate these 
impacts. 
A Policy Example C: WCPFC Management of the South Pacific Albacore Stock and PICTs’ 
Domestic Tuna Industry 
1 Overview of South Pacific Albacore Fishery and WCPFC CMMs 
The South Pacific albacore (SPA) stock supports domestic fishing activities and associated 
canneries across WCPO coastal communities. These communities are located south of the 
equator where SPA are concentrated, in the EEZs of the Cook Islands, Samoa, Fiji, New 
Caledonia, and American Samoa. The SPA stock fulfils at least three important socio-
economic functions. First, SPA catches have supported the only sustained, domestic tuna 
fishing industry in the WCPO since the 1990s.1088 Second, the stock sources culturally 
significant artisanal tuna fisheries throughout the Polynesian PICs.1089 Third, the SPA stock 
feeds major canneries in the region that provide employment to local populations, particularly 
in American Samoa.1090  
 
1087 UNFSA (n 10) art 24(a), (b). See also Chapter 2 II D.  
1088 Gillett, A Short History of Industrial Fishing in the Pacific Islands (n 583) 9.  
1089 See Gillett, Fisheries of the Pacific Islands: Regional and National Information (n 810).  
1090 See Gillett, Fisheries in PICT Economies (n 810).  
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The WCPFC has adopted three CMMs on SPA (each CMM replacing the other); CMM 2005-
02, CMM 2010-05, and CMM 2015-02.1091 These CMMs have responded to SC 
recommendations to limit fishing pressure on SPA. Despite three iterations, each CMM has 
retained the same effort limit⎯WCPFC members are obliged to keep the number of fishing 
vessels actively targeting SPA to 2005 levels, or an average of levels between 2000 and 
2004.1092 PICTs are exempted insofar as they ‘wish to pursue a responsible level of 
development of their fisheries’ for SPA.1093 Each CMM has instituted increasingly robust 
reporting requirements for members that harvest SPA.1094 Despite these CMMs, the SC, the 
Pacific Islands tuna fishing industry, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) have 
expressed increasing concern for the economic viability of the SPA stock and its ability to 
continue to support coastal communities.1095  
SPA catches have risen dramatically since the establishment of the WCPFC. Pre-WCPFC, 
SPA catches remained between 25,000 and 50,000 mt.1096 In the late 2000s, SPA catch 
rocketed to over 80,000 mt and has continued to increase.1097 In 2017, the longline catch for 
SPA (89,388 mt) was the highest on record.1098 Rising catch levels are attributable to two 
trends. The first is the increased efficiency of longline fishing vessels from DWFSs, which 
render the existing effort limit ineffective for constraining SPA catch.1099 The second is an 
increase in chartering arrangements between PICs and foreign fishing firms based in Taiwan 
 
1091 WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure for South Pacific Albacore, CMM 2005-02, 2nd reg sess, 
12−16 December 2005 (‘CMM 2005-02’); WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure for South Pacific 
Albacore, CMM 2010-05, 7th reg sess, 6−10 December 2010 (‘CMM 2010-05’); WCPFC, Conservation and 
Management Measure for South Pacific Albacore, CMM 2015-02, 12th reg sess, 3−8 December 2015 (‘CMM 
2015-02’). 
1092 CMM 2005-02 (n 1091) [1]; CMM 2010-05 (n 1091) [1]; CMM 2015-02 (n 1091) [1]. This effort limit 
applies only to SPA caught in the area above 20 degrees South.  
1093 See, e.g., CMM 2015-02 (n 1091) [2].  
1094 CMM 2005-02 did not require members to report SPA catch data, while CMM 2010-05 merely required 
members to report the number of vessels actively targeting SPA, and SPA bycatch data: CMM 2010-05 (n 1091) 
[4]. CMM 2015-02 now requires members to report catch data for SPA: CMM 2015-02 (n 1091) [4].   
1095 See, e.g., WCPFC, Fourteenth Regular Session of the SC, WCPFC15-2018-SC14-00, 8−16 August 2018, 53 
[246]; Pacific Islands Tuna Industry Association, ‘Longlining for South Pacific Albacore: The Ship has Sailed 
and the Domestic Industry is Left to Sink’ (Press Release, Fisheries Newsletter No 142, Pacific Community, 29 
January 2014); Banks, Short, and Tuqiri (n 645). The SC has cautioned members on the impacts of increasing 
SPA catches since its second session: WCPFC, Second Regular Session of the SC, 7−18 August 2006 [20]. 
1096 Overview of WCPO Tuna Fisheries (n 51) 45.  
1097 Ibid.  
1098 Ibid. 
1099 Banks, Short, and Tuqiri (n 645) 14−5.  
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and China.1100 Catch data reveals rising levels of SPA catch by PIC-flagged longline vessels, 
many of which operate through charters and are owned by these firms.1101  
Two factors have frustrated the WCPFC’s ability to manage the SPA stock adequately. The 
first is the Commission’s overall approach to management which, reflecting both WCPFC 
treaty law and broader TRFMO practises, focuses primarily on maintaining or restoring tuna 
stocks to levels that produce MSY. The way the SPA stock is impacted by fishing pressure 
render MSY an inappropriate measure for managing the SPA fishery.1102 SPA are primarily 
caught by industrial-scale longline fishing vessels, which focus fishing pressure on larger, 
mature-aged individuals. Over time, increased fishing pressure has significantly reduced the 
biomass of mature SPA, resulting in ‘localised depletions’ in PICT EEZs and severe impacts 
on catch rates.1103 Economic conditions for vessels that harvest SPA have subsequently 
deteriorated. While the SC has repeatedly recommended that the WCPFC take management 
action to reduce fishing pressure on SPA, Commission negotiations reflect difficulties in 
adopting adequate CMMs based on concern for economic, rather than biological, indicators 
in the fishery.  
The second, related factor concerns the behaviour of industrial fishing fleets that harvest 
SPA. As Chapter 1 discussed, external factors, such as the economic pressure of reduced 
catch rates, rather than TRFMO management actions, are often responsible for reductions in 
fishing pressure on tuna stocks.1104 It has become clear however that limiting economic 
factors have not affected the behaviour of DWFS fleets that target SPA.1105 Commentators 
have argued that government subsidisation has allowed these fleets to remain operational, 
despite significant declines in their profitability.1106 Consequently, many PIC-flagged fleets 
 
1100 Ibid 7−8.  
1101 Ibid.  
1102 See Skirtun et al (n 73); Graham Pilling, ‘A Scientific Perspective on Current Challenges for PICT Domestic 
Tuna Longline Fleets that are Dependent on South Pacific Albacore’ (September−December 2013) SPC 
Fisheries Newsletter.  
1103 See Adam D. Langley, SPC-OFP, The SPA Fishery Management Issues of Relevance to PICTs (Technical 
Report No 37, 17 July 2006) 21−4.  
1104 Pons, Melnychuk and Hilborn (n 66). 
1105 Banks, Short, and Tuqiri (n 645).  
1106 Jemima Garrett, ‘Huge Chinese Subsidies Shock Pacific Tuna Industry’, Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation News (online, 12 August 2013) <https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-08-12/pacific-tuna/4881870>.  
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have shut down their operations due to declining catch rates, while fishing fleets owned by 
operators from DWFSs, have increased their share of the fishery.1107 
2 WCPFC Negotiations on SPA 
To address the problematic economic conditions in the SPA fishery, WCPFC members have 
focused negotiations on the development of a TRP for SPA.1108 A TRP would incorporate 
economic considerations into future catch and/or effort limits for the SPA stock. The WCPFC 
began negotiating a TRP after FFA proposals to revise the existing effort limits failed 
repeatedly. From 2012 to 2014, the FFA submitted three proposals to revise the SPA measure 
by strengthening effort limits for SPA and imposing a catch limit for SPA on the high 
seas.1109 These proposals faced significant resistance and failed to garner support. In lieu of 
agreement, the WCPFC committed to the next best option: adopting a SPA TRP in a separate 
measure on harvest strategies.1110 
3 Policy Outcome 
In 2018, the WCPFC took first steps to act on deteriorating economic conditions in the SPA 
fishery. The Commission adopted an interim SPA TRP (acknowledging the need to rebuild 
the stock in order to improve catch rates) and agreed to continue developing a ‘roadmap’ 
outlining subsequent commitments to improve SPA management.1111 This policy outcome 
resolved a long and frustrating negotiation process that lasted three years, during which the 
Commission repeatedly failed to meet an agreed deadline to adopt an interim SPA TRP.1112 
 
1107 Lagi Toribau, ‘Ready to Hear the Truth About South Pacific Albacore’, Pacific Scoop (online, 18 August 
2015) <http://pacific.scoop.co.nz/2015/08/tuna-fisheries-ready-to-hear-the-truth-about-south-pacific-albacore/>; 
Pita Ligaiula, ‘Dire Warning for Pacific’s Domestic Albacore Fishery’, WWF South Pacific (Web Page, 5 
December 2017) <http://www.wwfpacific.org/?uNewsID=318055>. 
1108 Skirtun et al (n 73). For a review of historical discussions on SPA at the SC, TCC, and Commission plenary, 
see WCPFC, South Pacific Albacore Roadmap Previous SC, TCC, and Commission Discussions Regarding 
CMMs 2010-05 and 2015-02, WCPFC15-2018-SPalbroadmap_suppl, 15th reg sess, 26 November 2018. 
1109 WCPFC, FFA Members Draft Amendments to the CMM for South Pacific Albacore, WCPFC8-2011-DP/03, 
8th reg sess, 26−30 March 2012; WCPFC, Proposal on a Revised CMM for South Pacific Albacore by a Number 
of FFA Member Countries, WCPFC10-2013-DP34_rev3, 10th reg sess, 2−6 December 2013; WCPFC, FFA 
Members’ Proposed Replacement for the CMM for South Pacific Albacore, WCPFC11-2014-DP05, 11th reg 
sess, 1−5 December 2014. 
1110 CMM 2014-06 (n 238). 
1111 WCPFC15 Summary Report (n 1044) 36 [207]; ibid 32 [182]. See also WCPFC, Intersessional Activity 
Report from South Pacific Albacore Roadmap Virtual Working Group, WCPFC15-2018-SPalbroadmap, 15th reg 
sess, 26 November 2018.   
1112 This deadline was first set out in the Harvest Strategy Workplan adopted by the Commission in 2015: 
WCPFC, Agreed Workplan for the Adoption of Harvest Strategies under CMM 2014-06, suppl_CMM 2014-06, 
12th reg sess, 3−8 December 2015, 4. Unable to reach agreement, the WCPFC repeatedly revised the deadline to 
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In truth, negotiations on the Commission’s effective and equitable management of the SPA 
stock dated back to 2012, when FFA members first flagged the need to address economic 
conditions in the SPA fishery. 
4 Comparison with WCPFC Differentiation Framework 
The special circumstances surrounding management of the SPA stock implicate several 
elements of the WCPFC differentiation framework, including core obligations. The WCPF 
Convention obliges members to design CMMs on the basis of MSY.1113 This obligation is 
qualified by the need to consider relevant environmental and economic factors, including the 
special requirements of PICTs1114⎯and the special vulnerability and needs of coastal 
communities1115.  
WCPFC members are obliged to consider the dependency of coastal communities on the SPA 
stock for domestic fishing activities and associated industries in designing relevant CMMs. 
Moreover, because artisanal fisheries have also been established for SPA, this is reinforced 
by members’ further obligation to take into account the interests of artisanal and subsistence 
fishers.1116 Additionally, the WCPF Convention requires members to consider uncertainties 
associated with existing and predicted socio-economic conditions, which would plausibly 
apply to the present and future impacts on the domestic tuna industry in PICTs.1117  
Furthermore, PICTs raised the need for adequate management action under the Commission’s 
standing agenda item on special requirements from its 2012 session onwards,1118 and 
 
agree to a SPA TRP from 2016 to 2017, and again to 2018: WCPFC, Summary Report, 13th reg sess, 5−9 
December 2016, 45 [314]; WCPFC14 Summary Report (n 834) 37 [188]. In 2017, some FFA members were 
prepared to call a vote rather than delay the adoption of a SPA TRP again: WCPFC14 Summary Report (n 834) 
36−7 [180]−[187]. 
1113 WCPF Convention (n 46) art 5(b).  
1114 Ibid.  
1115 Ibid art 30(2)(a)−(c).  
1116 Ibid art 5(h).   
1117 Ibid art 5(c), art 6(1)(b).  
1118 See, e.g., WCPFC9 Summary Report (n 893) 11 [83]; WCPFC, Summary Report, 10th reg sess, 2−6 
December 2013 15 [97]. 
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regularly incorporated associated management actions, such as the establishment of a TRP 
for the stock, as an item on the SIDS Checklist1119.  
While the WCPFC has taken early management decisions in response to PICTs’ concerns, 
there are gaps between these actions and the WCPFC differentiation framework. For 
example, the current interim TRP merely anticipates a future catch limit. While the 
Commission is developing a SPA ‘roadmap’, it has yet to set a deadline for agreement on an 
improved SPA catch limit (derived from the TRP). Therefore, while the interim SPA TRP 
represents progress in negotiations, actual conditions in the SPA fishery remain the same and 
will continue to have impacts on PICTs until catch limits for members are set out in a revised 
CMM.  
In the case of SPA, the WCPFC has failed to address core obligations contained in its 
differentiation framework. In a broad sense, economic conditions in the fishery will continue 
to impact coastal communities in PICTs, including artisanal fishers and cannery workers, 
until the WCPFC adopts and implements a new catch limit. Furthermore, the longer the 
Commission takes to set a revised catch limit, the greater the likelihood that impacts will 
worsen and require increasingly drastic management action to recover the SPA fishery.  
The current CMM operating in the fishery⎯CMM 2015-02⎯contains the same catch limit 
the Commission has used since 2005. The Commission continues to implement this catch 
limit, despite being made aware by the SC of its impacts (local depletions and lower catch 
rates) as early as 2006.1120 Some DWFSs, specifically China and Taiwan, have repeatedly 
dismissed arguments on this effort limit’s impacts on PICTs’ domestic fishing and processing 
operations and have actively blocked consensus to revise it in negotiations.1121 The repeated 
failure of the Commission to revise the SPA catch limit, despite increasingly dire appeals 
from PICTs, representatives of the domestic tuna industry, and NGOs represents a lack of 
 
1119 See WCPFC9 SIDS Checklist (n 505) (ii); WCPFC10 SIDS Checklist (n 505) 1; WCPFC11 SIDS Checklist 
(n 505) (iv); WCPFC12 SIDS Checklist (n 505) (iii).  
1120 Langley (n 1103). 




consideration for the special requirements of PICTs as they are articulated in the WCPFC 
differentiation framework. 
This Policy Example draws attention to the link established in both UNFSA and the WCPF 
Convention between the obligation to take into account special requirements and the duty to 
cooperate.1122 Vicuña argues that ‘Because [special requirements] is expressly linked to the 
duty to cooperate it can be argued that such a duty will not be properly discharged unless this 
requirement is satisfactorily met’.1123 It would appear that DWFS members have not 
satisfactorily taken into account the special requirements of PICTs, or properly discharged 
their duty to cooperate within the WCPFC, given their repeated refusal to respond to calls to 
revise the effort limit on SPA, which remains the same after 15 years.  
Nevertheless, while the WCPFC’s management actions (or lack thereof) indicate a broader 
violation of treaty law, the Commission’s repeated failure to honour its own timeline to agree 
on a SPA TRP does not. This is because the commitments set out by the Commission, first in 
the Harvest Strategy Workplan from 2015 and later at WCPFC13 in 2016, were non-
binding.1124 In the instance where the Commission did use binding language at WCPFC14 in 
2017, members succeeded in adopting an interim SPA TRP at WCPFC15 in 2018.1125  
The Commission’s management actions should be considered in light of broader policy 
developments among PICs that are coastal states in the SPA fishery. As Chapter 4 discussed, 
South Pacific coastal states began to organise subregionally to manage the SPA fishery in 
2010.1126 Supported by the New Zealand Government, six PICs negotiated and signed the Te 
Vaka Moana Arrangement, which established Te Vaka Moana (TVM), a subregional 
organisation focused on shared fisheries such as SPA.1127 TVM members submitted a formal 
statement on SPA to the Commission in 2012 at WCPFC9.1128  
 
1122 UNFSA (n 10) art 24(2); WCPF Convention (n 46) art 30(2). 
1123 Vicuña, Changing Law of High Seas Fisheries (n 370) 225.  
1124 See, e.g., use of the phrase ‘possible adoption of an interim [TRP] for the [SPA] stock’ in the WCPFC13 
summary report: WCPFC, Summary Report, 13th reg sess, 5−9 December 2016 (‘WCPFC13 Summary Report’). 
1125 Contrast this language with use of the phrase ‘shall adopt a [TRP] for [SPA]’ in the WCPFC14 summary 
report: WCPFC14 Summary Report (n 834). 
1126 Chapter 4 Section III C.   
1127 Te Vaka Moana Arrangement (n 892) [5.1]. 
1128 WCPFC9 Summary Report (n 893) att O.  
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After proposals to revise the SPA CMM failed at the WCPFC, the FFA also began to focus 
its efforts on subregional collective action.1129 In 2014, the FFA facilitated the signature of 
the Tokelau Arrangement,1130 which foresees the development of a SPA management 
scheme1131 and sets out initial, non-binding1132 catch limits in EEZs of 12 members1133. 
Signatories of the Tokelau Arrangement have convened several meetings under FFA auspices 
since 2014, though members have struggled to reach agreement on binding catch limits.1134  
Subregional SPA management actions invoke other provisions in WCPFC treaty law that 
articulate the need to avoid a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto PICs.1135 
Since the beginning of their efforts to manage SPA, PICs have shown a willingness to take 
action on deteriorating conditions in the SPA fishery, including through the adoption of EEZ 
catch limits while WPCFC negotiations on adjacent high seas areas have stalled. If members 
of the Tokelau Arrangement succeed in adopting binding EEZ catch limits before a new catch 
limit is adopted by the WCPFC, conditions in the SPA fishery will clearly place a 
disproportionate burden on PICs.  
The Commission’s management actions reveal that the WCPFC has failed to address 
concerns about the impacts of conditions in the fishery on local industries and communities 
that rely on SPA. The Commission has only committed to interim actions that have yet to 
result in concrete catch limits to constrain fishing pressure on SPA and alleviate impacts on 
PICTs. As more time elapses before adequate management action is taken, these impacts are 
 
1129 For insight into the rationale of FFA leadership at the time the Tokelau Arrangement was adopted, see 
James Movick, ‘South Pacific Albacore Tuna Crisis: Collective Action of the Pacific Islands is the Way 
Forward’ (Press Release, FFA, April 2014) <http://www.pimrisportal.org/news/205-south-pacific-albacore-
tuna-crisis-collective-action-of-the-pacific-islands-is-the-way-forward>. 
1130 TKA (n 895).  
1131 Ibid 4.3(b). 
1132 Ibid 3.1.  
1133 Ibid Note.  
1134 See Emmanuel Samoglou, ‘A Pacific Dilemma⎯How to Fish the World’s Biggest Ocean When Tuna are 
Scarce’, Matangi Tonga Online (online, 6 December 2017) <https://matangitonga.to/2017/12/06/pacific-
dilemma-how-fish-world-s-biggest-ocean-when-tuna-are-scarce>. The Solomon Islands exited the TKA in 2017: 
Ronald Toito’ona, ‘We Are Out’, Solomon Star (online, 4 December 2017) 
<https://www.solomonstarnews.com/index.php/news/national/item/19724-we-are-out>. 
1135 See WCPF Convention (n 46) art 30(2)(c); CMM 2013-06 (n 460) paras (1)–(2); CMM 2013-07 (n 460) 
paras (1)–(2). The example of the SPA stock implicates a number of other obligations for WCPFC members that 
are not related to differentiation. These obligations include provisions in WCPFC treaty law on applying the 
precautionary approach by developing reference points and ensuring that CMMs are compatible with fishing 
regulations within areas under national jurisdiction: WCPF Convention (n 46) art 5(c), art 6(1)(a), (2), art 8. 
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ongoing; and it remains to be seen whether a revised WCPFC SPA catch limit will provide an 
appropriate response.  
B Policy Example D: IOTC Management of the Southwest Indian Ocean (SWIO) Yellowfin 
Stock and Impacts on SWIO Cannery Workers 
1 Overview of Yellowfin Fishery and IOTC Resolutions 
The YFT stock is critical to the socio-economic benefits IOCs receive from tuna production 
in the region. YFT is responsible for supporting IO coastal communities in two ways. First, it 
directly sources multiple artisanal fisheries in the region.1136 Second, YFT has long been 
harvested by the industrial purse seine fleet in the WIO, which, in turn, supplies canneries in 
the region that provide local employment⎯primarily in Seychelles, Mauritius, and 
Madagascar.1137  
Since 2015, the IOTC has been aware that the IO YFT stock is overfished. SC reporting from 
three stock assessments conducted in 2015, 2016, and 2018 have confirmed this.1138 The most 
recent stock assessment determined that the MSY for the YFT stock is 403,000 mt.1139 
According to the IOTC’s catch history, YFT catches have reached and exceeded this MSY at 
various points: first in 1993, then in 2004, and, more recently, from 2016 up to the 
present.1140 Prior to 2016, the IOTC had no Resolutions in place to restrict YFT catch, aside 
from Resolution 15/08 which applied FAD limitations to purse seiners targeting YFT.1141  
 
1136 See Chapter 5 Section II B. 
1137 See Chapter 5 Section II C.  
1138 The SC first determined with 94% certainty that YFT was overfished in 2015: IOTC, Report of the 18th 
Session of the IOTC SC, IOTC-2015-SC18-R[E], 23−27 November 2015, 84 app XI (‘SC18 Summary Report’). 
In 2016, the SC confirmed that YFT was overfished after conducting a new stock assessment, though it reduced 
the level of certainty to 67.6%: IOTC, Report of the 19th Session of the IOTC SC, IOTC-2016-SC19-R[E], 1−5 
December 2016, 114−6 app XI. Another stock assessment in 2018 reported that YFT continues to be overfished: 
IOTC, Report of the 21st Session of the IOTC SC, IOTC-2018-SC21-R[E], 3−7 December 2018, 131−3 app 11 
(‘SC21 Summary Report’). 
1139 SC21 Summary Report (n 1138) 132. 
1140 Prior to 1980, YFT was almost exclusively caught by longline vessels in the IO, with catches remaining 
below 80,000 mt: IOTC Nominal Catches Database (n 909). YFT catches increased in the 1980s and peaked in 
1993 at 400,000 mt (nearly MSY for the stock): ibid. This rise in catches was due to innovations in fishing gear 
technology and the development of other fisheries (in particular, industrial purse seining) in the IO. YFT catch 
decreased slightly and then increased sharply in 2004 to a record catch of over 520,000 mt: ibid. YFT catch 
decreased again from 2004 to 2007 and fell sharply from 2007 to 2011 as a result of piracy issues in the region: 
ibid. In 2016, YFT catches rose again to above 400,00 mt and have remained around this level up to 2018: ibid. 
1141 IOTC, Procedures on a Fish Aggregating Devices Management Plan, Including a Limitation on the Number 
of FADs, More Detailed Specifications of Catch Reporting from FAD Sets, and the Development of Improved 
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The IOTC has adopted four measures to address the overfished state of the YFT stock, which, 
taken together, comprise the Commission’s interim plan to rebuild the stock. These measures 
include Resolutions 16/01, 17/01, 18/01, and 19/01 (with each subsequent measure replacing 
the other).1142 Importantly, all measures contain largely the same catch limits1143 which 
amount to a 7% reduction in YFT catch from 2014 catch levels.1144 These catch limits 
conflict with SC advice from 2015 that a 20% reduction of YFT catch from 2014 catch levels 
was required for the stock to have a 50% chance of recovery by 2024.1145  
The core of the four measures set out catch limits1146 for different gears, including purse 
seine,1147 gillnet,1148 longline,1149 and ‘other gears’1150. For purse seiners, the measures 
 
FAD Designs to Reduce the Incidence of Entanglement of Non-Target Species, Resolution 15/08, 19th reg sess, 
27 April−1 May 2015, [14].  
1142 IOTC, Resolution 16/01 On an Interim Plan for Rebuilding the Indian Ocean Yellowfin Tuna Stock in the 
IOTC Area of Competence, Resolution 16/01, 20th reg sess, 23−27 May 2016 (‘Resolution 16/01’); IOTC, On an 
Interim Plan for Rebuilding the Indian Ocean Yellowfin Tuna Stock in the IOTC Area of Competence, 
Resolution 17/01, 21st reg sess, 22−26 May 2017 (‘Resolution 17/01’); IOTC, On an Interim Plan for 
Rebuilding the Indian Ocean Yellowfin Tuna Stock in the IOTC Area of Competence, Resolution 18/01, 22nd reg 
sess, 21−25 May 2018 (‘Resolution 18/01’); IOTC, On an Interim Plan for Rebuilding the Indian Ocean 
Yellowfin Tuna Stock in the IOTC Area of Competence, Resolution 19/01, 23rd reg sess, 17−21 June 2019 
(‘Resolution 19/01’).  
1143 Two modifications have altered catch limits in the YFT rebuilding plan. The first is a change to the baseline 
year for catch reductions for members that are SIDS, LDCs, and SVEs. In 2017, these members were allowed to 
choose between the baseline years of 2014 and 2015 in order to increase their catch limits: Resolution 17/01 
[13]. (The adoption of a later baseline year for DCSs shows that this is an example of number (ii) of Rajamani’s 
categories for differentiated implementation: see Chapter 1 Section II B1.) The second is an additional purse 
seine catch limit for SIDS for 2019 and 2020. SIDS that caught less than 4% of total YFT catch in 2017 are 
required to reduce their purse seine catch by 7.5% of 2018 catch: Resolution 19/01 [10]. 
1144 Jessica Rattle, A Case Study on the Management of Yellowfin Tuna by the IOTC (Blue Marine Foundation 
Information Paper, No IOTC-2019-S23-INF14) 18 June 2019. 
1145 SC18 Summary Report (n 1138). 
1146 The catch limits imposed across all four measures only apply to vessels that the IOTC does not classify as 
‘artisanal’: See Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 2 [1]; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 2 [1]; Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) 3 
[1]; Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [1]. The catch limits also apply only to vessels that caught over a certain amount 
of YFT in 2014. Resolution 18/01 does not provide substantive revisions, but simply clarifies the definition of a 
‘supply vessel’ to include a ‘support vessel’: Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) 4. 
1147 Members reporting purse seine catches over 5000 mt for 2014 are obliged to reduce their catches by 15% of 
2014 catch levels: See Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 2 [3]; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 2 [3]; Resolution 18/01 (n 
1142) 3 [3]; Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [5]. 
1148 Members reporting gillnet catches over 2000 mt for 2014 are obliged to reduce their catches by 10% of 2014 
catch levels: See Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 2 [4]; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 3 [4]; Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) 4 
[4]; Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [6]. 
1149 Members reporting longline catches over 5000 mt for 2014 are obliged to reduce their catches by 10% of 
2014 catch levels: See Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 2 [5]; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 3 [5]; Resolution 18/01 (n 
1142) 4 [5]; Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [7]. 
1150 Members reporting catches for ‘other gears’ over 5000 mt for 2014 are obliged to reduce their catches by 
5% of 2014 catch levels: See Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 2 [6]; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 3 [6]; Resolution 18/01 
(n 1142) 4 [6]; Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [8]. While no definition is provided, it may be assumed that ‘other 
gears’ are all gears excluding purse seine, gillnet, and longline.  
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contain increasingly restrictive limits on the use of FADs and supply vessels.1151 The 
measures also create reporting requirements for members, institute penalties for lack of 
compliance with catch limits,1152 and set deadlines for subsequent actions by the 
Commission. These deadlines are for conducting additional stock assessments,1153 taking 
measures to manage artisanal YFT catch,1154 evaluating the effectiveness of each measure,1155 
and reviewing the interim plan in 20201156.  
2 IOTC Negotiations on YFT 
Negotiations on the Commission’s interim plan for rebuilding the YFT stock have centred on 
its impact on coastal communities in IOCs. Although all three measures exempt artisanal 
vessels from YFT catch limits, the Commission faced unforeseen impacts on coastal 
communities in the WIO in 2017.  
In 2017, multiple IOCs submitted proposals to amend Resolution 16/01.1157 Seychelles and 
Mauritius argued that catch limits for purse seiners (which had come into effect in January) 
 
1151 The first measure, Resolution 16/01, listed the existing limit for FADs in Resolution 15/08, which was a 
total of 1275 FADs: Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 2 [3]. It also limited the number of supply vessels to half of the 
number of active purse seine vessels: at ibid. Resolution 17/01 further restricted the number of FADs to 1050: 
Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 3 [3], and introduced a stepped plan to reduce the overall number of supply vessels 
operating in the IO from 2018 to 2022, requiring that no more than one supply vessel could support a purse 
seiner: at ibid. Resolution 18/01 set out the same limits to FAD and supply vessels: Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) 
3−4 [3]. Resolution 19/01 does not include FAD limits, but sets out the same limits on supply vessels as 
Resolution 17/01: Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [16]−[17]. Resolution 19/01 also provides that supply vessel limits 
do not apply to members with only one supply vessel: ibid [18]. The likely reason that FAD limits are not 
included in Resolution 19/01 is because of the limits already adopted in Resolution 19/02: IOTC, Procedures on 
a FADs Management Plan, Resolution 19/02, 17−21 June 2019 [4].  
1152 Penalties are only included in Resolution 19/01: see Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [13]−[15].  
1153 Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 3 [9]; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 4 [9]; Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) 4−5 [9].  
1154 Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 3 [11]; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 4 [11]; Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) 5 [11]. Since 
2016, the Commission has had a deadline to ‘take appropriate measures’ to manage the artisanal YFT fishery by 
2018. It is unclear whether the IOTC has taken management actions in view of this obligation: see Resolution 
19/01 (n 1142).  
1155 The SC was required to evaluate the effectiveness of the measures set out in the rebuilding plan in 2018 and 
2019: Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 3 [10]; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 4 [10]; Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) 5 [10]; 
Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [30].  
1156 Originally, the Commission was obliged to review the interim plan for rebuilding the YFT stock in 2019: 
Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 3 [12]; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) 4 [12]; Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) 5 [12]. In 2019, 
the Commission adopted Resolution 19/01 as an interim measure and set a deadline for another review in 2020: 
Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [2]. 
1157 The separate proposals were originally submitted by Mauritius, Seychelles and (jointly) South Africa, and 
Maldives: IOTC, Amendments to Resolution 16/01: On an Interim Plan for Rebuilding the IO YFT, IOTC-2017-
S21-PropD[E], 21st reg sess, 21 April 2017; IOTC, On an Interim Plan for Rebuilding the IO YFT Stock in the 
IOTC Area of Competence, IOTC-2017-S21-PropE[E], 21st reg sess, 12 April 2017; IOTC, Proposal to Amend 
16/01: On an Interim Plan for Rebuilding the IO YFT Stock in the IOTC Area of Competence, IOTC-2017-S21-
PropI[E], 21st reg sess, 21 April 2017. These proposals were combined later in the meeting and sponsored by 
several additional IOCs. 
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were resulting in fleet dynamics that were likely to cause an early closure of the fishing 
season.1158 This change in supply to local canneries would require large numbers of workers 
to lose work for several months.1159 IOCs proposed to take measures to decrease the 
efficiency of purse seiners harvesting YFT.1160 They argued that this could be accomplished 
through further restrictions on the use of FADs and supply vessels, so that purse seiners 
would take longer to reach YFT catch limits.1161 Additional restrictions would extend the 
season and thereby keep cannery workers in the region employed for longer.1162 Seychelles 
also argued that the baseline year for reducing YFT catch in the measure⎯2014⎯imposed a 
disproportionate burden of conservation action on IOCs that were SIDS, LDCs, and 
SVEs.1163 Seychelles proposed that these IOCs be allowed the option of choosing 2014 or 
2015 as their baseline year for reducing YFT catch.1164 Despite vocal resistance from 
DWFSs, these concerns were reflected in the adoption of Resolution 17/01.1165  
As the IOTC has progressed its interim plan, it has focused devising appropriate limits to 
reduce fishing pressure. In 2019, a paper submitted to the WPTT suggested that effort, rather 
than catch limits may be better suited to the fishery due to the intermeshed manner in which 
YFT is caught with other tropical tuna species.1166 While this may provide a path forward, 
IOTC management actions on YFT continue to be adopted in the uncertain context of stalled 
negotiations on allocation criteria.1167 Some commentators have argued that the inability of 
the IOTC to progress allocation negotiations has resulted in higher overall catches in recent 
years, including for YFT, because members are incentivised to pad out their historical catch 
numbers to increase their future share of the fishery.1168  
 
1158 Author’s fieldnotes, IOTC21 plenary, 25 May 2017. See also Angela Abolhassani, ‘Tuna Fisheries and 
Geopolitical Change: Coastal and Fishing Country Tensions Resurface at the IOTC’ (2017) 10(1) Australian 
Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs 35, 37−8. 
1159 Ibid. 
1160 Ibid.  
1161 Ibid.  
1162 Ibid.  
1163 Ibid.  
1164 Ibid.  
1165 See IOTC21 Summary Report (n 542) 93 app 8.  
1166 Gorka Merino et al, Prospects for an Effort-Based management of IO YFT, IOTC-2018-WPTT20-43, 20th 
reg sess of WPTT, 16 October 2018.  
1167 More detailed information on these negotiations is provided in Policy Example F below.  
1168 See, e.g., Jeremy Noye and Kwame Mfodwo, ‘First Steps Towards a Quota Allocation System in the Indian 
Ocean’ (2011) 30 Marine Policy 882, 885−6. For a detailed discussion of the phenomenon of the perverse, 
short-term effects of negotiating a quota allocation system based on historical catches⎯sometimes referred to as 
the ‘announcement effect’⎯see also: Palma (n 81) 146−7; Lodge et al (n 66) 41.  
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3 Policy Outcome 
Reflecting calls from IOCs that the Commission redesign the purse seine limits on YFT catch 
to protect the livelihoods of cannery workers in the WIO, the IOTC adopted changes to its 
interim plan to rebuild the YFT stock in 2017. Resolution 17/01 retained the same limit on 
purse seine catches, but required a further reduction in the number of FADs and supply 
vessels used by purse seiners, and set out a plan to oversee a gradual reduction in the use of 
supply vessels by 2022. The provisions on supply vessels provided that the IOTC would not 
allow for the inclusion of new or additional supply vessels on its vessel registry after 2017 
and obliged flag states to submit a ‘supply vessel reduction plan’ to the SC by the end of 
2017.1169 
In addition, Resolution 17/01 granted SIDS, LDCs and/or SVEs the option of choosing 
between 2014 and 2015 as baseline years for their catch reductions.1170 Only Seychelles 
selected the alternative baseline year of 2015 reducing its purse seine catches.1171 Finally, 
Resolution 17/01 provided language in its preamble referring to the IOTC differentiation 
framework, including article V(2), sub-paras (b) and (d) of the IOTC Agreement. The 
preamble further recognises that the IOTC is obliged to ensure that Resolutions do not 
transfer a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing states, especially 
SIDS, under article V(2)(d).1172  
In accordance with its interim plan, the IOTC reviewed the effectiveness of its actions to 
rebuild the YFT stock in 2018. Upon reviewing YFT catch levels, the SC found that overall 
catches had increased by 3%.1173 Further analysis of the fleets subject to catch limits revealed 
that four members⎯the EU, Seychelles, Iran, and Maldives⎯had violated their catch limits. 
Of these members, the EU had not made large enough reductions in their catch; the remaining 
three IOCs had increased their catch.1174 Further analysis revealed that a larger number of 
fleets was exempted from catch limits in Resolution 17/01 and that these fleets had greatly 
 
1169 Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) [3] sub-paras (c), (iii).  
1170 Ibid 4 [13].  
1171 SC21 Summary Report (n 1138) 39 Table 3.  
1172 Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) Preamble paras 16, 17.  
1173 SC21 Summary Report (n 1138) 39 [124].  
1174 The EU reduced purse seine catches by 5% rather than the requisite 15%. Seychelles increased its purse 
seine catches by 7%, Iran increased its gillnet catches by 33%, and the Maldives increased its hand-line catches 
by 1%: ibid 39−40 Table 3.  
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increased their YFT catches, some by over 1000%.1175 Therefore, a large part of the increase 
in YFT catches was attributed to exempted fleets.1176 Despite the proven ineffectiveness of 
catch limits in the interim plan, the Commission made few changes in 2018.  
In 2019, the IOTC revisited its interim plan.1177 At IOTC23, the Commission adopted another 
interim measure containing the same catch limits as those set out in previous measures.1178 
Resolution 19/01 closes loopholes that distorted catch limits in previous measures,1179 
imposes penalties for over-catch of YFT,1180 and sets out additional requirements on the use 
of gillnets with a view to phasing out their use in the IO1181. The revised measure also 
provides that the Secretariat circulate a table of catch limits to members every December1182 
and that the SC will evaluate the effectiveness of the measure in 20191183.  
It remains to be seen how Resolution 19/01 will resolve issues with the IOTC’s management 
of the YFT stock. In a rare occurrence, India has submitted an objection to the measure and is 
therefore not subject to YFT catch limits.1184 The preamble of Resolution 19/01 refers to new 
scientific advice that the YFT stock requires a 20% catch reduction from 2017 levels to have 
a 50% probability of recovery by 2027.1185 This scientific advice is not reflected in the catch 
limits in the current measure, which are based on 2015 (for Seychelles, 2014) catch levels. As 
was the case in Policy Example C, the IOTC’s decision to retain the same catch limits in the 
 
1175 10 fleets were exempt from purse seine catch reductions, 20 fleets from longline catch reductions, 16 fleets 
from gillnet catch reductions and 22 fleets from reductions for ‘other gears’: ibid. Fleets flagged to Comoros, 
Iran, Mauritius, and Mozambique increased their YFT catch by over 1000%: ibid. 
1176 While total YFT catches increased by 3% in 2017, total YFT catches among members subject to the catch 
limits contained in the measure decreased by 1%: ibid.  
1177 IOTC23 Summary Report (n 768) 47−8. The deadline to review the interim plan was originally agreed in 
2016: Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) 3 [12]. 
1178 Resolution 19/01 (n 1142).   
1179 From 2017 onwards, any exempted member which exceeds its YFT catch limits is obliged to reduce its 
catches: Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) [11]. 
1180 If a member’s YFT catches from 2017 to 2019 exceed their total YFT catch limit for those three years, the 
over-catch will be deducted from their 2021 YFT catch limit. This penalty is adjusted for SIDS and LDCs. After 
2020, if a member exceeds its YFT catch limit, the over-catch will be deducted from its YFT catch limit over 
the next two years. If over-catch occurs over two or more consecutive years, an additional 25% will be deducted 
from its YFT catch limit over the next two years: ibid [13]−[15]. 
1181 Resolution 19/01 obliges all members to set gillnets at a 2m depth from the surface by 2023. The measure 
also includes non-binding language on phasing out or converting gillnet fleets and increasing observer coverage 
of gillnet vessels by 10%: ibid [21]−[24]. 
1182 Ibid [25]. 
1183 Ibid [30]. 
1184 IOTC, Objection from India to IOTC Resolution 19/01 On an Interim Plan for Rebuilding the IO YFT Stock 
in the IOTC Area of Competence, IOTC Circular 2019-35, 4 September 2−19. 
1185 Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) Preamble para 10. 
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YFT fishery is problematic. These catch limits do not reflect scientific advice and are likely 
to result in ongoing impacts on local employment and artisanal fisheries in IOCs.  
4 Comparison with IOTC Differentiation Framework 
The IOTC differentiation framework provides little guidance to the Commission for 
addressing the case of the YFT stock. The preambles of YFT measures after 2017 
nevertheless point to article V(2) of the IOTC Agreement1186 and Resolution 12/01.  
The preambles of Resolution 17/01, 18/01, and 19/01 elaborate on differentiation provisions 
in the IOTC Agreement. One preambular paragraph repeated in all three measures notes that 
article V(2)(b), which sets out a soft obligation for the IOTC to engage in research and 
development activities on IOTC fisheries, also contains ‘full recognition [of] the special 
interests and needs of Members in the region that are developing countries’.1187 Another 
preambular paragraph notes that article V(2)(d), which obliges the IOTC to review socio-
economic data on IOTC fisheries, further obliges the Commission to ensure that 
‘conservation and management measures do not result in transferring, directly or indirectly, a 
disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States, especially [SIDS]’.1188 
These paragraphs extend IOTC Agreement obligations to include formal recognition of the 
special interests and needs of IOCs and avoiding placing a disproportionate burden of 
conservation action onto IOCs.  
Preambular paragraphs in all four YFT measures also reference language on states’ 
application of the precautionary approach from article 6 of UNFSA.1189 The relevant 
paragraph in Resolution 19/01 also references Resolution 12/01, which emphasises the 
precautionary approach in the context of the IOTC’s development of reference points and 
harvest control rules.1190 This reference establishes a link between the IOTC’s application of 
 
1186 IOTC Agreement (n 47) art V(2) sub-paras b and d. 
1187 Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) Preamble para 16; Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) Preamble para 15; Resolution 19/01 
(n 1142) Preamble para 15.  
1188 Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) Preamble para 17; Resolution 18/01 (n 1142) Preamble para 16; Resolution 19/01 
(n 1142) Preamble para 16. 
1189 Resolution 16/01 (n 1142) Preamble para 6; Resolution 17/01 (n 1142) Preamble para 6; Resolution 18/01 (n 
1142) Preamble para 6; Resolution 19/01 (n 1142) 6. 
1190 IOTC, On the Implementation of the Precautionary Approach, Resolution 12/01, 16th reg sess, 22−26 April 
2012. Resolution 12/01 obliges the Commission to consider uncertainty about ‘socio-economic events’ among 
other uncertainties in determining reference points and harvest control rules: at [3].  
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the precautionary approach and its management of the YFT stock. Given this link, the IOTC 
should consider the current and future status of the YFT stock in light of socio-economic 
conditions in IOCs. While preambular language in treaty law can be used as an interpretive 
aid, it is crucial to acknowledge that this language is not binding on members.  
The IOTC differentiation framework contains broad recognition of the special interests and 
needs of developing members. This recognition has a bearing on YFT management due to the 
relationship of the YFT stock to artisanal fisheries and local canneries in several developing 
IOCs, including SIDS. Furthermore, the IOTC’s binding obligations under article V(2)(d) 
highlights the need for improved data on the precise role of the YFT stock in IOC coastal 
communities.  
Despite this lack of information, IOCs such as Seychelles and Mauritius argued in 2017 at 
IOTC21 that the purse seine catch limits in Resolution 16/01 were likely to have a significant 
impact on local employment in canneries. The Commission responded to these potential 
impacts by revising the purse seine catch limits to include further restrictions on the use of 
FADs and supply vessels. These revisions had the effect of reducing the efficiency of purse 
seiners targeting YFT, extending the fishing season, and alleviating potential impacts on 
employment in local canneries. The actions taken by the IOTC in 2017 show that the 
Commission responded quickly to needs articulated by IOCs. Furthermore, when the SC 
conducted a review of the effectiveness of the interim rebuilding plan in 2018 showing that 
YFT catches had actually increased, the Commission modified new provisions on catch limits 
and penalties for over-catch for SIDS and LDCs in Resolution 19/01. While the broader 
effectiveness of the IOTC’s management of the YFT stock remains in question, the 
Commission’s actions indicate a record of responding to the special interests and needs of 
developing members articulated in the IOTC differentiation framework. 
III OBJECTIVE 3: PROMOTION OF ACCESS TO HIGH SEAS FISHERIES FOR DCSS AND TRFMO 
ALLOCATION SYSTEMS 
The third, final objective of IFL is the promotion of high seas fisheries access for DCSs, 
though recent developments provide only limited support for this objective.1191 UNFSA is the 
 
1191 See Chapter 2 Section II. 
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only binding legal instrument in this analysis to set out a direct obligation that states assist in 
enabling the participation of developing states in high seas fisheries, which includes 
‘facilitating access to such fisheries’.1192 Due to its limited inclusion in IFL instruments⎯and 
substantial debate among both practitioners and scholars as to its content⎯this objective is 
the most contested principle in this analysis.1193 Other than ICCAT, there is little precedent 
among TRFMOs for incorporating DCSs’ access to high seas fisheries into quota allocation 
systems. Lodge et al note the complexities involved in such a task, especially in fully 
exploited tuna fisheries.1194 The authors conclude that 
 Generally, there is limited evidence that RFMOs have yet taken positive steps to increase the 
access of developing States to high seas stocks…In most cases, the criterion of the special 
needs of developing countries is relegated to a subsidiary category of allocation criteria, well 
below elements such as historical catch and record of compliance…The aspirations of 
developing countries are always diluted in this scenario.1195  
DCSs’ access to high seas fisheries is an important element of TRFMOs’ quota allocation 
systems. Over time, the WCPFC and IOTC have adopted measures through short-term, ad-
hoc allocations determined largely through members’ historical fishing activities. More 
recently, both TRFMOs have made concrete commitments to devising long-term quota 
allocation systems. An inherent element of these commitments is the need to address DCSs’ 
legitimate fishing aspirations and prospective fishing rights. Recent trends indicate that the 
WCPFC and IOTC are struggling to deliver on these commitments due to the contested and 
sensitive nature of long-term allocations and its association with value capture within tuna 
GPNs. 
A Policy Example E: Allocation Frameworks within the WCPFC 
1 Overview of WCPFC Negotiations on Allocation Frameworks for High Seas Purse Seine 
and Bigeye Fisheries 
In 2017, the WCPFC agreed to adopt long-term limits for two core components of the WCPO 
tuna fishery. As part of this commitment, the Commission also agreed to devise allocation 
 
1192 UNFSA (n 10) art 25(1)(b).  
1193 See Palma (n 81) 98−100; Lodge et al (n 66) 94−8.  
1194 Lodge et al (n 66) 95.  
1195 Ibid.  
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frameworks for distributing these limits among WCPFC members.1196 CMM 2018-01 
provides that the first of these limits are to be catch or effort limits on the high seas for the 
purse seine fishery;1197 and the second are to be hard limits on the bigeye stock1198. 
Originally, the WCPFC agreed to adopt the first set of limits by 2019 and the second by 
2020.1199  
In 2018, the WCPFC discussed convening a two-day workshop to begin advancing 
negotiations.1200 Initial talks were to cover the first set of limits for the high seas purse seine 
fishery. At WCPFC15, members were presented a draft TOR for the workshop1201 and 
decided could not agree on a primary objective.1202 Deciding against holding the workshop, 
the Commission delayed the deadline for adopting an allocation framework for the high seas 
purse seine fishery to 2020.1203  
WCPFC negotiations to establish hard limits and long-term allocations in the WCPO tuna 
fishery have been much-anticipated by members. The initial commitment in 2017 was 
perceived as a momentous decision by FFA leadership, who viewed long-term allocations on 
the high seas as a vital step towards securing an equitable distribution of WCPO tuna 
resources.1204 Publications dating back to negotiations for the WCPF Convention convey that 
PICs expected the WCPFC to address the allocation issue far earlier in its negotiating history. 
For example, Tarte describes the question of whether WCPFC allocations would cover both 
 
1196 WCPFC, Conservation and Management Measure for Bigeye, Yellowfin and Skipjack Tuna in the WCPO, 
CMM 2017-01, 14th reg sess, 3−7 December 2017, [28], [44] (‘CMM 2017-01’).  
1197 The WCPFC updated its tropical tuna measure in 2018⎯the current measure is CMM 2018-01: CMM 2018-
01 (n 232) [28]. 
1198 Ibid [44]. 
1199 Ibid; CMM 2017-01 (n 1196) [44]. 
1200 WCPFC15 Summary Report (n 1044) 40-1 [237]−[243]. 
1201 Ibid [239].  
1202 Ibid [242]. The EU argued that negotiations for an allocation framework should not only encompass limits 
on the high seas for the purse seine fishery, but also limits for PIC EEZs: at [240]. It is significant that this 
negotiating stance conflicts with the clearly worded commitment to an allocation framework for the high seas 
purse seine fishery contained in CMM 2017-01: (n 1196) [28].  
1203 WCPFC15 Summary Report (n 1044) 41 [243]. 
1204 See Fatu Tauafiafi, Jemima Garrett, and Lisa Williams-Lahari, ‘UNPLUGGED: Impacts of 2018 Tuna 
Commission Measures on Pacific Island Fisheries’ (Media Release, Pacific Islands Oceanic Fisheries 
Management Project, 3 February 2018) <http://www.tunapacific.org/2018/02/03/unplugged-impacts-of-2018-
tuna-commission-measures-on-pacific-island-fisheries/>. After the adoption of CMM 2017-01, then-Deputy 
Director General of the FFA, Wez Norris stated that:  
The agreement to High Seas allocation is a really large step forward in terms of other Commission members 
recognising the needs of SIDS…This is a real, tangible way that the Commission can implement [article 30 
of the WCPF Convention]. It is not about development funding or assistance for meeting participation⎯it is 
about actually structuring management measures that will benefit SIDS in the region: ibid. 
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EEZs and high seas areas as a contentious issue in negotiations for the WCPF Convention.1205 
According to Tarte, negotiators resolved conflicting views by leaving the relevant provision 
ambiguous.1206 Article 10 of the WCPF Convention therefore only sets out criteria and 
principles to guide allocations and does not explicitly require the Commission to take 
allocation decisions.1207 Negotiators also quarantined allocation decisions through an article 
obliging the Commission to decide on allocation matters through consensus only.1208 
Expectations that the Commission would address allocation faded as members repeatedly 
deferred negotiations in favour of short-term measures with de facto allocations determined 
by historical fishing activities. Consequently, WCPFC members’ commitment to hard limits 
and allocation frameworks in 2017 represented the Commission’s first step towards 
addressing the issue of long-term catch/effort allocations in over 15 years. 
2 Policy Outcome 
At the time of writing, it is unclear how the WCPFC will progress negotiations for long-term 
allocations into the future.   
3 Comparison with WCPFC Differentiation Framework  
The WCPFC differentiation framework anticipates establishing a long-term system for 
distributing allocations of TAC and/or TAE. According to the WCPF Convention, a function 
of the Commission is to develop criteria for determining allocations among members.1209 The 
WCPF Convention sets out ten factors the Commission is required to consider in developing 
allocation criteria, some of which reflect differentiation.1210 Two factors provide explicit and 
direct differentiation advantaging PICTs: the first is the special needs of PICTs resulting from 
 
1205 Tarte (n 48) 204. 
1206 Ibid 213.  
1207 WCPF Convention (n 46) art 10(3), (4).    
1208 Ibid art 10(4).  
1209 WCPF Convention (n 46) art 10(1)(g). Lodge et al discuss how the WCPF Convention uniquely sets out this 
obligation:  
The exception is the WCPFC, which is unique in including in its constituent treaty the requirement that the 
Commission will develop criteria for the allocation of catch or effort and in setting out some of the factors 
that the Commission must take into account in doing so. These factors include a very specific recognition of 
the circumstances of developing States in the region: Lodge et al (n 66) 96 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).  
1210 Ibid art 10(3). 
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their dependency on the relevant fish stock;1211 the second is the fishing interests and 
aspirations of PICTs which have EEZs where the relevant fish stock occurs.1212  
Two additional factors provide indirect, implicit differentiation that appear to favour 
allocations for DCSs: the needs of dependent coastal communities that fish for the relevant 
fish stock;1213 and the respective interests of existing participants in the fishery (including the 
extent to which catch is being utilised for domestic consumption). This second factor may 
apply to subsistence fisheries and coastal communities that rely on fresh and canned tuna for 
food security within PICTs.1214 Accordingly, the WCPFC would be required to take these 
factors (among the others contained in article 10) into account in allocating hard limits for the 
high seas purse seine fishery and bigeye stock.  
During deliberations in 2018, Japan argued that negotiations for allocation frameworks 
governing the high seas purse seine fishery and bigeye stock were distinct from negotiations 
for the allocation criteria provided for under article 10 of the WCPF Convention.1215 While it 
remains to be seen how members will conduct negotiations at this early stage, Japan’s 
intervention conflicted with the inclusion of references to article 10(3) in CMM 2017-01.1216 
If members do not regard the factors contained in article 10(3) as relevant to their 
negotiations for allocation frameworks, it is possible differentiation will only play a marginal 
role in the determination of final allocations.  
Another relevant part of the WCPFC differentiation framework focuses on the Commission’s 
role in promoting the fishing interests and aspirations of PICTs. In this respect, the WCPFC 
 
1211 Ibid art 10(3)(d). 
1212 Ibid art 10(3)(j).  
1213 Ibid art 10(3)(g).  
1214 Ibid art 10(3)(b). Recently, Bell et al have argued that under conditions of climate change, PICTs may need 
to diversify traditional food sources to increase food security for coastal communities as reef fisheries decline; 
this may require increasing domestic consumption of tuna: Bell et al (n 27). 
1215 WCPFC15 Summary Report (n 1044) 41 [240]. 
1216 ‘By 2019 the Commission shall agree on hard effort or catch limits in the high seas of the Convention Area 
and a framework for the allocation of those limits in the high seas … that adequately take into account Articles 
8, 10(3) and 30 of the Convention’: CMM 2017-01 (n 1196) (emphasis added). ‘By 2020 the Commission shall 
agree on hard limits for bigeye and a framework to allocate those limits … that adequately take into account 
Articles 8, 10(3) and 30 of the Convention’: at 44 (emphasis added).  
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has set out soft legal obligations to support the development of the domestic tuna sector 
within PICTs in Resolution 2008-01 and CMM 2013-07.1217  
Given the nascency of allocation negotiations at the WCPFC, it is difficult to determine 
whether the agreed allocation frameworks will produce allocations that address high seas 
fisheries access for PICTs. It is nevertheless clear that the Commission has failed to address 
its obligation to develop allocation criteria for over 15 years and that this status quo will 
remain until allocation negotiations begin in earnest. 
B Policy Example F: Allocation Criteria within the IOTC 
1 Overview of IOTC Allocation Negotiations  
IOTC members have been negotiating a quota allocation system for IO tuna stocks for nearly 
a decade. Allocation negotiations at the IOTC are therefore more advanced than those 
currently underway at the WCPFC. More recently, negotiations have been guided by 
revisions to two proposals representing the majority views of members.1218 These views are 
those of IOCs, formally negotiating as the G16, and those of the region’s DWFSs, formally 
led by the EU.1219 Both allocation proposals incorporate elements of differentiation 
advantaging DCSs. Despite longstanding points of difference that continue to stall 
negotiations, both sides support operationalising differentiation within the IOTC’s quota 
allocation scheme. However, recent allocation proposals differ substantially on whether 
differentiation will play a central role in determining final allocations.  
The current G16 allocation proposal weaves provisions accommodating the special 
requirements of IOCs throughout its scheme, including, in its first principles; how allocations 
 
1217 Resolution 2008-01 (n 459); CMM 2013-07 (n 460) [12]−[18].  
1218 The IOTC began working from two majority view proposals in 2016 at the third meeting of the Technical 
Committee on Allocation Criteria (TCAC): IOTC, Report of the 3rd TCAC, IOTC-2016-TCAC03-R[E], 21−23 
February 2016, 9 [30]−[32], 10 [51] (‘TCAC3 Summary Report’).  
1219 IOTC negotiations on a quota allocation system have formally excluded Taiwan, as is not a member of the 
Commission, though they delegates do attend TCAC negotiations as ‘invited experts’ with observer status. The 
TCAC first flagged this issue at TCAC3 in 2016: at 9 [32]. At TCAC4 in 2018, one area of consensus among 
negotiators obliquely referred to Taiwan’s membership status in the IOTC: ‘Any final and adopted allocation 
scheme should provide language that is inclusive of a long-term participating fishing fleet’:  IOTC, Report of the 
4th TCAC, IOTC-2018-TCAC04-R[E], 5−7 February 2018, 8 [17] sub-para ii (‘TCAC4 Summary Report’). 
Recent allocation proposals have nevertheless allocated Taiwan’s catch limit to China: see, e.g., IOTC, On the 
Allocation of Fishing Opportunities for IOTC Species, IOTC-2019-S23-PropA[E], 23rd reg sess, 17−21 June 
2019, 1 Explanatory Memorandum (‘G16 Allocation Proposal’).   
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are to be calculated and weighted; and how the burden of future downward adjustments to 
TAC will impact individual allocations. The EU allocation proposal does not incorporate 
provisions advantaging IOCs into its calculation of core allocations, but rather allows for 
marginal, additional allocations through a ‘complementary allocation’ and ‘correction factor’.  
In 2019, the results of simulations were presented to illustrate the allocation outcomes of both 
allocation proposals⎯this did little to advance negotiations. It remains to be seen whether the 
IOTC will conclude discussions and adopt a quota allocation system in the near term. While 
it appears IOTC members agree to incorporating the special requirements of IOCs into the 
Commission’s quota allocation system (including taking into account their dependence on 
fish stocks and fishing aspirations), the G16 and DWFSs remain divided on how to 
operationalise this principle. In addition, the seemingly intractable issue of the attribution of 
historical catch taken within IOC EEZs continues to loom large over negotiations.  
2 History of IOTC Allocation Negotiations: 2011 to Present 
The IOTC first discussed a quota allocation system in 2009, when the initial performance 
review of the Commission recommended that members ‘explore the advantages and 
disadvantages’ of devising a system for allocating fishing quota.1220 That year, the EU 
submitted the first proposal to the Commission, setting out catch limits for the region’s 
yellowfin, bigeye, and swordfish stocks.1221 Allocations were largely based on the historical 
catch of members and, after being deemed unacceptable by IOCs, the proposal was not 
adopted.1222  
The following year, the IOTC adopted Resolution 10/01, calling for the Commission to 
convene a technical meeting to discuss allocation criteria and recommend a quota allocation 
system.1223 Resolution 10/01 was also adopted to respond to increasing concerns for the status 
of the region’s yellowfin and bigeye stocks.1224 In this context, the Commission was obliged 
 
1220 IOTC, Report of the 13th Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2009-S13-R[E], 30 March-3 April 2009, app I 57 [46].  
1221 Ibid 12 [49]−[50]. 
1222 Ibid. 
1223 Resolution 10/01 (n 256) [12].  
1224 IOTC, Report of the 14th Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2010-S14-R[E], 1−5 March 2010, 8 [18], 12 [42]−[44]. 
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to determine a quota allocation system or ‘other relevant measure’ for these stocks by 
2012.1225  
The Technical Committee on Allocation Criteria (TCAC) held its first meeting in 2011, and 
has subsequently convened four more meetings (in 2013, 2016, 2018, and 2019). Over time, 
Resolution 10/01 was replaced by Resolution 12/131226 and Resolution 14/02,1227 which 
eliminated provisions on an area closure for yellowfin and bigeye catches, and removed the 
2012 deadline for agreement on a quota allocation system.1228 Since 2011, the IOTC has 
failed to adopt a quota allocation system for any of the species under its mandate. 
3 Primary Issues in IOTC Allocation Negotiations 
Several issues have thwarted the IOTC’s efforts to establish a quota allocation system. While 
difficult to provide a full survey, it is possible to isolate a few central issues that have vexed 
negotiators. The first is the need to assess, reconcile, and finalise the IOTC’s historical catch 
records. In TRFMOs that have instituted quota allocation schemes, a reliable record of 
historical catches has been necessary to establish baseline allocations for fishery users. The 
Commission requested the Secretariat to provide information on the quality of historical catch 
data for all fleets,1229 consult with members to reconcile this data,1230 and finalise historical 
catch data from 1950 to 2016 for all members1231. The IOTC Secretariat has reported to the 
Commission that catch estimates in the IOTC database are generally considered heavily 
approximated and incomplete.1232 In particular, the IOTC database does not currently provide 
 
1225 Resolution 10/01 (n 256) [13].  
1226 IOTC, For the Conservation and Management of Tropical Tuna Stocks in the IOTC Area of Competence, 
Resolution 12/13, 16th reg sess, 22−26 April 2012. 
1227 IOTC, IOTC, For the Conservation and Management of Tropical Tuna Stocks in the IOTC Area of 
Competence, Resolution 14/02, 18th reg sess, 1−5 June 2014. 
1228 The Commission has since acknowledged that the ‘implementation of a quota system may take several 
years’: IOTC, Report of the 15th Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2011-S15-R[E], 18−22 March 2011, 17 [102] 
(‘IOTC15 Summary Report’).   
1229 IOTC, Report of the TCAC, IOTC-2011-SS4-R[E], 1st sess, 16−18 February 2011, 8 [34] (‘TCAC1 Summary 
Report’); IOTC15 Summary Report (n 1124) 16 [95]. See also at 17 [99]−[100]. 
1230 TCAC3 Summary Report (n 1218) 54.  
1231 TCAC4 Summary Report (n 1219) 20. In 2019, the Secretariat presented an administrative process for 
reconciling historical catch data and consulting with members on associated over-catch penalties: IOTC, Report 
of the 5th TCAC, IOTC-2019-TCAC05-R[E], 11−13 March 2019, 7−8 [20]−[21] (‘TCAC5 Summary Report’); 
Secretariat, IOTC, Administrative Processes, IOTC-2019-TCAC05-INF06, TCAC5, 11−13 March 2019.  
1232 The Secretariat has reported that ‘Both nominal catches and catch-and-effort in the IOTC database are 
considered to be incomplete to varying degrees⎯dependent on the fishery and species in question⎯due to non-
reporting of data by IOTC CPCs [members]’: Secretariat, IOTC, Estimation of EEZ Catches in the IOTC 
Database: Report on the Availability and Quality of Catch Estimates, IOTC-2017-SC20-INF05, 20th reg sess, 
20 November 2017, 2. In addition to non-reporting, the Secretariat has stated there is a lack of reliability of 
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information on catches in IOCs’ EEZs. The issues associated with the IOTC’s database of 
historical catches create significant uncertainty in allocation negotiations.  
The second issue is how historical catches in EEZs will be attributed to members to establish 
baseline allocations. One of the topics discussed at length during in 2016 at TCAC3, this 
point of difference has continued to divide members, largely as a result of conflicting 
interpretations of relevant provisions in IFL.1233 IOCs argue that 100% of historical catches 
taken in a coastal state’s EEZ should be attributed to the coastal state, regardless of whether 
that historical catch was taken by a different flag state under an FAA or licensing/chartering 
agreement.1234 DWFSs argue that all historical catches should be attributed to the flag state, 
regardless of whether the historical catch was taken in an EEZ or on the high seas.1235 
Differing views on this point have emerged as a key stumbling block in negotiations⎯a 
recent analysis undertaken by the TCAC Chair underscored the high degree of difficulty of 
reconciling members’ positions.1236  
The third issue is procedural and includes the need for strong leadership and legal guidance to 
progress negotiations. This issue was partially resolved in 2016, when the TCAC contracted 
an independent Chairman.1237 In 2013 at TCAC2, members identified the need for an external 
legal expert to advise and inform negotiations and requested funding for this purpose.1238 
While the Commission endorsed this request, no funding was provided.1239 The FAO has not 
sent a representative from its Legal Office to any TCAC meetings to address this need. As the 
issue of attributing historical catch taken in EEZs demonstrates, IOTC allocation negotiations 
continue to require the clarity of informed legal advice.  
 
artisanal catch estimates and difficulties with precise estimates for industrial catch due to raised or aggregated 
catch-and-effort data from EU purse seiners and Japanese longliners: at 8 [1]; 9 [4].   
1233 TCAC3 Summary Report (n 1112) 8 [25] sub-paras (b), (g), (h).  
1234 Ibid 8 [27]. IOCs argue that attributing historical catches from their EEZs to another flag states prejudices 
their sovereign rights to living marine resources. 
1235 In its most recent proposal, the EU modified its position, allowing for the reallocation of 10% of total EEZ 
catches from a flag state to the coastal state. This reallocation would be made over a ‘transitional period’ of a 
decade: IOTC, On a Quota Allocation System in the IOTC Area of Competence, IOTC-2019-S23-PropM[E], 
23rd reg sess, 17−21 June 2019, 4 [8] (‘EU Allocation Proposal’). 
1236 Don MacKay, ‘Chair’s Table’, Allocation Estimations (Information Paper, 8 April 2019) 6−7 
<https://www.iotc.org/allocation-estimations>.  
1237 TCAC3 Summary Report (n 1218) 7 [13]. 
1238 IOTC, Report of the 2nd TCAC, IOTC-2013-TCAC02-R[E], 18-20 February 2013, 10 [35]; IOTC, Report of 
the 17th Session of the IOTC, IOTC-2013-S17-R[E], 6−10 May 2013, 12 [42].  
1239 TCAC3 Summary Report (n 1219) 7 [12]. 
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4 Negotiating Positions of IOCs and DWFSs: Recent Allocation Proposals 
Despite issues confronting IOTC negotiations, members have continued to galvanise 
discussions through periodic proposals outlining their differing visions for a future quota 
allocation system. While complex, allocation proposals have been organised around six key 
elements first agreed during TCAC1 in 2011.1240 These elements include: guiding principles; 
allocation criteria; indicators to quantify allocation criteria; an allocation formula weighting 
criteria against one another; correction factors to adjust baseline allocations; and rules of 
implementation to govern how allocations are implemented, monitored, and enforced. To 
varying degrees, the two most recent proposals from 2019 contain these elements.  
The two proposals convey substantially different applications of differentiation to quota 
allocations, both in respect to the procedure for determining quota allocations and the 
substantive outcome of quota allocations.  
(a) G16 Allocation Proposal (2019) 
The G16 proposal is framed by preambular language1241 and allocation principles1242 that 
refer to the special requirements, fishing aspirations, and social and economic dependency of 
IOCs, especially SIDS. The proposal provides explicit differentiation for developing IOCs in 
two (out of three) components of their allocation formula.1243 The first is the ‘Baseline 
 
1240 TCAC1 Summary Report (n 1229) 7−8 [26]−[29]. 
1241 The preamble of the G16 proposal refers to the objective of the IOTC as, ‘maintaining stocks … at levels 
not less than those capable of producing their maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental, social and economic factors including the special requirements of developing States in the IOTC 
Area of Competence’: G16 Allocation Proposal (n 1219) Preamble para 3 (emphasis added). The preamble also 
contains references to article V of the IOTC Agreement which recognises the special interests and needs of 
DCSs in the IO in para 2, sub-paras b and d: at Preamble para 5. Borrowing from previously adopted 
Resolutions, the preamble further refers to recommendations adopted by Kobe on the need to consider freezing 
fishing capacity in a way that does not constrain the fishing aspirations of developing states and that may 
include a transfer of capacity from developed to developing members: at Preamble paras 9−10. The proposal 
also takes pains to refer to specific provisions in UNCLOS, UNFSA and the FAO Code of Conduct that require 
the recognition of the special requirements of developing states and, in particular, SIDS: at Preamble paras 
11−4. 
1242 Two of the nine allocation principles set out in the G16 proposal provide differentiation for DCSs. These are 
the special requirements and development aspirations of DCSs in the region and their social and economic 
dependency on IOTC fisheries. The proposal provides that dependency is to be measured by the contribution of 
IOTC fisheries to social and economic needs: ibid 5 [14] sub-para d; 6 [14] sub-para h.  
1243 According to the G16 proposal, quota allocations for IOTC members will be derived from three calculations, 
the weighting of which must accommodate the special requirements and development aspirations of developing 
IOCs: ibid 10 [25]. These three calculations are the Baseline Coastal State Allocation, Baseline Historical Catch 
Allocation, and Supplementary High Seas Allocation: ibid. Informally, the G16 has proposed that these could be 
weighted respectively according to a rough ration of 30%, 65%, and 5%: ibid. 
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Coastal State Allocation’, nearly half of which is to be allocated to developing IOCs 
according to their development status with reference to various indicators: the Human 
Development Index, level of Gross National Income, and whether they are classified as a 
SIDS.1244  
The second component is the ‘Supplementary High Seas Allocation’.1245 This allocation is 
open to both members and non-members of the IOTC. After the quota allocation system has 
operated for three years, however, the portion held by DWFS members would be gradually 
transferred, at a rate of 20% per year, to developing IOCs (both members and non-members) 
over five years.1246  
Finally, the G16 proposal also sets out differentiation in a provision on the procedural matter 
of reductions to the overall TAC. If overall TAC is reduced, DCSs will receive a smaller 
allocation reduction of between one-fourth and one-third less than other IOTC members.1247 
A visual overview of the basic allocation formula of the G16 proposal is provided in Figure 
12 below.  
 
1244 Ibid 7 [19] sub-para (a)(ii). 
1245 Ibid 9 [21].  
1246 Ibid 9 [21] sub-para d. 
1247 Ibid 11 [27]. 
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Figure 12: G16 Allocation Proposal Formula1248 
 
The G16 allocation proposal sets out to frame the IOTC’s quota allocation system in 
recognition of the special requirements and development aspirations of developing IOCs. 
Consequently, the proposal provides for the systematic incorporation of this principle into the 
determination of current and future quota allocations among IOTC members (and non-
members).  
(b) EU Allocation Proposal (2019) 
In its proposal, the EU sets out a more contained role for differentiation. In comparison to the 
G16 proposal, the preamble is relatively light on references to the special requirements of 
developing IOCs, including their economic and social dependence on IOTC fisheries, and 
does not provide a reference to the fishing aspirations of these states.1249 In its main 
 
1248 Dr. Indiah Hodgson-Johnston helped format this figure 
1249 The preamble of the EU proposal refers to the special requirements of developing states in the IO in 
characterising the IOTC’s objectives: EU Allocation Proposal (n 1235) Preamble para 2. The preamble also 
refers to a paragraph in UNFSA on the special requirements developing states, but fails to reference the fishing 
aspirations of developing states: at Preamble para 5. The EU also highlights ‘important investments in 
harvesting, processing and trade industries’ which it states ‘are essential to keep IOTC fisheries economic and 
socially viable’ and which ‘maintain jobs created in the region’: Preamble para 15. While this paragraph 
267 
 
principles, the proposal does not include references to the special requirements, fishing 
aspirations, or economic and social dependence of developing IOCs.1250 Rather than 
systematically incorporate differentiation for developing IOCs, the EU proposal sets out a 
welfare payment style approach, wherein minor additional allocations are given to these 
states.1251  
The greatest share of the TAC in the EU proposal is entirely based on IOTC members’ 
historical catches, assigned as an ‘Initial Baseline Allocation’.1252 The proposal then provides 
the first element of differentiation, which is a ‘Complementary Allocation’ to developing 
IOCs, intended to address their special requirements.1253 Developing IOCs are to receive 
different portions of the Complementary Allocation, according to the proportional size of 
their EEZs and whether they are classified as LDCs (½), SIDS (¼), or developing (¼).1254 
Procedurally, developing IOCs must also meet certain requirements to be assigned a 
Complementary Allocation. A developing IOC is not eligible if it already has an initial 
allocation which accounts for 5% to 10% of the TAC.1255 In addition, developing IOCs must 
ensure that this additional allocation is consistent with the terms and implementation of their 
FDP.1256  
The second element of differentiation in the EU proposal is a ‘Correction Factor’ allocation, 
which comprises two groups of factors: ‘Development and Social Factors’ and ‘Fishery-
 
identifies the economic and social dependence of IOCs on IOTC fisheries, it appears to also highlight foreign 
investments which are part of this dependency. 
1250 Ibid 3−4 [1]−[7]. The proposal sets out a ‘stability principle’, which provides differentiation advantaging 
DWFSs to prevent ‘sudden economic dislocation/disruption’ with existing fishing activities and investments: at 
[7]. 
1251 According to the EU proposal, quota allocations for IOTC members would be primarily based on an ‘Initial 
Baseline Allocation’ largely determined by historical catches: ibid 4 [8]. This first allocation would then be 
adjusted to include a ‘Complementary Allocation’ and ‘Correction Factors’: at 4 [9]–[11]; 4−5 [12]–[13]. The 
proposal provides that Commission members will make a ‘good faith effort’ to determine a weighting scheme 
two years after the adoption of the quota allocation system: at 6 [19]. Importantly, the ratio proposed by the EU 
for the simulation of allocation outcomes in 2019 was 85%, 8% and 6%: Joel Rice, Report on the Simulations of 
Catch Allocation Based on Criteria from the EU Proposal and the Coastal States Proposal (Consultancy for 
IOTC No IOTC-2019-TCAC-5-02_Rev5, 18 May 2019) 26 app 3. 
1252 EU Allocation Proposal (n 1235) 4 [8]. 
1253 ‘In addition to the baseline allocation provided for in paras 9 and 10 and to accommodate the special 
requirements of the developing States in Article 24 UNFSA and special interests of developing countries in the 
Indian Ocean Region to benefit equitably from the fishery resources as recognised in the IOTC Agreement the 
following complementary allocations shall be added to the baseline allocation to be distributed’: ibid 4 [9].  
1254 Ibid.  
1255 Ibid 4 [10].  
1256 Ibid 4 [11].  
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Related Issues and Trade Factors’.1257 The list of indicators for these factors shows that this 
allocation sets out implicit differentiation for developing IOCs.1258 Many indicators depend 
upon existing interactions with IO tuna production and therefore reinforce an overall bias 
towards historical fishing interests. Furthermore, the second set of trade-related factors 
establishes additional allocations for both developing IOCs and DWFSs. While the EU 
proposal sets out a quota allocation scheme that would provide explicit and implicit 
differentiation for developing IOCs, it is important to underscore that these elements 
constitute a relatively small portion of the overall TAC and are strictly governed by 
procedures which constrain their application to IOCs.  
  
 
1257 Ibid 4−5 [12]. 
1258  ‘Development and Social Factors’ include: the needs of subsistence, small-scale and artisanal fishers; the 
special dependency of coastal states as determined by the percentage of jobs and exports linked to the 
exploitation of living marine resources; and the vulnerability of developing IOCs, particularly LDCs: ibid 5 [12] 
sub-paras (i)–(iii). ‘Fishery-Related Issues and Trade Factors’ are less strongly linked to the needs of developing 
states. Indicators for these factors include: the existence of a domestic fleet and FDP; imports of raw tuna 
products; and exports linked to marine living resources: at 5 [12] sub-paras (i)–(iv). 
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A visual overview of the basic allocation formula and elements of the EU proposal is 
provided in Figure 13 below. 
Figure 13: EU Allocation Proposal Formula1259 
 
5 Policy Outcome 
The future of IOTC negotiations for a quota allocation system remains uncertain. At the most 
recent TCAC meeting, members noted that there was not enough time to discuss all the 
elements of a potential quota allocation system1260, such as whether a single quota allocation 
scheme would be used for all IOTC stocks, how compliance matters would be incorporated 
into an allocation procedure, and the fundamental issue of how historical catch in EEZs 
would be attributed to coastal states and/or fishing states.1261 While efforts were made to 
carry forward negotiations from the TCAC to the Commission’s most recent meeting in 2019, 
 
1259 Dr. Indiah Hodgson-Johnston helped format this figure 
1260 TCAC5 Summary Report (n 1231) 10 [47]. 
1261 Ibid 9 [28]; 21−2 app 5; 8 [26]–[27]. 
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no allocation proposals were adopted and the process for advancing negotiations remains 
unclear.  
6 Comparison with IOTC Differentiation Framework 
The IOTC differentiation framework provides minimal guidance to members in negotiating a 
quota allocation system. As observed in Chapter 2, this is partly because the IOTC Agreement 
lags behind modern developments in IFL and does not include provisions for the 
establishment of a system for determining and allocating TAC and/or TAE. However, 
preambular language in recent Resolutions state that the Commission has ‘clarified its 
objectives’ over time to include:  
the aim of maintaining stocks in perpetuity and with high probability, at levels not less than 
those capable of producing their maximum sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant 
environmental, social and economic factors including the special requirements of developing 
States in the IOTC Area of Competence.1262  
One difference between the objective in the IOTC Agreement and this revised objective is its 
reference to the special requirements of developing IOCs. Both the G16 and EU include this 
language in the preamble of their allocation proposals, acknowledging that the revised 
objective is critical to contextualising negotiations for the Commission’s quota allocation 
system. It appears that tacit agreement on this objective also informs the inclusion of (albeit 
different) differentiation for developing IOCs in both recent proposals.  
The IOTC Agreement contains one provision that indirectly refers to the fishing aspirations of 
developing IOCs. As discussed in Policy Example D, article V(2)(b) obliges the Commission 
‘to encourage, recommend, and coordinate research and development activities’ for IOTC 
fisheries.1263 The IOTC Agreement states that these activities include capacity building for 
members,1264 and are to be carried out with ‘due regard to the need to ensure the equitable 
participation of the Members of the Commission in the fisheries and the special interests and 
needs of Members in the region that are developing countries’.1265 While not directly 
 
1262 This contrasts with the objective contained in the IOTC Agreement that the Commission merely ‘promote 
cooperation among its Members with a view to ensuring, through appropriate management, the conservation 
and optimum utilization of stocks covered by this Agreement and encouraging sustainable development of 
fisheries based on such stocks’: IOTC Agreement (n 47) art V(1) (emphasis added).  
1263 IOTC Agreement (n 47) art V(2)(b). 
1264 ‘[I]ncluding activities connected with transfer of technology, training and enhancement’: ibid. 
1265 Ibid.  
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addressing the fishing aspirations of developing IOCs, this provision affirms the need to 
prioritise their special requirements in the process of researching and developing IOTC 
fisheries. According to this provision, it would be reasonable to expect that the IOTC would 
be responsible for responding to the future fishing aspirations and interests of developing 
IOCs in the context of a quota allocation system.1266  
It is difficult to state with certainty that the outcome of IOTC allocation negotiations will 
produce allocations addressing high seas access for developing IOCs. As this section has 
shown, the IOTC differentiation framework provides little guidance to the Commission on 
how to address this issue. In contrast to WCPFC negotiations for allocation frameworks 
however, recent TCAC negotiations show that both IOCs and DWFSs agree that 
differentiation, including consideration for the high seas fishing aspirations of developing 
IOCs, should play some role in the IOTC quota allocation system.1267 Nonetheless, TCAC 
negotiations are unlikely to conclude in the near future, with the result that the IOTC will 
continue to rely on short-term catch limits until a quota allocation system is agreed. 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has analysed six Policy Examples within the WCPFC and IOTC. These 
examples of TRFMO practice were selected to reflect the three objectives for differentiation 
in IFL. The outcomes of these Policy Examples—and the extent to which they reflected 
TRFMO treaty law—are mixed. Only the outcomes of Policy Examples B (IOTC MPF) and 
D (IOTC YFT) reflected the application of differentiation provisions in TRFMO treaty law.  
Surprisingly, the IOTC outperforms the WCPFC across Policy Examples. WCPFC policy 
outcomes appeared not to conform to the high standards set out in its differentiation 
framework. This finding seems to disrupt the premise that an elaborate differentiation 
framework is necessary to address equity issues for DCSs in TRFMOs. However, it could be 
argued that the difference in performance between the WCPFC and IOTC reflects the 
difference in standards set out in their respective differentiation frameworks. This argument 
 
1266 This expectation is also in line with the Commission’s work on FDPs. See Chapter 1 Section IV B3.  
1267 See the TCAC Chair’s comments: ‘Agreement that there should be special treatment of developing States 
including SIDS is common to both Proposals, and the principle itself is reasonably straightforward and 
uncontroversial. Operationalising it is more difficult however (Difficult/Medium degree of difficulty), due to the 
different approaches taken by both Proposals’: MacKay (n 1236) 8.  
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is refuted by a comparison of Policy Examples C (WCPFC SPA) and D (IOTC YFT), 
however, which reveals substantial differences in the responsiveness of the two TRFMOs to 
impacts on coastal communities in DCSs.  
Findings from this chapter have generated other insights about the WCPFC and IOTC’s 
applications of differentiation, or lack thereof. Many policy outcomes reflected interim 
management decisions with a view to future negotiations. This introduces a temporal 
dimension to the analysis of whether the TRFMOs conformed to relevant treaty law and 
reveals a new aspect of equity issues for DCSs in TRFMO decision-making. In addition, both 
TRFMOs have failed to execute policies that promote DCSs’ access to high seas fisheries. 
Though treaty law on this objective is limited, and negotiations for an allocation system 
which would address this issue are ongoing in both TRFMOs, neither TRFMO has carried 
out programming to promote DCSs’ access to high seas fisheries to date.  
As previous chapters have posited, findings from this chapter reflect the influence of 
distributional struggles on TRFMO policy outcomes. The TRFMOs perform the worst in 
Policy Examples E (WCPFC AFs) and F (IOTC ACs), which have the greatest (long-term) 
distributional implications for the fishing node of regional tuna industries. External factors 
affecting the application of differentiation by the WCPFC and IOTC are discussed at length 
in the next chapter, which undertakes a deeper, comparative analysis of the Policy Examples.   
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CHAPTER 7: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE APPLICATION OF 
LEGAL DIFFERENTIATION WITHIN THE WCPFC AND IOTC 
This chapter demonstrates that differentiation is not sufficient to produce equitable TRFMO 
policy outcomes for DCSs. The chapter provides evidence that the WCPFC and IOTC have 
not fully addressed the range of procedural and distributive equity issues for DCSs raised in 
the six Policy Examples. It goes on to show that despite this, both TRFMOs have addressed 
two out of the three objectives for differentiation in IFL.  
This chapter’s comparative analysis of Policy Examples within the WCPFC and IOTC finds 
that differentiation does not significantly shape the outcomes of TRFMO management 
decisions. Rather, it appears that distributional struggles between DCSs and DWFSs exert a 
more powerful influence over the equitability of TRFMO management decisions. Both 
TRFMOs perform poorly in Policy Examples that implicate significant distributional 
struggles between DCSs and DWFSs. This is especially the case in Policy Examples E and F, 
which describe negotiations for quota allocation systems underway in both TRFMOs.  
The chapter subsequently argues that TRFMOs should develop management models that 
transparently incorporate equity considerations into both law and practice. The chapter 
recommends that TRFMOs design quota allocation systems to explicitly deliver concrete 
economic benefits to DCSs. Through a system analogous to Community Development 
Quotas (CDQs), TRFMOs could begin to adequately address equity issues for DCSs.  
II COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WCPFC AND IOTC 
Structured according to the three objectives for differentiation in IFL, this section examines 
comparable Policy Examples within the two TRFMOs to determine the extent to which their 
respective management decisions have addressed equity issues for DCSs. It also discusses the 
role distributional struggles—and the interference and cooperative strategies employed by 
TRFMO members—may have played within the Policy Examples.  
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A Objective I: Effective Participation  
The first set of Policy Examples in Chapter 6 investigated WCPFC and IOTC special funding 
to support the effective participation of DCSs. This funding encompassed special funds to 
sponsor the attendance of delegates to TRFMO meetings, as well as capacity building 
funding to enhance their capabilities to engage in scientific and technical TRFMO work.  
Given the extensive capacity building work undertaken by the TRFMO Secretariats (and 
other organisations) in both regions, Policy Examples A and B focused on special funds 
established by the TRFMOs to support the effective participation of developing members: the 
SRF and MPF. Both funds became depleted in the 2000s, requiring TRFMO members to 
discuss the primary objectives and sustainable resourcing of the funds. To maintain this 
funding, extra-budgetary funds, often sourced from contributions by industrialised members, 
increased in both TRFMOs. DCSs argued that the funds were necessary to support their 
effective participation in TRFMO work. DWFSs maintained that financial contributions to 
the funds should either be voluntary (SRF) or shared by all members (MPF).  
In both Policy Examples, TRFMO members agreed to resource the funds in the long term at 
levels between 150,000 and 250,000 USD. The WCPFC adopted the SRF SIP and agreed to 
annually allocate 150,000 USD from its budget. Similarly, the IOTC agreed to fund the MPF 
through its budget and recently raised its allocation by 50,000 USD to meet demand among 
IOCs. While both TRFMOs have secured long-term funding for these funds, Policy Examples 
A and B raised several procedural and distributive equity issues for DCSs which have yet to 
be resolved in the TRFMOs.   
The need to maintain the special funds highlights the relationship between the effective 
participation of DCSs and their ability to engage in TRFMO decision-making. Long-term 
funding for DCS members to attend TRFMO meetings addresses procedural equity in two 
ways. First, it relieves the financial burden of sponsoring delegates to attend TRFMO 
meetings from DCSs’ domestic fisheries departments. Second, it enfranchises DCSs by 
increasing their negotiating capacity through expanded delegations (as Policy Example A 
showed) and providing learning opportunities to less-experienced staff. Consequently, both 
TRFMOs have responded to these equity issues by committing to long-term resourcing for 
both funds.  
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Policy Examples A and B provided evidence of a distributive equity issue related to funding 
for both special funds. In each Policy Example, long-term funding was sourced from TRFMO 
budgets. Both examples therefore produced policy outcomes whereby all members, 
regardless of development status, were responsible for the long-term resourcing of the special 
funds. 
Insofar as industrialised members are obliged to support the DCS members’ effective 
participation, the current funding schemes for the SRF and MPF raise a distributive equity 
issue. By incorporating the SRF and MPF into their annual budgets, both TRFMOs have 
essentially made contributions to these funds mandatory for all members. In doing so, they 
have addressed the issue of mandatory contributions, which has long vexed the 
implementation of similar funds, such as the UNFSA Part VII fund.1268 However, there is a 
question as to whether all TRFMO members or only industrialised members should be 
obliged to finance these special funds. According to IFL, provisions in UNCLOS and UNFSA 
oblige all states to support the effective participation of DCSs. Given that both special funds 
are now sourced from budgetary contributions, it would appear that the TRFMOs have 
followed relevant provisions in IFL. However, this legal requirement fails to address the 
distributive equity issue of obliging DCSs to bear the cost of supporting the participation of 
other members. 
Lastly, these Policy Examples may indicate that negotiations on the effective participation of 
DCSs in TRFMO decision-making reveal the deployment of interference strategies by 
DWFSs. DWFS members repeatedly advocated against mandatory contributions to support 
the multilateral funds administered by the TRFMOs.1269 In this light, the actions of DWFS 
members could be viewed as interference strategies to undermine DCS members’ negotiating 
capacity at TRFMO meetings. As Chapter 4 described, this tactic has been used previously in 
TRFMO settings, such as in negotiations leading to the establishment of the WCPFC.1270 
Instead, DWFS members exhibited a greater willingness to fund bilateral, aid-related 
projects, which as Chapter 5 showed can function to advantage DWFSs’ interests and 
disempower aid-dependent DCSs.1271 Notably, not all DWFS members participated in this 
 
1268 See Chapter 2 Section D 1(a). 
1269 See e.g., above (n 1043).  
1270 See above (n 876). 
1271 See above (n 992). 
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interference strategy, one example being the consistent financial support provided by the US 
and Canada to the SRF.1272 This could indicate that rather than use interference strategies to 
undermine the ability of PICs to represent their interests at WCPFC negotiations, these 
DWFS members were more interested in being viewed as supportive development partners. 
In any case, these Policy Examples show that even procedural equity issues, such as the 
effective participation of DCSs in TRFMO meetings, can be implicated in distributional 
struggles between DCSs and DWFSs.  
B Objective II: Protection of Vulnerable and Fisheries-Dependent Coastal Populations  
Policy Examples C and D examined management decisions that incorporate considerations 
for vulnerable and fisheries-dependent coastal populations.  Each management decision 
concerns a particular stock: SPA in the WCPO and YFT in the IO. In Policy Examples C and 
D, management action was required to limit catches while maintaining the delivery of 
economic benefits to coastal communities. The process of designing, negotiating, and 
adopting appropriate management actions to respond to these two objectives has proved 
contentious within both TRFMOs. Consequently, both policy outcomes have been interim 
management actions adopted in the context of broader commitments by members to 
undertake further actions in coming years.  
Each Policy Example highlights how TRFMO management decisions often operate at the 
interface of sustainability and equity concerns. In both examples, local employment in coastal 
communities relies heavily on onshore processing operations that source raw materials from 
the stock⎯these processing operations depend on foreign fishing vessels to deliver them a 
consistent supply. Under these circumstances, both DWFSs and DCSs with onshore 
processing operations are concerned with maintaining recent catch levels of the stocks. 
However, advice from both TRFMOs’ SCs revealed the detrimental impact of recent rises in 
catch levels on SPA and YFT, and resulted in recommendations for management actions to 
either strengthen existing (SPA) or adopt new (YFT) catch limits. Both Policy Examples also 
indicate that increases in catch levels have affected the viability of local fishing operations in 
nearby DCSs.  
 
1272 Chapter 6 Section I A3.  
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In Policy Examples C and D, several measures have been adopted over multiple years to 
address the concerns of the TRFMO SCs. These measures contain negotiated catch limits that 
grossly exceed those recommended by the SCs. The same measures provide exemptions 
(SPA) or modifications (YFT) to catch limits for DCSs. DCSs have argued that existing catch 
limits are insufficient to address the concerns expressed by their SCs. As a first step, the 
WCPFC committed to concrete actions towards improving its approach to managing SPA and 
adopted an interim TRP for the stock. The IOTC similarly committed to revising its approach 
to managing YFT by 2020. It agreed to an interim measure that closed loopholes on catch 
limits for previously exempted members, imposed stronger limits on (environmentally 
harmful) gillnet fisheries, and sanctioned members found to be in violation of their limits. 
While both TRFMOs have taken steps to contain the impacts of their management actions (or 
lack thereof) on coastal communities in DCSs, the Policy Examples bring to light complex 
procedural and distributive equity issues, some of which both TRFMOs have been unable to 
resolve.  
The SPA and YFT Policy Examples underscore tensions between the design of TRFMO 
management actions intended to constrain fishing pressure and their effect on coastal 
communities. In each example, a distributive equity issue is raised by the need to limit 
catches (with a specific emphasis on fishing pressure generated by foreign fishing fleets) and 
the objective of maintaining economic benefits for coastal communities. Both TRFMOs 
initially responded to this tension by modifying the application of the relevant measure to 
DCSs. In this respect, the TRFMOs have attempted to limit the impact of relevant measures 
on fishing fleets based in DCSs. These actions are in accordance with common practice 
across TRFMOs, as well as relevant provisions in UNFSA requiring all states to take into 
account the special requirements of DCSs, including the particular dependency and 
vulnerability of their coastal populations with respect to tuna stocks.1273 In both Policy 
Examples, however, this response produced conditions that continued to encourage increased 
exploitation of both stocks.  
Consequently, each TRFMO has found itself in a similar position, whereby its attempts to 
address distributive equity issues for DCSs have negatively impacted on the effectiveness of 
its management actions. Critically, the WCPFC and IOTC have addressed concerns for the 
 
1273 See above (n 79). 
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SPA and YFT stocks through heavily negotiated, short-term measures. In both Policy 
Examples, these measures have been periodically renegotiated without providing significant 
changes to the core issue of inadequate catch limits. Eventually, both TRFMOs responded to 
the problematic design of their measures by committing to change their overall management 
approaches to SPA and YFT through the adoption of long-term management strategies that 
will enable the stocks to recover from overharvesting.  
Despite these commitments, the TRFMOs have not acknowledged a crucial procedural equity 
issue associated with these Policy Examples. This procedural equity issue concerns the 
temporal dimension of TRFMO management actions. While the WCPFC and IOTC have 
committed to a plan for improved management of SPA and YFT stocks, the time taken for 
these negotiations to produce this outcome continues to jeopardise the recovery of both 
stocks and the local fishing operations that depend upon them.  
For example, scientific advice first cautioned the WCPFC against increased catches in 2005 
and DCSs in the region have called for management action to limit impacts on local fishing 
fleets since 2012. In the intervening years, news agencies in the region have reported the 
closure of local longline fishing operations. The IOTC, on the other hand, was first advised in 
2015 that the YFT stock was overfished (though scientific advice cautioning the Commission 
on the state of the stock goes back to as early as 2009). While the Commission adopted a 
measure the following year (2016), it continued to adopt catch limits that did not follow 
scientific advice for stricter catch limits which would allow the stock a 50% chance of 
recovery. These catch limits have been retained in the present measure and their effect on the 
recovery of the YFT stock remains to be seen.  
Consequently, the lack of timely and effective TRFMO management action in both Policy 
Examples reveals a procedural equity issue that adversely impacts on coastal communities in 
DCSs. Nevertheless, both TRFMOs are attempting to address the objective set out in 
UNFSA⎯of providing protections for dependent and vulnerable coastal 
communities⎯through longer-term approaches to managing SPA and YFT. However, this 
legal requirement does not address the procedural equity issue outlined above regarding 
ongoing adverse impacts on coastal communities as TRFMOs shift their approaches to 
managing the two stocks. 
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These Policy Examples captured the implementation of both interference and cooperative 
strategies in distributional struggles among TRFMO members. In both cases, DWFS 
members sought to support the interests of their DWF fleets, while DCSs advocated for the 
interests of their locally based fleets. Ultimately, these interests resulted in both TRFMOs 
adopting effort (SPA) and catch (YFT) limits that did not reflect scientific advice or 
sufficiently respond to concerns about the status of both stocks. However, DCSs sought to 
maintain local employment in onshore processing operations and therefore also advocated for 
improvements to stock management in order to secure the future of both stocks and the 
economic benefits they provide. This resulted in commitments to improve the future 
management of both stocks.  
The most visible example of distributional struggle was observed in Policy Example 4. 
DWFSs such as Taiwan and China exhibited interference strategies by blocking consensus at 
the WCPFC to improve economic conditions in the SPA fishery.1274 These actions resulted in 
economic conditions within the fishery that led to the closure of PIC domestic fishing 
firms.1275 However, these actions were not supported by all DWFSs, reflecting their different 
fishing and processing interests. For example, US processing interests in American Samoa 
led them to support stronger WCPFC management actions on SPA.1276 DCSs responded 
through cooperative strategies, which enabled the adoption of the Tokelau Agreement. 
However, unable to reach consensus on binding catch limits within their EEZs, PICs were 
disempowered from effectively leveraging these cooperative strategies to secure stronger 
management action on SPA at the WCPFC. These distributional struggles produced interim 
policy outcomes that fail to offer a positive outlook for both stocks and the coastal 
communities that depend on them for their livelihoods. In this respect, distributional struggles 
in these Policy Examples were shown to impact on both procedural and distributive equity 
issues for DCSs.   
C Objective III: High Seas Fisheries Access  
Policy Examples E and F reviewed ongoing negotiations for the development of quota 
allocation systems in the WCPFC and IOTC. Both Policy Examples assessed the extent to 
 
1274 Chapter 6 Section II A4. 
1275 See above (n 1095).  
1276 See above (n 1090). 
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which current negotiations within the TRFMOs address facilitating DCSs’ future access to 
high seas fisheries. The majority of high seas fisheries globally are harvested by fishing 
vessels from industrialised DWFSs.1277 Furthermore, in both the WCPO and IO regions, 
industrial fishing vessels that catch the largest volume of tuna on the high seas are either 
flagged to, or owned by, firms headquartered in DWFSs.1278  
While controversial, UNFSA provisions oblige states to cooperate through (T)RFMOs to 
increase the participation of developing states in high seas fisheries for highly migratory 
stocks like tuna.1279 UNFSA further provides that cooperation can include different forms of 
assistance, including transfer of technology.1280 In addition to the direct forms of assistance 
set out in UNFSA, TRFMOs are empowered to support the participation of DCSs in high seas 
fisheries through participatory rights in quota allocation systems. As a form of rights-based 
management, the implementation of quota allocation systems within TRFMOs has significant 
implications for distributive equity for DCSs. Policy Examples E and F both show that the 
negotiation and design of quota allocation systems within TRFMOs also have notable 
procedural equity implications for DCSs.  
Both examples demonstrate the potentially critical role of quota allocation schemes in 
increasing the value DCSs capture from tuna production. Both TRFMOs currently operate 
through annual negotiations on ad-hoc, short-term measures, but in recent years have agreed 
to improve their approach to fisheries management through the development and 
implementation of various best practices.1281 As Chapter 1 discussed, best practices 
recommended by experts include the implementation of rights-based management. In Policy 
Examples E and F, concrete commitments to the implementation of rights-based management 
signalled a major juncture in the practice of both TRFMOs. In fact, compared with other 
TRFMOs, both the WCPFC and IOTC are latecomers in implementing quota allocation 
systems.1282  
 
1277 McCauley et al (n 773). 
1278 See Chapter 4 Section II V; Chapter 5 Section II V.  
1279 UNFSA (n 10) arts 24(1), 25(1) sub-paras (a), (b).  
1280 Ibid art 25(2), (3)(c). 
1281 See above (n 24).  
1282 Seto et al (n 765).  
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As Chapters 4 and 5 demonstrated, DCSs have benefitted from increasing the value they 
capture from tuna production through forms of quasi rights-based management within their 
collective EEZs. Observers of negotiations for the establishment of the WCPFC originally 
expected that a quota allocation system would be developed early in the Commission’s 
history.1283 When it became clear this would not be the case, PNA PICs leveraged their 
control of skipjack resources to design the VDS, which implements effort controls (a form of 
rights-based management among PICs) in the WCPO tuna fishery and has significantly 
increased the value they collectively capture from regional tuna production.1284 Thirteen years 
after its establishment, the WCPFC finally agreed to initiate negotiations for a Commission-
wide quota allocation scheme.  
WIO IOCs have recently begun to explore formalising MTCs, a potential precursor to the 
same quasi rights-based management system developed by PICs in the WCPO.1285 Like the 
WCPFC, the IOTC delayed negotiations until more than 15 years after its establishment. 
IOTC negotiations on rights-based management have included deliberations on effort 
controls, which culminated in the Commission’s measures on limiting fishing capacity in the 
IO tuna fishery in 2003.1286 This management decision explicitly highlighted DCSs’ concerns 
for their participation in high seas fisheries by requiring members to submit FDPs.1287 
Because IOCs have a lesser portion of IO tuna resources under their jurisdiction and have less 
developed rights-based management within their EEZs than PICs in the WCPO, an IOTC 
quota allocation system has greater potential to substantially increase their capacity to capture 
value from IO tuna production.  
In both regions, DCSs stand to significantly increase the value they capture from regional 
tuna production through rights-based management in high seas areas. After their access to 
these stocks is secured, DCSs will be better able to determine the value of their tuna 
resources and make vital decisions about how to increase the value they capture from their 
rights to these resources. Once both tuna fisheries are rationalised through a quota allocation 
system, DCSs will possess quota within closed, rather than open, access tuna fisheries in the 
 
1283 See, e.g., Vina Ram-Bidesi and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘Implications of the Tuna Management Regime for 
Domestic Industry Development in the Pacific Island States’ (2004) 28 Marine Policy 383.  
1284 See Chapter 4 Section III C.  
1285 See Chapter 5 Section III B.  
1286 Resolution 03/01 (n 257).  
1287 Chapter 1 Section IV B.   
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IO and WCPO regions. This is expected to increase the value of their tuna resources in the 
form of concrete quotas within a limited system.  
This has the potential to increase the value they capture from tuna resources in two key ways. 
The first is their ability to attract foreign investment in domestic tuna fisheries. With a more 
clearly defined idea of their tuna resources, DCSs will be better informed on the potential to 
develop their domestic tuna fisheries and how this compares with other fisheries in the 
region. The second is their ability to negotiate FAAs. Through a closed access system, DCSs 
will be better able to calculate, leverage, and potentially increase the value of their quota in 
FAA negotiations. Agreement on a quota allocation system within both TRFMOs therefore 
captures some of the most significant distributive equity issues for tuna fisheries in both 
regions.  
Perhaps due to the potential of quota allocation systems to disrupt value flows from tuna 
production in both regions, TRFMO members in Policy Examples E and F have repeatedly 
delayed negotiations due to a lack of agreement. These policy outcomes are not particularly 
surprising, given the length of time required for other TRFMOs to negotiate quota allocation 
systems.1288 While WCPFC negotiations are still in their infancy, the inability of members to 
agree on key first principles to convene an initial workshop signals that negotiations may 
even surpass the updated deadline of 2020. Similarly, the IOTC has repeatedly exceeded 
deadlines for finding agreement since 2012. Key sticking points in current negotiations, such 
as historical catch attribution within IOC EEZs, further call into question whether members 
will agree on a quota allocation system in the near term. These policy outcomes evidence that 
the WCPFC and IOTC have found negotiations for a quota allocation system highly 
contentious and repeatedly failed to meet their own negotiated deadlines for agreement. 
The indeterminate outcomes of Policy Examples E and F have a direct impact on the specific 
issue of improving high seas fisheries access for DCSs. The lack of momentum around 
negotiations within both TRFMOs has obscured whether either quota allocation system will 
set aside a specific allocation of high seas quota for DCSs. Nevertheless, negotiations on this 
issue within the IOTC are more advanced, and recent allocation proposals by both the G16 
 
1288 See Seto et al (n 765).  
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and EU have explicitly provided special high seas allocations for coastal states on the basis of 
their development status.  
In parallel with the previous set of Policy Examples, negotiations on quota allocation systems 
within the WCPFC and IOTC have a temporal dimension that raises an important procedural 
equity issue for DCSs. As has been shown, DCSs within both TRFMOs will continue to 
forego potentially significant changes in the value they capture from regional tuna production 
so long as agreement is repeatedly delayed. In connection with this issue, both TRFMOs have 
observed substantial increases in catches in recent years, which some commentators attribute 
to vessel operators anticipating a quota allocation system and peremptorily increasing 
historical catch levels.1289 Given the risks associated with high catches in both regions, where 
most tuna stocks are either at or exceeding full exploitation, these developments have the 
potential to negatively impact DCSs and the tuna stocks they depend upon. As these 
circumstances persist in the absence of agreement on quota allocation systems, both 
TRFMOs risk placing additional burdens on DCSs in their regions over time. It remains the 
case that, insofar as quota allocation systems have yet to be adopted in either TRFMO, the 
WCPFC and IOTC have not addressed the relevant provisions on high seas fisheries access 
for DCSs in UNFSA.  
Policy Examples 5 and 6 have significant long-term implications for distributional struggles 
between DCSs and DWFSs at the fishing node of tuna GPNs. However, given that 
negotiations in both Policy Examples are still nascent, it was difficult to observe whether 
distributional struggles have begun to impact on policy outcomes yet. These Policy Examples 
nevertheless speak to both procedural and distributive equity issues for DCSs that pivot on 
the role long-term allocation systems could play in distributional struggles between DCSs and 
DWFSs.  
D Conclusions of Comparative Analysis of Application of Legal Differentiation by the 
WCPFC and IOTC 
This review of Policy Examples within the WCPFC and IOTC has examined: first, relevant 
procedural and distributive equity issues associated with DCSs; second, whether policy 
 
1289 See above (n 1168)  on the ‘announcement effect’.  
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outcomes addressed these equity issues; and third, whether the TRFMOs fully addressed 
corresponding objectives in IFL. Across these three dimensions of analysis, the two TRFMOs 
exhibited similar results. In Policy Examples A, C, and D, the WCPFC and IOTC were found 
to have addressed objectives 1 and 2. In Policy Examples E and F, the WCPFC and IOTC 
were found not to have addressed objective 3. On first glance, it appears that the WCPFC and 
IOTC have successfully applied differentiation in the majority of cases and therefore 
addressed equity issues for DCSs within their memberships. Table 10 sets out these findings 
below (and includes findings from Chapter 6 on whether policy outcomes reflected relevant 
TRMFO treaty law). 
However, a deeper examination of these results, which looks beyond black letter law to the 
equity issues arising for DCSs, demonstrates a different finding. Across Policy Examples, 
one repeated observation emerged: many equity issues are not fully captured by the three 
objectives in IFL. Therefore, although the Policy Examples show that the WCPFC and IOTC 
have addressed two out of three of the objectives in IFL, the TRFMOs were also found to 
have repeatedly failed to respond to the full range of equity issues which arose for DCSs. On 
this point, none of the policy outcomes in the six examples fully addresses all equity issues 
associated with DCSs. From the perspective of substantive procedural and distributive equity 
issues, then, both TRFMOs have failed to deliver equitable policy outcomes for DCSs within 
their memberships. These results support the conclusion that the application of differentiation 
by TRFMOs is not sufficient to adequately address equity issues for DCSs.  
A fine-grained comparison of the WCPFC and IOTC Policy Examples further supports the 
finding that differentiation plays a less significant role in determining the equitability of 
policy outcomes than may be assumed. Across Policy Examples, the IOTC was found to have 
demonstrated greater qualitative progress on equity issues for DCSs in its membership than 
the WCPFC⎯including agreement on the incorporation of differentiation into a future quota 
allocation system. 




























Objective I: Effective Participation 
A. WCPFC SRF ✖  ✔ ✔ ✖ 
B. IOTC MPF ✔ ✔ ✔ ✖ 
Objective II: Protection of Vulnerable and Fisheries-Dependent Coastal Populations 
C. WCPFC SPA ✖  ✔ ✖  ✔(✖) 
D. IOTC YFT ✔ ✔ ✖ ✔(✖) 
Objective III: High Seas Fisheries Access 
E. WCPFC AFs ✖  ✖  ✖ ✖ 
F. IOTC AC ✖ ✖  ✖ ✖ 
This difference between the WCPFC and IOTC Policy Examples challenges the premise that 
differentiation is sufficient for addressing equity issues, because the IOTC has a markedly 
less developed differentiation framework than the WCPFC. It must be noted that, while 
surprising, this comparative finding remains tentative. This is because the comparison has 
been made at a time when the WCPFC is progressing a number of interim negotiating 
processes that could improve its ability to address the equity issues for developing members 
in a number of the Policy Examples. While provisional, this finding nonetheless affirms the 
overall conclusion that there is no strong connection between differentiation and the 
equitability of policy outcomes within the two TRFMOs.  
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III LEGAL DIFFERENTIATION ADVANTAGING DCSS AND THE EQUITABILITY OF TRFMO 
POLICY OUTCOMES 
The comparison of the WCPFC and IOTC supports the conclusion that differentiation alone 
(in TRFMO treaty law and broader IFL) does not produce equitable TRFMO policy 
outcomes for DCSs. Instead, the comparative analysis provides evidence of other factors 
shaping the equitability of TRFMO policy outcomes. This section explores three alternative 
explanations, drawing from concepts introduced in Chapter 1, to describe dynamics (other 
than the presence of differentiation) that potentially underwrite the equitability of TRFMO 
policy outcomes.   
A Legal Differentiation and Equity as a ‘Balanced Settlement of Conflicting Claims’ 
In order to explain why differentiation does not significantly alter the equitability of TRFMO 
policy outcomes, it is necessary to look more closely at how differentiation was applied in the 
Policy Examples. As suggested in Section II D, the manner in which IFL sets out 
differentiation did not capture the range of equity issues that arose for DCSs in the Policy 
Examples. However, this is only a partial explanation for why the application of 
differentiation did not yield equitable policy outcomes for DCSs.  
As Chapter 6 demonstrated, analysis of the relationship between differentiation provisions in 
TRFMO treaty law and the TRFMO policy outcomes shows that the WCPFC and IOTC have 
repeatedly struggled to apply their own law advantaging DCSs in practice. For example, in 
Policy Examples A and B, both TRFMOs convened extensive negotiations over several years 
on the resourcing and governance of special funds to support the attendance of DCS delegates 
to TRFMO-related meetings. Funding depletions instigated TRFMO negotiations revisiting 
the primary objectives of both funds and revealed differing interpretations among members 
on treaty law governing the funds. In both cases, DCSs advocated for mandatory, sustainable 
resourcing of the funds to reflect commitments to effective participation in TRFMO treaty 
law. Differences among members prolonged the negotiations (over multiple years) and 
effectively hindered the implementation of both special funds.  
The ‘effective participation’ Policy Examples reveal that how to apply TRFMO treaty law to 
practice remains a significant source of contention among members in negotiations. These 
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examples reveal that WCPFC and IOTC members have required years of negotiations to 
determine how to reflect treaty law provisions on effective participation in the resourcing and 
governance of special funds. Their negotiations indicate that the application of differentiation 
within both TRFMOs often reflects compromises among members⎯and that this can take 
multiple years to achieve. It is reasonable to conclude, then, that while black letter treaty law 
guides the application of differentiation within the two TRFMOs, actual policy outcomes are 
ultimately determined by the results of protracted negotiations among members.  
This observation is supported by the literature on the role of justice and fairness in 
international negotiations.1290 It may be that, while the formulation of differentiation is 
important, the negotiating conditions under which it is applied are just as important. In this 
sense, equity for DCSs, as it is reflected in the policy outcomes of TRFMOs, reflects Albin’s 
definition of justice: a ‘balanced settlement of conflicting claims’.1291  
B Legal Differentiation and Distributional Struggles within Tuna GPNs 
Distributional struggles among members also influence the equitability of TRFMO outcomes 
in the Policy Examples. One recurring procedural equity issue was the timeliness of TRFMO 
management decisions. In repeated instances, DCSs were negatively affected by delays in 
TRFMO negotiations (Policy Examples B, C, E, and F). In every case, negotiations were 
delayed as a result of the negotiating positions of DWFS members. Often, these positions 
reflected distributional struggles occurring within TRFMO memberships, thus linking this 
broader procedural equity issue with distributive equity issues. These delays reflected a core 
weakness in the mode of decision-making within TRFMOs, which is consensus based.1292 
This was illustrated in the second set of Policy Examples C and D, in which distributional 
struggles among members delayed timely TRFMO management decisions. In the example of 
the SPA fishery, the WCPFC repeatedly failed to achieve consensus to take timely 
management action due to resistance by DWFSs such as China and Taiwan. While the 
domestic tuna industry in many PICs languished over multiple years, these members blocked 
WCPFC management action and maintained economic conditions in the fishery that 
 
1290 Franck (n 42).  
1291 See above (n 154). See also Chapter 1 Section II C.   
1292 See Introduction Section II C2. 
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deteriorated to such an extent that only their government-subsidised fleets could operate. In 
the example of the YFT fishery, the IOTC struggled to implement effective and equitable 
management actions despite several iterations of regulatory actions over multiple years. In 
negotiations DWFS members, such as the EU and South Korea, resisted management 
decisions, and in particular, the inclusion of adjusted catch limits for developing IOCs. 
Moreover, the EU, which harvests some of the largest YFT catch in the region, failed to 
comply with binding catch reductions. 
In both examples, after surpassing multiple deadlines, the TRFMOs adopted interim 
measures in light of broader commitments to revising their management approach to SPA and 
YFT stocks. While signifying a step forward, these interim measures underscore the 
procedural equity issue of the need for effective and timely TRFMO management actions that 
do not adversely impact DCSs. These Policy Examples depict a negotiating reality within 
both TRFMOs⎯legal commitments to differentiation have less of an impact than 
distributional struggles among members on the equitability of management decisions. 
This finding extends work by Havice and Campling on the relationship between TRFMOs 
and the tuna industry. It shows that distributional struggles among TRFMO members are 
relevant to the application of differentiation by TRFMOs. Havice and Campling have shown 
that commercial and geopolitical drivers often motivate the negotiating positions of members 
within TRFMOs. In Havice and Campling’s parlance, TRFMOs currently operate under a 
‘corporate-environmental seafood governance regime’ that has been heavily moulded by the 
imbrication of state-led fisheries management with historical, competitive dynamics within 
tuna GPNs.1293 
C Legal Differentiation and Neoliberal Fisheries Management 
The TRFMO policy outcomes examined in this thesis are heavily shaped by the broader 
context of neoliberal fisheries management. In part, this finding is evidenced by the relevance 
of distributional struggles among members to TRFMO management decisions. It was also 
evidenced by the limited possibilities available to both TRFMOs for applying differentiation, 
 
1293 Liam Campling and Elizabeth Havice, ‘The Global Environmental Politics and Political Economy of 
Seafood Systems’ (2018) 18(2) Global Environmental Politics 72. 
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which has constrained their ability to address the full range of equity issues raised by DCSs, 
particularly distributive equity issues. In most negotiations, the Policy Examples show that 
both TRFMOs either did not discuss, or were unable to reach agreement on, distributive 
equity issues for DCSs. This finding corresponds with Okereke’s description of 
neoliberalism’s role in the development of the oceans governance regime, and its careful 
excision of distributive justice themes for developing states.1294 As was noted in Chapter 2, 
IFL on the whole avoids the use of binding language with respect to distributive equity for 
DCSs (save some exceptional provisions in UNSFA). Consequently, both the law and practice 
of TRFMOs in this analysis reflects a lack of attention to distributive equity issues for DCSs.  
The third set of Policy Examples (E and F) illustrates a neoliberal logic operating in both 
TRFMOs. The WCPFC and IOTC have both elected to rationalise their tuna fisheries through 
a rights-based management model. As Chapter 1 discussed, Mansfield has demonstrated that 
rights-based management exemplifies a fisheries-specific form of neoliberalism.1295 This 
form of neoliberal fisheries management often fails to account for equity concerns, and 
typically results in the concentration of quota in the hands of historically powerful fishing 
interests (often the same interests that have driven the fishery into crisis). Importantly, DCSs 
in both regions (though to a much lesser extent in the IO) have anticipated TRFMO-wide 
rights-based management, and its omission of equity issues, by leveraging fisheries access in 
their waters to develop subregional, quasi rights-based management. Despite these 
precautions, it remains unclear how quota allocation systems in both TRFMOs will address 
distributive equity issues for DCSs in both regions. While negotiations in these cases are 
ongoing, the IOTC appears more inclined to integrate differentiation into its quota allocation 
system.  
D Conclusion: Limitations of TRFMOs Applying Legal Differentiation within a Neoliberal 
Context for Tuna Fisheries Management 
This section has shown that both TRFMOs did not address all procedural and distributive 
equity issues for DCSs in the Policy Examples. This leads to the conclusion that 
 
1294 Okereke (n 100).  
1295 Mansfield, Neoliberalism in the Oceans (n 100). 
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differentiation does not have a sufficient, or significant influence, on the equitability of 
TRFMO policy outcomes. This thesis proposes three explanations for this finding: 
(i) Members within TRFMOs do not seek to apply their obligations under 
differentiation provisions, but, rather, seek to strike a balanced settlement of 
conflicting claims.  
(ii) Members are motivated within TRFMOs by distributional struggles, which have a 
significant impact on the equity issues that TRFMOs are willing to address 
through differentiation. 
(iii) TRFMOs operate within the broader context of neoliberal fisheries management, 
which also constrains the type of equity issues they are willing to address within 
their technical-scientific framework for management (thereby avoiding 
distributive equity issues for DCSs).  
IV A WAY FORWARD: COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT QUOTAS (CDQS) AND DISTRIBUTIVE 
EQUITY FOR DCSS 
This thesis has shown that TRFMOs are not adept at addressing the range of equity issues 
that arise from regional tuna management for DCSs, and, in particular, distributive equity 
issues. Given that rights-based management strikes at the core of long-term (procedural and) 
distributive equity issues in both regions, there is a high risk that DCSs will be disadvantaged 
by the outcome of these negotiations. These negotiating outcomes are likely, despite the 
potential for these systems to significantly increase the value they capture from regional tuna 
production and deliver on the objective of differentiation provisions in wider IFL.1296  
To address this situation, this thesis recommends focusing on integrating elements into 
TRFMOs’ rights-based management systems that disrupt neoliberal fisheries management 
and explicitly target generating equitable outcomes for DCSs. One example of a way to 
accomplish this is through the inclusion of a Community Development Quota (CDQ)-style 
system for DCSs. Currently, CDQs have only been implemented in a domestic context 
among indigenous communities in the Bering Sea region of western Alaska in the US, so an 
 
1296 See above Chapter 7 Section II C. 
291 
 
analogous system among states would have to be developed within the WCPFC and 
IOTC.1297 
A CDQ is a portion of quota set aside and assigned to coastal communities for the purposes 
of developing fisheries-based economic activity.1298 The objective of the US CDQ program is 
to combat equity issues for poorer coastal communities associated with the privatisation, or 
implementation of rights-based management, in offshore fisheries.1299 The CDQ program in 
the US provides allocations for multiple species in Bering Sea fisheries to coastal, mostly 
indigenous rural communities in Alaska.1300 Quota is allocated to ‘CDQ organisations’ that 
lease their quota to fishing firms.1301 The income from leasing quota is then used in fisheries-
related and other community development projects.1302  
A limited amount of research has been conducted on CDQs, which have only been 
implemented in the US context in comparison to the much wider implementation of 
individual transferable quota (ITQ) systems. Carothers’ study examines how the US CDQ 
program addresses equity for poorer populations negatively affected by fisheries 
privatisation.1303 In a similar vein, Mansfield argues that CDQs protect coastal communities 
from the market under neoliberal conditions of fisheries privatization.1304 Carother’s claims 
that CDQs centralise and institutionalise equity concepts in fisheries management.1305  She 
argues that by responding to inequities, CDQs address a ‘politics of difference’.1306 CDQs are 
 
1297 The implementation of a CDQ-style system would be premised on the development of rights-based 
management and the conclusion of WCPFC and IOTC allocation negotiations. It would also require that 
national quotas be transferable. Notwithstanding her comments on non-discrimination in high seas fisheries, a 
CDQ-style system may address the criticisms levelled by Palma on the subject of quota trading in (T)RFMOs: 
Palma (n 81) 282−7.  
1298 National Research Council, Sharing the Fish: Toward a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas 
(Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas, 9 June 1999) 125.  
1299 Jay J. C. Ginter, ‘The Alaska Community Development Quota Fisheries Management Program’ (1995) 
28(1−3) Ocean and Coastal Management 147; Courtney Lyons, Courtney Carothers, and Jesse Coleman, 
‘Alaska’s Community Development Quota Program: A Complex Institution Affecting Rural Communities in 
Disparate Ways’ (2019) 108 Marine Policy 103560, 1. 
1300 Becky Mansfield, ‘Property, Markets, and Dispossession: The Western Alaska Community Development 
Quota as Neoliberalism, Social Justice, Both, and Neither’ (2007) 39(3) Antipode 479, 479 (‘The Western 
Alaska CDQ’). 
1301 Lyons, Carothers, and Coleman (n 1299) 1−2. 
1302 Ibid.  
1303 Courtney Carothers, ‘Equity and Access to Fishing Rights: Exploring the Community Quota Program in the 
Gulf of Alaska’ (2011) 70(3) Human Organization 213. 
1304 Mansfield, The Western Alaska CDQ (n 1300) 481−2. 




therefore clearly associated with notions of intragenerational equity in fisheries and 
differentiation for poorer, vulnerable, and dependent populations. 
Recent scholarship by Carothers and others on the CDQ program nevertheless raise a few 
issues. The first is that while CDQs provide economic benefits to coastal communities, they 
do not improve fisheries access.1307 This is because CDQs provide allocations, rather than 
fisheries access to coastal communities. Similar issues have been raised in relation to the 
operation of ITQ systems.1308 Secondly, and related to fisheries access is the fact that while 
CDQs have mostly delivered economic benefits to coastal communities, some have not 
delivered on other development metrics, like improved well-being.1309 These issues 
associated with CDQs will have to be addressed if they are to be implemented at the TRFMO 
level. If they are to receive an analogous quota for similar purposes, DCS fisheries 
departments may be forced to choose, depending on their specific circumstances whether 
they will prioritise economic benefits or fisheries access for coastal communities. 
Within a TRFMO quota allocation system, a ‘CSDQ’ (Coastal State Development Quota) 
could be assigned to DCSs. CSDQs could either be used by DCSs themselves or transferred 
to other TRFMO members for revenue. DCSs would then be obliged to either use CSDQs or 
revenue from CSDQs to develop domestic fishing and associated industries. Development 
activities could include the establishment of tuna fisheries and associated industries that have 
proven positive socio-economic impacts on coastal communities, such as pole and line 
fishing operations.1310 Eventually, as has been the case in the domestic context, the use of 
revenue from CSDQs could be expanded to non-fisheries-related coastal development 
activities.1311  
It would also be necessary to determine the scale of the collective to which CSDQs would be 
assigned. One option would be to administer CSDQs to individual DCSs. Another option 
would be to assign CSDQs to subregional groupings of DCSs with respect to specific 
fisheries/stocks. If CSDQs were assigned to subregions, TRFMOs might find a better fit 
 
1307 Ibid. 
1308 See Tracy Yandle and Christopher M. Dewees, ‘Consolidation in an Individual Transferable Quota Regime: 
Lessons from New Zealand, 1986−1999’ (2008) 41 Environmental Management 915, 916−7. 
1309 Lyons, Carothers, and Coleman (n 1299) 11−2. 
1310 Barclay and Parris (n 967).  
1311 Lyons, Carothers, and Coleman (n 1299) 4−5. 
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between the tuna resources themselves (which generally occur in subregions) and the scale of 
quota allocations for the purposes of generating economic activity in DCSs. In addition, 
DCSs, especially SIDS, might increase their chances of establishing viable domestic tuna 
industries through economic cooperation that would increase their collective economies of 
scale.1312  
Finally, it would also be necessary to create an administrative infrastructure within the 
TRFMOs to govern the CSDQ system. It is important to highlight that this is the most 
problematic aspect of the analogy between domestic CDQs and a regional CSDQ system. In 
domestic contexts, CDQs have been administered by central governments in relation to 
community-based indigenous corporations established for the purposes of implementing 
CDQs. It is therefore important to acknowledge that a CSDQ system would have to operate in 
relation to (mostly) sovereign members within TRFMOs.  
Nevertheless, the most likely candidate for administering CSDQs would be TRFMO 
Secretariats under the direction of their respective Commissions. A CSDQ system, 
administered by the TRFMOs and their Secretariats would represent a tuna-specific, 
multilateral approach to addressing capacity development provisions in UNCLOS and 
UNFSA. This would be in juxtaposition with the largely bilateral system under which these 
provisions are currently addressed through ‘fish for aid’ FAAs with DWFSs. It would be 
critical to underscore the importance of responding to procedural equity issues for DCSs and 
ensuring their full enfranchisement in the administration of CSDQ systems. Ultimately, 
CSDQs could become the basis for the development of domestic fishing and associated 
industries in DCSs seeking to increase the value they capture from regional tuna production. 
This would, in turn, ensure that rights-based management in both regions translated into the 
delivery of concrete socio-economic benefits to DCSs, thereby addressing the distributive 
equity issues at the core of tuna management and production in both regions.  
CSDQs would also provide an avenue for explicitly addressing the distributional struggles 
within tuna GPNs that often underwrite TRFMO negotiations. In quota allocation system 
 
1312 Hanich, Teo, and Tsamenyi set out a potential model for subregional scales of cooperation among smaller 
PICs through in-country capacity building and ‘sub-regional collective management authorities’: Quentin 
Hanich, Feleti Teo, and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘A Collective Approach to Pacific Islands Fisheries Management: 
Moving Beyond Regional Agreements’ (2010) 34 Marine Policy 85, 89−90.  
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negotiations, CSDQs would bring to the surface the policy incoherence of DWFSs that has 
traditionally been observed, both in this thesis and elsewhere, in TRFMO decision-
making.1313 If a CSDQ system were resisted by these members, it would become necessary 
for them to explicitly oppose fishery-based development of DCSs in these regions. As 
Chapter 2 showed, this would be in contradiction to the commitments they have made in 
provisions on fisheries development for DCSs within both UNCLOS and UNFSA.1314  
‘Scaling up’ the concept of CDQs to TRFMO quota allocation systems accomplishes two 
objectives that increase the likelihood of TRFMOs addressing the full range of equity issues 
for DCSs and potentially improve the equitability of TRFMO policy outcomes. First, a 
CSDQ system would transparently and explicitly integrate distributive equity considerations 
into the TRFMO management model. If successfully implemented, CSDQs would result in 
greater direct participation of DCSs in tuna fisheries, which could, in turn, result in their 
sustained and deeper engagement with TRFMO decision-making. It is possible to argue that 
this connection between the expansion of DCSs’ involvement in value capture from tuna 
fisheries and their management has already been established in the historical engagement of 
PICs with tuna management in the WCPO region.  
Second, a CSDQ system would provide an important countervailing force to the rising 
influence of neoliberal fisheries management within TRFMOs. In her assessment of CDQs in 
the Bering Sea, Mansfield describes how CDQs can generate a productive tension within the 
scope of neoliberal fisheries management.1315 In the context of TRFMOs, the productive 
tension created through CSDQs could provide a pathway for TRFMOs to arrive at more 
equitable policy outcomes for DCSs. In this way, CSDQs could enable an increasing number 
of DCSs to become deeply engaged and enfranchised stewards of regional tuna resources.  
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter provides evidence that the WCPFC and IOTC have been unable to address the 
range of procedural and distributive equity issues for DCSs across the six Policy Examples. 
 
1313 See Les Clark, Perspectives on Fisheries Access Agreements: Developing Country Views (Chapter 5, OECD 
Fishing for Coherence: Proceedings on Policy Coherence for Development in Fisheries, 2006). 
1314 See, e.g., Chapter 2 Section II D1. 
1315 Mansfield, The Western Alaska CDQ (n 1300). 
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This incapacity has resulted in policy outcomes that partially reflect differentiation but do not 
respond to equity concerns expressed by DCSs. The IOTC is shown to have produced more 
equitable policy outcomes than the WCPFC, in spite of the WCPFC’s sophisticated 
differentiation framework.  
Drawing from relevant literatures presented in Chapter 1, this chapter argues that a 
‘negotiated’ form of equity has often been applied by the TRFMOs through differentiation 
which reflects a ‘balanced settlement of conflicting claims’ among members. It also argues 
that the application of differentiation by the WCPFC and IOTC operates in tension with 
broader forces that have been shown to underwrite the imbrication between TRFMOs and the 
tuna industry. These include the presence of distributional struggles among members and the 
influence of neoliberal fisheries management.  
Showing that these themes run through current negotiations for quota allocation systems 
within the WCPFC and IOTC, the chapter charts a preliminary path forward for TRFMOs to 
explore in the form of a CDQ-style system explicitly and transparently addressing equity 
issues for DCSs.   
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CONCLUSION: DIFFERENTIATION ALONE WILL NOT PRODUCE 
INTRAGENERATIONAL EQUITY IN TRFMOS 
This thesis began with the premise that differentiation plays a critical role in how TRFMOs 
address equity issues for DCSs. From this premise, the thesis analyses six Policy Examples to 
investigate how the WCPFC and IOTC have applied differentiation. The thesis finds that the 
two TRFMOs have addressed the majority of objectives for differentiation set out in IFL. 
However, the TRFMOs have failed multiple times to apply differentiation as provided for in 
their own treaty law. In addition, in every Policy Example, the WCPFC and IOTC have failed 
to deliver wholly equitable outcomes for DCSs. These results indicate that, at present, the 
WCPFC and IOTC do not adequately address equity issues for DCSs. 
This thesis originated as an interrogation of intragenerational equity in transboundary tuna 
management, conceived as procedural and distributive equity for DCSs in TRFMOs. 
Intragenerational equity issues are underplayed in the scholarly literature on TRFMO 
performance, despite research findings that point to socio-economic disparities among 
members as a key factor in determining TRFMO effectiveness. 
Legal scholarship in IFL shows a lack of consensus concerning the normative content of 
intragenerational equity and its implications for TRFMO decision-making. In literature that 
does broach the equitability of transboundary tuna management, surprisingly little work has 
been done, either on conceptualising these issues within the scope of TRFMO work or 
describing how TRFMOs currently respond to equity issues that arise in their work. This 
underdeveloped area of study has presented a research opportunity to describe and examine 
equity issues for DCSs in TRFMOs. 
Importantly, this thesis examines intragenerational equity for DCSs pragmatically. Rather 
than using theoretical or normative conceptualisations of equity to evaluate how TRFMOs 
respond to equity issues, it uses a comparative analysis of the design and application of 
WCPFC and IOTC differentiation frameworks to examine how state practice compares with 
treaty law. In this way, the thesis is able to compare legal provisions on equity that states had 
committed to on paper with TRFMO policy outcomes that states produced in practice.  
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I KEY FINDINGS 
A On Describing Differentiation in IFL and TRFMO Treaty Law 
A central objective of this thesis has been to conceptualise and describe how TRFMOs 
respond to equity issues for DCSs. In order to identify provisions in IFL and TRFMO treaty 
law that address equity for DCSs, the thesis draws from a robust literature on differentiation 
and its changing role in the arena of international law and politics. Analytically, this thesis 
argues that differentiation provides an expanded conceptualisation of equity that, in 
comparison to related concepts like CBDR, encompasses both rights and responsibilities, and 
is better suited to analysing TRFMOs.   
Initially, this descriptive task required an analysis of UNCLOS and UNFSA to map key IFL 
principles relevant to differentiation within TRFMOs. This mapping exercise discovered 
eight principles in two main areas of TRFMO work: conservation and management of shared 
fish stocks and special assistance to developing states. Three objectives were extrapolated 
from these principles and used to guide the selection of comparative Policy Examples.  
Another dimension of the descriptive work conducted in this thesis is mapping WCPFC and 
IOTC differentiation frameworks. Differentiation frameworks in both TRFMOs are broken 
down into relevant provisions concerning management decisions, decision-making, and 
internal governance processes. The WCPFC exhibited a comparatively more highly 
developed differentiation framework in its treaty law than the IOTC. The analysis found that 
differentiation in both IFL and TRFMO treaty law speak to both procedural and distributive 
notions of equity for DCSs.  
B On Comparing Differentiation Provisions to TRFMO Policy Outcomes 
Comparing differentiation in IFL and TRFMO treaty law with WCPFC and IOTC policy 
outcomes reveals that both TRFMOs have only partially applied differentiation in practice. In 
other words, differentiation provisions do not appear to have a significant impact on TRFMO 
policy outcomes.  
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This thesis proposes an explanation for this finding: that differentiation within the TRFMOs 
is used for a purpose other than the stated objective of responding to equity issues for DCSs. 
Instead, it is suggested, differentiation within the Policy Examples has been used by TRFMO 
members to achieve a ‘balanced settlement of conflicting claims’. Drawing from Albin’s 
work on international negotiations, this explanation clarifies why most policy outcomes have 
been interim measures adopted on the basis of continuing negotiations. Ultimately, the thesis 
finds that differentiation is used instrumentally, as a way to broker compromises among 
TRFMO members in negotiations, rather than to achieve equitable policy outcomes for 
DCSs. 
C On Assessing the Equitability of TRFMO Outcomes 
This thesis pursues the related question of whether the application of differentiation actually 
results in equitable TRFMO policy outcomes for DCSs. As indicated above, the scope of this 
question is limited to Policy Examples (or parts thereof) in which the TRFMOs were found to 
have applied relevant differentiation provisions. In these Policy Examples, it has been shown 
that, even where differentiation was applied, the policy outcome often failed to capture 
additional procedural and distributive equity issues for DCSs. This finding demonstrates that 
the application of differentiation alone has not generated equitable TRFMO policy outcomes. 
It reinforces the conclusion that differentiation is not sufficient to address equity issues for 
DCSs in TRFMOs.  
D On the Influence of Distributional Struggles on TRFMO Policy Outcomes 
This thesis draws from insights in political economy research on the relationship between the 
tuna industry and transboundary tuna management. Researchers like Havice and Campling 
argue that TRFMOs are imbricated in distributional struggles within tuna GPNs, among and 
between firms and states. Positioning TRFMOs in this broader context, this thesis widens its 
inquiry to incorporate non-legal factors that might also influence the equitability of TRFMO 
policy outcomes. To describe these other factors, the thesis provides the necessary 
background to contextualise transboundary tuna management by the WCPFC and IOTC with 
descriptions of the tuna industries and historical relations between DCSs and DWFSs in both 
regions. This groundwork on the political economy associated with transboundary tuna 
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management in each region deepens understandings of each TRFMO’s differentiation 
framework and application of differentiation in the Policy Examples.  
The thesis demonstrates that, in both regions, TRFMO members have participated in 
implicating the WCPFC and IOTC in distributional struggles among themselves. In this 
specific form of distributional struggle among states, the thesis identifies ‘interference 
strategies’ employed by DWFSs and ‘cooperative strategies’ used by DCSs over time to 
advance their interests through the TRFMOs. In the Policy Examples, the thesis finds that 
these strategies are still operating among members in the context of applying differentiation.  
The thesis finds that distributional struggles among DCSs and DWFSs are a chief driver of 
the policy outcomes observed in the majority of Policy Examples. Perhaps surprisingly, the 
procedural issue of the duration of TRFMO negotiations was found to be most influenced by 
distributional struggles. Across multiple Policy Examples, interference strategies employed 
by DWFSs repeatedly prolonged negotiations, while cooperative strategies by DCSs 
countered these extensions, forcing negotiations to a decision. In this context, interim 
measures were adopted in multiple cases as a compromise. While these policy outcomes 
often reflect general objectives in IFL, they do not adequately address specific differentiation 
provisions in TRFMO treaty law.  
The policy outcomes of the case studies reflect a wider resistance to responding to 
distributive equity issues within the TRFMOs. In the literature on equity among states, 
Franck argues that procedural and distributive equity are mutually constitutive.1316 This thesis 
confirms this link, demonstrating that the procedural equity issue of the duration of 
negotiations is manifested in negative distributive outcomes for DCSs. Moreover, a 
dimension of this procedural equity issue is that TRFMO members were often unable to 
openly negotiate distributive equity issues, despite clear guidelines set out in TRFMO treaty 
law. The thesis argues that this inability to directly confront distributive equity issues in the 
Policy Examples may point to a wider neoliberal logic operating in the TRFMO management 
model.  
 
1316 Franck (n 1290). 
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III CONCLUSIONS FOR TRFMO POLICYMAKERS AND RESEARCHERS 
A The WCPFC and IOTC Do Not Currently Produce Equitable Policy Outcomes For DCSs  
This thesis embarked on an investigation of equity within TRFMOs, arguing that little 
research has been conducted on the equitability of TRFMO policy outcomes. This thesis 
demonstrates that, in the selected Policy Examples, the WCPFC and IOTC have not produced 
equitable outcomes for DCSs.  
The thesis conceptualises equity within TRFMOs in two ways: (i) legal differentiation 
advantaging DCSs; and (ii) procedural and distributive equity for DCSs. The WCPFC and 
IOTC failed to meet the standards set in assessments of each of these legal and non-legal 
understandings of equity. This finding is not surprising in light of the current structure of the 
tuna industry (as described in Chapter 3).  
This finding may point to one of several reasons why equity issues are under-discussed in the 
literature on TRFMOs and their performance. It may be that commentators do not believe 
that TRFMOs are capable of delivering equitable policy outcomes for DCSs, given the 
inequitable nature of current industrial tuna production and consumption practices. As 
highlighted in Chapter 4, Havice and Campling argue that TRFMOs mediate competitive 
dynamics among actors within the tuna industry which they are neither designed, nor 
equipped, to handle.1317  
Regardless of why equity for DCSs appears to be a particularly problematic aspect of 
TRFMO research, it remains the case that equity issues are becoming an increasingly critical 
part of transboundary tuna management. As indicated in Chapter 1, this is due to reasons that 
are both internal (moves towards longer-term management models) and external (biomass 
reductions and migratory shifts in tuna distributions resulting from climate change) to 
TRFMOs. Therefore, while the initial findings from these studies are intuitive to many 
commentators, other (perhaps less intuitive) findings may still be of interest to TRFMO 
policymakers and researchers into the future.  
 
1317 Interfirm Strategies in the Canned Tuna GVC (n 202) 309.  
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B Differentiation Plays A Functional Role in Brokering Agreement Among TRFMO Members 
Perhaps most strikingly, this thesis finds that differentiation exerts little direct influence on 
the equitability of WCPFC and IOTC policy outcomes. Differentiation was found to be only 
partially applied by the TRFMOs, and in cases where it was applied, it did not result in 
equitable policy outcomes for DCSs. Rather, similar to other broad principles in IFL, like the 
precautionary approach and ecosystem-based management, differentiation is subject to 
ongoing disputes among states as to its meaning and implementation.1318 
These findings lead to two conclusions that are significant for considering the relationship 
between law and equity issues in the context of TRFMO decision-making. The first is that 
law may matter little in realising procedural and distributive equity for DCSs. This is because 
differentiation may play an alternative role in TRFMO negotiations (apart from realising 
equity for DCSs.) Instead, differentiation may provide a way for TRFMO members to reach 
compromises, particularly in cases where interests appear diametrically opposed.  
In the Policy Examples, differentiation provisions provide a sort of ‘black box’ of legal 
obligation, in which members utilise ambiguity surrounding their obligations to apply 
differentiation provisions to support their arguments and reach interim compromises. This 
function may explain why differentiation frameworks and equitable principles in TRFMO 
treaty law feature heavily in TRFMO negotiations in the Policy Examples, but are not 
ultimately reflected in policy outcomes. For TRFMO policymakers, this conclusion supports 
the notion that differentiation does play an important role in TRFMO negotiations⎯though 
this role may not be for the purpose of delivering equitable TRFMO policy outcomes for 
DCSs. 
C Differentiation in IFL Does Not Capture the Full Scope of Procedural and Distributive 
Equity Issues that Arise for DCSs in Transboundary Tuna Management 
Differentiation, as it is currently formulated in IFL and TRFMO treaty law, does not capture 
the full scope of procedural and distributive equity issues for DCSs. This thesis identifies 
 
1318 De Bruyn, Murua, and Aranda (n 23) 405; Ruth Davis and Quentin Hanich, ‘Developing an Equitable and 
Ecosystem-Based Approach to Fisheries Management’ in Harry N. Scheiber, James Fraska, and Moon-Sang 
(eds), Science, Technology, and New Challenges to Ocean Law (Koninklijke Brill NV, 2013) 124. 
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several procedural and distributive equity issues for DCSs that are not addressed by TRFMO 
policy outcomes, even in cases where differentiation has been applied. On the one hand, this 
conclusion further confirms that differentiation does not function to actualise equitable 
TRFMO policy outcomes for DCSs. On the other, it identifies new spaces in which TRFMO 
policymakers could further develop differentiation to better address equity issues for DCSs. 
A closer reading of the types of equity issues both TRFMOs have repeatedly failed to address 
leads to two additional conclusions that point to new ways of thinking about the equitability 
of TRFMO policy outcomes. The first concerns a procedural equity issue (with implications 
for distributive equity) that has been repeatedly observed across the Policy Examples. This 
procedural equity issue refers to the duration of negotiations, which was often extended at 
key junctures in the Policy Examples, until the absence of a TRFMO decision produced 
negative distributive outcomes for DCSs. The extension of TRFMO negotiations over 
multiple years provides a clear example of an equity issue that links procedural and 
distributive themes in the Policy Examples.  
This thesis concludes that both TRFMOs have failed to take into account this procedural 
equity issue in their differentiation frameworks and policy outcomes. For TRFMO 
policymakers, this finding may highlight the need to address temporality in future provisions 
setting out differentiation in TRFMO treaty law. For TRFMO researchers, this finding could 
prove to be a fertile area for exploring the (shorter-term) temporal dimensions of (intra-
generational) equity issues within transboundary tuna management. 
The second, additional conclusion concerns the overall lack of engagement of TRFMO policy 
outcomes with distributive equity issues for DCSs. Chapter 3 discussed, distributive equity 
for DCSs is a contentious area in IFL today. (It is only provided for in legally binding 
language on DCSs’ access to high seas fisheries in UNFSA.) Therefore, it is not surprising 
that this analysis concludes that distributive equity issues for DCSs are largely not reflected 
in TRFMO differentiation frameworks and policy outcomes.  
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D Distributional Struggles Play a Limiting Role in the Equitability of TRFMO Policy 
Outcomes  
Distributional struggles breach the surface in multiple Policy Examples, where negotiations 
raise distributive equity issues for DCSs. In these examples, the presence of underlying 
distributional struggles appears to constrain the scope of distributive equity issues addressed 
by TRFMO policy outcomes. The limiting role distributional struggles play in the application 
of differentiation by the TRFMOs points to the imbrication of states, TRFMOs, and the tuna 
industry. In the second and third sets of Policy Examples (C−F), where distributive equity 
issues were explicitly raised, negotiations revealed that the TRFMOs are ill-equipped to 
confront diverging interests among members. This analysis suggests that TRFMO members’ 
negotiating positions often reflect differing interests within tuna GPNs and that negotiating 
dynamics are informed by longstanding distributional struggles between DCSs and DWFSs.  
In these examples, TRFMO policy outcomes elided distributive equity issues to arrive at 
interim compromises which included commitments to address points of contention among 
members in the future. This raises the procedural equity issue (discussed above) of the 
timeliness of TRFMO negotiations and the distributive outcomes of extended negotiations for 
DCSs. Consequently, the Policy Examples demonstrate that distributional struggles inform 
the negotiating positions of TRFMO members (DWFSs in particular) and constrain the level 
of ambition within TRFMOs for addressing distributive equity issues for DCSs.  
IV A PATH FORWARD FOR ACHIEVING EQUITABLE TRFMO POLICY OUTCOMES 
The conclusions of this thesis provide a foundation for considering equity within TRFMOs in 
a different light than has previously been conceived in the small literature on the subject. This 
new research has unearthed findings that demonstrate complex legal and non-legal dynamics 
at work in determining the equitability of TRFMO policy outcomes.  
Overall, this thesis has demonstrated TRFMOs are particularly constrained in their ability to 
address distributive equity issues for DCSs. The thesis attributes this finding to both the 
limited formulations of differentiation in IFL and TRFMO treaty law, and the influence of 
distributional struggles on TRFMO negotiations. This thesis proposes that both factors reflect 
the broader, panoptic presence of neoliberal fisheries management.  
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As Palma and Burgt have observed, the word ‘equity’ has faced erasure in international 
fisheries instruments at the same time as differentiation has developed in TRFMO 
practice.1319 The wider literature on differentiation observes a similar trend in other IEL 
regimes, and commentators have connected this trend to the broader rise of neoliberalism in 
international environmental policymaking.1320  
This thesis shows that, while legal provisions setting out differentiation reflect equitable 
principles in IFL and TRFMO treaty law, the actual application of differentiation by the 
TRFMOs largely functions to reach compromises between asymmetrical negotiators. In this 
context, DWFSs (guided by their interests in the distributional struggles that underwrite these 
negotiations) have often argued for compromised solutions that delay policy outcomes and 
result in poorer distributive outcomes for DCSs. It is this ‘negotiated’ form of ‘functional’ 
equity that appears to dominate the outcomes of most Policy Examples examined in this 
thesis. Consequently, it is argued that, while the WCPFC and IOTC have made long-term 
commitments to address distributive equity issues for DCSs, other actions may be required to 
ensure that these issues are resolved in a way that delivers concrete socio-economic benefits 
to DCSs in both regions.  
A For TRFMO Policymakers: A CDQ-Style System  
This thesis proposes that TRFMO policymakers in the WCPFC and IOTC consider 
implementing a CDQ-style system to explicitly and directly address distributive equity for 
DCSs. It argues that, to achieve equitable TRFMO policy outcomes, an alternative pathway 
to the application of differentiation to short-term management decisions is needed. Looking 
to the future, this thesis proposes introducing elements into the TRFMO management model 
that are in tension with neoliberal fisheries management and which acknowledge the 
imbrication of regional tuna management and tuna GPNs.  
With negotiations for regional quota allocation systems underway in both TRFMOs, the 
WCPFC and IOTC are poised to assign quotas for the purpose of fisheries-based economic 
development to DCSs. This thesis has shown that, within a neoliberal decision-making 
 
1319 See Chapter 1 Section II B. 
1320 Chukwumerije Okereke, ‘Equity Norms in Global Environmental Governance’ (2008) 8(3) Global 
Environmental Politics 25.  
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context, rights-based management is unlikely to result in distributive outcomes that 
meaningfully benefit DCSs. A CDQ-style system might ensure that DCSs become 
enfranchised stewards and beneficiaries of the tuna resources in their regions.  
B For TRFMO Researchers: The Temporal Dimension of Equity in TRFMOs, Empirical 
Research on the Firm-State Nexus in Tuna GPNs, and Models of Fisheries Management that 
Successfully and Explicitly Prioritise Socio-Economic Objectives 
This thesis suggests new territory for scholars to explore in TRFMO research. Overall, this 
analysis underscores the necessity of inquiry into the equity-related dimensions of TRFMO 
work. In general, more empirical evidence is needed on the ways TRFMOs address equity 
issues. It remains a reality that TRFMO management decisions produce distributive outcomes 
among states in tuna fisheries and that negotiations often revolve around the equitability of 
these decisions. Despite this reality, many scholars continue to examine TRFMOs as if this 
were not the case⎯and, instead, assess them on the basis of a solely technical-scientific 
framework for fisheries management.1321 Further research in this area could help better 
conceptualise equity issues and their function within TRFMOs⎯a similar analysis of 
differentiation in ICCAT could provide a starting point for drawing more generalisable 
conclusions than those suggested by this thesis. In addition, greater understanding is required 
of the implications for differentiation among DCSs.1322 Moreover, inquiry could be 
broadened to include other transboundary fisheries managed by (non-tuna) regional fishery 
bodies more generally.  
Future work could extend inquiry on equity issues in regional fishery bodies by exploring 
four areas of research that branch naturally from the findings of this thesis. Firstly, future 
research could seek counterfactuals to the cases in this thesis⎯this would require surveying 
management decisions for cases where distributive equity issues have been adequately 
addressed by regional fisheries bodies. It may also further pursue examples where the 
WCPFC and IOTC have adequately addressed distributive equity issues for DCS members. 
Breaking down the anatomy of these management decisions could shed light on enabling 
(rather than limiting) factors that shape the equitability of policy on transboundary fisheries. 
 
1321 Davis and Hanich (n 1318) 128.  
1322 Certain findings in this thesis point to these differences among DCSs. See, e.g., Chapter 5 Section III C. 
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Secondly, future studies might further examine whether differentiation plays the same 
‘functional’ role in reaching compromises among members in other bodies, particularly those 
with majorities of developed states, such as CCSBT. Thirdly, future work could investigate 
further interdependencies between procedural and distributive equity within TRFMOs. As a 
starting point, this research could focus on equity issues like those associated with the 
temporal dimension of TRFMO policy outcomes identified in this thesis.1323 Fourth, a review 
of successful fisheries management models that prioritise socio-economic objectives could 
provide a template for thinking about how to improve the equitability of transboundary 
fisheries management.  
Future research could also concentrate on theoretical development around the strategies 
actors employ in distributional struggles within seafood GPNs. Greater examination of the 
calculus that motivates these strategies is needed. This thesis has offered the concepts of 
‘interference’ and ‘cooperative’ strategies to describe the strategies used by DWFSs and 
DCSs within TRFMOs.1324 However more research is needed to drill down into these 
strategies and how they specifically inform states’ negotiating positions, not only within 
regional fishery bodies, but in other intergovernmental fora relevant to seafood GPNs (such 
as in bilateral FAA negotiations). More research is also needed into the strategies employed 
by other actors within seafood GPNs, such as firms and NGOs.1325  
A dimension of this research could examine heterogeneities in economic interests among 
DCSs and DWFSs, which this thesis indicates can either reinforce or challenge these 
strategies, with interesting implications for negotiating outcomes. For example, this thesis 
showed that states can exhibit varied and potentially multiple engagements with tuna GPNs. 
This was the case with traditional DWFSs, such as the EU, US, and Japan, which are also 
core market states, as well as a number of DCSs that have leveraged their role as coastal 
states to become processing states through second generation FAAs.1326 Some Policy 
Examples used in this thesis point to tensions created by these heterogeneities, which 
 
1323 See Chapter 7 Section III C. 
1324 See Chapter 4 Section III C.  
1325 Havice and Campling have gone some way in addressing this through their description of ‘interfirm 
strategies’: see above (n 205). 
1326 See, e.g., Chapter 4 Section II E.  
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challenge the classical division of interests between DCSs and DWFSs and may give rise to 
less common distributional struggle among states within these groupings.1327 
This area of research is connected to possible new directions for studying the relationship 
between state-led fisheries management and the seafood industry. In particular, empirical 
research is needed on the explicit and implicit connections between corporations involved in 
the seafood industry and national fisheries administrations, and how this translates to the 
negotiating positions observed within regional fishery bodies.1328  
  
 
1327 See Chapter 7 Section II A, B.  
1328 In order to examine the opaque nexus of the state and industry, it may be necessary to engage in new 
research methods. One possibility would be a corporate ethnography of lead firms in tuna GPNs. See: June 
Nash, ‘Anthropology of the Multinational Corporation’ in Madeline Barbara Léons and Frances Rothstein (eds) 
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